.

Defense Digest

Did the Cat Move the Ladder?

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2025

March 1, 2025

by Keith M. Andresen

Key Points:

  • New York appellate decision gives defense counsel firm ground on which to defend a standard § 240(1) case. 
  • In Simpertegui v. Carlyle House Inc., 209 N.Y.S.3d (1st Dept. May 9, 2024), a “ladder-fall” case, the First Department found that the defendants raised triable issues of fact by identifying inconsistencies in plaintiff’s account of the accident and “calling into question his overall credibility and circumstances underlying his claimed injuries.” 

In 2024 there were several important New York labor law decisions across the Appellate Divisions and even at the Court of Appeals. It is easy to ignore some of these cases given the ongoing “Fraudemic.” However, in the midst of this storm, one appellate decision has given defense counsel some firm ground on which to defend a standard § 240(1) case, particularly one involving a fall from a ladder. So, what does a cat have to do with anything? Let me explain. 

New York Labor Law § 240(1), also known as the scaffold law, provides in relevant part:

"All contractors and owners and their agents, except owners of one- and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work, in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure shall furnish or erect, or cause to be furnished or erected for the performance of such labor, scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropes, and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person so employed."

Once judgment under this statute is granted, liability is absolute, and it doesn’t matter what the plaintiff was doing or if they were comparatively negligent. 

While there are some limited defenses available—such as an uncovered worker, a non-covered activity, a recalcitrant worker, sole proximate cause—these are all very fact-specific and are typically not available in a standard fall-from-a-ladder case. Unfortunately, the majority of cases involving a fall from a ladder are simply liability dead-ends, where the plaintiff testifies they climbed up the ladder to do work, it shook, and they fell. Often times the plaintiff will testify they knew the ladder was unsafe, but they “wanted to get the job done.” These facts pled bare in an affidavit are enough for a plaintiff to move for early summary judgment after joinder of issue and before any depositions or initial discovery have taken place. 

Again, defendants are hard pressed to come up with a defense. The purpose of the statute itself, which was created to protect workers by charging owners and general contractors with absolute liability, seems to fall by the wayside. Ladder cases in recent years seem to follow the same exact fact pattern. Still, the courts seem to simply adopt the circular logic without even looking at the underlying facts—the plaintiff fell because there was a violation; there was a violation because the plaintiff fell. 

Anyone who has defended a ladder case has found it extremely frustrating. The testimonies are usually the exact same: “The ladder moved.” “The ladder shifted.” “The ladder shook.” This testimony is enough to trigger liability, no matter how ridiculous or unbelievable the remainder of the plaintiff’s testimony may be or what led up to the ladder mysteriously moving. I am tempted, sometimes, to ask the plaintiff, “Did a cat move it? Were there cats on the jobsite?” Because, frankly, that would be a much more credible explanation than the ladder just moved. 

Enter Simpertegui v. Carlyle House Inc., 209 N.Y.S.3d (1st Dept. May 9, 2024). In this matter, the plaintiff alleged he fell from a ladder while performing brickwork. He claimed that the ladder “suddenly shook” while he was about seven feet off the ground (shocking) and he fell. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment pursuant to Labor Law § 240(1), which was granted by the Bronx Supreme Court. 

The defendants appealed to the First Department. In a short, but powerful decision, the Appellate Division found the defendant raised triable issues of fact to defeat the summary judgment motion and reversed the lower court’s ruling. 

First, the plaintiff provided two separate dates of accident. He cited July 28, 2017, as the accident date in a workers’ compensation form and at a hearing. Later, at his deposition, he stated his accident date was on July 31, 2017. While mixing up accident dates is usually not dispositive, video evidence shows the plaintiff working on both days. Furthermore, no accidents were reported on those days. 

Second, he claimed he personally reported his accident to his supervisor, Abraham Diaz. Mr. Diaz confirmed the plaintiff did not report an accident to him on either date. He also provided phone records to prove the plaintiff never called him to report the accident. 

Finally, the court noted the plaintiff first went to the hospital just days after the employer fired him for absenteeism. 

The defendants also argued on appeal that the plaintiff never put forth any evidence that the ladder itself was defective, either from his own recollection or witnesses. Specifically, the plaintiff testified he was not aware if his feet came off the ladder. The court did not mention these issues, and it seems they were more concerned with his overall credibility: “Defendants raised triable issues of fact sufficient to defeat the motion by identifying various inconsistencies in plaintiff’s account of the accident, thus calling into question his overall credibility and circumstances underlying his claimed injuries.” 

This decision is important because it highlights the importance of getting all specific facts surrounding the plaintiff’s accident, not just those facts focusing on the happening of the accident itself. Defendants should seek to obtain testimony from all co-workers, supervisors, or anyone else at the jobsite who can testify as to whether an accident happened or was reported at all. Even if an accident was reported, the initial complaints or accident reports, workers’ compensation filings, testimony provided by the plaintiff, and the first medical treatment should all be compared and analyzed when assessing the plaintiff’s credibility. Obviously, phone, video, and metadata also must be scrutinized to the extent they are available. 

This may be the first in a significant line of cases where the New York State courts start seriously looking at the circumstances of ladder falls, not just providing the typical rubber-stamp treatment. After all, a cat was not on the jobsite.

*Keith is Co-Chair of our New York Construction & Labor Law Practice Group and works in our New York City office. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Takes Up the Gist of the Action Doctrine

The gist of the action doctrine has been a hot topic in legal malpractice cases in Pennsylvania over the last several years.  Beginning in 2014, the Pennsylvania courts applied the gist of the action doctrine to professional liability actions, following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion in Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., 106 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014).  In Bruno, the court applied the gist of the action doctrine to a professional negligence claim, and found that a negligence claim was not barred simply because the parties were in a contractual relationship where the gist of the claim sounded in negligence. Thereafter, courts in Pennsylvania applied the gist of the action doctrine to breach of contract claims as well, finding that where the allegations sounded in negligence, a plaintiff could not recast a negligence claim as one for breach of contract. This was important because of the distinction between statutes of limitations: negligence claims must be brought within two (2) years, while breach of contract claims can be brought within four (4) years.  Then, last year, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the gist of the action doctrine does not apply to breach of contract claims as seen through two opinions. These opinions were Swatt v. Nottingham Village, 342 A.3d 23 (Pa. Super. 2025) and Poteat v. Asteak, et al., 350 A.3d 198 (Pa. Super. 2025). That is, the gist of the action doctrine can bar a negligence claim but it cannot bar a breach of contract claim.  This month, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the petition for allowance of appeal in Poteat.  The Supreme Court phrased the issue for consideration as follows: Whether the Superior Court majority’s holding conflicts with this Court’s holding in Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co., 160 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014), as well as Superior Court opinions that applied Bruno, and departs from almost 200 years of controlling precedent that distinguishes between causes of action in contract and tort based upon the nature of the duty that was allegedly breached? Attorneys on both sides of legal malpractice matters no doubt look forward to clarification on these issues from our Supreme Court.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.