.

Defense Digest

Attorneys Behaving Badly: Sanctions, Attorney’s Fees and Costs in Florida Workers’ Compensation Claims

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 3, September 2023

September 1, 2023

by Heather Byrer Carbone

Key Points:

  • Florida workers’ compensation law allows for sanctions.
  • While Judges of Compensation Claims are generally hesitant to award sanctions, there are very limited circumstances where they will do so.

The vast majority of the time, the Florida workers’ compensation bar is a model of professionalism. There are more than 100,000 attorneys in the state of Florida, but the workers’ compensation bar is still small enough that everyone gets to know each other after practicing for a few years. They ask about kids and families. They celebrate weddings and share vacation pictures on social media. They are empathetic and move a deposition if someone is sick. Attorneys on opposite sides are friendly when encountering one another at conferences, seminars, and Inns of Court meetings. And it’s because of this genuine congeniality that most cases move through the system without overly antagonistic litigation. But there are always a few outliers. Judges of Compensation Claims (JCC) occasionally have to struggle with how to handle repeat violators as Florida workers’ compensation law does not have a bad faith clause. So how does a JCC send a message with some teeth when an attorney is unprofessional, overly aggressive, unresponsive, or hostile? Case law from the last few years has given us some guidance on what the First District Court of Appeals has found to be within the jurisdiction of the JCCs.

Florida workers’ compensation law allows for sanctions pursuant to DOAH Rule 60Q-6.125 by striking claims, petitions, defenses, and pleadings, or allowing for the imposition of costs or attorney’s fees. It also allows for other general sanctions that the JCC may deem appropriate. However, traditional F.S.57.105 sanctions that are available in civil cases are not applicable in administrative workers’ compensation claims, unless they are at an appellate level. 

In Mary Hektner v. School Board of Brevard County, OJCC# 13-014654RLD, 1st DCA 1D18-3792, PCA date April 15, 2019, counsel for the claimant had scheduled and noticed the adjuster’s deposition multiple times. A motion for protective order was filed and the employer/carrier’s attorney alleged that the deposition was going forward only to harass, annoy, or embarrass his adjuster and that there were very limited contested issues. The docket indicates extensive litigation and multiple issues appealed to the First District Court of Appeals. Relating to this adjuster’s live deposition, the attorney for the employer/carrier traveled from Orlando to Pompano Beach, stayed overnight in a hotel, and spent extensive time preparing the adjuster for the deposition. Counsel for the employer/carrier emailed claimant’s counsel three times and called multiple times, attempting to confirm that the deposition was going forward. Claimant’s counsel neither responded to the emails nor returned the calls. On the date of the deposition, he failed to appear in person or participate by phone. After the deposition was set to begin, claimant’s counsel’s office advised that the deposition was canceled. The employer/carrier then filed a motion for sanctions. The JCC ultimately found the circumstances warranted sanctions against claimant’s counsel only, and not the claimant. Pursuant to Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.310, the JCC awarded $3,661.50 for the employer/carrier attorney’s fees and $362.39 for costs. The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the decision per curiam

In a similar case, Carlos Santiago v. American Airlines, OJCC# 19-029788JIJ 1st DCA 1D20-2931 PCA date April 5, 2022, Premise, a health care provider, filed a motion for sanctions against a claimant’s attorney after the granting of a motion for protective order. The claimant’s attorney (the same attorney from the Hektner case mentioned previously) had filed a motion to compel better responses when asked to produce a contract between the defendant/employer and Premise. The employer/carrier objected on the basis of relevancy and trade secrets privilege, as it related to the workers’ compensation case. The JCC granted Premise’s motion for protective order, finding the contract was not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. The judge entered an order denying the claimant’s motion, and the claimant then filed a motion for rehearing. Premise responded by filing a motion for sanctions based upon F.S. 440.32(3), indicating that there was no good faith argument related to the modification of existing law. Additionally, Premise argued the purpose for the motion for rehearing was to harass or needlessly increase the cost of litigation. A motion for rehearing cannot re-litigate the same issue, unless there is some reversal of existing law. In this case, Premise incurred legal fees in excess of $100,000 defending this issue. The JCC found that claimant’s counsel filed the motion for rehearing for an improper purpose and that an appropriate sanction was to pay an attorney’s fee to Premise’s Health in the amount of $3,358. The district court affirmed the decision per curiam

On the other hand, in an evidentiary order on motion for sanctions in the case of Wilmer Hernandez Perez v. Seacrest Services/Travelers Insurance, OJCC #20-016176TAH dated March 2, 2023, the JCC found that it did not have enough evidence to warrant sanctions after the claimant missed four different depositions. The claimant appeared for the hearing on the motion for sanctions and testified that he was unaware of one of the dates of the deposition. Additionally, a Florida provision pursuant to DOAH Rule 60Q-6.125 provides that the party shall be served, but not filed, within 21 days of service of the motion for sanctions. This gives the allegedly offending party the ability to correct the deficiency and avoid the actual filing of the motion for sanctions. In the present case, the employer/carrier did not serve the motion on the claimant 21 days before filing it. The JCC, therefore, denied the motion for sanctions, indicating it was not a violation of the rules and the motion for sanctions was deficient. 

While Judges of Compensation Claims are generally hesitant to award sanctions, these cases show the (very limited) circumstances where they are pushed the edge to do so. The Florida workers’ compensation bar strives to maintain the collegial reputation that it has earned by avoiding the bad behavior outlined in the situations above and hoping that younger attorneys learn from these errors for the future. 

*Heather is a shareholder in our Jacksonville, Florida, office. She can be reached at 904.358.4225 or HBCarbone@mdwcg.com.
 

 

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 3, September 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.