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Defense Digest

Attorneys Behaving Badly: Sanctions, Attorney’s Fees and Costs in Florida Workers’ Compensation Claims

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 3, September 2023

September 1, 2023

by Heather Byrer Carbone

Key Points:

  • Florida workers’ compensation law allows for sanctions.
  • While Judges of Compensation Claims are generally hesitant to award sanctions, there are very limited circumstances where they will do so.

The vast majority of the time, the Florida workers’ compensation bar is a model of professionalism. There are more than 100,000 attorneys in the state of Florida, but the workers’ compensation bar is still small enough that everyone gets to know each other after practicing for a few years. They ask about kids and families. They celebrate weddings and share vacation pictures on social media. They are empathetic and move a deposition if someone is sick. Attorneys on opposite sides are friendly when encountering one another at conferences, seminars, and Inns of Court meetings. And it’s because of this genuine congeniality that most cases move through the system without overly antagonistic litigation. But there are always a few outliers. Judges of Compensation Claims (JCC) occasionally have to struggle with how to handle repeat violators as Florida workers’ compensation law does not have a bad faith clause. So how does a JCC send a message with some teeth when an attorney is unprofessional, overly aggressive, unresponsive, or hostile? Case law from the last few years has given us some guidance on what the First District Court of Appeals has found to be within the jurisdiction of the JCCs.

Florida workers’ compensation law allows for sanctions pursuant to DOAH Rule 60Q-6.125 by striking claims, petitions, defenses, and pleadings, or allowing for the imposition of costs or attorney’s fees. It also allows for other general sanctions that the JCC may deem appropriate. However, traditional F.S.57.105 sanctions that are available in civil cases are not applicable in administrative workers’ compensation claims, unless they are at an appellate level. 

In Mary Hektner v. School Board of Brevard County, OJCC# 13-014654RLD, 1st DCA 1D18-3792, PCA date April 15, 2019, counsel for the claimant had scheduled and noticed the adjuster’s deposition multiple times. A motion for protective order was filed and the employer/carrier’s attorney alleged that the deposition was going forward only to harass, annoy, or embarrass his adjuster and that there were very limited contested issues. The docket indicates extensive litigation and multiple issues appealed to the First District Court of Appeals. Relating to this adjuster’s live deposition, the attorney for the employer/carrier traveled from Orlando to Pompano Beach, stayed overnight in a hotel, and spent extensive time preparing the adjuster for the deposition. Counsel for the employer/carrier emailed claimant’s counsel three times and called multiple times, attempting to confirm that the deposition was going forward. Claimant’s counsel neither responded to the emails nor returned the calls. On the date of the deposition, he failed to appear in person or participate by phone. After the deposition was set to begin, claimant’s counsel’s office advised that the deposition was canceled. The employer/carrier then filed a motion for sanctions. The JCC ultimately found the circumstances warranted sanctions against claimant’s counsel only, and not the claimant. Pursuant to Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.310, the JCC awarded $3,661.50 for the employer/carrier attorney’s fees and $362.39 for costs. The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the decision per curiam. 

In a similar case, Carlos Santiago v. American Airlines, OJCC# 19-029788JIJ 1st DCA 1D20-2931 PCA date April 5, 2022, Premise, a health care provider, filed a motion for sanctions against a claimant’s attorney after the granting of a motion for protective order. The claimant’s attorney (the same attorney from the Hektner case mentioned previously) had filed a motion to compel better responses when asked to produce a contract between the defendant/employer and Premise. The employer/carrier objected on the basis of relevancy and trade secrets privilege, as it related to the workers’ compensation case. The JCC granted Premise’s motion for protective order, finding the contract was not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. The judge entered an order denying the claimant’s motion, and the claimant then filed a motion for rehearing. Premise responded by filing a motion for sanctions based upon F.S. 440.32(3), indicating that there was no good faith argument related to the modification of existing law. Additionally, Premise argued the purpose for the motion for rehearing was to harass or needlessly increase the cost of litigation. A motion for rehearing cannot re-litigate the same issue, unless there is some reversal of existing law. In this case, Premise incurred legal fees in excess of $100,000 defending this issue. The JCC found that claimant’s counsel filed the motion for rehearing for an improper purpose and that an appropriate sanction was to pay an attorney’s fee to Premise’s Health in the amount of $3,358. The district court affirmed the decision per curiam. 

On the other hand, in an evidentiary order on motion for sanctions in the case of Wilmer Hernandez Perez v. Seacrest Services/Travelers Insurance, OJCC #20-016176TAH dated March 2, 2023, the JCC found that it did not have enough evidence to warrant sanctions after the claimant missed four different depositions. The claimant appeared for the hearing on the motion for sanctions and testified that he was unaware of one of the dates of the deposition. Additionally, a Florida provision pursuant to DOAH Rule 60Q-6.125 provides that the party shall be served, but not filed, within 21 days of service of the motion for sanctions. This gives the allegedly offending party the ability to correct the deficiency and avoid the actual filing of the motion for sanctions. In the present case, the employer/carrier did not serve the motion on the claimant 21 days before filing it. The JCC, therefore, denied the motion for sanctions, indicating it was not a violation of the rules and the motion for sanctions was deficient. 

While Judges of Compensation Claims are generally hesitant to award sanctions, these cases show the (very limited) circumstances where they are pushed the edge to do so. The Florida workers’ compensation bar strives to maintain the collegial reputation that it has earned by avoiding the bad behavior outlined in the situations above and hoping that younger attorneys learn from these errors for the future. 

*Heather is a shareholder in our Jacksonville, Florida, office. She can be reached at 904.358.4225 or HBCarbone@mdwcg.com.
 

 

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 3, September 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.