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Defense Digest

Attorneys Behaving Badly: Sanctions, Attorney’s Fees and Costs in Florida Workers’ Compensation Claims

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 3, September 2023

September 1, 2023

by Heather Byrer Carbone

Key Points:

  • Florida workers’ compensation law allows for sanctions.
  • While Judges of Compensation Claims are generally hesitant to award sanctions, there are very limited circumstances where they will do so.

The vast majority of the time, the Florida workers’ compensation bar is a model of professionalism. There are more than 100,000 attorneys in the state of Florida, but the workers’ compensation bar is still small enough that everyone gets to know each other after practicing for a few years. They ask about kids and families. They celebrate weddings and share vacation pictures on social media. They are empathetic and move a deposition if someone is sick. Attorneys on opposite sides are friendly when encountering one another at conferences, seminars, and Inns of Court meetings. And it’s because of this genuine congeniality that most cases move through the system without overly antagonistic litigation. But there are always a few outliers. Judges of Compensation Claims (JCC) occasionally have to struggle with how to handle repeat violators as Florida workers’ compensation law does not have a bad faith clause. So how does a JCC send a message with some teeth when an attorney is unprofessional, overly aggressive, unresponsive, or hostile? Case law from the last few years has given us some guidance on what the First District Court of Appeals has found to be within the jurisdiction of the JCCs.

Florida workers’ compensation law allows for sanctions pursuant to DOAH Rule 60Q-6.125 by striking claims, petitions, defenses, and pleadings, or allowing for the imposition of costs or attorney’s fees. It also allows for other general sanctions that the JCC may deem appropriate. However, traditional F.S.57.105 sanctions that are available in civil cases are not applicable in administrative workers’ compensation claims, unless they are at an appellate level. 

In Mary Hektner v. School Board of Brevard County, OJCC# 13-014654RLD, 1st DCA 1D18-3792, PCA date April 15, 2019, counsel for the claimant had scheduled and noticed the adjuster’s deposition multiple times. A motion for protective order was filed and the employer/carrier’s attorney alleged that the deposition was going forward only to harass, annoy, or embarrass his adjuster and that there were very limited contested issues. The docket indicates extensive litigation and multiple issues appealed to the First District Court of Appeals. Relating to this adjuster’s live deposition, the attorney for the employer/carrier traveled from Orlando to Pompano Beach, stayed overnight in a hotel, and spent extensive time preparing the adjuster for the deposition. Counsel for the employer/carrier emailed claimant’s counsel three times and called multiple times, attempting to confirm that the deposition was going forward. Claimant’s counsel neither responded to the emails nor returned the calls. On the date of the deposition, he failed to appear in person or participate by phone. After the deposition was set to begin, claimant’s counsel’s office advised that the deposition was canceled. The employer/carrier then filed a motion for sanctions. The JCC ultimately found the circumstances warranted sanctions against claimant’s counsel only, and not the claimant. Pursuant to Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.310, the JCC awarded $3,661.50 for the employer/carrier attorney’s fees and $362.39 for costs. The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the decision per curiam. 

In a similar case, Carlos Santiago v. American Airlines, OJCC# 19-029788JIJ 1st DCA 1D20-2931 PCA date April 5, 2022, Premise, a health care provider, filed a motion for sanctions against a claimant’s attorney after the granting of a motion for protective order. The claimant’s attorney (the same attorney from the Hektner case mentioned previously) had filed a motion to compel better responses when asked to produce a contract between the defendant/employer and Premise. The employer/carrier objected on the basis of relevancy and trade secrets privilege, as it related to the workers’ compensation case. The JCC granted Premise’s motion for protective order, finding the contract was not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. The judge entered an order denying the claimant’s motion, and the claimant then filed a motion for rehearing. Premise responded by filing a motion for sanctions based upon F.S. 440.32(3), indicating that there was no good faith argument related to the modification of existing law. Additionally, Premise argued the purpose for the motion for rehearing was to harass or needlessly increase the cost of litigation. A motion for rehearing cannot re-litigate the same issue, unless there is some reversal of existing law. In this case, Premise incurred legal fees in excess of $100,000 defending this issue. The JCC found that claimant’s counsel filed the motion for rehearing for an improper purpose and that an appropriate sanction was to pay an attorney’s fee to Premise’s Health in the amount of $3,358. The district court affirmed the decision per curiam. 

On the other hand, in an evidentiary order on motion for sanctions in the case of Wilmer Hernandez Perez v. Seacrest Services/Travelers Insurance, OJCC #20-016176TAH dated March 2, 2023, the JCC found that it did not have enough evidence to warrant sanctions after the claimant missed four different depositions. The claimant appeared for the hearing on the motion for sanctions and testified that he was unaware of one of the dates of the deposition. Additionally, a Florida provision pursuant to DOAH Rule 60Q-6.125 provides that the party shall be served, but not filed, within 21 days of service of the motion for sanctions. This gives the allegedly offending party the ability to correct the deficiency and avoid the actual filing of the motion for sanctions. In the present case, the employer/carrier did not serve the motion on the claimant 21 days before filing it. The JCC, therefore, denied the motion for sanctions, indicating it was not a violation of the rules and the motion for sanctions was deficient. 

While Judges of Compensation Claims are generally hesitant to award sanctions, these cases show the (very limited) circumstances where they are pushed the edge to do so. The Florida workers’ compensation bar strives to maintain the collegial reputation that it has earned by avoiding the bad behavior outlined in the situations above and hoping that younger attorneys learn from these errors for the future. 

*Heather is a shareholder in our Jacksonville, Florida, office. She can be reached at 904.358.4225 or HBCarbone@mdwcg.com.
 

 

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 3, September 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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