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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Construction Zone Death Suit Against employer and Engineering Firms Based on Workers’ Compensation Bar and Failure to Serve Affidavits of Merit.

Estate of Mike Alexander, Deceased, et al. v. Northeast Sweepers, et al., No. A-1486-23 (June 19, 2025)

August 1, 2025

by Kiara K. Hartwell

On July 11, 2014, Michael Alexander was struck and killed by a sweeper truck while working in an active construction zone on the New Jersey Turnpike. Northeast Sweepers owned the truck, which was driven by Christopher Hackett. Crisdel Group, Inc. was the decedent’s employer and was hired as the general contractor. HAKS Engineers, Architects and Land Surveyors, P.C. was retained by New Jersey Transit Authority to provide “professional services” for the resurfacing project, including supervision to ensure compliance. John Schweppenheiser, a HAKS employee and licensed professional engineer, was the project manager. HAKS then subcontracted the construction inspection services to Johnson, Mirmiran & Thompson, Inc. (JMT). Lawrence Fink, a JMT employee and licensed professional engineer, was the supervisor. 

Christopher Hackett drove his sweeper around a milling machine and struck Alexander, who was taken to a hospital and passed away approximately a month later. While it was Crisdel’s practice to assign a dump truck to each sweeper truck, there was none near Hackett’s sweeper at the time of the accident. After the accident, OSHA cited Crisdel for violations; failure to provide a place of employment free from recognized hazards and to establish a pre-planned traffic pattern. It was noted to be a serious violation, but not willful or repeated. 

In October 2014, the plaintiffs filed a complaint, which they amended in January 2016 to add claims against HAKS and JMT. In the amended complaint, the plaintiffs alleged intentional wrongs, noting that HAKS and JMT were responsible for supervision of the site and that they had negligently supervised the project. Because Alexander and his estate received workers’ compensation benefits, Crisdel’s answer asserted the affirmative defense that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the Workers’ Compensation Act. HAKS’ answer demanded compliance with the affidavit of merit statute, and JMT’s answer made no reference, but did assert a general defense of failure to state a claim. 

In June 2017, HAKS and JMT moved to dismiss the claims for failure to serve affidavits of merit. After oral arguments, the trial court issued orders dismissing the claims, noting the negligence was in their professional capacities as engineers, therefore, affidavits of merit were needed. The plaintiffs then filed a motion for reconsideration and submitted two affidavits from professional engineers, who certified that the work HAKS and JMT performed only involved supervision, not professional engineering services. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration in September 2017. 

After the Appellate Division granted leave to appeal, the orders dismissing the claims against HAKS and JMT were reversed for a more complete record on whether the claims required the affidavit of merit requirement. On remand, additional expert discovery was performed, and all parties produced more expert reports. In April 2018, Crisdel moved for summary judgment, and after oral arguments, the trial court granted summary judgment as the plaintiffs failed to produce evidence that Crisdel committed an intentional wrong as this was the type of accident that occurred in constructions areas. 

In May 2019, HAKS and JMT moved for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiffs’ claims involved professional engineering service malpractice claims. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment, noting the expert reports and deposition testimony revealed the duties of HAKS and JMT were within the practice of engineering. As such, the plaintiffs needed to submit an affidavit of merit and failure to do so required dismissal of their claims. 

The other defendants were all dismissed at various times. In December 2023, the plaintiffs resolved their claims against Northeast Sweepers and Hackett. The plaintiffs then appealed the June 22, 2018, order granting summary judgment to Crisdel and the July 26, 2019, orders granting summary judgment to JAKS and JMT.

The Appellate Division reviewed, under the de novo standard, and delved into the Workers’ Compensation Act as well as case law regarding intentional wrongs. While the plaintiffs identified six areas (work lighting, audible backup alarms, properly functioning mirrors, dedicated dump trucks, use of spotters and written traffic control plan) that were allegedly known and ignored by Crisdel, the Appellate Division found none of them were evidence of an intentional wrong within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation Act. The Appellate Division also noted the OSHA violations were only “serious” and not “willful.” As such, the Appellate Division affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Cristel.

As for the summary judgment granted for HAKS and JMT, the Appellate Division reviewed the case law for a claim against a licensed professional covered by the affidavit of merit statute. The Appellate Division noted it was undisputed that both defendants were engineering and architectural companies and that HAKS was retained by New Jersey Transit Authority for professional engineering services. HAKS then retained JMT, and under the terms of the subcontract, all work performed by JMT was required to be done under the “direct supervision” of “licensed professional” engineers. Given the undisputed evidence showed HAKS and JMT were providing professional engineering services and the plaintiffs failed to timely serve affidavits of merit, the Appellate Division affirmed the grant of summary judgment to HAKS and JMT. 


 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 29, No. 8, August 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.