.

The Quarterly Dose

ALL RISE - Notable Litigation Achievements*

The Quarterly Dose – May 2025

May 1, 2025

Missy Minehan (Harrisburg, PA), with assistance from paralegal Angela Lentz, obtained a defense award on behalf of a skilled nursing facility client in a hotly contested “wound” case after a two-day arbitration. The 93-year-old plaintiff had been a resident at a skilled nursing facility for over three years without having suffered any pressure injuries, despite a plethora of risk factors. She was transferred emergently to an acute care hospital and was diagnosed with a myocardial infarction and cardiogenic shock. The hospital administered vasopressor, a life-saving medication that can increase the risk of pressure injuries, and recommended that she consult with Palliative Medicine, which the family declined. Within several weeks of her return to the assisted living facility, she was found to have a Stage III left wound and a Stage II wound, which were treated and resolved within four and five months, respectively. The plaintiff did not suffer any additional pressure injuries until she was re-admitted to the acute care hospital in January 2025. 

Rob Aldrich (Scranton, PA) obtained a defense verdict on behalf of an anesthesiologist after a medical malpractice jury trial in Lehigh County. The plaintiff, who underwent an elective right-shoulder surgery, alleged that the anesthesiologist and the CRNA who performed his laryngoscopy intubated him too soon, and under suboptimal paralytic conditions, leading to permanent throat damage. After a five-day trial, the jury returned a defense verdict within 15 minutes.

Joe Hoynoski (King of Prussia, PA) received a defense verdict at the Montgomery County Arbitration Center where the three-attorney panel found in favor of our clients, a pediatric primary care office and a pediatric nurse. We represented the pediatric practice and the nurse against claims from the plaintiff who claimed her median nerve was injured by a venipuncture procedure performed by the nurse. The case was originally filed in the Court of Common Pleas; however, after discovery revealed a weak damages claim—we found many TikTok videos helpful to our defense—it was dropped to the arbitration level.

Leslie Jenny and Gabriella Wittbrod (Cleveland, OH) were granted summary judgment on behalf of our corporate nursing home clients in a medical negligence case in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas. The judge granted our request, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish liability, causation, or viable claims against individual employees—rendering vicarious liability inapplicable under Ohio law.

Brett Shear (Pittsburgh, PA) received a defense verdict for his client, a general surgeon, in a case where the plaintiff had been suffering from bilateral carpal tunnel and came to our client who performed carpal tunnel surgery on his left hand. Following surgery, the plaintiff continued to complain of tingling, numbness and weakness in his hand. He went on to have two additional surgeries, performed by two different surgeons. During the third surgery, the surgeon found a median nerve injury. The plaintiff claimed that this nerve injury was caused by the defendant cutting the median nerve during his initial operation and that the injury resulted in permanent dysfunction such that he would no longer be able to work or use his hand normally. At trial, the defendant demonstrated how he performs carpal tunnel surgery and protects the median nerve, making it nearly impossible to cut or injure the nerve. We contended that the median nerve injury must have happened later, likely during the second surgery. The jury rendered a defense verdict in favor of our client.
 
Adam Fulginiti (Philadelphia, PA) received a defense verdict in a nursing home malpractice matter involving the development and progression of pressure injuries that the decedent experienced during her admission. As a result of these injuries, the plaintiff claimed damages, including but not limited to pain, suffering and death. Adam cited the resident’s significant comorbidities, non-compliance with pressure reduction measures and nutritional support, and documentation of the wound consultant, and overcame potential liabilities including several wounds that developed in-house and documentation deficiencies.

Gary Samms (King of Prussia, PA/Philadelphia, PA) obtained a defense verdict in a complicated urosepsis case where the damages included neurological sequelae and cognitive deficits. The trial was marked by aggressive cross examination of experts and comprehensive neurological records and literature. Instrumental in the successful result were Raymond Petruccelli (King of Prussia, PA), Michael Mongiello (Harrisburg, PA) and Angela Lentz (Harrisburg, PA).

Lynne Nahmani and David Drake (Mount Laurel, NJ) successfully defended an anesthesiologist after a two-week trial which included testimony of five medical experts and three treating doctors. The plaintiffs claimed the doctor's regional nerve block, executed in advance of an orthopedic Achilles rupture repair, was performed negligently causing permanent nerve damage. Damages were sought for pain impacting marital relations and all aspects of the plaintiff's life. Under Lynne's cross examination, the plaintiff's standard of care expert flipped his opinion. Despite excellent conditions for a directed verdict, the court declined to rule, ultimately resulting in a unanimous jury verdict for the defense.

Suzanne Utke and Benjamin Matzke (Philadelphia, PA) received a defense verdict in a five-day jury trial in Philadelphia County involving multiple defendants. We defended the medical malpractice claim alleging a violation of HIPAA privacy and an intrusion upon plaintiff's seclusion resulting in his eviction and severe emotional distress. The plaintiff claimed an anonymous email he sent to our client, a social worker, purporting to seek mental health therapy was a "mental health record" and subject to HIPAA privacy laws. When it was discovered that the email was from the same individual stalking and harassing the client's sister who worked at the apartment complex where he lived, our client provided the email to her sister, who then gave it to her employer to support legal action against the plaintiff. The email was used in an eviction proceeding, and the plaintiff claimed that the disclosure of the email violated his privacy rights under HIPAA and that he suffered humiliation and severe emotional distress as a result. The claim involved counts for medical and legal professional negligence, negligence per se, intrusion upon seclusion, conspiracy to commit an intrusion upon seclusion, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and a plea for punitive damages. The initial demand of $5 million was reduced to $125,000 before trial. No offer was made, and a unanimous defense verdict was rendered in less than three hours.
 

*Prior Results Do Not Guarantee a Similar Outcome 


 

The Quarterly Dose – May 2025, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.