.

Sunny Marie Sparano

Assistant Director, Professional Liability Department

Chair, Architectural, Engineering and Construction Defect Litigation Practice Group

Portrait of Sunny Marie Sparano

Sunny is the Assistant Director of the firm’s Professional Liability Department and serves on the firm's Board of Directors. Along with the Director of the Professional Liability Department, she is responsible for the administrative oversight and leadership of more than 140 lawyers across 19 offices.  As a member of the firm’s Board of Directors, Sunny oversees the firm’s daily operations spanning four departments and 50 practice areas.

Sunny also serves as Chair of the firm's Architectural, Engineering and Construction Defect Litigation Practice Group. She focuses her practice on the defense of design and construction professionals, both independently and through their insurance carriers, in complex construction defect suits asserting a variety of claims, such as building and design-related deficiencies.

These large and complex construction defect suits often involve multiple parties in which issues of code violations, negligence, breach of contract and fraud are at issue, as well as insurance coverage claims under GL policies.  Similarly, Sunny defends contractors and design professionals in claims involving construction site accidents. She also defends manufacturers in product liability actions.

In addition to the above, Sunny regularly handles environmental claims and serves as counsel in litigation involving leaking underground storage tanks, groundwater contamination, and claims pursuant to the New Jersey Spill Compensation Act.

Sunny has brought a significant amount of litigation experience with her when she joined the firm in 2005.  Prior to joining the firm, Sunny was a construction litigation attorney who represented builders and contractors in complex construction defect suits.  Prior to gaining experience in the construction litigation arena, Sunny briefly focused her practice in ERISA litigation handling health, life and disability benefit claims and the defense of insurance companies in connection with said claims. 

In 1997 Sunny received her B.A. in Political Science from Seton Hall University. She then entered Widener University School of Law and received her juris doctor in 2000.  Following law school, she served as judicial secretary to the Honorable Sallyanne Floria, J.S.C. in the Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, New Jersey. Sunny is a member of the New Jersey State, New York State and Essex County Bar Associations.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., 2000)
    • Seton Hall University (B.A., 1997)
    • New Jersey, 2000
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2000
    • New York, 2001
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of New York, 2001
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of New York, 2001
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
      The Martindale-Hubbell rated attorney list is issued by Internet Brands, Inc. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Litigation - Construction (2023-2027)
      The Best Lawyers list is issued by Woodward & White. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • New Jersey Super Lawyer Rising Star (2010-2013)
      The Super Lawyers list is issued by Thomson Reuters. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • Essex County Bar Association
    • New Jersey State Bar Association
    • New York State Bar Association
    • Women's Construction Litigation Alliance, Regional Associate, Northeast Region
    • Women's Law Caucus, 1997-2000, President (2000)
    • Navigating Liability for Design: Key Considerations for Contractors, Professionals, and Insurers, ILG Webinar, July 10, 2024
    • Coordinating the Design Defense, NJICLE 2023 Construction Law Forum, June 21, 2023
    • Building a Stronger Industry: The Impact of the Building Safety Legislation on Construction and Insurance, ILG 360º London Annual Conference 2023, March 15, 2023
    • Survival and Revival - How the Construction Industry is Embracing Change to Overcome Recent Challenges, ILG Virtual Conference, March 24, 2021
    • Construction Defect Litigation in New York and New Jersey, Client Webinar, December 2020
    • Leveling the Playing Field To Avoid Problems Down the Road on Construction Projects, West Coast Casualty Construction Defect Seminar, May 2017
    • If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Sue: Why Products Claims in Construction Defect Cases Are Not Easy Money, West Coast Casualty Construction Defect Seminar, May 2016
    • Statute of Repose and PREDFDA in New Jersey Construction Defect Law, Construction Defect Claims Manager Association, March 2013
    • Construction Defect in the State of New Jersey, Construction Defect Claims Managers Association, March 2013
    • Case Law Alerts, contributor, 2011-2012
    • "If You Build It, They Will Sue," New Jersey Law Journal, March 27, 2006, co-author
    • "If You Build It, They Will Sue: Construction Defect Litigation In The Garden State And The Trend Of Alternative Dispute Resolution," Defense Digest, Vol. 11, No. 4, December 2005, co-author
    • Successfully represented a general contractor in a multimillion dollar construction defect litigation in New York alleging deficient construction of a mid-rise luxury building and resolved the case through mediation. Achieved a global resolution of the case for less than ten percent of the total damages complained of by plaintiff. Significantly limited our clients contribution, by taking the lead role in mediation and working with the subcontractor defendants to come up with a global settlement package.
    • Successfully represented general contractors in construction site injury cases whereby the defense of our client was tendered to the subcontractor defendants and the defense of our client was assumed.
    • Successfully represented a window manufacturer in a multi-party litigation whereby the matter was resolved through mediation with no payment by our client.
    • Summary judgment granted for defendant in case against an oil tank testing and removal company alleging negligence in connection with the testing of the underground oil tank. 
    • Summary judgment granted for defendant in case by homeowner against contractor whose alleged work caused and/or contributed to the alleged structural deficiencies of the home. Successfully established that plaintiff's expert failed to establish a causal connection between the alleged deficiencies and the work performed by defendant contractor. 

Results

Defense Prevails in Multi-Party Construction Defect Action

The decision was later affirmed by the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, and we successfully argued both the summary judgment motion and the appeal. The plaintiff, a condominium association, filed suit against the sponsor of a newly constructed mixed-use residential and commercial building in Hoboken, New Jersey. The plaintiff also sued the property management company, the general contractor and various subcontractors involved in the construction. A temporary certificate of occupancy was issued in March 2004 and the plaintiff did not commence litigation until June 2014—more than ten years after substantial completion. Therefore, the claims were barred by the ten-year Statute of Repose, N.J.S.A. § 2A14-1.1. The former property manager for the building and the sponsor entity had common ownership. The plaintiff argued the sponsor maintained control of the property by virtue of its continued involvement through the property management entity, and that the Statute of Repose did not apply to a party in actual possession and control of the property at the time that the defective and unsafe condition caused the injury or damage at issue. The Appellate Division held that the plain language of the Statute of Repose precludes any “action, whether in contract, in tort, or otherwise, to recover damages for any deficiency in the design, planning, surveying, supervision or construction of an improvement to real property, [and] any action for contribution or indemnity for damages sustained on account of such injury . . . more than [ten] years after the performance or furnishing of such services and construction.” N.J.S.A. 2A14-1.1(a). The court found that the claims were also barred by the six-year statute of limitations as the plaintiff alleged that the first repairs at the building were undertaken in 2004, and the complaint was not filed until 2014.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.