School Leaders' Liability

We obtained summary judgment for our clients, a school district and its board of education, in a construction injury case. The school district hired a paving contractor to install a drainage pipe and to perform paving work at a number of its schools. The paving contractor had to excavate a trench to install the pipe. The plaintiff, an employee of the paving contractor, was working in the trench installing the pipe when the trench collapsed around him, trapping him up to his head and requiring that he be extricated by first responders. According to the plaintiff, the trench collapse was affected by a condition of the property that caused water to enter and destabilize the trench. He alleged that the school district was liable because the existence of the water was a dangerous condition of the property and, as the property owner, the district was negligent in failing to properly supervise the work and provide for the safety of the workers. The school district’s superintendent had visited the site on the morning of the incident, observed mud in the trench, and said to the paving contractor that he should not let anyone work in the trench. In our summary judgment motion, we argued that the school district did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff because the contractor was, by contract, in charge of the means and methods of its work and was contractually obligated to provide for the safety of its work and its workers. The court granted summary judgment to the school district, agreeing that it did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff. 

We obtained summary judgment on behalf of two school districts in a matter brought by various plaintiffs against the Career and Technology Center of Lackawanna County (CTC) and four of its sending school districts. The plaintiffs had asserted claims under Title IX, the 14th Amendment, and Section 8542(b)(9) of the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act based on their sexual abuse by an automotive technology instructor at CTC. While permitting some claims to proceed against CTC, the court dismissed all claims against the sending school districts on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that any individual at any of the defendant-school districts had actual knowledge of the automotive technology instructor’s conduct, and the instructor was not an employee, independent contractor or ostensible agent of any school district by virtue of his employment by CTC.

We achieved dismissal of a suit against a school district by way of preliminary objections. The Dauphin County case involved allegations that the district deprived the plaintiffs of certain educational rights, premised on procedural due process violations, negligence and subornation of perjury. Preliminary objections were filed to the plaintiffs’ original complaint on both procedural and substantive grounds. Following the filing of an amended complaint and additional preliminary objections on similar grounds, argument was held. As a result, the court agreed with the defendant and dismissed the plaintiffs’ amended complaint with prejudice. 

We defended a school district in a special education matter involving a high school student identified with a specific learning disability and ADHD. The student sought out a peer during the school day, went into the peer’s classroom and physically attacked her, punching and kicking her several times. After the incident, the student’s Individualized Education Program team determined the conduct was not a manifestation of the student’s disabilities. The student and her parent disagreed with this determination and requested an expedited due process hearing. At the hearing, the parent argued that the student’s conduct was a result of trauma she had experienced from a previous fight she had with her peer and that the student’s decision to fight the other student was on impulse and attributable to her ADHD condition. We presented testimony from the dean of students that she had talked to the student earlier in the school day, and during the conversation, the student expressed to the dean that she wanted to fight her peer to “squash the beef” they had between them. With this, we argued the student’s behavior was not impulsive, and her decision to attack the student was premediated and thought out. The hearing officer agreed and found the school district was correct in concluding the student’s conduct was not a manifestation of her disabilities. The hearing officer permitted the school district to seek further discipline of the student, including expulsion.

We obtained summary judgment in a Sunshine Act case in the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas. The plaintiff alleged that the school district violated the law by temporarily requiring school board meeting attendees to show photo identification to gain entry without holding a public vote prior to implementation of the measure. The court determined that this security measure did not constitute a policy requiring a public vote and that the plaintiff was not prevented from attending school board meetings because he possessed a valid driver’s license and chose not to produce it.

We prevailed on a motion to dismiss a hazing lawsuit filed against a school district. The plaintiff, who was a member of his high school football team, alleged he was subject to hazing and physical abuse by several other members of the team while attending a dinner at the home of one of his teammates. The plaintiff claimed that the school district had been aware of the hazing, but failed to prevent it. He asserted claims against the school under Title IX for emotional distress damages and punitive damages. The court eventually agreed with our arguments that emotional distress and punitive damages are nor recoverable under Title IX, and that all other claims were barred by the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

We secured summary judgment in a Fourth Amendment civil rights claim involving an unlawful search and seizure. The plaintiff, a former social worker employed by a school district, alleged that the assistant superintendent and Right to Know Law officer conducted an illegal search of her work space, who then produced these records to the plaintiff’s estranged husband, with whom she was in the midst of a contentious divorce. The court agreed that the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence to show that either the assistant superintendent or the Right to Know Law officer actually searched her filing cabinet or seized her personal property. All claims, including those under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Rehabilitation Act and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, were previously dismissed on a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion.

We successfully defended a local school district and its board members in a lawsuit filed in Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court. The petitioner is a resident of the school district and a former school board member. At its December 2021 reorganization meeting, the school board voted to appoint a new school district solicitor. The petitioner attempted to make public comment and object to the school board's appointment of the solicitor, but he was not permitted to do so. The petitioner contended the school district and its board members violated the Sunshine Act and his right to free speech under the Pennsylvania Constitution by not allowing him to offer public comment at the meeting. The petitioner filed in Commonwealth Court, seeking to invoke the court's original jurisdiction, and he sought a writ of mandamus as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. Chris filed preliminary objections in response to the petition on various grounds. The Commonwealth Court agreed with our primary argument that it lacked original jurisdiction over the petitioner's claims because the school district (and, by extension, its board members) is a local agency and not an agency of the Commonwealth, and that the court could not assert ancillary jurisdiction because there were no other viable claims within the court's exclusive original jurisdiction. Also, although the court recognized that the petitioner could have challenged the school board's actions by filing a complaint under the Sunshine Act in the Court of Common Pleas, he failed to do so within 30 days of the December 2021 meeting. Thus, his claims by statute were untimely, and the court concluded that the transfer of his suit to Common Pleas Court would be futile. The court dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice.  

The petitioner resides in the school district and is a former school board member. At its December 2021 reorganization meeting, the school board voted to appoint a new school district solicitor. The petitioner attempted to make public comment and object to the school board’s appointment of the solicitor, but he was not permitted to do so. The petitioner contended the school district and its board members violated the Sunshine Act and his right to free speech under the Pennsylvania Constitution by not allowing him to offer public comment at the meeting. The petitioner filed in Commonwealth Court, seeking to invoke the court’s original jurisdiction, and he sought a writ of mandamus as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. We filed preliminary objections in response to the petition on various grounds. The court agreed with our primary argument that it lacked original jurisdiction over the petitioner’s claims because the school district (and, by extension, its board members) is a local agency and not an agency of the Commonwealth, and that the court could not assert ancillary jurisdiction because there were no other viable claims within the court’s exclusive original jurisdiction. Also, although the court recognized that the petitioner could have challenged the school board’s actions by filing a complaint under the Sunshine Act in the Court of Common Pleas, he failed to do so within 30 days of the December 2021 meeting. Thus, his claims by statute were untimely, and the court concluded that the transfer of his suit to Common Pleas Court would be futile. The court dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice.

We successfully disposed of a defamation action via preliminary objections. The plaintiff brought a defamation action against a public school district and certain district officials, alleging that he was defamed through a series of internal text messages exchanged between an elementary principal and another parent. The defense raised several procedural violations that occurred in the pro se plaintiff’s filings, and also argued legal insufficiency by way of demurrer. Following oral argument, the court agreed, granted all preliminary objections, and dismissed the complaint in its entirety.

The plaintiffs filed a complaint stemming from the school district’s alleged violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Defense counsel prepared a F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs’ pleadings were insufficient to show that the student was disabled under the Act, that the district did not discriminate against the student, and that an isolated incident or comment from one teacher does not impart liability in violation of Section 504. The motion was first evaluated by a U.S. Magistrate Judge who issued a report and recommendation that the motion be granted and the plaintiffs’ complaint be dismissed. The plaintiffs objected, and the defendants briefed the district’s position that the report and recommendation should be adopted. Thereafter, a U.S. District Judge held that the report and recommendation contained no clear errors or manifest injustice, and that “plaintiffs’ objections merely express disagreement with the Judge’s analysis and attempt to rehash or restate arguments already considered and rejected by the Judge in the thorough report and recommendation.” As a result, the defendant’s motion to dismiss was granted and the plaintiffs’ complaint was dismissed with prejudice. 

We successfully defended a public school district that had been sued in federal court for not providing busing to charter schools within its district. The charter schools sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to prevent the district from prioritizing busing to students attending traditional schools over those attending charter schools. The court agreed that the district was fairly maximizing its bus driver resources to service the most students possible.

The case involved a middle school student diagnosed with epilepsy and ADHD. Throughout middle school, the student was accommodated for his medical conditions through a 504 Service Agreement, and was provided intensive, small group instruction in reading and math as he struggled in those areas. The student was evaluated for special education twice by the school district, at the parents’ request, because they believed he might have a learning disability. The school district concluded both times that the student did not have a learning disability; however, the district also determined in the second evaluation that the student was eligible for special education with an Other Health Impairment, in light of his medical diagnoses. The school district presented the parents with an Individualized Education Plan (IEP) for the student, which they initially approved. Before the school district had a chance to implement the plan, however, the parents unilaterally withdrew the student from public school and placed him at a private school for children with special needs. In their complaint, the parents claimed the school district conducted inadequate evaluations and, therefore, failed to timely identify the student as eligible for special education (and to recognize his alleged learning disability), and that the school district denied the student a Free Appropriate Public Education by offering him an inadequate IEP. The parents also claimed the school district failed to take appropriate measures to prevent the student from being bullied by his peers. The family sought, among other relief, reimbursement for the cost of the private school at the school district’s expense, reimbursement for the cost of a private educational evaluation and a finding of intentional discrimination because of the school district’s response to the alleged bullying. After nine hearing sessions, the Hearing Officer found in favor of the school district on all claims. Preliminarily, the Hearing Officer agreed with our argument that the complaint was not timely filed and, therefore, much of the parents’ claim was precluded by the IDEA statute of limitations. The Hearing Officer also found that the school district’s evaluations were appropriate and that the family was not entitled to tuition reimbursement because there was insufficient evidence to show the private school was an appropriate placement. Additionally, the Hearing Officer concluded that the school district responded promptly and appropriately to the parents’ reports of alleged bullying and, therefore, the school district did not discriminate against the student. 

We obtained summary judgment in Carbon County, Pennsylvania in a negligence action brought against a local school district. The plaintiff, a former high school athlete, was working out in the District’s weight lifting facility when a cable snapped on a leg curl machine, striking his head and causing significant injury. The plaintiff sued the district, alleging negligence in the operation, inspection, and maintenance of the gym and, more specifically, the leg curl machine. Following discovery, the district moved for summary judgment, arguing that the leg curl machine at issue was personalty and not part of the District’s real property and, accordingly, the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA) prevented recovery. The court agreed and concluded the District was immune under the PSTCA since all evidence showed that the leg curl machine was not a fixture of the building and, therefore, the “real property” exception to local governmental immunity did not apply.

We successfully defended a local school district in a special education due process complaint by the parent of a former student who was diagnosed with autism, learning disabilities and ADHD. ​The student had graduated from high school, completed all credits and earned a regular diploma. Yet, the parent claimed that while the student was still attending high school, the school district failed to provide the student with sufficient learning support in reading and math, appropriate social skills training, and adequate vocational and transition services to help the student with life after graduation. Also, the parent claimed the school district failed to take appropriate measures to protect the student from alleged bullying by his peers, including fellow members of the varsity football team. The hearing officer found for the school district on all issues and concluded the school district had provided the student with a free appropriate public education during all times in dispute. The hearing officer also found there was no evidence to suggest the school district had failed to respond appropriately to the parent’s and student’s reports of bullying.

We obtained a defense verdict after a one-week trial in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The case involved alleged race, gender and/or “intersectional” (race and gender) discrimination claims by two women against a Philadelphia area school district.

The plaintiff, a suspended high school principal, claimed that the Pennsylvania Sunshine Act had been violated when the doors to the administration building had been locked at the start of the first day of her termination hearing. The court considered the issues of whether a plaintiff is denied a right under the Pennsylvania School Code when access to the hearing room by the public is barred, and whether a public hearing qualifies as “official action” within the meaning of the Sunshine Act. The court found that the public hearing required by the school code is not concurrently a “meeting” within the meaning of the Sunshine Act and subject to its provisions. Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district.

The defense prevailed on a motion for summary judgment in the Middle District of Pennsylvania on behalf of a local school district. The plaintiff, a former teacher, asserted claims of age discrimination and retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The defense argued in their motion that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie age discrimination claim or retaliation claim because she could not establish that she suffered from an adverse employment action. The court agreed and determined that the plaintiff's transfer to a new grade level, placement on an improvement plan, and voluntary resignation did not constitute adverse employment actions in order to establish her claims. Consequently, the court granted the school district's motion and dismissed all claims.

We successfully defended a superintendent of a Pennsylvania School District. The elementary teacher plaintiff was disciplined following an investigation into allegations that she struck a student. The plaintiff raised claims against the superintendent for intentional infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium, and violation of procedural due process. The defense argued that, as a superintendent, he was afforded high public official immunity and, therefore, the court dismissed the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The court also dismissed the loss of consortium claim as it was a derivative claim of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The court further held that the plaintiff was not deprived of her procedural due process rights, as she was given the opportunity through the teacher's union to arbitrate a grievance over her suspension. Consequently, the court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, with prejudice.