.

Saynyenoh B. Warner

Associate

SBWarner@mdwcg.com

Portrait of Saynyenoh B. Warner

Saynyenoh is a member of the Professional Liability Department where she focuses on defending suits made and brought against broker-dealers, registered representatives and registers investment advisors in Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) arbitration proceedings. She also concentrates her practice on privacy and data security matters, counseling and representing clients on different issues relative to privacy law, data breaches, intellectual property, copyright and trademark infringement.

Before joining the firm, Saynyenoh worked as an assistant district attorney where she handled cases with complex issues on appeal and presented oral arguments in front of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. 

While in law school, Saynyenoh gained ample experience in corporate law, specifically handling cases involving shareholder's derivative action as well as mergers and acquisitions. She also obtained a certificate of expertise in labor and employment law as a result of her extensive work in that area.

    • Chicago-Kent College of Law (J.D., 2023)
    • State University of New York at Cortland (B.S., magna cum laude, 2019)
    • Pennsylvania, 2023

Thought Leadership

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Defense Digest

The Third Circuit Clarifies Article III Standing in Website Replay Litigation

September 30, 2026

Key Points: • The collection of ordinary website browsing activity does not constitute concrete injury as needed to have standing to bring a claim; • The unauthorized capture of complete payment card information or similarly sensitive data may constitute a concrete privacy injury sufficient to establish standing; • Allegations involving anonymous browsing behavior, standing alone, may not satisfy Article III’s concreteness requirement, and; • Businesses using session replay, analytics, or similar website monitoring technologies should evaluate what information those tools collect, whether sensitive information is masked or excluded, and whether appropriate disclosures and consent mechanisms are in place. On May 11, 2026, the United Stated Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued an important  published, precedential opinion in In re BPS Direct LLC, 175 F. 4th 423 (3d. Cir. 2026) for companies that use website analytics and session replay technologies. The main issue in the case concerned whether website users have Article III standing to sue over the unauthorized capture of their online activity through session replay code. The Third Circuit held that plaintiffs who alleged their complete payment card information was secretly captured by website session replay software sufficiently alleged a concrete injury to establish Article III standing. However, plaintiffs who only alleged that their anonymous browsing activity was recorded failed to establish standing. The decision provides meaningful guidance for the types of alleged privacy harms that may support federal jurisdiction in the growing wave of website tracking and session replay litigation. Background Bass Pro Shops and Cabela’s (BPS) embedded JavaScript “Session Replay Code” developed by a third-party provider on their retail websites. The code operated invisibly in users’ browsers and captured the user’s interaction on the website, including mouse movements, clicks, scrolls, keystrokes, and text entries, while recording data at intervals of just milliseconds.  Critically, the Session Replay Code intercepted text inputs even if the user did not click “submit” or “enter,” allowing BPS and the third-party providers to create video replays of each user’s website visit. Eight named plaintiffs filed a putative class action suit claiming that defendant BPS’s use of a JavaScript computer code known as “session replay code” without users’ consent violated various state and federal privacy laws. Two of the plaintiffs completed purchases on the websites and entered personal identifying information, including names, addresses, and complete payment card information. The remaining six plaintiffs merely browsed the websites and did not submit identifying or financial information. The district court dismissed the action for lack of Article III standing. The Third Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Holding The Third Circuit held that for plaintiffs to have standing to bring their claim, they must first demonstrate a concrete injury that is closely related to traditional common law privacy torts  such as intrusion upon seclusion or public disclosure of private facts. Browsing activity alone was insufficient to prove concrete injury. The court held that although the session replay technology allegedly captured browsing interactions, the information was neither particularly sensitive nor connected to the plaintiffs’ identities. As a result, the alleged injury was not sufficiently analogous to the common-law privacy torts relied upon by the plaintiffs. The court reached a different conclusion for the two plaintiffs who entered their names, addresses, and complete credit or debit card numbers during online checkout. For these  plaintiffs, the court found that the alleged injury closely resembled the common-law tort of intrusion upon seclusion. The court emphasized that complete payment card numbers are private financial information that individuals reasonably expect to remain free from unauthorized observation. Allegations that third-party software secretly recorded that information without the user’s knowledge constituted the type of unauthorized intrusion historically recognized by the common law. This decision further develops the growing body of federal appellate authority addressing standing in website privacy litigation involving session replay technologies and similar tracking tools. Saynyenoh is an Associate in our Philadelphia, PA office. She can be reached at (215) 575-2713 or SBWarner@MDWCG.com.

Case Law Alerts

FINRA Panel Orders Axos Clearing to Pay $49.2 Million to Former Worden Capital Clients

July 21, 2026

A FINRA arbitration panel ordered Axos Clearing to pay $49.2 million in compensatory damages, attorneys’ fees and costs to clients of the now defunct Worden Capital Management. In the amended statement of claim, claimants, a group of 102 individuals, asserted the following causes of action: fraud, churning, unauthorized trading, excessive trading/commissions, breach of fiduciary duty, unsuitability, breach of contract, negligence, and unjust enrichment. Claimants alleged that Axos failed to act while one of its introducing brokerage firms, Worden Capital Management, and its representatives used Claimants’ accounts as personal slush funds, engaging in alleged unsuitable and excessive trading and churning, garnering over $16 million dollars in commissions and fees while costing nearly all of the claimants out-of-pocket losses of over $12 million dollars. Axos denied the claimants’ allegations, asserted various affirmative defenses, and filed a third-party claim seeking a declaratory judgment that Worden Capital Management was responsible for the alleged damages. The FINRA arbitration panel found in favor of the claimants and awarded approximately $35.85 million in compensatory damages, $12.3 million in attorneys' fees, and roughly $72,000 in costs. Axos has challenged the ruling, filing a motion in federal court to vacate the arbitration award. The firm maintains that the arbitration process was flawed and that the award should be overturned. However, courts generally grant substantial deference to FINRA arbitration decisions, making successful challenges relatively uncommon.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.

Result

$19 Million Medical Malpractice Verdict Overturned

In this medical malpractice case, the trial court vacated $10 million of a $19 million verdict in post-trial motions and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacated the remaining $9 million on appeal.

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News

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 New Jersey Super Lawyers And Rising Stars

Result

Statutory Employer Immunity Upheld

In this construction accident case that resulted in a $5 million verdict, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the Statutory Employer Doctrine, which immunizes general contractors and other contractors on construction sites when certain elements are satisfied.

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

News

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

Result

$1.09 Billion Products Liability Verdict Overturned

In this products liability crashworthiness case, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed a Philadelphia jury verdict of $1.09 billion, the largest verdict ever overturned by a PA appellate court.  The court ordered a new trial based on deficient jury instructions, clarified important aspects of crashworthiness law, and confirmed that so-called standard jury instructions may be incompatible with Pennsylvania law. 

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

News

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.