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Ryan is a member of the firm’s Health Care Department, where he focuses his practice on defending physicians and health care organizations such as hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, and various other health systems against medical malpractice claims and lawsuits. He works closely with clients in defending and guiding them through all phases of litigation. In addition to handling complex medical malpractice and skilled nursing home matters, Ryan actively handles child welfare cases involving severe allegations of sexual and physical abuse.

Born and raised in Philadelphia, Ryan stayed true to his roots by attending Temple University for both undergraduate and law school degrees. He was a member of the American Constitution Society and Student Bar Association during law school. Ryan clerked for the Honorable Steven C. Tolliver in Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas and also spent time in the Major Trial Division at the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office.

Outside of the office, Ryan is an avid basketball fan who plays in several recreational leagues and follows the NBA. When not on the basketball court, you may find him at a music festival or out hiking.

    • Temple University Beasley School of Law (J.D., 2022)
    • Temple University (B.B.A., 2018)
    • Pennsylvania, 2022
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Philadelphia Bar Association
    • Part of the defense team that successfully obtained a defense verdict during arbitration in a medical malpractice case. Our client performed major reconstructive surgery for a patient with a highly complex and longstanding history of severe right foot problems. The plaintiffs alleged that our client failed to properly evaluate the patient and perform the surgery at issue, causing complications that required three additional surgeries to correct. We argued that the plaintiff's postoperative course, including the clinical manifestations that developed and the subsequent surgeries he received, constituted a series of known complications/outcomes regarding the complex surgery he underwent. An arbitration verdict was made in favor of our client.

    Results

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    Summary Judgment Received in a Nursing Home Malpractice Case

    We received summary judgment in the defendant’s favor in a nursing home malpractice case. The plaintiff claimed that the facility failed to prevent various conditions and injuries during the resident’s admission—such as UTI/sepsis, acute kidney injury/metabolic encephalopathy, dehydration and failure to thrive/weight loss, and skin breakdown. The plaintiff alleged these developments resulted in numerous damages, including, but not limited to, death. Our motion for summary judgment on behalf of the defendant sought dismissal on the grounds that the facility held immunity pursuant to the Pennsylvania Tort Claims Act. The plaintiff hotly disputed the issue. Ultimately, several rounds of briefing were required to achieve the ruling in the facility’s favor.

    Thought Leadership

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    The Quarterly Dose

    Isn’t That Wunderly? How the Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Mental Health Procedures Act Positively Impacts Treatment Providers

    November 1, 2025

    On October 23, 2025, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a 4-3 decision, reconfirmed the established reach of the immunity afforded by the Mental Health Procedures Act (MHPA), once again noting that “medical treatment that is coincident to mental health treatment” falls within the ambit of its protections. Wunderly v. St. Luke’s Hospital of Bethlehem, --- A.3d ---, 2025 WL 2988503 (Pa. Oct. 23, 2025). Wunderly stems from a situation involving a patient who was involuntarily admitted to a St. Luke’s Hospital facility for dementia and aggression and who had stage I decubitus ulcers upon admission. While treating the whole person, the hospital demonstrated that the treatment of the patient’s ulcers was “coincident” to the main course of treatment, which was with respect to his mental health. Indeed, the Court recognized that “he was involuntarily admitted to St. Luke’s under Section 302 for dementia-related aggression and remained in its care under Section 303.” Wunderly, 2025 WL 2988503. While being treated, his wound issues worsened, and he was eventually transferred to another facility where he died ten days later. His estate filed suit against St. Luke’s Hospital and its affiliates, asserting that the providers were negligent in the decedent’s care and treatment. At the trial level, the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas granted judgment on the pleadings for the hospital and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims based on immunity under the MHPA enjoyed by “those individuals and institutions that provide treatment to mentally ill patients.” 50 P.S. § 7114. The decision was affirmed by the Superior Court, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review to consider the scope of additional care provided by St. Luke’s Hospital during the decedent’s admission and whether it constituted “treatment” under the MHPA. In determining that the additional care (i.e., treatment for pressure-related skin-breakdown and wounds) constitutes “treatment” under the MHPA, the Court explained that the Act is not limited to care that is directly related to a patient’s mental status. Rather, “the legislature intended a broader meaning of treatment that includes medical care `coincident to mental health care’ as well as `care and other services that supplement treatment’ in order to promote the recovery of the patient from mental illness.” Wunderly, 2025 WL 2988503 (citing Allen v. Montgomery Hospital, 696 A.2d 1175, 1179 (Pa. 1997). The Court noted the General Assembly’s policy-based decision to apply the MHPA to “treatment” in various areas aimed at whole-person health, “such as diet, heat, light, sanitary facilities, clothing, recreation, education and medical care as are necessary to maintain decent, safe and healthful living conditions.” Id. Toward that end, the MHPA grants immunity to ensure the “willingness of doctors [and] hospitals to provide needed medical care to a mentally ill patient.” Id. However, in reaching its decision that the MHPA immunity applies to “medical treatment coincident to mental health treatment,” the Court noted that there is no bright-line rule when “coincident” begins or ends. “While it is difficult to enounce specific parameters given the fact-specific nature of these cases, there will be circumstances where medical treatment is so tenuously connected to the mental health treatment that the [i]mmunity [p]rovision does not apply. The definitions of `treatment’ and `adequate treatment’ are broad but not without limitation.” Id. Stated differently, medical treatment rendered by health care providers to mental health patients may be within the scope of the MHPA if it is something that could be anticipated or expected to occur given the patient’s status. Despite the lack of a bright-line rule, the effect of the Wunderly decision is certainly significant. Health care providers who are in the front lines of the Commonwealth’s current mental health crisis now likely have a stronger defense to professional liability claims premised on care involving medical treatment interwoven with care for a patient’s mental health issues. To ensure the availability of the immunity protections afforded by the MHPA, it is a best practice to document and record in detail how the treatment of any physical ailment is related to or connected with a patient’s mental health care. By doing so, a health care provider will be best positioned in defending against any future claim.  The Quarterly Dose – November 2025, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

    Firm Highlights

    Result

    No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

    We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

    blue facade of a hospital sign against blue sky

    Result

    Defense Verdict in Complex Medical Malpractice Trial

    Congratulations to our 2026 Florida Super Lawyers & Rising Stars: Elizabeth Ferguson, A.C. Nash, Taylor Naughton, Sophia Philor, Amara Rodriguez

    News

    Marshall Dennehey Announces 2026 Florida Super Lawyers & Florida Rising Stars

    Result

    Summary Judgment Secured, Preserving $750,000 in Coverage for Insured in Major Trucking Liability Dispute

    Ray Freudiger and Michael A. Roberts (both of Cincinnati) successfully obtained summary judgment on behalf of their client in a coverage dispute arising from a May 19, 2022, motor vehicle accident. A permissive driver operated a box truck for an interstate trucking company and caused severe injuries to two tort victims. Prior to the accident, the insured had procured a commercial auto policy for the trucking company with stated limits of $1,000,000. Following the accident, the insurer initiated a declaratory judgment action asserting that only reduced bodily injury limits of $25,000/$50,000 applied and later counterclaimed, alleging it would not have insured the driver had he been properly submitted for approval under the policy. After extensive discovery, briefing, and oral argument, the court rejected the insurer’s attempt to shift responsibility for the $750,000 in coverage it was legally required to provide for permissive drivers under Ohio law, granting summary judgment in favor of the insured and preserving $750,000 in liability exposure.

    News

    Veteran Trial Attorney Joseph M. Toddy Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Casualty Department in Philadelphia

    News

    Marshall Dennehey’s John J. Hare Brings Home Attorney of the Year Honors; Firm Named Litigation Department of the Year in Two Categories

    Marshall Dennehey took home top honors in three categories at the The Legal Intelligencer’s 2026 Pennsylvania Legal Awards, held June 11 in Philadelphia. The first place awards include: Attorney of the Year: John J. Hare, Chair of the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post-Trial Practice Group and Executive Committee member, together with Charles “Chip” Becker of Kline & Specter Litigation Department of the Year, Appellate – Third Win in a Row! Litigation Department of the Year, Product Liability/Mass Torts “There is no one more deserving of Attorney of the Year honors than John. This award is a testament to his exceptional skill, dedication, and leadership—qualities that truly exemplify the very best of our firm,” said G. Mark Thompson, Marshall Dennehey’s President & CEO. “These honors also reflect the strength and depth of our product liability, mass torts, and appellate practices across Pennsylvania and beyond, underscoring our ongoing commitment to delivering outstanding results for our clients.” Attorney of the Year – John J. Hare, Marshall Dennehey, together with Charles “Chip” Becker, Kline & Specter Over the past year, John and Charles were opposing counsel in many of the highest-profile civil appeals in Pennsylvania. John is renowned as a preeminent appellate lawyer on the defense side, and Chip on the plaintiff's side. They have opposed each other repeatedly, exhibiting peerless professionalism and exceptional civility, while zealously litigating under the unremitting pressure of high-profile litigation and record-setting verdicts totaling more than $3.5 billion. They have also collaborated, outside of litigation, on many commissions, committees, and projects of importance to the Pennsylvania judiciary and legal community. Litigation Department of the Year – Appellate Law, Winner (previous winner, 2025 and 2024) 2025 was another standout year for the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post‑Trial Practice Group, led by John J. Hare, which was retained to challenge many of Pennsylvania’s “nuclear” verdicts—awards exceeding $10 million. Notably, the department persuaded the Pennsylvania Superior Court to reverse a Philadelphia judgment of $1.09 billion, the largest judgment ever overturned by a Pennsylvania appellate court. The group’s 11 full‑time Pennsylvania‑based appellate lawyers are at the center of Pennsylvania’s most high-profile matters, bringing more than 150 years of combined appellate experience. They routinely handle post‑trial and appellate matters and are frequently engaged to participate in and monitor trials in high‑exposure cases to ensure that critical legal issues are properly raised and preserved for appeal. Litigation Department of the Year – Product Liability/Mass Torts, Winner This marks the first win for the firm’s Pennsylvania Product Liability and Mass Torts practices, which operate within our Casualty Department, managed by Matthew Schorr and Jeff Rapattoni. For almost five decades, Fortune 500 product manufacturers/distributors and their insurers have turned to these groups to defend their litigation. Led by Bradley D. Remick and Vlada Tasich, our Product Liability group’s success can be attributed to its commitment to keeping abreast of ever-changing legal theories, judicial viewpoints, and evolving technology impacting the product liability landscape. Our attorneys have successfully handled thousands of product liability matters in all jurisdictions across the state. Likewise, our mass tort litigation practice – divided into Asbestos & Mass Tort, and Environmental & Toxic Tort Litigation –  has defended manufacturers, distributors, contractors, and premises owners in thousands of personal injury and other claims. Led by Kevin E. Hexstall and Patrick T. Reilly, most attorneys in these groups have more than 20 years of experience, and our seasoned trial team has tried hundreds of cases to verdict, consistently achieving strong results through both trials and settlements. In addition to these awards, Marshall Dennehey was a Litigation Department of the Year finalist for Professional Liability.

    Thought Leadership

    Pennsylvania Supreme Court Holds Self-Referral Prohibition Does Not Cover Prescriptions Written by Physicians with Ownership Interests in Dispensing Pharmacies

    700 Pharmacy v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office (State Workers’ Insurance Fund); Nos. 97, 98, 99, 100, 101 MAP 2024; decided June 16, 2026; by Justice Mundy.   In this case, Drs. Miteswar Purewal and Shailen Jalali, treating physicians for workers’ compensation claimants, wrote prescriptions for various medications that were filled by 700 Pharmacy. The worker’s compensation insurer refused to pay for the prescriptions on the basis that they were illegal self-referrals under the Act. 700 Pharmacy subsequently filed fee review applications with The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Medical Fee Review Office. At a fee review hearing, both physicians stipulated they had a financial interest in the pharmacy.  The physicians argued that the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act does not bar self-referrals on prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services, since the provision does not specifically identify prescription drugs. The Fee Review Hearing Officer rejected this argument and found that prescriptions for medications are prohibited under the “goods or services” language included in the provision. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Commonwealth Court, and the court affirmed, agreeing with the Hearing Officer’s interpretation of “goods and services” as encompassing prescriptions. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the Hearing Officer and the Commonwealth Court, holding that the term “goods and services” in the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act did not include prescriptions. According to the Court, “goods and services” was not a catch-all, but simply explanatory as to the eight enumerated categories in the provision. The provision (Section 306(f.1)(3)(iii)) reads, in pertinent part: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it is unlawful for a provider to refer a person for laboratory, physical therapy, rehabilitation, chiropractic, radiation oncology, psychometric, home infusion therapy  or diagnostic imaging, goods or services pursuant to this section if the provider has a financial interest with the person or in the entity that receives the referral. The Court said that if the General Assembly wanted to specifically include prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services in the Anti-Referral Provision, they would have done so. They pointed out that prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services were included by the legislature in Section 306 (f.1)(3)(vi) of the Act as to reimbursement, and claimed that their omission from the Anti-Referral Provision supports the conclusion that those services are not included in the Anti-Referral Provision’s self-referral prohibition.

    Result

    Unanimous Verdict Obtained in a Medical Malpractice Matter in Bergen County, New Jersey

    Thought Leadership

    Coverage Determined, Judgment Paid, Bad Faith Survives: Fourth DCA’s Opinion Highlights the Distinction Between Contractual and Extra-Contractual Damages

    In Healthy Food Experts, LLC v. Amguard Ins. Co., No. 4D2025-0181 (4th DCA June 10, 2026), the Fourth District Court of Appeal explained that an insurer’s payment of a judgment in a breach of contract case does not automatically eliminate a later bad faith claim seeking extra-contractual damages. The decision provides guidance on when a first-party bad faith claim may still proceed after a coverage dispute has already been resolved by a judgment. Healthy Food Experts, LLC involved a dispute related to a property damage claim submitted under a commercial insurance policy issued by the insurer following a ceiling collapse at the insured’s restaurant. The insurer denied coverage for the insured’s losses for business personal property and business income, but extended coverage for the food spoilage losses. As a result, the insured filed a breach of contract action and ultimately obtained a jury verdict. The insurer appealed the verdict and, while the appeal was pending, the insured filed a Civil Remedy Notice (CRN) seeking payment for the judgment plus interest. The insurer failed to cure the CRN within the statutory sixty-day cure period, but paid the judgement in full with accrued interest following the appeals court’s per curiam affirmance. Nevertheless, the insured filed a first party bad faith lawsuit claiming to have suffered extra-contractual damages. In response to the bad faith suit, the insurer filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, relying on Fridman v. Safeco Insurance Co. of Illinois, 185 So. 3d 1214 (Fla. 2016) stating that damages were fixed by judgment of the breach of contract suit and the insured could not recover additional damages beyond those already awarded. The insurer also argued that the judgment did not exceed the insured’s policy limits, which was a required element of a first party bad faith claim. The trial court dismissed the bad faith action based on Fridman, concluding the insured could not seek any additional damages.  The insured appealed the court’s ruling to the Fourth DCA arguing the trial court’s order conflicts with Florida law and misapplies Fridman, as a contractual damage determination in the underlying suit establishes the “condition precedent to prosecute a first party bad faith action.” Cingari v. First Protective Ins. Co., 377 So. 3d 1169, 1174 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024). Further, the insured argued that the only purpose to the binding language in Fridman is to prevent the re-litigating of the same damages, which in this case are the contractual damages. The insured asserted the damages were not the “same” as they were seeking consequential damages from the insurer’s alleged bad faith. The Fourth District emphasized in its ruling that a first party bad faith claim is not ripe for litigation until there has been the following: a determination of the insurer’s liability for coverage; a determination of the extent of the insured’s contractual damages, and the required civil remedy notice is filed pursuant to §624.155(3)(a).  Demase v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 239 So. 3d 218, 221 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) The court concluded that the necessary conditions were satisfied as the jury verdict determined both coverage and the extent of the insured’s contractual damages, and the insured properly filed a civil remedy notice, so the bad faith claim was ripe for litigation. The Fourth DCA further explained the insured could not seek contractual damages in its bad faith action, which was previously litigated in its breach of contract suit. However, the court determined the insured could seek “extra-contractual damages,” which were not recoverable in the insured’s breach of contract suit, which may include interest, court cost, and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by the insured. Further, the court held excess judgment is not essential in a first party bad faith claim and the insurer’s late payment of the judgment did not preclude the insured’s bad faith action. As a result, the Fourth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s final dismissal order of the bad faith action. This opinion highlights the distinction between contractual and extra-contractual damages. Moreover, this case demonstrates that a judgment does not necessarily end the dispute in a first party property claim as it is could also serve as a prerequisite of a bad faith action. The decision serves as a reminder that insurers may face bad faith exposure notwithstanding the payment of a judgment in an underlying breach of contract action.

    Thought Leadership

    Unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court Holds That Personal Emails of Public Employees and Officials are Subject to OPRA

    In Rosetti v. Ramapo-Indian Hills Regional High School Board of Education, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held that government-related emails, which are contained within personal email accounts, are government records under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), and a log of those emails must be produced when requested. In reaching this decision, the court conducted an analysis of the OPRA and cited previous cases that held that emails do in fact fall within OPRA’s definition of a record and must be produced when requested pursuant to the Act. The court in Rosetti then had to answer the question as to whether public officials’ personal email accounts that are used for government purposes are subject to OPRA, and found that they are. Rosetti made an OPRA request to the Board of Education seeking email logs from Board members’ personal email accounts. The Board refused to produce the logs and indicated that it was not under any obligation to produce personal email account logs, only from government-related email accounts. The issue was whether a log had to be produced for Board members’ personal email accounts, which they used to conduct Board business. The Board argued that while it was possible to create a log for government-related email accounts through its IT Department, it was not possible to do so for personal email accounts. The court rejected this argument and ruled that Board members are required to search their personal email accounts and create a log of government-related emails housed in those accounts. Once completed, each Board member then must submit a certification detailing the searches that were conducted. The court went one step further with a suggestion to government employees and officials, stating, “[g]overnment agencies should strongly advise their employees, elected officials, and others engaged in government-related business to refrain from using their personal email accounts when conducting government-related business.”  Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions regarding this case and others pertaining to the OPRA.