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Successfully proved that a claimant was not an employee/special employee of our client, the employer.

January 12, 2024

We successfully defended a claim where a large cable provider (owner) hired a contractor to complete work at an out-of-state location, and various parts of the job were subcontracted to several different companies, one of which did not have New York workers’ compensation insurance coverage. The contested issues were whether the Board has subject matter jurisdiction over this claim, what company employed the claimant, and whether the claimant was a covered employee.

We argued that the claimant was not an employee/special employee of the cable provider and emphasized that an owner who contracts with an independent contractor for construction on his own property is not a contractor within the meaning of Section 56 of the Workmen's Compensation Law in New York. A special employer assumes and exercises “exclusive control” over a general employee; a determination on the issue of special employment may be made as a matter of law. However, if there are issues of fact concerning a surrender of control by a general employer and an assumption of control by a special employer, a determination on the issue of special employment will hinge upon a consideration of not only control but also factors such as the special employer's right to hire or discharge such an employee, the payment of wages and ownership of tools utilized on the job, all the while recognizing that ordinarily no one factor is determinative. There was no evidence on the record to support that an employee-employer relationship existed between our client and the claimant.

With regard to subject matter jurisdiction, we argued that New York did not have sufficient contacts with the circumstances surrounding this claim. The only contact between this claim and the state of New York was the claimant’s home address.

The court agreed with our arguments and dismissed our client from the claim.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.