Results

The decision, which reversed the trial court and Superior Court, reinstated a jury verdict in favor of our clients. Following a defense verdict, the trial court awarded a new trial based on a question posed by defense counsel, who was not a Marshall Dennehey attorney. The Superior Court affirmed the award of a new trial, but the Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the defense verdict on the basis that defense counsel’s question was neither improper nor prejudicial.

We obtained a dismissal of an ethics grievance filed against our client, a school law attorney who represented a school board and a school district. The grievance included allegations of ex parte communications with the administrative law judge, undue influence over the court, and conflict of interest based on a mediator’s spouse being retained by this attorney’s firm. We successfully argued to the disciplinary investigator that the conversations this attorney had with the administrative law judge’s staff were rudimentary scheduling and routinely conducted in cases across New Jersey. In terms of the conflict of interest alleged, we also argued that this attorney was an associate with the firm and had no interactions or decision-making authority regarding hiring of attorneys in the firm. The disciplinary ethics investigator found by clear and convincing evidence that the testimony of the school law attorney was credible, and that there was no ethical misconduct by our client. 

We defeated a plaintiff’s petition for certification to the New Jersey Supreme Court in a tortious interference and defamation action against an attorney for a lender bank. The New Jersey Appellate Division had affirmed a trial court decision granting summary judgment in a $10 million tortious interference and defamation case filed by borrowers against the attorneys for a lender bank. This case arose out of an underlying deficiency and foreclosure action filed by a bank due to the plaintiff’s failure to repay a multi-million dollar loan used to finance the purchase of real estate. During the course of negotiations to resolve the debt, the bank’s counsel had discussions with the plaintiff’s new lender. The plaintiffs alleged that during these discussions, the defendant attorney called the plaintiff a “wannabe gangster.” On appeal, Jack and Jeremy successfully argued that the trial court was correct in dismissing this case on summary judgment. The Appellate Division held that the trial judge correctly concluded that a statement made by the bank’s attorney to a potential new lender calling the plaintiff a “wannabe gangster” was mere name calling, not actionable defamation. The claims for tortious interference were based upon the lost opportunity, since the new lender rescinded its conditional commitment after the alleged statement was made. The Appellate Division held that the trial court was correct in holding that the statements were protected under the litigation privilege, that the litigation privilege is not confined to the courtroom, but extends to all statements or communications in connection with judicial proceedings. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a petition for certification before the New Jersey Supreme Court, which we successfully opposed. The Supreme Court, in its decision, denied the plaintiff’s petition, with costs in favor of our client. 

We defended a claim petition and penalty petition wherein the claimant alleged serious neck and back injuries as a result of a work-related motor vehicle accident. We convinced the judge that the claimant was not in the course and scope of employment at the time of injury and, therefore, his claim was barred. The judge noted that, based on claimant’s testimony on cross examination, he had a legal address in North Carolina but was allegedly leasing an apartment in Newtown Square, Pa. He alleged he was on a special mission on the date of injury, traveling to an office owned by the employer. It was established that on the date of the accident, he was traveling on an expressway in New Jersey prior to his shift and admitted that his job required him to service many of the employer’s offices. The judge accepted the defense argument that the claimant was traveling to work, not in the course and scope of employment and not on a special mission, and dismissed the claim and penalty petitions.

This case had potential national implications where the allegations by Disciplinary Counsel included 93 paragraphs and alleged violations of multiple Rules of Professional Conduct.

A FINRA arbitration panel recommended the expungement of two separate customer complaints from a financial advisor’s public record.  Both complaints involved allegedly unsuitable sales of alternative investments.

We successfully prosecuted a termination petition on behalf of a Philadelphia-based ice cream shop. The claimant sustained a serious ankle fracture after a slip and fall in the shop’s freezer. We utilized the treating physician to certify the claimant’s full and complete recovery from the ankle fracture and established that there were no residual maladies or disability stemming from the incident.

A FINRA arbitration panel granted a financial advisor and his supervisor’s motion to dismiss a FINRA arbitration on the basis that the Claimant previously brought multiple claims regarding the same securities related dispute against the broker-dealer, who was not a party to this arbitration.  

The arbitrations were commenced by medical providers against the respondent-carrier for non-payment of medical bills insofar as the policyholder and the claimant engaged in material misrepresentation in the procurement of the policy, and in the presentation of the claim. We submitted a defense brief that included numerous exhibits, including examination under oath transcripts, an affidavit from the respondent-carrier’s underwriting department and screenshots of insurance premium payments from the claimant to the policyholder. At the hearings, the defense argued that the respondent-carrier owed no duty of coverage insofar as the policyholder and the claimant engaged in material misrepresentation in the procurement of the policy and in the presentation of the claim. Specifically, the policyholder fraudulently obtained an insurance policy with the respondent-carrier on behalf of the claimant. The misrepresentation was deemed “material” insofar as the respondent-carrier would have charged a higher premium based on the actual garaging location of the insured vehicle and, moreover, would not have otherwise insured the claimant. The arbitrator held that the respondent-carrier established, by a preponderance of credible evidence, that the instant loss involved fraud and misrepresentation in the procurement of the insurance policy; the policyholders’ misrepresentation with regard to the ownership, operation and garaging of the insured vehicle was material; the respondent-carrier would not have issued the policy if the facts had been disclosed by the policyholders, and that the respondent-carrier was justified in denying the claim.

We obtained dismissal of all claims against an optometrist in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff was incarcerated when the allegations at issue arose. He alleged medical malpractice and civil rights violations against various health care providers for treatment received while he was an inmate at SCI-Dallas. Rob filed a motion to dismiss on numerous grounds, including the plaintiff’s claims were timed barred by the statute of limitations, failure to state a viable cause of action, and failure to file a Certificate of Merit pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1042.3. The court granted the motion and dismissed all claims, finding they were timed barred by the statute of limitations, and because the plaintiff failed to meet his burden that the discovery rule applied.

We obtained an entry of judgment on behalf of an urgent care physician. The plaintiff filed suit in magisterial district court in Wayne County, PA. She alleged that the physician negligently sutured a hand laceration, leading to dehiscence and the need for subsequent surgery. The plaintiff sought recovery of medical expenses and pain and suffering. At the bench trial, the defense sought dismissal based upon the plaintiff’s lack of expert support for her claims, as is required in medical malpractice claims. The court agreed and entered judgment in the defendant’s favor. 

Our attorneys successfully obtained summary judgment on behalf of a car dealership. The dealership rented a vehicle to the co-defendant, who was having his personal vehicle serviced at the dealership. The co-defendant was involved in an auto accident with the plaintiff while operating the dealership’s rental. The plaintiff was operating a motorcycle, and significant damages were alleged. The defense team filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to the Graves Amendment, which states that an owner of a motor vehicle, who rents a vehicle to a person, shall not be vicariously liable for harm to persons or property that arises out of the use or operation of that vehicle during the period of the rental, so long as certain additional criteria is met. The court agreed with our arguments raised in the motion and dismissed our client with prejudice.

The plaintiff claimed she sustained serious head and neck injuries following a two-car motor vehicle accident. At trial, we demonstrated that the plaintiff’s alleged injuries were largely related to pre-accident and degenerative medical conditions. The defense also highlighted the fact this was the plaintiff’s third personal injury lawsuit in a 15-year span. On the day of trial, the plaintiffs reduced their demand from $85,000 to $75,000. At the conclusion of trial, the jury returned a verdict of only $4,000.

We obtained summary judgment in Carbon County, Pennsylvania in a negligence action brought against a local school district. The plaintiff, a former high school athlete, was working out in the District’s weight lifting facility when a cable snapped on a leg curl machine, striking his head and causing significant injury. The plaintiff sued the district, alleging negligence in the operation, inspection, and maintenance of the gym and, more specifically, the leg curl machine. Following discovery, the district moved for summary judgment, arguing that the leg curl machine at issue was personalty and not part of the District’s real property and, accordingly, the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA) prevented recovery. The court agreed and concluded the District was immune under the PSTCA since all evidence showed that the leg curl machine was not a fixture of the building and, therefore, the “real property” exception to local governmental immunity did not apply.

The plaintiff, a pipefitter employed on a construction site, claimed he tripped and fell over a 2’ x 4’ metal stud, causing him to sustain a shoulder injury and subsequent surgery. The plaintiff sued the owner and general contractor under the New York State Labor Law. At his deposition in 2018, the plaintiff produced a photograph showing a loose metal stud lying on the floor of the construction site. When questioned as to who took the photograph, he stated his friend a co-worker, took the photo but that he was not there when it was taken. Four days later, the defense visited the friend and showed him the photograph produced. The friend denied ever taking the photograph and showed the defense the one photograph that he did take of the plaintiff merely sitting on a bench after the incident.  During trial, the plaintiff again produced the photograph (which was entered into evidence) and testified that it was taken by his friend and co-worker, Brian. The plaintiff also testified that he was not wearing sunglasses at the time of his fall, despite an email from a co-worker to his employer who witnessed the incident stating that he was. The email also stated that the plaintiff tripped and fell while trying to squeeze between two vertical metal studs while wearing a work backpack and carrying two energy drinks.  When the plaintiff rested his case, we called the eyewitness to the stand, who testified that the plaintiff tripped and fell trying to fit through two vertical studs while wearing a backpack and sunglasses. He further testified that the plaintiff tripped over a fixed plate on the floor, not a loose stud. The defense then called the plaintiff's friend and co-worker to the stand, who testified that he did not take the photograph produced by the plaintiff, nor did he give the photograph to the plaintiff. The jury rendered a defense verdict.  

We obtained dismissal via preliminary objections of all claims asserted against a day care center in a shooting case venued in Philadelphia. The case arose from the shooting death of a student’s father. The shooter had been previously convicted of manslaughter and assault and was an employee of the day care center’s long-time food service vendor. While the decedent was dropping off his youngest child at day care, he got into an argument with the shooter, who was on the premises delivering food. The decedent subsequently drove away with his 17-year-old son in the passenger seat, and the shooter followed in his work van. A few blocks away from the day care center, the shooter pulled up alongside the decedent’s vehicle and repeatedly fired a handgun at the decedent. The decedent’s son survived the shooting. The food service vendor, its affiliated entities, the day care center and the shooter were named as defendants. The claims against the day care center included negligence per se, negligent hiring, negligent supervision, negligent undertaking to render services, negligent infliction of emotional distress, violations of the Unfair Trade Practices & Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL), negligent misrepresentation, and negligent infliction of emotional distress as to the decedent’s seventeen-year-old son who witnessed the shooting. The plaintiffs’ negligence per se claims centered on alleged violations of the Child Protective Services Law (CPSL), the Public Welfare Law (PWL) and the Pennsylvania School Code (School Code). Among other things, the plaintiffs took the position that the day care center had a duty to ensure that its service vendor’s employees did not have criminal records because those employees foreseeably came into contact with children and parents. On behalf of the day care center, we filed preliminary objections seeking dismissal of all claims asserted against it. After briefing, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas granted our preliminary objections. The case subsequently resolved with no contribution whatsoever from our client.

We obtained dismissal of two charges filed with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission. The charging party had been removed from two of the employer’s stores. He claimed it was due to discrimination, because of his race and disability (he required a service animal to be with him). The defense submitted a position statement with affidavits of employees and managers, explaining that the employee was removed because he was videoing other customers without their consent and making racially charged comments to employees and customers. 

The plaintiff, who owns a restaurant, sustained personal injuries in a car accident while on a business errand. He collected the tortfeasor’s liability limits of $100,000, and then filed underinsured motorist claims with his own insurance carrier who had issued the personal auto and commercial auto policies. The underinsured claims were denied by the carrier. There was no UIM coverage under the personal auto policy because the $100,000 UIM limits equaled the liability carrier’s limits. Further, although the plaintiff had $1 million UIM limits on his commercial policy, the Mazda he was driving at the time of the accident was not listed on the commercial policy; rather, it was listed on the personal auto policy. The court granted our motion for summary judgment on several bases: the Statute of Limitations began to run when the Mazda was first put on the personal auto policy, not when the accident occurred; despite the plaintiff’s and the agent’s friendship and long-standing business dealings, there was not a fiduciary relationship between the agent and insured customer; and the agent’s alleged statement to the plaintiff that he was covered in “every single possible way you can think of” did not amount to a misrepresentation of fact. 

We obtained summary judgment in the Philadelphia, PA Court of Common Pleas in a case involving the alleged defective design and installation of a synthetic turf field. Our client was the alleged installer of a turf field located at a popular venue for recreational athletics. The plaintiff sustained a full tear of his right ACL, a complex tear of the medial meniscus and partial tear of the IT band when he tripped on an exposed seam in the turf. Discovery revealed that a flood occurred during turf installation, arguably impacting the outcome. Nevertheless, the court granted our motion for summary judgment premised on an argument that the plaintiff could not establish a deviation from the standard of care for turf installation in the absence of qualified expert testimony.

The claimant filed a claim petition alleging that she sustained a contusion to the back of her head, a concussion, bilateral shoulder pain and neck pain. The judge found the claimant credible and that an incident did occur in the course and scope of her employment. However, the judge also found the employer’s medical expert credible. The employer’s medical expert found that the claimant was fully recovered as of the date of the Independent Medical Examination. This limited the receipt of indemnity and medical to fourteen months, rather than an ongoing claim.

Our attorneys secured a voluntary dismissal on behalf of an aircraft parts supplier in an asbestos mesothelioma case. The plaintiff alleged he was diagnosed with mesothelioma as a result of exposure to numerous asbestos products while doing home renovation work with his father in the 1940s; while in the U.S. Air Force working as an aircraft mechanic between 1953 to 1957; as a self-employed painter between 1958 and 1960; and as a civilian aircraft maintenance crew chief at the Willow Grove Air Force Base between 1959 to 1968. The plaintiff contended our client was the exclusive supplier of asbestos-containing fire sleeves for military aircraft hose assemblies that he worked with almost on a daily basis while at Willow Grove. Based upon the plaintiff’s description of the product during his trial video and discovery depositions, our client took the position that the product could not have been supplied by them. All other defendants either settled or were dismissed, and our client took a no-pay position. As the case neared trial, plaintiff’s counsel presented evidence as to why the product identified by the plaintiff was accurate and, therefore, why the case should be settled. Through a combination of the plaintiff’s testimony, our witness’s prior testimony, select portions of catalog pages and drawings from the aircraft the plaintiff worked on, and catalog pages from our client’s catalogs, plaintiff’s counsel was persuaded to voluntarily dismiss our client shortly before trial was to begin. 

Our attorneys obtained judgment in favor of a local borough and its employees/agents following numerous rounds of motions to dismiss in the Western District. The plaintiff, a construction contractor, brought suit alleging the borough violated its constitutional civil rights by failing to issue it a grading permit in the time it perceived as reasonable. The matter is more generally described as a land use dispute, involving the plaintiff’s excessive dumping and destruction of a local sewer line, thus jeopardizing the health and safety of the local residents. In support of dismissal, we argued that no substantive due process rights were violated, and that the civil conspiracy claim as to the individual defendants failed as a matter of law. The court agreed and granted the plaintiff leave to amend. Failing to heed our position, the plaintiff filed an additional complaint, to which we again moved to dismiss. The court agreed with our arguments and dismissed the federal claims, with prejudice.

The claimant alleged several injuries. The Board denied the claimant’s petition for additional compensation due on all counts, and granted the employer’s petition for review to terminate total disability benefits. Specifically, the Board concluded that (1) a proposed left ankle reconstruction surgery was not reasonable and necessary, (2) there was insufficient evidence to prove a compensable left knee injury, (3) there was insufficient evidence to prove a compensable lumbar spine injury and (4) the claimant was capable of unrestricted return to work. 

Our attorneys succeeded in obtaining an affirmance in the Fifth District Court of Appeal of a final dismissal order of a wrongful death product liability action. The decedent’s estate filed the lawsuit two years after the statute of limitations expired. The estate argued the statute was tolled for a variety of reasons. The trial court dismissed the case, with prejudice, after giving the Estate five attempts to amend. The Fifth District affirmed the dismissal and dispensed with oral argument that same day. 

Our attorneys succeeded in obtaining an affirmance by the Fourth District Court of Appeal. The Fourth District affirmed the dismissal, with prejudice, of our clients, a listing real estate agent and his broker, in an alleged negligence and fraud case. The court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing their pleadings due to their attorney’s conduct. The court detailed how the plaintiff’s attorney dropped the ball in litigating the case in a separate opinion reversing the plaintiffs’ attorney’s contempt conviction.

Our attorneys prevailed on an appeal to the Third Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s rejection of the plaintiffs’ request for class certification in a product liability and warranty action. The named plaintiffs are several property owners and communities of common ownership who allege they have yellow-jacketed, corrugated stainless steel tubing (CSST) transporting natural gas through their structures. The flexible, yellow CSST is the modern heir to the black iron pipe formerly universal in the building industry. The flexible CSST offers advantages, including ease of installation, but the plaintiffs asserted there are latent product defects that risk failure in the event an electrical surge makes its way to the tubing, either from an in-house event or nearby lightning strike. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ request for nationwide and Pennsylvania-wide class certification of their disparate claims because of a failure of record proof on the elements of ascertainability of a sufficiently numerous class, predominance of typical and common claims, and an inability to demonstrate proof of liability and damages issues on a class-wide basis. The Third Circuit granted the plaintiffs’ request for interlocutory review of the class certification decision, but nevertheless affirmed the district court’s ruling on largely the same bases. Without passing on the merits of the product defect claims, the Third Circuit recognized that there was no basis to grant class-wide treatment given the differences in everything from notification to putative class members, liability and damages proofs, and the law governing claims. The denial of class certification was affirmed, and the case will proceed on an individual basis only.

Our clients specialize in identifying and reclaiming lost property for consumers who are unaware that such lost property exists. The plaintiff brought claims under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL) and for fraudulent inducement, arguing that the business model was deceptive because consumers could recover their own property without paying for the ease and convenience of having the defendant business work on their behalf. Not surprisingly, the district court found that the plaintiff’s serial complaints failed to allege anything “more than Defendants’ expertise,” and that there was no factual basis to support the notion that consumers are unduly influenced or misled. On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal, expressly noting that the defendants made no misrepresentation at any time, and the UTPCPL and fraud claims were dismissed without merit. 

We successfully handled a pension rights action before the Commonwealth Court on behalf of a municipality. A police chief in small municipality alleged that a scrivener’s error in his employment contract erroneously referencing Act 600 entitled him to an Act 600 pension plan upon retirement when his existing pension plan had been organized many years pursuant to Act 15. The police chief had never contributed to an Act 600 pension plan, which would have provided for much higher benefits and for which the municipality had no funds set aside to pay because it had never established an Act 600 plan. The Commonwealth Court held that the police chief’s pension rights existed only under Act 15 because the municipal pension ordinance was established under Act 15, not Act 600. Pennsylvania law requires an ordinance to establish pension rights. Pension rights cannot be conferred only by agreement, without an ordinance. This decision was very important to the municipality we represented, and the opinion affirms well-established law that a municipality cannot contract for benefits if there is no enabling law for the benefits.

Our attorneys obtained dismissal of claims against a real estate agent arising from the agent’s representation of a buyer in connection with the purchase of a home in Philadelphia. Following the purchase of the property, the buyer discovered numerous undisclosed issues with the home and commenced suit against the seller and the seller’s agent. In turn, the seller’s agent joined our client, the buyer’s agent, alleging it was actually the buyer’s agent who should be liable on the buyer’s claims for negligence, violation of the Pennsylvania Seller’s Disclosure Law, breach of contract, negligent representation and fraud. On preliminary objections, we argued that the plaintiff’s conclusory allegations did not give rise to valid claims, that a buyer’s agent cannot be liable under the Seller’s Disclosure Law without actual knowledge of a material defect which was not disclosed, that the joinder complaint did not adequately allege that the buyer’s agent made any misrepresentations, and that there were no allegations adequate to suggest the buyer’s agent breached his statutory duties under the law. The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas agreed, sustaining the preliminary objections and dismissing the joinder complaint. 

We obtained summary judgment on behalf of a Bedford County real estate agency and its agents, who represented the buyers/plaintiffs in their purchase of a home in Bedford, PA. Prior to closing, the plaintiffs waived their contractual right to a home inspection. After they closed and moved into the home, the plaintiffs became aware of several issues with the home, including a leaking metal roof, a defective heat pump and flooding in the crawlspace after a heavy rain. The plaintiffs claimed the sellers/defendants were aware of these conditions but knowingly failed to disclose them on the sellers’ disclosure statement. The plaintiffs also claimed our clients were negligent in failing to advise them about the alleged material omissions in the sellers’ disclosure statement and by not taking steps to try to ascertain whether there were any undisclosed defects in the property in light of the information that was omitted from the disclosure statement. The plaintiffs conceded during their deposition testimony that they reviewed and signed the disclosure statement, even though they did not ask any questions of our clients about its contents or the sections of the statement that were not completed by the sellers. The plaintiffs also acknowledged that our clients did not prepare the disclosure statement and that they had no actual knowledge of any of the alleged defects in the property at issue. In granting summary judgment, the court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to produce sufficient evidence in support of their negligence claim, and dismissed the claim, with prejudice.