Results

In a case of relative first impression in Pennsylvania, we successfully defended a mushroom harvesting company. The claimant sustained a work-related injury to the right shoulder. She underwent surgery and was released to modified duty. The employer offered her a modified job. The claimant returned to work and continued at restricted duty. She was ultimately found to be fully recovered by a renowned Philadelphia shoulder surgeon. The defense then filed a termination petition, alleging full recovery of the right shoulder. The claimant responded by filing a claim petition, alleging a new injury to the opposite shoulder that totally disabled her from employment. After cross examining the claimant, it was determined that she purposely exceeded her work release restrictions upon return to work, despite the employer’s directive to the contrary. The claimant alleged that her voluntary acts exceeding her restrictions caused her new injury. The judge ruled that the claimant was not in the course and scope of employment when she exceeded her restrictions, and that the alleged injuries to her left shoulder were degenerative, not work-related. The judge also found the claimant to be fully recovered from the previously accepted right shoulder injury.

We successfully defended one of Pennsylvania’s largest turkey processing plants in a million dollar amputation claim. The claimant alleged that, due to an alleged exposure to turkey blood and feces at the workplace, he developed an infection in his foot that led to amputation of his leg. The claimant alleged a specific loss of the leg, total disability due to injuries separate and apart from the loss, and disabling psychological injuries. The defense was able to prove through the use of an infectious disease expert that the claimant’s leg amputation was caused by an underlying venous insufficiency and infection stemming from years of uncontrolled diabetes. The defense also established on cross examination that the claimant failed to provide proper notice of a work-related injury within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation Act. 

Our attorneys prevailed on an appeal to the Third Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s rejection of the plaintiffs’ request for class certification in a product liability and warranty action. The named plaintiffs are several property owners and communities of common ownership who allege they have yellow-jacketed, corrugated stainless steel tubing (CSST) transporting natural gas through their structures. The flexible, yellow CSST is the modern heir to the black iron pipe formerly universal in the building industry. The flexible CSST offers advantages, including ease of installation, but the plaintiffs asserted there are latent product defects that risk failure in the event an electrical surge makes its way to the tubing, either from an in-house event or nearby lightning strike. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ request for nationwide and Pennsylvania-wide class certification of their disparate claims because of a failure of record proof on the elements of ascertainability of a sufficiently numerous class, predominance of typical and common claims, and an inability to demonstrate proof of liability and damages issues on a class-wide basis. The Third Circuit granted the plaintiffs’ request for interlocutory review of the class certification decision, but nevertheless affirmed the district court’s ruling on largely the same bases. Without passing on the merits of the product defect claims, the Third Circuit recognized that there was no basis to grant class-wide treatment given the differences in everything from notification to putative class members, liability and damages proofs, and the law governing claims. The denial of class certification was affirmed, and the case will proceed on an individual basis only.

The plaintiff claimed she sustained serious head and neck injuries following a two-car motor vehicle accident. At trial, we demonstrated that the plaintiff’s alleged injuries were largely related to pre-accident and degenerative medical conditions. The defense also highlighted the fact this was the plaintiff’s third personal injury lawsuit in a 15-year span. On the day of trial, the plaintiffs reduced their demand from $85,000 to $75,000. At the conclusion of trial, the jury returned a verdict of only $4,000.

The plaintiff, who owns a restaurant, sustained personal injuries in a car accident while on a business errand. He collected the tortfeasor’s liability limits of $100,000, and then filed underinsured motorist claims with his own insurance carrier who had issued the personal auto and commercial auto policies. The underinsured claims were denied by the carrier. There was no UIM coverage under the personal auto policy because the $100,000 UIM limits equaled the liability carrier’s limits. Further, although the plaintiff had $1 million UIM limits on his commercial policy, the Mazda he was driving at the time of the accident was not listed on the commercial policy; rather, it was listed on the personal auto policy. The court granted our motion for summary judgment on several bases: the Statute of Limitations began to run when the Mazda was first put on the personal auto policy, not when the accident occurred; despite the plaintiff’s and the agent’s friendship and long-standing business dealings, there was not a fiduciary relationship between the agent and insured customer; and the agent’s alleged statement to the plaintiff that he was covered in “every single possible way you can think of” did not amount to a misrepresentation of fact. 

The injury was accepted for a foot contusion for medical benefits only. The claimant claimed much more severe injuries and sought wage loss benefits after his termination from employment. We successfully argued that the injury was limited to a contusion from which the claimant had recovered, and that his termination was for cause. The Workers’ Compensation Judge denied the claim petition and granted our termination petition.

We obtained dismissal of all claims against an optometrist in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff was incarcerated when the allegations at issue arose. He alleged medical malpractice and civil rights violations against various health care providers for treatment received while he was an inmate at SCI-Dallas. Rob filed a motion to dismiss on numerous grounds, including the plaintiff’s claims were timed barred by the statute of limitations, failure to state a viable cause of action, and failure to file a Certificate of Merit pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1042.3. The court granted the motion and dismissed all claims, finding they were timed barred by the statute of limitations, and because the plaintiff failed to meet his burden that the discovery rule applied.

In the complaint and throughout discovery, the plaintiff raised claims of overarching neglect in addition to a fall that occurred during physical therapy. The plaintiff alleged negligence, corporate negligence, and punitive damages premised upon allegations of understaffing, Department of Health violations and putting profits over patient care. The plaintiff sought to hold not only the nursing home, but also its management company and a holdings company, liable for such claims. The defense sought partial summary judgment and asked the court to limit the plaintiff’s claims to the fall only and argued that neither the record evidence nor the plaintiff’s expert reports supported the all-encompassing claims of neglect. The court agreed and narrowed the claims, thereby significantly hampering the plaintiff’s case. The court limited the claims to proceed at trial to the fall only. The court also dismissed punitive damages and dismissed the holdings company defendant outright.

We obtained summary judgment in Carbon County, Pennsylvania in a negligence action brought against a local school district. The plaintiff, a former high school athlete, was working out in the District’s weight lifting facility when a cable snapped on a leg curl machine, striking his head and causing significant injury. The plaintiff sued the district, alleging negligence in the operation, inspection, and maintenance of the gym and, more specifically, the leg curl machine. Following discovery, the district moved for summary judgment, arguing that the leg curl machine at issue was personalty and not part of the District’s real property and, accordingly, the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA) prevented recovery. The court agreed and concluded the District was immune under the PSTCA since all evidence showed that the leg curl machine was not a fixture of the building and, therefore, the “real property” exception to local governmental immunity did not apply.

We obtained an entry of judgment on behalf of an urgent care physician. The plaintiff filed suit in magisterial district court in Wayne County, PA. She alleged that the physician negligently sutured a hand laceration, leading to dehiscence and the need for subsequent surgery. The plaintiff sought recovery of medical expenses and pain and suffering. At the bench trial, the defense sought dismissal based upon the plaintiff’s lack of expert support for her claims, as is required in medical malpractice claims. The court agreed and entered judgment in the defendant’s favor. 

Our attorneys successfully obtained summary judgment on behalf of a car dealership. The dealership rented a vehicle to the co-defendant, who was having his personal vehicle serviced at the dealership. The co-defendant was involved in an auto accident with the plaintiff while operating the dealership’s rental. The plaintiff was operating a motorcycle, and significant damages were alleged. The defense team filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to the Graves Amendment, which states that an owner of a motor vehicle, who rents a vehicle to a person, shall not be vicariously liable for harm to persons or property that arises out of the use or operation of that vehicle during the period of the rental, so long as certain additional criteria is met. The court agreed with our arguments raised in the motion and dismissed our client with prejudice.

We obtained dismissal via preliminary objections of all claims asserted against a day care center in a shooting case venued in Philadelphia. The case arose from the shooting death of a student’s father. The shooter had been previously convicted of manslaughter and assault and was an employee of the day care center’s long-time food service vendor. While the decedent was dropping off his youngest child at day care, he got into an argument with the shooter, who was on the premises delivering food. The decedent subsequently drove away with his 17-year-old son in the passenger seat, and the shooter followed in his work van. A few blocks away from the day care center, the shooter pulled up alongside the decedent’s vehicle and repeatedly fired a handgun at the decedent. The decedent’s son survived the shooting. The food service vendor, its affiliated entities, the day care center and the shooter were named as defendants. The claims against the day care center included negligence per se, negligent hiring, negligent supervision, negligent undertaking to render services, negligent infliction of emotional distress, violations of the Unfair Trade Practices & Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL), negligent misrepresentation, and negligent infliction of emotional distress as to the decedent’s seventeen-year-old son who witnessed the shooting. The plaintiffs’ negligence per se claims centered on alleged violations of the Child Protective Services Law (CPSL), the Public Welfare Law (PWL) and the Pennsylvania School Code (School Code). Among other things, the plaintiffs took the position that the day care center had a duty to ensure that its service vendor’s employees did not have criminal records because those employees foreseeably came into contact with children and parents. On behalf of the day care center, we filed preliminary objections seeking dismissal of all claims asserted against it. After briefing, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas granted our preliminary objections. The case subsequently resolved with no contribution whatsoever from our client.

We obtained summary judgment in the Philadelphia, PA Court of Common Pleas in a case involving the alleged defective design and installation of a synthetic turf field. Our client was the alleged installer of a turf field located at a popular venue for recreational athletics. The plaintiff sustained a full tear of his right ACL, a complex tear of the medial meniscus and partial tear of the IT band when he tripped on an exposed seam in the turf. Discovery revealed that a flood occurred during turf installation, arguably impacting the outcome. Nevertheless, the court granted our motion for summary judgment premised on an argument that the plaintiff could not establish a deviation from the standard of care for turf installation in the absence of qualified expert testimony.

In a lawsuit seeking $279 million in alleged property damages, Marshall Dennehey attorneys successfully defended their client, a subcontractor of a railroad repair shop, against any and all liability.  The case involved the August 2016 rupture of a railroad tank car containing 178,000 lbs. of liquefied chlorine at the plaintiff’s chlorine manufacturing plant in West Virginia. The tank car had recently been returned to the plaintiff after undergoing extensive repairs in the spring of 2016. The chemical producer-plaintiff filed suit against three parties as a result of the chlorine release: its fleet maintenance manager, the railcar repair shop that performed the 2016 repairs to the tank car and our client, a subcontractor of the railroad repair shop involved in the aspect of the repairs which the plaintiff claimed were performed negligently.  At the time of the 2016 repairs, the tank car was 37 years old and had several characteristics associated with it that were known in the railroad industry to cause cracks in the tank’s shell. It was undisputed at trial that there was a small, pre-existing crack in the tank shell prior to the 2016 repairs at issue, and that, but-for this pre-existing crack, the tank car would not have ruptured in August of 2016, which was the first time the tank car was loaded with chlorine since the repairs were completed. Allegations of comparative negligence were asserted by all of the defendants against the plaintiff for its decision to repair, rather than scrap, the tank car in 2016.  During trial, the plaintiff asserted it was entitled to $278 million in replacement-value property damage associated with alleged damage to its equipment at its 500-acre chlorine manufacturing plant. The plaintiff requested, and the trial judge granted, a jury instruction providing that the jury could award replacement value damages. The nearly six-week trial encompassed over 30 witnesses and 10 expert witnesses. After deliberations, the jury awarded only $12.8 million in damages, assessing the railcar repair shop with 40% of liability, the plaintiff’s fleet maintenance manager with 20% of liability, and the plaintiff itself with the remaining 40% of liability. No liability was assessed to our client.   

We obtained a dismissal of a declaratory judgment action against our clients, a national firm and its principal, who specialize in identifying and reclaiming lost property for consumers, who do not realize such lost property exists. Plaintiff brought this declaratory judgment action on the heels of plaintiff’s having suffered a smarting defeat in an attempted class action lawsuit against our clients. In that underlying litigation, the lower court dismissed plaintiff’s lawsuit twice and the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal. Plaintiff brought this action to preempt any attempts by our clients to someday bring a Dragonetti claim against plaintiff for filing the class action lawsuit in the underlying litigation without probable cause. We filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s declaratory judgment action, asserting that Plaintiff’s lawsuit was improper because it was asking the Court to make a decision on an issue that had not yet arisen. The Court granted our motion and soundly rejected Plaintiff’s claims, issuing an opinion that decisively stated “no amendment would save [plaintiff’s] Amended Complaint.” The lawsuit against our clients was dismissed with prejudice.

Our attorneys obtained summary judgment relief on behalf of an amusements park in a lawsuit for alleged personal injury sustained at the park’s lazy river attraction. The plaintiff and his family were business invitees at our client’s amusement and water park. The plaintiff alleged he sustained injury when he attempted to board an inner tube on the lazy river attraction, which was staffed by certified lifeguards. The plaintiff claimed that the lifeguards negligently failed to assist and/or help him get onto the inner tube and were further negligent for failing to observe him while he attempted to do so. As a result of the lifeguards’ alleged negligence, the plaintiff claimed his inner tube flipped backwards, resulting in his head striking the floor of the shallow watercourse.   During depositions, the plaintiff and his wife conceded that the extent of the lifeguards' assistance to visitors of the attraction was gathering vacant inner tubes and pushing them towards people waiting in line. Moreover, the plaintiff testified he made one initial unsuccessful attempt to climb on an inner tube before ultimately "over engineering it" on his second attempt, which caused the inner tube to flip backwards. The court agreed that under the "no-duty" rule, the lifeguards did not owe the plaintiff a duty because the alleged risks associated with climbing onto an inner tube in the lazy river attraction were common, inherent, expected or frequent risks associated with the activity. Furthermore, the plaintiff was unable to satisfy an exception to the no duty rule because he could not prove the employees deviated from an established custom or duty. The trial court's decision granting summary judgment and dismissing the plaintiff's claims, with prejudice, was ultimately affirmed on appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.  

We obtained dismissal of claims asserted against our insurance broker client for breach of contract and declaratory judgment in connection with a COVID-related business interruption loss. The Court granted our Motion to Dismiss, determining that plaintiff restaurant lacked a viable breach of contract claim against the insurance broker, and thus that the derivative declaratory judgment claim also failed as a matter of law.  The lawsuit arose from pandemic-related, government-mandated business closures and plaintiff’s claim for business interruption losses, which was denied by its insurer.  The allegations against our client pertained to alleged breach of the insurance policy and coverage obligations under the policy, which unequivocally stated that the parties to the insurance policy were plaintiff as policyholder and the insurer – not our insurance broker client.   In the Magistrate Judge’s Opinion, adopted by U.S. Middle District of PA Judge Mariani, the Court concluded that our client was not a party to the insurance policy contract and did not agree to undertake any responsibilities or liabilities for the insurer’s coverage determinations, but merely acted as an agent for a plainly disclosed principal (insurer) and facilitated the contract between the parties thereto.  

We secured partial summary judgment for a Central Pennsylvania obstetrician and health system in a birth injury case that also alleged significant urogynecological injuries to the mother. The plaintiff’s firm had previously secured a $10 million award for a similar maternal claim. In this matter the court agreed that the plaintiff’s expert reports were insufficient, and dismissed the corporate negligence claim, the claim for injuries and future economic and non-economic damages of the child, and the mother’s claim for future economic and non-economic damages.

We obtained dismissal of a six-figure claim in Philadelphia County via preliminary objections. The plaintiff homeowner sued a lighting designer for breach of contract, negligence for $23k in remediation costs, statutory remedies for treble damages and legal fees. The plaintiff alleged the lighting designer was a home improvement contractor who violated the Home Improvement Consumer Protection Act (HICPA) and Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law. The plaintiff omitted pertinent facts from the complaint. Using judicial notice, we presented facts from public records to show that the design services were performed in the construction of a new home. We argued that HICPA does not apply to new construction and that the gist of the action doctrine barred the contract claim. The court agreed, dismissed the statutory and contract claims, and remanded the $23k negligence claim to Common Pleas Court arbitration.

Our defense team successfully obtained dismissal of a New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD) perceived disability claim, alleging COVID-19 to be a disability under this statute. This employment discrimination claim involved a matter of first impression in New Jersey. A former employee filed suit asserting perceived disability discrimination under the NJLAD. The plaintiff alleged he was wrongfully terminated based upon his employer’s perception that he had COVID-19. We filed a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer, asserting the complaint did not set forth a cause of action as COVID-19 is not a recognized disability under the NJLAD. The court granted our motion and agreed that COVID-19 is not a disability under the NJLAD and, therefore, could not be the predicate for a perceived discrimination case. 

Our defense team was successful before the New Jersey Appellate Division. The plaintiff is a former employee of a non-profit agency that provides services to disabled individuals. She filed suit against her former employer and its manager, alleging gender discrimination and retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim. As discovery progressed, thousands of pages of discovery were exchanged, which demonstrated that legitimate, long-standing performance deficiencies were the actual basis for her termination. The defendants filed for summary judgment prior to the end of the discovery period, and the Law Division granted the motion, finding no reason not to grant the immediate dismissal, especially as the plaintiff failed to even respond to the statement of material facts. On appeal to the Appellate Division, the court affirmed the dismissal, rejecting the plaintiff’s arguments that the motion judge engaged in a subjective analysis of the facts and thereby made factual findings on disputed issues, and that the motion judge erred by granting the motion before discovery was complete. The court found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate, with any degree of particularity, that further discovery would supply the missing elements to her cause of action. The court further found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of gender discrimination or workers’ compensation retaliation given the unrebutted facts provided by the defendants. 

We obtained the dismissal of a former employee accused of trademark infringement. A spray foam insulation company brought a claim for trademark infringement against a former employee. The plaintiff claimed that it had used the mark in connection with its business for over eight years, thereby establishing secondary meaning of the mark in connection with spray foam insulation in the New Jersey market. The plaintiff further alleged the defendants used the mark in marketing and promoting their competing spray foam insulation business in New Jersey. There was no valid claim against our client as there were no facts pled to support the threshold issue, that the plaintiff held a protectable mark. The complaint pled only conclusory allegations that the mark had secondary meaning, and there were no allegations that our client had any interest in the allegedly offending mark.

The lawsuit was brought by 54 condominium unit owners of a 608-unit, age-restricted planned development against the homeowner’s association board, the property manager and the sponsor/developer, for the early transfer of control of the condominium association. Dismissal of the board and the property manager was granted in what was properly a unit owner-sponsor/developer dispute over control of the association. The unit owners alleged that the sponsor/developer was no longer offering new units for sale; rather, they were only renting units, thereby triggering the turn-over provisions in the by-laws. No claims against either the board or the property manager were properly pled in the complaint. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed as to both.

The plaintiff filed suit against her employer, a governmental agency, alleging she was subject to discrimination under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD) based upon her disability and that she was subject to retaliation for filing a previous discrimination suit. She further asserted aiding-and-abetting claims against fellow employees. The case was dismissed via summary judgment, and the plaintiff appealed. The Appellate Division accepted our argument that the failure to move the plaintiff to a position she desired did not constitute an adverse employment action or failure to accommodate as she suffered no adverse effect on her salary or benefits, and did not materially alter her working conditions. Further, the court addressed concerns the plaintiff’s physician had expressed when she sought the accommodation, even though she was not transferred to a position in which she preferred to work, and agreed the claims were properly rejected by the trial Judge.

The plaintiff, who owned his own restaurant business, sustained personal injuries in a car accident while on a business errand. He collected the tortfeasor’s liability limits of $100,000 and then filed underinsured motorist claims with his own insurance carrier that had issued the personal auto and commercial auto policies. The underinsured claims were denied by the carrier. There was no UIM coverage under the personal auto policy because the $100,000 UIM limits equaled the liability carrier’s limits. Further, although the plaintiff had $1 million in UIM limits on his commercial policy, the Mazda he was driving at the time of the accident was not listed on the commercial policy; rather, it was listed on the personal auto policy. The plaintiff then sued the insurance agent and broker who listed the Mazda on the personal rather than commercial policy. He argued professional negligence, breach of fiduciary duty and negligent misrepresentation. Extensive discovery was conducted, including depositions of insurance standard of care experts for each side. The court granted Ray’s motion for summary judgment on several bases: the statute of limitations began to run when the Mazda was first put on the personal auto policy, not when the motor vehicle accident occurred; despite the plaintiff’s and the agent’s friendship and long-standing business dealings, there was not a fiduciary relationship between the agent and insured customer; and the agent’s alleged statement to the plaintiff that he was covered in “every single possible way you can think of” did not amount to a misrepresentation of fact.    

We obtained an order of dismissal through pretrial motions in a complex legal malpractice action heard before the United States District Court. It arose out of an underlying first-party coverage action that involved hundreds of thousands of dollars in connection with building damage caused by Hurricane Sandy. The plaintiffs filed a complaint against our clients, certain individuals and a law firm, alleging claims for legal malpractice.  Our motion for summary judgment filed on behalf of the defendants asserted that an order for dismissal should be entered because: (1) the plaintiffs’ expert failed to offer an opinion on causation and damages; (2) the individual claims of the plaintiffs should be dismissed since the plaintiffs did not establish an individual claim; and (3) the plaintiffs failed to come forward with proofs to satisfy the punitive damages standard in New Jersey. The court granted our motion for summary judgment.   

We obtained a defense verdict in a Bucks County bench trial. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant homeowners’ association was obligated to replace an old stone bridge that provided the only access to the plaintiff’s residence and open public space. As part of the initial community development approval, the township directed the builder to carve out open space and repair the stone bridge so that emergency vehicles could access the open space. Continued maintenance/replacement of the bridge would thereafter pass to the the homeowner’s association. The builder never made the repairs to the bridge despite multiple requests by the township. The homeowner’s association successfully argued that its obligation to replace the bridge did not arise as the builder had not fulfilled the condition precedent of repairing the bridge and bringing it up to a current safe standard.

We obtained a directed verdict following a six-day jury trial in York County, Pennsylvania under COVID-19 restrictions. In this property damage case, the plaintiff claimed that his house was flooded when his local property manager and water company failed to coordinate the turn-on of water service while he was residing in Colorado. Brooks represented the water company at trial and demonstrated that the plaintiff failed to prove that the water company owed any additional duties of care to him, or that any breach of those duties was a factual cause of the harm which occurred—namely, flooding of the house for seven days. A directed verdict was granted in favor of the water company at the end of trial. The plaintiff passed on a joint offer of $100,000 in the days leading up to trial. The property manager secured a defense verdict just hours after the water company’s directed verdict. The judge, jury, staff, and all counsel wore masks and socially distanced during trial. Testifying witnesses were asked by the court to remove their masks in order to testify, with the witness stand encapsulated in Plexiglass. All but one witness consented.

In a case where we represented an insurance broker, a Federal District Judge from the Southern District of West Virginia granted our motion to dismiss and dismissed the suit in its entirety. The plaintiff was a women’s fashion and accessory boutique. The suit arose from a dispute over the plaintiff’s insurance coverage for damages it sustained while being ordered to close by West Virginia’s COVID-19-related orders. The insurance carrier filed a motion to dismiss, and, thereafter, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the carrier. The broker filed a motion to dismiss all of the claims plead against it, including bad faith, West Virginia’s Unfair Trade Practices Act, estoppel and breach of fiduciary duty. The court dismissed the counts of bad faith and Unfair Trade Practices Act, finding that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient allegations to support such claims. The court further explained that the plaintiff alleged very few facts specific to the broker and that the allegations plead did not support any unreasonable conduct by the broker, which is required to establish bad faith or deception. For similar reasons, the court held that the plaintiff’s estoppel claim failed. The plaintiff alleged the broker advised that they would have coverage as a result of the COVID-19 orders. The court found that the plaintiff failed to allege how it relied on those representations or how that reliance was detrimental. The alleged representations occurred months after the plaintiff accepted the policy and did not appear to have any impact on the plaintiff’s request for payments from its insurance carrier. Finally, the court explained that the plaintiff failed to identify any West Virginia authority to establish a breach of fiduciary duty against the broker. Regardless, the court found that the plaintiff failed to allege that it requested specific coverage before the broker procured the policy.

We assisted an attorney and his zoning board clients in having sanctions that had been imposed by a trial court judge vacated. We helped the attorney in obtaining pre-claim assistance coverage from his insurance carrier, and then worked with him to author an appellate brief challenging the sanctions. In an unpublished opinion, the judge writing for the Commonwealth Court agreed with the arguments presented by our team and the client. The Commonwealth Court found that the trial court had no jurisdiction to issue sanctions under Section 2503 of the Judicial Code. The Commonwealth Court also found there was no basis to sanction the attorney or his clients under Rule of Civil Procedure 1701, and that the trial court did not provide appropriate due process prior to making a finding of contempt. The trial court’s order for sanctions was vacated.