Results

We defeated a plaintiff’s petition for certification to the New Jersey Supreme Court in a tortious interference and defamation action against an attorney for a lender bank. The New Jersey Appellate Division had affirmed a trial court decision granting summary judgment in a $10 million tortious interference and defamation case filed by borrowers against the attorneys for a lender bank. This case arose out of an underlying deficiency and foreclosure action filed by a bank due to the plaintiff’s failure to repay a multi-million dollar loan used to finance the purchase of real estate. During the course of negotiations to resolve the debt, the bank’s counsel had discussions with the plaintiff’s new lender. The plaintiffs alleged that during these discussions, the defendant attorney called the plaintiff a “wannabe gangster.” On appeal, Jack and Jeremy successfully argued that the trial court was correct in dismissing this case on summary judgment. The Appellate Division held that the trial judge correctly concluded that a statement made by the bank’s attorney to a potential new lender calling the plaintiff a “wannabe gangster” was mere name calling, not actionable defamation. The claims for tortious interference were based upon the lost opportunity, since the new lender rescinded its conditional commitment after the alleged statement was made. The Appellate Division held that the trial court was correct in holding that the statements were protected under the litigation privilege, that the litigation privilege is not confined to the courtroom, but extends to all statements or communications in connection with judicial proceedings. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a petition for certification before the New Jersey Supreme Court, which we successfully opposed. The Supreme Court, in its decision, denied the plaintiff’s petition, with costs in favor of our client. 

We successfully represented an attorney who was sued by a former client after representing that client in a personal injury action. The plaintiff alleged the attorney failed to file suit within the time allowed by the Statute of Limitations. We argued in our summary judgment motion that the attorney sent two letters to the plaintiff, advising that the attorney would not file suit and further informing the plaintiff when the Statute of Limitations would expire. The plaintiff, who filed suit four years later, argued that he did not receive the letters and the attorney was obligated to do more than send letters. We successfully argued that the plaintiff failed to overcome the presumption that a letter, correctly addressed, was received. The Appellate Division affirmed, adopting our argument that the plaintiff could not overcome the presumption by simply claiming he did not receive the letters. 

In this civil rights litigation, we obtained summary judgment and the dismissal of all claims against a Pennsylvania City and one of its police officers. The court found that the traffic stop of the plaintiff was proper and did not violate his constitutional rights. The plaintiff filed a federal civil rights action against the police officer and the City, alleging that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because of unlawful search and seizure as well as a malicious prosecution. The plaintiff further alleged that the City was liable for the constitutional violation based upon a failure to train its officers. These claims were based, in part, upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Commonwealth v. Hicks, which was filed approximately two months before the plaintiff’s arrest. In this civil rights case, the parties agree to forego discovery and instead rely solely upon the record developed in the plaintiff’s state criminal prosecution. After considering the record evidence, the arguments of each side, and the motions and briefs submitted, the District Court issued an opinion finding that the police officer possessed a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, justifying the traffic stop of the plaintiff’s vehicle. Because the court concluded that the plaintiff’s constitutional rights had not been violated, an analysis of qualified immunity was unnecessary. Finally, after finding that the officer did not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the court dismissed the Monell claims raised against the City.

We prevailed in a jury trial on a UM claim in Hillsborough County’s 13th Judicial Circuit. The plaintiff claimed he suffered permanent and debilitating injuries in a rear-end collision in Tampa, Florida. Liability was admitted, but the extent of the plaintiff’s injuries was in dispute. The plaintiff asked the jury to award him $500,000 for past and future damages.  The jury found there was no permanent injury and awarded $25,000 for past medical expenses only.

We obtained summary judgment for an insurance carrier client that had been sued by another insurance carrier for more than $1.6M in damages arising out of a fire loss. The opposing insurance company had paid $1.6M in damages and intended to pursue a product liability claim against a vehicle manufacturer, alleging that a defectively manufactured vehicle had caused the fire to an auto repair facility. Our client insured the vehicle that was allegedly defective. After the insurance companies conducted a preliminary expert evaluation, the vehicle was destroyed by a salvage yard in the normal course of business. A claim was made against our client for promissory estoppel where it was alleged that the vehicle was destroyed despite a promise to preserve. The Court of Common Pleas of Erie County rejected the claims against our client and agreed with our defense that the promissory estoppel claim was a disguised claim for negligent spoliation, which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania does not recognize. Moreover, assuming such a cause of action could withstand summary judgment, the damages claimed were speculative in that without the vehicle it could never be proven that a manufacturing defect within the vehicle had caused the fire. Although the $1.6M damages were established, whether the insurance company could prove causation of damages was speculative and the promissory estoppel claim could not survive summary judgment.

Despite dueling expert affidavits, Marshall Dennehey attorneys won summary judgment in a premises matter in the Connecticut Superior Court Middlesex Judicial District. The plaintiff claimed negligence against our client, a mattress retailer, for a hazardous and defective condition in the store. The defect alleged was a tile-carpet transition claimed to be approximately one-half of an inch in differential, as well as a “slope” in the continuing carpet that created a friction co-efficient that caused the plaintiff to fall. We submitted an affidavit from the store owner (whom the plaintiff waived deposing), an affidavit from an engineering expert, photographs from the site inspection, and a detailed memorandum of law outlining Connecticut law on constructive and actual notice. Our engineering expert had researched the history of the premises at the Town Clerk for the time prior to our client’s occupation (eight months leading up to the incident) and observed there were no claims, complaints or code infractions relative to the alleged condition. In other words, our client inherited the premises as is and, although responsible for the floor per the terms of the lease, had no reason or cause to repair anything or to take any corrective action. Our client’s affidavit attested that both he and his customers traversed over the “defect” countless times without feeling, observing, noticing or detecting anything foreseeably dangerous. Moreover, we asserted that because the plaintiff’s expert failed to bring up any mention of a government regulation, code, industry standard or custom that was deviated from with respect to the carpet-tile transition and premises, the expert’s affidavit was tantamount to no affidavit at all. The court granted our summary judgment motion and dismissed the case.

We defended a claim petition and penalty petition wherein the claimant alleged serious neck and back injuries as a result of a work-related motor vehicle accident. We convinced the judge that the claimant was not in the course and scope of employment at the time of injury and, therefore, his claim was barred. The judge noted that, based on claimant’s testimony on cross examination, he had a legal address in North Carolina but was allegedly leasing an apartment in Newtown Square, Pa. He alleged he was on a special mission on the date of injury, traveling to an office owned by the employer. It was established that on the date of the accident, he was traveling on an expressway in New Jersey prior to his shift and admitted that his job required him to service many of the employer’s offices. The judge accepted the defense argument that the claimant was traveling to work, not in the course and scope of employment and not on a special mission, and dismissed the claim and penalty petitions.

The decision, which reversed the trial court and Superior Court, reinstated a jury verdict in favor of our clients. Following a defense verdict, the trial court awarded a new trial based on a question posed by defense counsel, who was not a Marshall Dennehey attorney. The Superior Court affirmed the award of a new trial, but the Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the defense verdict on the basis that defense counsel’s question was neither improper nor prejudicial.

This case had potential national implications where the allegations by Disciplinary Counsel included 93 paragraphs and alleged violations of multiple Rules of Professional Conduct.

We won a total controvert on a workers’ compensation exposure claim and successfully defended a denial. The claimant alleged exposure to a toxic airplane paint thinner at a plant in Kentucky in December of 2019. He was a subcontractor of the airplane manufacturer, but a Florida employee. The claimant complained of breathing issues and skin rashes. He sought treatment at an emergency room in Kentucky on the date of alleged exposure ,and again approximately 10 months later for skin rashes. However, the claimant was able to continue working without any wage loss the entire time. The employer/carrier denied and defended on the basis that the claimant could not prove causation by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to F.S. 440.02. The claimant obtained an IME, which opined that his breathing issues could be attributable to the alleged exposure, but that the rashes most likely were not. The claimant’s IME physician opined that the claimant needed to undergo additional testing to determine causation. The employer/carrier’s IME opined that the major contributing cause of the claimant’s rashes and breathing issues was not the alleged exposure. The Judge of Compensation Claims accepted the employer/carrier’s IME and held that the claimant failed to prove that a workplace chemical exposure was the major contributing cause of his complaints. 

A FINRA arbitration panel recommended the expungement of two separate customer complaints from a financial advisor’s public record.  Both complaints involved allegedly unsuitable sales of alternative investments.

We successfully prosecuted a termination petition on behalf of a Philadelphia-based ice cream shop. The claimant sustained a serious ankle fracture after a slip and fall in the shop’s freezer. We utilized the treating physician to certify the claimant’s full and complete recovery from the ankle fracture and established that there were no residual maladies or disability stemming from the incident.

A FINRA arbitration panel granted a financial advisor and his supervisor’s motion to dismiss a FINRA arbitration on the basis that the Claimant previously brought multiple claims regarding the same securities related dispute against the broker-dealer, who was not a party to this arbitration.  

The arbitrations were commenced by medical providers against the respondent-carrier for non-payment of medical bills insofar as the policyholder and the claimant engaged in material misrepresentation in the procurement of the policy, and in the presentation of the claim. We submitted a defense brief that included numerous exhibits, including examination under oath transcripts, an affidavit from the respondent-carrier’s underwriting department and screenshots of insurance premium payments from the claimant to the policyholder. At the hearings, the defense argued that the respondent-carrier owed no duty of coverage insofar as the policyholder and the claimant engaged in material misrepresentation in the procurement of the policy and in the presentation of the claim. Specifically, the policyholder fraudulently obtained an insurance policy with the respondent-carrier on behalf of the claimant. The misrepresentation was deemed “material” insofar as the respondent-carrier would have charged a higher premium based on the actual garaging location of the insured vehicle and, moreover, would not have otherwise insured the claimant. The arbitrator held that the respondent-carrier established, by a preponderance of credible evidence, that the instant loss involved fraud and misrepresentation in the procurement of the insurance policy; the policyholders’ misrepresentation with regard to the ownership, operation and garaging of the insured vehicle was material; the respondent-carrier would not have issued the policy if the facts had been disclosed by the policyholders, and that the respondent-carrier was justified in denying the claim.

The plaintiff, a pipefitter employed on a construction site, claimed he tripped and fell over a 2’ x 4’ metal stud, causing him to sustain a shoulder injury and subsequent surgery. The plaintiff sued the owner and general contractor under the New York State Labor Law. At his deposition in 2018, the plaintiff produced a photograph showing a loose metal stud lying on the floor of the construction site. When questioned as to who took the photograph, he stated his friend a co-worker, took the photo but that he was not there when it was taken. Four days later, the defense visited the friend and showed him the photograph produced. The friend denied ever taking the photograph and showed the defense the one photograph that he did take of the plaintiff merely sitting on a bench after the incident.  During trial, the plaintiff again produced the photograph (which was entered into evidence) and testified that it was taken by his friend and co-worker, Brian. The plaintiff also testified that he was not wearing sunglasses at the time of his fall, despite an email from a co-worker to his employer who witnessed the incident stating that he was. The email also stated that the plaintiff tripped and fell while trying to squeeze between two vertical metal studs while wearing a work backpack and carrying two energy drinks.  When the plaintiff rested his case, we called the eyewitness to the stand, who testified that the plaintiff tripped and fell trying to fit through two vertical studs while wearing a backpack and sunglasses. He further testified that the plaintiff tripped over a fixed plate on the floor, not a loose stud. The defense then called the plaintiff's friend and co-worker to the stand, who testified that he did not take the photograph produced by the plaintiff, nor did he give the photograph to the plaintiff. The jury rendered a defense verdict.  

Our attorneys were successful in obtaining an order for dismissal in the Mount Holly, New Jersey Workers’ Compensation court. In his claim petition, the petitioner alleged permanent disability as a result of contracting COVID-19 while working for the insured. He alleged that while working as an auto hauler he was exposed to COVID-19, which resulted in a permanent pulmonary disability. The defense argued to the judge that the petitioner’s discovery failed to provide sufficient proof and evidence supporting that the petitioner had COVID-19 or that, if he did, it was “related to his job.”

The claimant filed a claim petition alleging that she sustained a contusion to the back of her head, a concussion, bilateral shoulder pain and neck pain. The judge found the claimant credible and that an incident did occur in the course and scope of her employment. However, the judge also found the employer’s medical expert credible. The employer’s medical expert found that the claimant was fully recovered as of the date of the Independent Medical Examination. This limited the receipt of indemnity and medical to fourteen months, rather than an ongoing claim.

The claimant alleged several injuries. The Board denied the claimant’s petition for additional compensation due on all counts, and granted the employer’s petition for review to terminate total disability benefits. Specifically, the Board concluded that (1) a proposed left ankle reconstruction surgery was not reasonable and necessary, (2) there was insufficient evidence to prove a compensable left knee injury, (3) there was insufficient evidence to prove a compensable lumbar spine injury and (4) the claimant was capable of unrestricted return to work. 

Our attorneys secured a voluntary dismissal on behalf of an aircraft parts supplier in an asbestos mesothelioma case. The plaintiff alleged he was diagnosed with mesothelioma as a result of exposure to numerous asbestos products while doing home renovation work with his father in the 1940s; while in the U.S. Air Force working as an aircraft mechanic between 1953 to 1957; as a self-employed painter between 1958 and 1960; and as a civilian aircraft maintenance crew chief at the Willow Grove Air Force Base between 1959 to 1968. The plaintiff contended our client was the exclusive supplier of asbestos-containing fire sleeves for military aircraft hose assemblies that he worked with almost on a daily basis while at Willow Grove. Based upon the plaintiff’s description of the product during his trial video and discovery depositions, our client took the position that the product could not have been supplied by them. All other defendants either settled or were dismissed, and our client took a no-pay position. As the case neared trial, plaintiff’s counsel presented evidence as to why the product identified by the plaintiff was accurate and, therefore, why the case should be settled. Through a combination of the plaintiff’s testimony, our witness’s prior testimony, select portions of catalog pages and drawings from the aircraft the plaintiff worked on, and catalog pages from our client’s catalogs, plaintiff’s counsel was persuaded to voluntarily dismiss our client shortly before trial was to begin. 

Our clients specialize in identifying and reclaiming lost property for consumers who are unaware that such lost property exists. The plaintiff brought claims under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL) and for fraudulent inducement, arguing that the business model was deceptive because consumers could recover their own property without paying for the ease and convenience of having the defendant business work on their behalf. Not surprisingly, the district court found that the plaintiff’s serial complaints failed to allege anything “more than Defendants’ expertise,” and that there was no factual basis to support the notion that consumers are unduly influenced or misled. On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal, expressly noting that the defendants made no misrepresentation at any time, and the UTPCPL and fraud claims were dismissed without merit. 

Our attorneys obtained dismissal of an ethics grievance filed against their client, the litigation counsel for a condominium association. In this case, the attorney was able to obtain a multi-million dollar settlement on behalf of the condominium association resulting from various construction defects caused by the developer, among others. After the settlement was reached, the developer’s vice president was able to assume control of the condominium association’s board and brought ethics charges against the attorney, alleging collusion with the board president and a property manager, who acted in concert to abscond with the settlement proceeds. The ethics grievance alleged the attorney should have notified the association board of the conspiracy and should have warned the association of the theft taking place. Upon responding to the ethics grievance filed against the attorney, the defense argued that the attorney had no involvement with the president of the association or the project manager and did not have any knowledge of the conspiracy. The attorney focused on the litigation and did not involve himself in anything related to the association’s business, other than the litigation, and focused on obtaining the best settlement possible for the association against the developer. After investigating this matter, reviewing the attorney’s response, as well as interviewing the attorney, the Office of Attorney Ethics dismissed all allegations against the attorney, finding that the allegations could not be proven by clear and convincing evidence. 

Our attorneys obtained judgment in favor of a local borough and its employees/agents following numerous rounds of motions to dismiss in the Western District. The plaintiff, a construction contractor, brought suit alleging the borough violated its constitutional civil rights by failing to issue it a grading permit in the time it perceived as reasonable. The matter is more generally described as a land use dispute, involving the plaintiff’s excessive dumping and destruction of a local sewer line, thus jeopardizing the health and safety of the local residents. In support of dismissal, we argued that no substantive due process rights were violated, and that the civil conspiracy claim as to the individual defendants failed as a matter of law. The court agreed and granted the plaintiff leave to amend. Failing to heed our position, the plaintiff filed an additional complaint, to which we again moved to dismiss. The court agreed with our arguments and dismissed the federal claims, with prejudice.

We successfully handled a pension rights action before the Commonwealth Court on behalf of a municipality. A police chief in small municipality alleged that a scrivener’s error in his employment contract erroneously referencing Act 600 entitled him to an Act 600 pension plan upon retirement when his existing pension plan had been organized many years pursuant to Act 15. The police chief had never contributed to an Act 600 pension plan, which would have provided for much higher benefits and for which the municipality had no funds set aside to pay because it had never established an Act 600 plan. The Commonwealth Court held that the police chief’s pension rights existed only under Act 15 because the municipal pension ordinance was established under Act 15, not Act 600. Pennsylvania law requires an ordinance to establish pension rights. Pension rights cannot be conferred only by agreement, without an ordinance. This decision was very important to the municipality we represented, and the opinion affirms well-established law that a municipality cannot contract for benefits if there is no enabling law for the benefits.

We obtained summary judgment on behalf of a Bedford County real estate agency and its agents, who represented the buyers/plaintiffs in their purchase of a home in Bedford, PA. Prior to closing, the plaintiffs waived their contractual right to a home inspection. After they closed and moved into the home, the plaintiffs became aware of several issues with the home, including a leaking metal roof, a defective heat pump and flooding in the crawlspace after a heavy rain. The plaintiffs claimed the sellers/defendants were aware of these conditions but knowingly failed to disclose them on the sellers’ disclosure statement. The plaintiffs also claimed our clients were negligent in failing to advise them about the alleged material omissions in the sellers’ disclosure statement and by not taking steps to try to ascertain whether there were any undisclosed defects in the property in light of the information that was omitted from the disclosure statement. The plaintiffs conceded during their deposition testimony that they reviewed and signed the disclosure statement, even though they did not ask any questions of our clients about its contents or the sections of the statement that were not completed by the sellers. The plaintiffs also acknowledged that our clients did not prepare the disclosure statement and that they had no actual knowledge of any of the alleged defects in the property at issue. In granting summary judgment, the court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to produce sufficient evidence in support of their negligence claim, and dismissed the claim, with prejudice.

We obtained the dismissal of an ethics grievance on behalf of a local special education law attorney. The grievant filed her ethics grievance based upon allegations of fraudulent and unethical practices, accusing the attorney of taking legal fees from a settlement, and alleging that the attorney was prohibited from doing so based on the terms of the settlement agreement. Specifically, the grievant alleged that the attorney failed to safeguard funds from an irrevocable trust for a special needs child, her son. In fully investigating this grievance, the District Ethics Investigator concluded that based on the evidence received, the interviews conducted and the submissions prepared on behalf of the attorney, the investigation did not reveal clear and convincing evidence that the attorney engaged in unethical conduct.

We obtained dismissal of two charges filed with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission. The charging party had been removed from two of the employer’s stores. He claimed it was due to discrimination, because of his race and disability (he required a service animal to be with him). The defense submitted a position statement with affidavits of employees and managers, explaining that the employee was removed because he was videoing other customers without their consent and making racially charged comments to employees and customers. 

Our attorneys obtained dismissal of claims against a real estate agent arising from the agent’s representation of a buyer in connection with the purchase of a home in Philadelphia. Following the purchase of the property, the buyer discovered numerous undisclosed issues with the home and commenced suit against the seller and the seller’s agent. In turn, the seller’s agent joined our client, the buyer’s agent, alleging it was actually the buyer’s agent who should be liable on the buyer’s claims for negligence, violation of the Pennsylvania Seller’s Disclosure Law, breach of contract, negligent representation and fraud. On preliminary objections, we argued that the plaintiff’s conclusory allegations did not give rise to valid claims, that a buyer’s agent cannot be liable under the Seller’s Disclosure Law without actual knowledge of a material defect which was not disclosed, that the joinder complaint did not adequately allege that the buyer’s agent made any misrepresentations, and that there were no allegations adequate to suggest the buyer’s agent breached his statutory duties under the law. The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas agreed, sustaining the preliminary objections and dismissing the joinder complaint. 

Our attorneys succeeded in obtaining an affirmance in the Fifth District Court of Appeal of a final dismissal order of a wrongful death product liability action. The decedent’s estate filed the lawsuit two years after the statute of limitations expired. The estate argued the statute was tolled for a variety of reasons. The trial court dismissed the case, with prejudice, after giving the Estate five attempts to amend. The Fifth District affirmed the dismissal and dispensed with oral argument that same day. 

Our attorneys succeeded in obtaining an affirmance by the Fourth District Court of Appeal. The Fourth District affirmed the dismissal, with prejudice, of our clients, a listing real estate agent and his broker, in an alleged negligence and fraud case. The court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing their pleadings due to their attorney’s conduct. The court detailed how the plaintiff’s attorney dropped the ball in litigating the case in a separate opinion reversing the plaintiffs’ attorney’s contempt conviction.

We successfully defended a regional energy efficiency service agency in a claim petition wherein the claimant attempted to use the COVID-19 pandemic to support payments of disability. The claimant alleged that a work-related auto accident disabled him from employment at the time he was subject to an economic lay-off due to the pandemic. The defense convinced the court that at the time of layoff the claimant was capable of performing his pre-injury job duties despite alleged restrictions due to the motor vehicle accident. The judge also found the claimant to have made a full and complete recovery from the work injury during the pandemic lay-off, and the claimant demonstrated no good reason for his failure to return to work once the pandemic restrictions dissipated. The claim petition was denied and dismissed.