Results

We were successful in having a case dismissed on summary judgment in Brooklyn, New York. The plaintiff was a ticket agent for an international airline at LaGuardia airport. Our client was the cleaning service for the airport terminal. The plaintiff claimed she tripped and fell over a “worn/torn defective” floor mat behind the ticket counter. Depositions of the defendant indicated that they did not own, control, maintain or supervise the mats behind the airlines’ ticket counter. Summary judgment was filed in 2020. After two lengthy oral arguments in February 2022, the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing the action.

The arbitration panel found in favor of the defendant in a motor vehicle accident case where the plaintiff was driving a dump truck and claimed he was side-swiped by a tractor-trailer. The plaintiff filed suit against the driver of the tractor-trailer and his employer, both of whom were represented by Marshall Dennehey. It was the defendants’ position that the plaintiff was not side-swiped, but that the plaintiff actually rear-ended the tractor-trailer because he was going too fast to stop as the tractor-trailer moved from the right lane into the left lane. At the arbitration, plaintiff’s counsel attempted to introduce photographs that were not produced in discovery and were only shown by the plaintiff to his attorney the morning of the arbitration. Plaintiff’s counsel also attempted to enter into evidence the police report. We were successful in getting both items of evidence precluded. The key piece of evidence was that the plaintiff admitted, both in his written responses to discovery and during his testimony, that he first noticed the defendant’s vehicle merging into his lane when the defendant’s vehicle was 30-40 feet ahead of him.

We successfully prosecuted a termination petition and at the same time defended a review petition on behalf of a Berks County mushroom facility in a falling object case. The claimant sustained a strain injury to his neck when he was struck by a stack of falling mushroom baskets at work. Although the baskets only grazed one side of his head and neck, the claimant alleged that his opposite shoulder was injured in the accident to the extent of a fully torn rotator cuff tendon. The claimant also alleged that a calcified longitudinal ligament in his neck was also caused by this accident, resulting in surgery and disability. We convinced the court that the only injury sustained during the incident was a neck strain that fully recovered—all other alleged injuries were found not to be work related.

We obtained summary judgment in a legal malpractice matter where the underlying case concerned a matrimonial representation in a highly contested divorce. In the underlying matter, our clients represented the wife in a contentious divorce from her attorney husband.  At all times, our clients advised the wife regarding litigation strategy and the disputes concerning discovery and failure to provide documents, which delayed the matrimonial case even further. At all times, our clients aggressively represented the wife and retained competent experts to evaluate the husband’s law practice for purposes of equitable distribution. When the wife terminated the representation by our clients, they advised the wife of the risks of settling the case with her husband (an attorney) without counsel present (the advice was not heeded by the wife in the settlement of the claims). We were successful in arguing that our  clients did not deviate from the standard of care and represented the wife adequately up until the point of termination of the representation. This was potentially a multi-million-dollar case based on the size of the marital estate, and the judge granted summary judgment on behalf of the attorney defendants.

We obtained a unanimous defense verdict after a nine-week trial in Suffolk County, New York, where the plaintiff’s counsel requested that the jury award $40 million in damages. The plaintiff was 51 years old when she was diagnosed with peritoneal mesothelioma, allegedly as a result of being exposed to asbestos-containing joint compound manufactured and sold by our client. The plaintiff, who was 56 at the time of trial, testified that she had little or no knowledge of ever being exposed to asbestos. However, her older sister, who served as the only product identification witness at trial, testified that she recalled that their father used asbestos-containing joint compound on two occasions, approximately 50 years ago, when he repaired their home after a fire in 1970 and when he built a home in Florida around 1975. The plaintiff was five years old during the alleged exposures, and her sister was seven years older. The plaintiff’s sister testified that she had a vivid memory of her father using six different joint compounds during the two projects, including our client’s product. She also testified that the plaintiff was present hundreds of times when their father mixed, applied and sanded the joint compound. At trial, we called an industrial hygienist, a toxicologist and an epidemiologist, who testified that the type of asbestos fiber used in our client’s joint compound did not cause or contribute to her mesothelioma because the fibers are too short and do not cause disease. Our epidemiologist testified that the plaintiff’s mesothelioma developed spontaneously and was not the result of asbestos exposure. We also called a construction expert, who testified that the sister’s testimony regarding the amount of joint compound used and the time the sister was exposed were excessive. The jury deliberated an hour before returning the verdict. Post-trial comments from jurors indicated they did not find the sister to be credible.

After suffering severe brain damage in a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff brought claims of negligence and recklessness against our restaurant client and other various defendants, including the owners and operator of the offending vehicle, who was charged with multiple criminal offenses (still pending) for operating under the influence. On behalf of our client, cross-claims were asserted for contribution and indemnification. The co-defendants first requested revision of the cross-claims, which were complied with, and then moved to strike the cross-claims as not recognized under Connecticut law. We argued, on behalf of the restaurant and sole proprietor owner, that there was a minority view of Superior Court cases of more recent vintage than that cited by the co-defendants’ counsel which supported such cross-claims. We submitted that the rationale behind these cases includes the plain language interpretation that Connecticut General Statutes Sec. 52-572h(c) does not prohibit a defendant from acquiring an apportionment evaluation of another (already named) party’s negligence. We argued this is particularly so under the circumstances of a criminally charged co-defendant operating under the influence as the final conduct in the negligence timeline. The Stamford Superior Court agreed that prohibiting the cross-claims would be absurd, irrational and nonsensical. 

The plaintiff claimed that our client, an orthopedic surgeon, was negligent (directly or circumstantially under a theory of res ipsa loquitur) in causing a right common peroneal nerve injury during a L4-5 laminectomy and posterior spinal fusion. The plaintiff sought to prove that the peroneal nerve injury was the result of improper positioning and/or monitoring of the plaintiff intra-operatively. Our defense was that the plaintiff’s peroneal nerve condition was indicative of a spontaneous entrapment unrelated to the allegations of negligence, and for which she was predisposed due to a prior total knee replacement. The arbitrator agreed and returned a finding of no negligence.

Despite dueling expert affidavits, Marshall Dennehey attorneys won summary judgment in a premises matter in the Connecticut Superior Court Middlesex Judicial District. The plaintiff claimed negligence against our client, a mattress retailer, for a hazardous and defective condition in the store. The defect alleged was a tile-carpet transition claimed to be approximately one-half of an inch in differential, as well as a “slope” in the continuing carpet that created a friction co-efficient that caused the plaintiff to fall. We submitted an affidavit from the store owner (whom the plaintiff waived deposing), an affidavit from an engineering expert, photographs from the site inspection, and a detailed memorandum of law outlining Connecticut law on constructive and actual notice. Our engineering expert had researched the history of the premises at the Town Clerk for the time prior to our client’s occupation (eight months leading up to the incident) and observed there were no claims, complaints or code infractions relative to the alleged condition. In other words, our client inherited the premises as is and, although responsible for the floor per the terms of the lease, had no reason or cause to repair anything or to take any corrective action. Our client’s affidavit attested that both he and his customers traversed over the “defect” countless times without feeling, observing, noticing or detecting anything foreseeably dangerous. Moreover, we asserted that because the plaintiff’s expert failed to bring up any mention of a government regulation, code, industry standard or custom that was deviated from with respect to the carpet-tile transition and premises, the expert’s affidavit was tantamount to no affidavit at all. The court granted our summary judgment motion and dismissed the case.

We successfully represented an attorney who was sued by a former client after representing that client in a personal injury action. The plaintiff alleged the attorney failed to file suit within the time allowed by the Statute of Limitations. We argued in our summary judgment motion that the attorney sent two letters to the plaintiff, advising that the attorney would not file suit and further informing the plaintiff when the Statute of Limitations would expire. The plaintiff, who filed suit four years later, argued that he did not receive the letters and the attorney was obligated to do more than send letters. We successfully argued that the plaintiff failed to overcome the presumption that a letter, correctly addressed, was received. The Appellate Division affirmed, adopting our argument that the plaintiff could not overcome the presumption by simply claiming he did not receive the letters. 

We prevailed in a jury trial on a UM claim in Hillsborough County’s 13th Judicial Circuit. The plaintiff claimed he suffered permanent and debilitating injuries in a rear-end collision in Tampa, Florida. Liability was admitted, but the extent of the plaintiff’s injuries was in dispute. The plaintiff asked the jury to award him $500,000 for past and future damages.  The jury found there was no permanent injury and awarded $25,000 for past medical expenses only.

The Appeal Board rejected the claimant’s argument that the testimony of the employer’s medical expert did not support the judge’s finding of a termination of benefits for a low back injury because the employer’s medical expert testified that if the claimant was asymptomatic in her back prior to her slip and fall in a kitchen at work, the injury may have aggravated a pre-existing, underlying condition in her lumbar spine. But, at the judge level, the claimant admitted under cross examination that she had a prior work injury to her low back that she did not report, which caused her to experience ongoing low back symptoms. The Board noted that the potential expansion of the claimant’s low back injury, based upon the testimony of the employer’s medical expert, was dependent on whether the claimant had no prior low back complaints, which said she did (and failed to disclose). The Board, thus, held that the judge correctly found the claimant’s low back injury was limited to that of a lumbar strain and sprain from which she was fully recovered. The decision was affirmed. 

We defended a claim petition and penalty petition wherein the claimant alleged serious neck and back injuries as a result of a work-related motor vehicle accident. We convinced the judge that the claimant was not in the course and scope of employment at the time of injury and, therefore, his claim was barred. The judge noted that, based on claimant’s testimony on cross examination, he had a legal address in North Carolina but was allegedly leasing an apartment in Newtown Square, Pa. He alleged he was on a special mission on the date of injury, traveling to an office owned by the employer. It was established that on the date of the accident, he was traveling on an expressway in New Jersey prior to his shift and admitted that his job required him to service many of the employer’s offices. The judge accepted the defense argument that the claimant was traveling to work, not in the course and scope of employment and not on a special mission, and dismissed the claim and penalty petitions.

We obtained a dismissal of an ethics grievance filed against our client, a school law attorney who represented a school board and a school district. The grievance included allegations of ex parte communications with the administrative law judge, undue influence over the court, and conflict of interest based on a mediator’s spouse being retained by this attorney’s firm. We successfully argued to the disciplinary investigator that the conversations this attorney had with the administrative law judge’s staff were rudimentary scheduling and routinely conducted in cases across New Jersey. In terms of the conflict of interest alleged, we also argued that this attorney was an associate with the firm and had no interactions or decision-making authority regarding hiring of attorneys in the firm. The disciplinary ethics investigator found by clear and convincing evidence that the testimony of the school law attorney was credible, and that there was no ethical misconduct by our client. 

We defeated a plaintiff’s petition for certification to the New Jersey Supreme Court in a tortious interference and defamation action against an attorney for a lender bank. The New Jersey Appellate Division had affirmed a trial court decision granting summary judgment in a $10 million tortious interference and defamation case filed by borrowers against the attorneys for a lender bank. This case arose out of an underlying deficiency and foreclosure action filed by a bank due to the plaintiff’s failure to repay a multi-million dollar loan used to finance the purchase of real estate. During the course of negotiations to resolve the debt, the bank’s counsel had discussions with the plaintiff’s new lender. The plaintiffs alleged that during these discussions, the defendant attorney called the plaintiff a “wannabe gangster.” On appeal, Jack and Jeremy successfully argued that the trial court was correct in dismissing this case on summary judgment. The Appellate Division held that the trial judge correctly concluded that a statement made by the bank’s attorney to a potential new lender calling the plaintiff a “wannabe gangster” was mere name calling, not actionable defamation. The claims for tortious interference were based upon the lost opportunity, since the new lender rescinded its conditional commitment after the alleged statement was made. The Appellate Division held that the trial court was correct in holding that the statements were protected under the litigation privilege, that the litigation privilege is not confined to the courtroom, but extends to all statements or communications in connection with judicial proceedings. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a petition for certification before the New Jersey Supreme Court, which we successfully opposed. The Supreme Court, in its decision, denied the plaintiff’s petition, with costs in favor of our client. 

In this civil rights litigation, we obtained summary judgment and the dismissal of all claims against a Pennsylvania City and one of its police officers. The court found that the traffic stop of the plaintiff was proper and did not violate his constitutional rights. The plaintiff filed a federal civil rights action against the police officer and the City, alleging that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because of unlawful search and seizure as well as a malicious prosecution. The plaintiff further alleged that the City was liable for the constitutional violation based upon a failure to train its officers. These claims were based, in part, upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Commonwealth v. Hicks, which was filed approximately two months before the plaintiff’s arrest. In this civil rights case, the parties agree to forego discovery and instead rely solely upon the record developed in the plaintiff’s state criminal prosecution. After considering the record evidence, the arguments of each side, and the motions and briefs submitted, the District Court issued an opinion finding that the police officer possessed a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, justifying the traffic stop of the plaintiff’s vehicle. Because the court concluded that the plaintiff’s constitutional rights had not been violated, an analysis of qualified immunity was unnecessary. Finally, after finding that the officer did not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the court dismissed the Monell claims raised against the City.

We won a total controvert on a workers’ compensation exposure claim and successfully defended a denial. The claimant alleged exposure to a toxic airplane paint thinner at a plant in Kentucky in December of 2019. He was a subcontractor of the airplane manufacturer, but a Florida employee. The claimant complained of breathing issues and skin rashes. He sought treatment at an emergency room in Kentucky on the date of alleged exposure ,and again approximately 10 months later for skin rashes. However, the claimant was able to continue working without any wage loss the entire time. The employer/carrier denied and defended on the basis that the claimant could not prove causation by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to F.S. 440.02. The claimant obtained an IME, which opined that his breathing issues could be attributable to the alleged exposure, but that the rashes most likely were not. The claimant’s IME physician opined that the claimant needed to undergo additional testing to determine causation. The employer/carrier’s IME opined that the major contributing cause of the claimant’s rashes and breathing issues was not the alleged exposure. The Judge of Compensation Claims accepted the employer/carrier’s IME and held that the claimant failed to prove that a workplace chemical exposure was the major contributing cause of his complaints. 

Our retail client faced a class action suit alleging claims it charged Pennsylvania state tax on face masks/coverings during the COVID-19 pandemic (when they were not subject to sales tax). The plaintiff on his own behalf and on behalf of the putative class alleged claims for violations of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices Consumer Protection Law and the Pennsylvania Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act, as well as common law claims for unjust enrichment, fraud and misappropriation/conversion. The plaintiff claimed that face masks and coverings became exempt from Pennsylvania sales tax as of March 6, 2020, when the governor issued a Proclamation of Disaster Emergency. Prior to the Proclamation, non-medical face masks/coverings were subject to sales tax because they were classified as ornamental wear or clothing accessories. The court held that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for any of the causes of action alleged and held that amendment would be futile.

We successfully handled a landscaper’s claim of a work-related low back injury. The claimant gave an inconsistent account of how his injury occurred, and when he gave notice. The defense presented five fact witnesses from the employer, two of whom testified the claimant never gave notice, and three of whom testified he told them he was going to fabricate this Workers’ Compensation injury because he wouldn’t be entitled to unemployment compensation benefits at the end of the season. Coincidentally, the testimony revealed the claimant did not receive unemployment compensation benefits. The IME physician found that the claimant fully recovered from any injury he sustained. The claimant subsequently had two surgeries, with $750,000 in medical bills (unadjusted). The judge found that the claimant sustained a low back sprain and then terminated him as of the date of the IME.

The decision, which reversed the trial court and Superior Court, reinstated a jury verdict in favor of our clients. Following a defense verdict, the trial court awarded a new trial based on a question posed by defense counsel, who was not a Marshall Dennehey attorney. The Superior Court affirmed the award of a new trial, but the Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the defense verdict on the basis that defense counsel’s question was neither improper nor prejudicial.

We obtained summary judgment for an insurance carrier client that had been sued by another insurance carrier for more than $1.6M in damages arising out of a fire loss. The opposing insurance company had paid $1.6M in damages and intended to pursue a product liability claim against a vehicle manufacturer, alleging that a defectively manufactured vehicle had caused the fire to an auto repair facility. Our client insured the vehicle that was allegedly defective. After the insurance companies conducted a preliminary expert evaluation, the vehicle was destroyed by a salvage yard in the normal course of business. A claim was made against our client for promissory estoppel where it was alleged that the vehicle was destroyed despite a promise to preserve. The Court of Common Pleas of Erie County rejected the claims against our client and agreed with our defense that the promissory estoppel claim was a disguised claim for negligent spoliation, which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania does not recognize. Moreover, assuming such a cause of action could withstand summary judgment, the damages claimed were speculative in that without the vehicle it could never be proven that a manufacturing defect within the vehicle had caused the fire. Although the $1.6M damages were established, whether the insurance company could prove causation of damages was speculative and the promissory estoppel claim could not survive summary judgment.

This case had potential national implications where the allegations by Disciplinary Counsel included 93 paragraphs and alleged violations of multiple Rules of Professional Conduct.

A FINRA arbitration panel recommended the expungement of two separate customer complaints from a financial advisor’s public record.  Both complaints involved allegedly unsuitable sales of alternative investments.

We successfully prosecuted a termination petition on behalf of a Philadelphia-based ice cream shop. The claimant sustained a serious ankle fracture after a slip and fall in the shop’s freezer. We utilized the treating physician to certify the claimant’s full and complete recovery from the ankle fracture and established that there were no residual maladies or disability stemming from the incident.

A FINRA arbitration panel granted a financial advisor and his supervisor’s motion to dismiss a FINRA arbitration on the basis that the Claimant previously brought multiple claims regarding the same securities related dispute against the broker-dealer, who was not a party to this arbitration.  

The arbitrations were commenced by medical providers against the respondent-carrier for non-payment of medical bills insofar as the policyholder and the claimant engaged in material misrepresentation in the procurement of the policy, and in the presentation of the claim. We submitted a defense brief that included numerous exhibits, including examination under oath transcripts, an affidavit from the respondent-carrier’s underwriting department and screenshots of insurance premium payments from the claimant to the policyholder. At the hearings, the defense argued that the respondent-carrier owed no duty of coverage insofar as the policyholder and the claimant engaged in material misrepresentation in the procurement of the policy and in the presentation of the claim. Specifically, the policyholder fraudulently obtained an insurance policy with the respondent-carrier on behalf of the claimant. The misrepresentation was deemed “material” insofar as the respondent-carrier would have charged a higher premium based on the actual garaging location of the insured vehicle and, moreover, would not have otherwise insured the claimant. The arbitrator held that the respondent-carrier established, by a preponderance of credible evidence, that the instant loss involved fraud and misrepresentation in the procurement of the insurance policy; the policyholders’ misrepresentation with regard to the ownership, operation and garaging of the insured vehicle was material; the respondent-carrier would not have issued the policy if the facts had been disclosed by the policyholders, and that the respondent-carrier was justified in denying the claim.

Our attorneys were successful in obtaining an order for dismissal in the Mount Holly, New Jersey Workers’ Compensation court. In his claim petition, the petitioner alleged permanent disability as a result of contracting COVID-19 while working for the insured. He alleged that while working as an auto hauler he was exposed to COVID-19, which resulted in a permanent pulmonary disability. The defense argued to the judge that the petitioner’s discovery failed to provide sufficient proof and evidence supporting that the petitioner had COVID-19 or that, if he did, it was “related to his job.”

We obtained dismissal of all claims against an optometrist in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff was incarcerated when the allegations at issue arose. He alleged medical malpractice and civil rights violations against various health care providers for treatment received while he was an inmate at SCI-Dallas. Rob filed a motion to dismiss on numerous grounds, including the plaintiff’s claims were timed barred by the statute of limitations, failure to state a viable cause of action, and failure to file a Certificate of Merit pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1042.3. The court granted the motion and dismissed all claims, finding they were timed barred by the statute of limitations, and because the plaintiff failed to meet his burden that the discovery rule applied.

We obtained an entry of judgment on behalf of an urgent care physician. The plaintiff filed suit in magisterial district court in Wayne County, PA. She alleged that the physician negligently sutured a hand laceration, leading to dehiscence and the need for subsequent surgery. The plaintiff sought recovery of medical expenses and pain and suffering. At the bench trial, the defense sought dismissal based upon the plaintiff’s lack of expert support for her claims, as is required in medical malpractice claims. The court agreed and entered judgment in the defendant’s favor. 

Our attorneys successfully obtained summary judgment on behalf of a car dealership. The dealership rented a vehicle to the co-defendant, who was having his personal vehicle serviced at the dealership. The co-defendant was involved in an auto accident with the plaintiff while operating the dealership’s rental. The plaintiff was operating a motorcycle, and significant damages were alleged. The defense team filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to the Graves Amendment, which states that an owner of a motor vehicle, who rents a vehicle to a person, shall not be vicariously liable for harm to persons or property that arises out of the use or operation of that vehicle during the period of the rental, so long as certain additional criteria is met. The court agreed with our arguments raised in the motion and dismissed our client with prejudice.

We obtained summary judgment on behalf of a Bedford County real estate agency and its agents, who represented the buyers/plaintiffs in their purchase of a home in Bedford, PA. Prior to closing, the plaintiffs waived their contractual right to a home inspection. After they closed and moved into the home, the plaintiffs became aware of several issues with the home, including a leaking metal roof, a defective heat pump and flooding in the crawlspace after a heavy rain. The plaintiffs claimed the sellers/defendants were aware of these conditions but knowingly failed to disclose them on the sellers’ disclosure statement. The plaintiffs also claimed our clients were negligent in failing to advise them about the alleged material omissions in the sellers’ disclosure statement and by not taking steps to try to ascertain whether there were any undisclosed defects in the property in light of the information that was omitted from the disclosure statement. The plaintiffs conceded during their deposition testimony that they reviewed and signed the disclosure statement, even though they did not ask any questions of our clients about its contents or the sections of the statement that were not completed by the sellers. The plaintiffs also acknowledged that our clients did not prepare the disclosure statement and that they had no actual knowledge of any of the alleged defects in the property at issue. In granting summary judgment, the court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to produce sufficient evidence in support of their negligence claim, and dismissed the claim, with prejudice.