Results

The plaintiff, who owned his own restaurant business, sustained personal injuries in a car accident while on a business errand. He collected the tortfeasor’s liability limits of $100,000 and then filed underinsured motorist claims with his own insurance carrier that had issued the personal auto and commercial auto policies. The underinsured claims were denied by the carrier. There was no UIM coverage under the personal auto policy because the $100,000 UIM limits equaled the liability carrier’s limits. Further, although the plaintiff had $1 million in UIM limits on his commercial policy, the Mazda he was driving at the time of the accident was not listed on the commercial policy; rather, it was listed on the personal auto policy. The plaintiff then sued the insurance agent and broker who listed the Mazda on the personal rather than commercial policy. He argued professional negligence, breach of fiduciary duty and negligent misrepresentation. Extensive discovery was conducted, including depositions of insurance standard of care experts for each side. The court granted Ray’s motion for summary judgment on several bases: the statute of limitations began to run when the Mazda was first put on the personal auto policy, not when the motor vehicle accident occurred; despite the plaintiff’s and the agent’s friendship and long-standing business dealings, there was not a fiduciary relationship between the agent and insured customer; and the agent’s alleged statement to the plaintiff that he was covered in “every single possible way you can think of” did not amount to a misrepresentation of fact.    

We secured partial summary judgment for a Central Pennsylvania obstetrician and health system in a birth injury case that also alleged significant urogynecological injuries to the mother. The plaintiff’s firm had previously secured a $10 million award for a similar maternal claim. In this matter the court agreed that the plaintiff’s expert reports were insufficient, and dismissed the corporate negligence claim, the claim for injuries and future economic and non-economic damages of the child, and the mother’s claim for future economic and non-economic damages.

We obtained dismissal of a six-figure claim in Philadelphia County via preliminary objections. The plaintiff homeowner sued a lighting designer for breach of contract, negligence for $23k in remediation costs, statutory remedies for treble damages and legal fees. The plaintiff alleged the lighting designer was a home improvement contractor who violated the Home Improvement Consumer Protection Act (HICPA) and Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law. The plaintiff omitted pertinent facts from the complaint. Using judicial notice, we presented facts from public records to show that the design services were performed in the construction of a new home. We argued that HICPA does not apply to new construction and that the gist of the action doctrine barred the contract claim. The court agreed, dismissed the statutory and contract claims, and remanded the $23k negligence claim to Common Pleas Court arbitration.

We obtained an order of dismissal through pretrial motions in a complex legal malpractice action heard before the United States District Court. It arose out of an underlying first-party coverage action that involved hundreds of thousands of dollars in connection with building damage caused by Hurricane Sandy. The plaintiffs filed a complaint against our clients, certain individuals and a law firm, alleging claims for legal malpractice.  Our motion for summary judgment filed on behalf of the defendants asserted that an order for dismissal should be entered because: (1) the plaintiffs’ expert failed to offer an opinion on causation and damages; (2) the individual claims of the plaintiffs should be dismissed since the plaintiffs did not establish an individual claim; and (3) the plaintiffs failed to come forward with proofs to satisfy the punitive damages standard in New Jersey. The court granted our motion for summary judgment.   

We obtained the dismissal of a former employee accused of trademark infringement. A spray foam insulation company brought a claim for trademark infringement against a former employee. The plaintiff claimed that it had used the mark in connection with its business for over eight years, thereby establishing secondary meaning of the mark in connection with spray foam insulation in the New Jersey market. The plaintiff further alleged the defendants used the mark in marketing and promoting their competing spray foam insulation business in New Jersey. There was no valid claim against our client as there were no facts pled to support the threshold issue, that the plaintiff held a protectable mark. The complaint pled only conclusory allegations that the mark had secondary meaning, and there were no allegations that our client had any interest in the allegedly offending mark.

The lawsuit was brought by 54 condominium unit owners of a 608-unit, age-restricted planned development against the homeowner’s association board, the property manager and the sponsor/developer, for the early transfer of control of the condominium association. Dismissal of the board and the property manager was granted in what was properly a unit owner-sponsor/developer dispute over control of the association. The unit owners alleged that the sponsor/developer was no longer offering new units for sale; rather, they were only renting units, thereby triggering the turn-over provisions in the by-laws. No claims against either the board or the property manager were properly pled in the complaint. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed as to both.

Our defense team successfully obtained dismissal of a New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD) perceived disability claim, alleging COVID-19 to be a disability under this statute. This employment discrimination claim involved a matter of first impression in New Jersey. A former employee filed suit asserting perceived disability discrimination under the NJLAD. The plaintiff alleged he was wrongfully terminated based upon his employer’s perception that he had COVID-19. We filed a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer, asserting the complaint did not set forth a cause of action as COVID-19 is not a recognized disability under the NJLAD. The court granted our motion and agreed that COVID-19 is not a disability under the NJLAD and, therefore, could not be the predicate for a perceived discrimination case. 

In a case where we represented an insurance broker, a Federal District Judge from the Southern District of West Virginia granted our motion to dismiss and dismissed the suit in its entirety. The plaintiff was a women’s fashion and accessory boutique. The suit arose from a dispute over the plaintiff’s insurance coverage for damages it sustained while being ordered to close by West Virginia’s COVID-19-related orders. The insurance carrier filed a motion to dismiss, and, thereafter, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the carrier. The broker filed a motion to dismiss all of the claims plead against it, including bad faith, West Virginia’s Unfair Trade Practices Act, estoppel and breach of fiduciary duty. The court dismissed the counts of bad faith and Unfair Trade Practices Act, finding that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient allegations to support such claims. The court further explained that the plaintiff alleged very few facts specific to the broker and that the allegations plead did not support any unreasonable conduct by the broker, which is required to establish bad faith or deception. For similar reasons, the court held that the plaintiff’s estoppel claim failed. The plaintiff alleged the broker advised that they would have coverage as a result of the COVID-19 orders. The court found that the plaintiff failed to allege how it relied on those representations or how that reliance was detrimental. The alleged representations occurred months after the plaintiff accepted the policy and did not appear to have any impact on the plaintiff’s request for payments from its insurance carrier. Finally, the court explained that the plaintiff failed to identify any West Virginia authority to establish a breach of fiduciary duty against the broker. Regardless, the court found that the plaintiff failed to allege that it requested specific coverage before the broker procured the policy.

Our defense team successfully obtained an affirmance of the grant of summary judgment in a premises liability case. The plaintiff asserted he tripped and fell in our client’s supermarket and that the fall exacerbated his epilepsy. The discovery period ended without the plaintiff producing an expert opinion that causally connected the medical complaints to the fall. The plaintiff claimed that his treatment for cancer caused his inability to be timely examined and to obtain an expert opinion. After the trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion to extend discovery, we moved for summary judgment on the grounds the plaintiff was required to provide an expert opinion linking his fall to his allegedly worsened epilepsy. The plaintiff filed a cross-motion for additional time. At the hearing on the motions, the judge expressed a willingness to consider further extension if the plaintiff had presented some indication that the report would be produced. But in the absence of such an indication, the judge found that fairness to the defense required that summary judgment be granted. On reconsideration, the plaintiff presented a “preliminary summary” from his doctor, which relied on the plaintiff’s wife’s statements to link the epilepsy to the plaintiff’s fall. The trial court denied reconsideration. On appeal to the Appellate Division, the court found no error in the decision of the Law Division judge. The court found that the plaintiff failed to show exceptional circumstances to justify a further extension of discovery and discounted the “preliminary summary” submitted on reconsideration as an improper attempt to expand the record and re-argue the motion.

Our defense team was successful before the New Jersey Appellate Division. The plaintiff is a former employee of a non-profit agency that provides services to disabled individuals. She filed suit against her former employer and its manager, alleging gender discrimination and retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim. As discovery progressed, thousands of pages of discovery were exchanged, which demonstrated that legitimate, long-standing performance deficiencies were the actual basis for her termination. The defendants filed for summary judgment prior to the end of the discovery period, and the Law Division granted the motion, finding no reason not to grant the immediate dismissal, especially as the plaintiff failed to even respond to the statement of material facts. On appeal to the Appellate Division, the court affirmed the dismissal, rejecting the plaintiff’s arguments that the motion judge engaged in a subjective analysis of the facts and thereby made factual findings on disputed issues, and that the motion judge erred by granting the motion before discovery was complete. The court found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate, with any degree of particularity, that further discovery would supply the missing elements to her cause of action. The court further found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of gender discrimination or workers’ compensation retaliation given the unrebutted facts provided by the defendants. 

The plaintiff filed suit against her employer, a governmental agency, alleging she was subject to discrimination under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD) based upon her disability and that she was subject to retaliation for filing a previous discrimination suit. She further asserted aiding-and-abetting claims against fellow employees. The case was dismissed via summary judgment, and the plaintiff appealed. The Appellate Division accepted our argument that the failure to move the plaintiff to a position she desired did not constitute an adverse employment action or failure to accommodate as she suffered no adverse effect on her salary or benefits, and did not materially alter her working conditions. Further, the court addressed concerns the plaintiff’s physician had expressed when she sought the accommodation, even though she was not transferred to a position in which she preferred to work, and agreed the claims were properly rejected by the trial Judge.

We assisted an attorney and his zoning board clients in having sanctions that had been imposed by a trial court judge vacated. We helped the attorney in obtaining pre-claim assistance coverage from his insurance carrier, and then worked with him to author an appellate brief challenging the sanctions. In an unpublished opinion, the judge writing for the Commonwealth Court agreed with the arguments presented by our team and the client. The Commonwealth Court found that the trial court had no jurisdiction to issue sanctions under Section 2503 of the Judicial Code. The Commonwealth Court also found there was no basis to sanction the attorney or his clients under Rule of Civil Procedure 1701, and that the trial court did not provide appropriate due process prior to making a finding of contempt. The trial court’s order for sanctions was vacated.

A FINRA arbitration panel recommended the expungement of a customer complaint relating to allegedly unsuitable investments in oil and gas investments that declined during the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic.  

We obtained a dismissal of a consumer fraud class action against our clients, a national firm and its principal, who specialize in identifying and reclaiming lost property for consumers who are unaware that such lost property exists. The plaintiff brought claims under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL) and for fraudulent inducement, arguing that the business model was deceptive because consumers could recover their own property without paying for the ease and convenience of having the defendant business work on their behalf.  Not surprisingly, the district court found that the plaintiff’s serial complaints failed to allege anything “more than Defendants’ expertise,” and that there was no factual basis to support the notion that consumers are unduly influenced or misled.  On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal, expressly noting that the defendants made no misrepresentation at any time, and the UTPCPL and fraud claims were dismissed as without merit.  DeSimone v. U.S. Claims Servs., Inc., 2020 WL 2556949 (E.D. Pa. May 20, 2020), aff’d 2021 WL 1662779 (3d Cir. Apr. 28, 2021).

We obtained a defense verdict following a non-jury trial. This case was brought under Pennsylvania’s Sunshine Act, which governs the meetings of Commonwealth public agencies, including school boards. The plaintiffs were residents of a Centre County school district, and they sued the school board and its president, claiming they violated the Act in the manner by which they conducted public meetings. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged the board failed to state with sufficient specificity during the open portion of its meetings the reasons why it was convening privately in executive session, and because the board did not allow public comment at, or keep minutes of, its executive session meetings. After trial and post-trial briefing, the court, in a written opinion found for the defendants, concluding the board complied with the Act as it routinely and appropriately announced, in general terms, when it was convening in executive session to discuss contract, personnel and non-litigation legal matters. Finally, the trial court found as matter of law that the board was not required to allow public comment at, or keep minutes of, its work sessions because the work sessions are non-voting meetings at which the board does not “deliberate” or take any “official action,” as those terms are specifically defined by the Act.

Our team successfully obtained summary judgment dismissing all claims against our client in a marine construction NY Labor Law case pending in Supreme Court Rockland County. The case involved bodily injuries sustained to an employee of our client, which was a sub-subcontractor at the site of the new Mario Cuomo Bridge. The property owner, general contractor and the subcontractor each cross-claimed and/or third-partied our client into the case. They sought contractual and common law indemnity and contribution pursuant to the terms and conditions of the various contracts. We argued, and the court agreed, that since there was no finding of negligence against our client causing the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, the indemnification clauses were not implicated. The court found that there was no evidence demonstrating that our client caused in whole or in part the injuries the plaintiff sustained.

We obtained a unanimous defense verdict in a civil jury trial in Northampton County, Pa. under COVID restrictions. In this premises liability case, the plaintiff claimed he had slipped on snow and ice on a sidewalk and suffered a comminuted tri-malleolar fracture, requiring two surgeries. At trial, Jason demonstrated that the plaintiff failed to establish that the accident occurred on the property his client maintained as power-of-attorney, or that his client breached any limited duty owed to a licensee. The socially-distanced jury returned its verdict in favor of the defense in one hour.

We obtained summary judgment on behalf of a dentist who sold her practice in an employment and contract claim. The plaintiff, also a dentist, was employed by our client. He claimed his contract automatically renewed, and that he was entitled to two years of pay. The plaintiff also claimed he was entitled to be compensated because our client allegedly prevented him from taking records of patients he was treating. The court accepted our argument that the plaintiff waived the extension of his contract, and that the patient records belonged to the practice and the patients, not the plaintiff.

The appeal was brought before the Appellate Division, Second Department. The plaintiff was a pedestrian who was struck by a car in the mall parking lot and sued our client, the mall owner. The plaintiff claimed that the parking lot was negligently designed, which led to the accident. The trial court granted summary judgment to the mall, saying that there was no evidence that the parking lot was negligently designed, or that the design led to the accident. A unanimous appellate court affirmed.

We won summary judgment for a housing authority in a political subdivision matter in the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Ohio. The plaintiff sought over $20 million in damages, alleging the housing authority violated the Fair Housing Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act by discriminatorily blocking funding for, and financing of, 60 units of project-based affordable housing for homeless veterans, most of whom are disabled. The court had previously awarded summary judgment to our client on all but one claim, but ruled that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on the plaintiff’s “reasonable accommodation” claim under the ADA and FHA. In an unusual turn of events, the court recently held that it had erred in not granting our previously filed summary judgment on all claims. It, therefore, dismissed all claims against the housing authority.

We successfully prosecuted a termination petition on behalf of a well-known hospital and defended the claimant’s petition for review to expand the nature of the accepted injury. The injury was accepted as a right distal bicep strain, which included a partial tear that resulted in surgery. The claimant asserted the injury should be expanded to also include right carpal tunnel, right elbow sprain and trigger fingers. A detailed cross-examination of the claimant established the complaints referable to right carpal and trigger fingers began six months after the injury, which was corroborated by the claimant’s treating physician’s records. The IME expert, a board-certified orthopedic surgeon with specialized training in hand surgery, had the opportunity to perform a comprehensive physical examination and review the diagnostic studies, post- and pre-injury medical records, and the claimant’s family physician’s records. This review revealed non-work-related carpal tunnel risk factor conditions, including obesity, post-menopausal, non-insulin dependent diabetes and testing for hypothyroidism. It was further argued that the claimant’s medical expert did not have expertise in the surgery involved in the case and failed to review the claimant’s testimony and diagnostic films. Ultimately, the judge found the defense medical expert competent, credible and persuasive.

We were successful in dismissing the employer and insurer from a fatal claim as a result of COVID-19 infection. The claimant-widower filed the claim on behalf of his deceased wife, alleging she contracted COVID-19 while working in the capacity of a caretaker for a sick client. We argued that the correct employer for workers’ compensation purposes was the claimant’s client, not the named employer. The Workers’ Compensation Judge agreed and dismissed the named employer and insurer as party defendants.

We obtained a favorable decision from the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, reversing the underlying judge’s decision pertaining to a school district’s entitlement to a credit for wages paid to a school teacher pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. The Board granted credits for wages received by the injured worker through the school district’s collective bargaining agreement, allowing offsets against the claimant’s future entitlement to wage loss benefits.

We received a favorable decision from the Department of Labor (DOL) denying a coal miner’s claim for benefits when the only evidence submitted by his widow was the death certificate listing severe chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) as the primary cause of death. The DOL claims examiner agreed with our position that the death certificate alone, was insufficient evidence to sustain the claimant’s burden of proving that her husband had totally disabling coal workers’ pneumoconiosis during his lifetime. Benefits were denied.

We were successful in obtaining a decision denying a widow’s claim for Federal Black Lung benefits. The deceased miner worked in underground coal mining for 11 years. His lifetime claim for benefits was denied after numerous claim filings and appeals. The widow then sought survivor’s benefits based upon the opinion of her medical expert, who opined that the miner’s death was hastened by coal workers’ pneumoconiosis. The judge rejected the widow’s expert in favor of our expert, who testified the miner’s death was not caused or hastened by pneumoconiosis. The widow requested reconsideration and attempted to submit additional evidence (an additional medical report and 12 medical journal articles) that she had not submitted during the litigation of the claim. The judge again rejected the claim on reconsideration.

The declaratory judgment complaint was filed against the landlord that leased three quarries to the insured tenant. The landlord sued its tenant for breach of contract and environmental clean-up costs. The landlord sought coverage as an additional insured to the tenant’s CGL policy. The insurer denied coverage. The court granted our motion for summary judgment in favor of the insurer, agreeing that the counterclaims alleged intentional acts that were not occurrences as defined in the policy, nor did the claims fall within the personal or advertising coverage under the policy. The court further held that, even if coverage were found, it is limited to such damage or injury “caused in whole or in part by the insured’s acts or omissions or the acts or omissions of those acting on the insured’s behalf in the performance of its ongoing operations for the additional insureds.” In light of this clear language in the policy, it follows that coverage was denied because the counterclaims were based solely on the acts or omissions of the landlord, not on the acts or omissions of the tenant or those acting on its behalf. Lastly, the court agreed that there would be no coverage available to the landlord as exclusions apply.

We prevailed on a motion for summary judgment related to the duty owed to a minor business invitee in an alleged wrongful death. The plaintiff, the personal representative of the estate of a minor, filed a wrongful death claim alleging the defendant daycare center breached its duty to exercise the reasonable care owed to the minor while he was under the care and supervision of the center. The plaintiff alleged the defendant center’s employees failed to render aid when the minor collapsed, including failing to train its employees, and failing to notify emergency personnel in a timely manner. We successfully argued that the defendant did not breach its duty to exercise reasonable medical care as its employees were CPR certified and immediately responded when an employee witnessed the incident. The mother of the minor arrived immediately after the collapse and held onto him until EMS arrived. The call to the EMS team was made within three minutes of the collapse and the employees reassessed the minor while he was in the mother’s arms and determined the minor was breathing. The minor was breathing until EMS arrived. Sadly, the minor passed away of natural causes. After reviewing the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and hearing our argument, the judge granted the motion for summary judgment, and the case was dismissed.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied a newspaper delivery person’s petition for allowance of appeal on March 30, 2021. The claimant filed a claim petition in 2018, alleging that he suffered serious injuries to his right leg after slipping and falling on ice when he was delivering newspapers. The newspaper asserted that the claimant was an independent contractor. The case was bifurcated to determine whether the claimant was an employee. After fully litigating the issue, the Workers’ Compensation Judge found in favor of the newspaper and found that the case was not so different than the seminal case of Johnson v. WCAB (DuBois Courier Express), 631 A.2d 693 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993). The Johnson court held that a newspaper carrier was an independent contractor because the newspaper did not exercise substantial control over his activities. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board. After hearing argument and reviewing the parties’ briefs, the Board affirmed the judge’s decision and order. The claimant appealed to the Commonwealth Court, urging the court to consider the evolving nature of the newspaper delivery business in rendering its decision. The court refused to do so and highlighted the lack of control by the newspaper because there was no prohibition on delivering competing newspapers or enlisting a substitute without prior notice or permission. The Commonwealth Court’s decision, which was issued as a non-precedential opinion, is the latest in an unbroken line of similar cases holding that newspaper carriers are independent contractors.  The claimant’s suit ended when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the petition for allowance of appeal.

Carolyn Bogart was successful in opposing a plaintiff’s appeal against our client, a former fraternity member and social guest. In 2014, the plaintiff was a 20-year-old college student and fraternity member attending a university in New Jersey. After consuming his own alcohol, he fell asleep in a dorm room that was the location of an on-campus party. In the early morning hours, he left the dorm room and proceeded to drive his vehicle, which was unknown to anyone in attendance, as all of the party attendees had either left the party or were asleep when he left. He injured himself in a one-car accident, resulting in a traumatic brain injury and disfigurement claim. In 2016, he filed a lawsuit naming all party attendees and fellow brothers in his fraternity, as well as the university and its employees. Following over 30 depositions, summary judgment was granted to all defendants. The appeal was filed in 2019, and a reported decision issued on March 25, 2021, affirming the underlying Superior Court decision as to our client. The appeal raised questions concerning the scope of the duty owed to an adult not old enough to drink legally, but who nonetheless drank to excess. The appellate panel ruled that the Social Host Liability Act did not apply because it governs liability for third party injuries resulting from the service of alcohol to an of-age adult.

In a case where we represented an insurance broker, a Federal District Judge from the Southern District of West Virginia granted our motion to dismiss and dismissed the suit in its entirety. The plaintiff was a women’s fashion and accessory boutique. The suit arose from a dispute over the plaintiff’s insurance coverage for damages it sustained while being ordered to close by West Virginia’s COVID-19-related orders. The insurance carrier filed a motion to dismiss, and, thereafter, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the carrier. The broker filed a motion to dismiss all of the claims plead against it, including bad faith, West Virginia’s Unfair Trade Practices Act, estoppel and breach of fiduciary duty. The court dismissed the counts of bad faith and Unfair Trade Practices Act, finding that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient allegations to support such claims. The court further explained that the plaintiff alleged very few facts specific to the broker and that the allegations plead did not support any unreasonable conduct by the broker, which is required to establish bad faith or deception. For similar reasons, the court held that the plaintiff’s estoppel claim failed. The plaintiff alleged the broker advised that they would have coverage as a result of the COVID-19 orders. The court found that the plaintiff failed to allege how it relied on those representations or how that reliance was detrimental. The alleged representations occurred months after the plaintiff accepted the policy and did not appear to have any impact on the plaintiff’s request for payments from its insurance carrier. Finally, the court explained that the plaintiff failed to identify any West Virginia authority to establish a breach of fiduciary duty against the broker. Regardless, the court found that the plaintiff failed to allege that it requested specific coverage before the broker procured the policy.