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Defense Digest

On the Pulse…Recent Appellate Victories*

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 4, December 2024

December 1, 2024

Kimberly Berman (Fort Lauderdale, FL) and Mark McCulloch (Orlando, FL) succeeded in obtaining a per curiam affirmance in the First District Court of Appeal of a final order dismissing the plaintiff’s fire-loss subrogation claim against our client, a tenant in a leased property it insured. The First District affirmed the trial court’s finding that the specific fire-loss provisions in the lease between our client and the landlord shifted the risk of loss to the landlord; thus, our client was a co-insured under the policy, and an insurance company cannot sue its own insured. 

Kimberly Berman also succeeded in obtaining a per curiam affirmance in the Fifth District Court of Appeal of a final order of dismissal. Kimberly represented an international not-for-profit private membership organization in an action by a former member for the alleged violation of his membership in said organization. The plaintiff attempted to use a settlement agreement from a prior case to show he was in compliance with the organization’s membership requirements. The plaintiff also argued that the requirement to be a member of an underlying organization was unconstitutional because of an antiquated Florida law. Kimberly argued that: a settlement agreement could not be enforced against a third party with no privity or connection to a settlement agreement; the plaintiff failed to follow the procedural requirements to challenge the statute and, even if he did, the law was wholly inapplicable to our client; claim and issue preclusion were appropriate because the plaintiff had incorporated the issues and claims into his complaint, which demonstrated that the same set of operative facts and issues were being litigated for a third time; and the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action under the Florida Declaratory Judgment Act because the elements were not met and the court did not have jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act. The trial judge dismissed with prejudice. After dispensing with oral argument, the Fifth District affirmed the dismissal. 

Audrey Copeland (King of Prussia, PA) convinced the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court to affirm the decisions of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board and a workers’ compensation judge denying penalties. The claimant alleged the employer failed to pay for medications and that the workers’ compensation judge did not properly credit Letters of Medical Necessity. Although the employer unilaterally ceased to pay the bills for the medications, the judge had found they were not causally related to claimant’s work injury. Therefore, the Commonwealth Court found the claimant was not entitled to penalties under the Act and that the judge issued a reasoned decision by adequately explaining why she rejected the Letters. 

Carol VanderWoude (Philadelphia, PA) obtained a reversal in the Pennsylvania Superior Court of the trial court’s denial of preliminary objections to venue. She successfully moved in the trial court for certification of the ruling pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(b) so that an immediate appeal from the interlocutory ruling could be taken, and she subsequently prevailed on appeal. The litigation arose from a helicopter accident that occurred in Afghanistan. Both plaintiffs, husband and wife, resided in Arizona. Carol’s client is a Delaware corporation located in Bucks County, Pennsylvania, that refurbished the helicopter in Bucks County. The codefendant corporation leased the helicopter to the plaintiff-husband’s employer, which was organized and principally operates in Montana. The plaintiffs’ primary focus in seeking to establish venue was on Carol’s client and, in particular, on the fact that it purchased two fabric interiors from a Philadelphia vendor. One of the interiors was installed on the helicopter. In reversing the trial court, the Superior Court emphasized that the relevant time period for assessing a defendant’s acts in Philadelphia County is at the time a lawsuit is filed, the limited amount of purchases in the relevant time frame and the lack of any evidence to show an ongoing business relationship. The Superior Court determined that the business dealings of Carol’s client did not constitute actual business conducted in Philadelphia County. It stressed that “doing business with a Philadelphia County company does not amount to doing business in Philadelphia County if the obtained goods, services, or personnel are utilized elsewhere to further the defendant’s business activities.” Moreover, the Superior Court noted that our appellate courts have held that purchasing supplies from a vendor in Philadelphia County is not sufficient to confer venue. As to the codefendant, the Superior Court concluded the limited venue evidence pointed to a separate but related corporate entity, and that the evidence failed to show the co-defendant regularly conducts business in Philadelphia County. Because there was no evidence to support the imputation of a separate entity’s contacts with Philadelphia on the co-defendant, venue as to the co-defendant was also improper. 

Carol VanderWoude also successfully defended on appeal the trial court’s grant of compulsory nonsuit in a legal malpractice action following the trial court’s rulings on various motions in limine. The trial court granted our clients’ motions in limine to preclude the plaintiff from introducing into evidence that its attorney sued the wrong parties, that its attorney obtained an uncollectable judgment, and that the plaintiff would have prevailed in a lawsuit against other parties. Following the motion in limine rulings, trial counsel moved for nonsuit—arguing the plaintiff could not carry its burden of proof without the precluded evidence. On appeal, the plaintiff argued the trial court’s evidentiary rulings violated the law of the case set forth in the Superior Court’s decision reversing the trial court’s order sustaining our clients’ preliminary objections and dismissing the amended complaint, and that the trial court erred in granting the motions in limine. The Superior Court rejected both arguments and affirmed the trial court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion to remove compulsory nonsuit. The Superior Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motions and that it properly concluded the plaintiff failed to present evidence to meet its burden of proof.

Christopher Woodward (Harrisburg, PA) and Thomas Specht (Scranton, PA) secured the Third Circuit Court of Appeal’s affirmation of a district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of our client. The Third Circuit agreed with our arguments that regular use exclusions in UIM policies do not act as de facto waivers of stacked coverage and, thus, do not violate Section 1738 of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law.

*Results do not guarantee a similar result. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 4, December 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.

Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.