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Defense Digest

On the Pulse…Recent Appellate Victories*

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 3, September 2025

September 1, 2025

Kimberly Berman (Fort Lauderdale, FL) succeeded in obtaining reversal of a non-final order that granted leave to amend to an estate to assert a claim for punitive damages and gross negligence against a dive captain, dive master, and the corporate-entity, dive companies. A woman drowned while scuba diving on a chartered tour, after which the toxicology report revealed high levels of illicit drugs and alcohol. During the litigation, her estate moved for leave to amend to add a claim for gross negligence and punitive damages, claiming the defendants were grossly negligent for failing to use the buddy system and for allowing the decedent to dive when they knew or should have known she was intoxicated. The estate also claimed gross negligence for the dive master allowing the decedent out of his eyesight for four to ten minutes during the dive despite having identified the decedent as requiring “special assistance.” In support of the motion, the estate relied on the police statements, deposition testimony, and an expert report. The defendants argued the evidence was insufficient to support the amendment and that none of the witnesses knew that the decedent was intoxicated before the dive. At the hearing, the trial judge noted the standard was “very liberal” and refused to consider the defendants evidentiary arguments because it “put the cart before the horse.” In granting the motion, the trial court did not make an affirmative finding that the estate had made a reasonable showing by evidence which would provide a reasonable evidentiary basis to recover punitive damages. On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed with our arguments and reversed on several grounds. The court found that: the trial court applied the wrong legal standard; the estate failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a reasonable basis for recovery of punitive damages against the dive captain and dive master; and the estate’s proposed, amended complaint did not properly allege a claim against the corporate entity defendants. Thus, the order for leave to amend was reversed. 

David Blake and Walter Kawalec (both of Mount Laurel, NJ) successfully overturned a $1.8 million judgment on appeal in a case that involved the Laidlow exclusion in a workers’ compensation/employers liability policy. The decedent succumbed to heat exhaustion while at work, and the plaintiff alleged the death was due to working conditions the employer knew were substantially certain to lead to injury. The plaintiff filed suit in the Superior Court, alleging both negligence and intentional torts. Our client, the insurer, offered to defend the employer, but only to the extent of obtaining dismissal of the workers’ compensation claim, which had been filed in the wrong forum. The insured rejected the offer, and suit for the injury and coverage claims commenced. At summary judgment, the trial court refused to apply the policy s clear and prominent Laidlow exclusion, which would have barred all coverage for claims in the Superior Court whether alleged as negligent or intentional. The trial court entered judgment in the amount of the arbitration award and awarded defense costs for the Laidlow suit, costs of the declaratory judgment action and interest. The matter went up on appeal. After briefing, but before argument, the New Jersey Supreme Court released the Rodriguez decision, which validated our client s position on application of the Laidlow exclusion and went even further to hold that the employer’s liability carrier has no obligation to provide a defense for the common law negligence claims filed in the Superior Court. The Rodriguez decision was unpublished and at the appellate level, while our case was at the trial level. The trial court refused to apply the principles enunciated by the Appellate Division in the Rodriguez decision and refused to apply the reasoning of a second unpublished appellate court decision directly on point. The trial court simply ignored the cases, reasoning they were unpublished. However, prior to oral argument in our matter, the Rodriguez decision was published, and the plaintiffs abandoned the case, settling for nuisance value. 

Kimberly House and Oswald Clark (both of Philadelphia, PA) successfully defended the plaintiffs’ appeal from a verdict obtained by Aaron Moore and Alesia Sulock (both of Philadelphia, PA) for our client in a legal malpractice claim. During the case, the trial court partially granted our motion for judgment on the pleadings, which dismissed several tort claims and a claim for unfair trade practices. The matter then proceeded to trial on the remaining breach of contract claim. The jury returned a verdict in favor of our client, and the plaintiffs appealed, challenging the rulings on the motion for judgment on the pleadings and a motion in limine that purportedly precluded the plaintiffs from introducing certain evidence. The Superior Court affirmed in a unanimous decision, holding that the plaintiffs’ tort claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that the plaintiffs' argument regarding the trial court's decision on the motion in limine was waived because they failed to properly develop the argument in their appellate brief. 

Kim Boyer-Cohen (Philadelphia, PA) convinced the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania to reverse the trial court's order that reinstated our client as a party for purposes of trial and the verdict sheet. The plaintiff, an employee of the co-defendant, brought suit after she slipped and fell during her employment. The Honorable Sean Kennedy had granted our client's motion for summary judgment and dismissed all claims and cross claims against them. Over one year later, the Honorable Linda Carpenter granted the co-defendant's motion in limine, allowing the co-defendant to present evidence against our client at trial, place our client on the verdict sheet, and essentially vacate the order granting summary judgment. The Commonwealth Court held that Judge Carpenter's order violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule and reversed the order reinstating our client as a party at trial and on the verdict sheet. 

In another matter, Kim Boyer-Cohen persuaded the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to affirm the summary judgment granted in favor of our client, a township solicitor, and the other township defendants. The plaintiffs sued the defendants for a substantive due process violation based on the defendants' alleged appropriation of a portion of the plaintiffs' property as a public road. The Third Circuit declined the plaintiffs' “invitation to constitutionalize garden-variety land-use disputes” and affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment, finding that the defendants’ conduct was a not virtual taking which shocked the conscience. 

Audrey Copeland (King of Prussia, PA) convinced the Commonwealth Court to affirm the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board in favor of our client, the employer, which upheld the workers’ compensation judge’s denial of a claim petition. By memorandum opinion, the court found that the judge’s credibility findings were neither contradictory nor arbitrary and capricious, and the decision was well reasoned. The court agreed with the employer that the defense expert’s opinions constituted substantial evidence, also noting that the Social Security Administration’s findings of disability were irrelevant to the issue of work-relatedness. The court concluded that the claimant failed to sustain her burden of proving a work-related injury, and since the causal connection between her “lingering symptoms and her work duties” was not obvious, she was required to present unequivocal medical evidence establishing that connection, which she failed to do. 

John ‘Jack’ Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias (both of Mount Laurel, NJ) successfully defended an appeal of a legal malpractice action in the New Jersey Appellate Division. The action was tried in Burlington County, New Jersey, and arose out of the plaintiff’s claims regarding our client’s settlement of underlying equitable distribution and alimony claims in connection with the plaintiff’s ownership of an ultrasound company. 

*Results do not guarantee a similar result.


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 3, September 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.

Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.