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Defense Digest

On the Pulse…Recent Appellate Victories*

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2025

December 1, 2025

Carol VanderWoude (Philadelphia, PA) convinced the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania to reverse the trial court’s denial of motions for post-trial relief and to direct entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict (jnov) in favor of Marshall Dennehey’s client. The plaintiff alleged he was injured while standing unsupported on a moving bus. He claimed that he lost his balance when the bus accelerated away from a bus stop and that he grabbed an overhead bar to keep from falling and injured his arm. The video showed only that the plaintiff lost his balance when the bus started moving. At trial, the defense moved for nonsuit and directed verdict, arguing that the evidence was insufficient, particularly in light of the video evidence, to overcome the jerk-and-jolt doctrine applicable to a passenger injured on a moving bus. Submission of a jerk-and-jolt case to a jury requires a sudden stop or jerk so unusual and extraordinary as to be beyond a passenger’s reasonable anticipation. The trial court denied our motions for nonsuit and directed verdict, as well as post-trial motions, having determined that the video evidence presented a jury question under the jerk-and-jolt doctrine. After independently reviewing the video evidence, the Commonwealth Court reversed and granted jnov to the defendant, pointing out that various of the trial court’s observations “were not supported by the video or testimony” adduced at trial. 

Carol and Aaron Moore (Wilmington, DE) obtained the Delaware Supreme Court’s affirmance of the trial court’s dismissal of a complex legal malpractice claim. The plaintiffs, seven affiliated companies and their owners in the business of developing property, had been sued by their bank for defaulting on multiple lines of credit. The bank filed multiple lawsuits against the property developers, claiming approximately $7 million in damages, plus attorneys’ fees, which were recoverable pursuant to the terms of the promissory notes. The property developers retained our client to defend the lawsuits, asserting that the amounts claimed to be owed to the bank were significantly overstated. Our client vigorously defended the bank’s underlying lawsuits. Ultimately, the property developers settled the bank’s lawsuits for the entire amount owed, plus interest, and the bank’s legal fees. The developers argued that its attorneys should have advised them to settle the bank’s claims after the lawsuits were commenced and that, if they had done so, they would not have had to pay the bank’s legal fees ($825,000), our client’s legal fees ($485,000), our expert witness fees ($335,000), or the additional interest on the loan. The property developers also claimed that not settling with the bank earlier caused them lost business opportunities valued at nearly $1 million. The plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claims were dismissed because their expert witness, a Maryland attorney with no business litigation experience, was not qualified to serve as an expert and because their damage claims were speculative.

Kimberly Berman and Matthew Wildner (both of Fort Lauderdale, FL) succeeded in obtaining an affirmance by the Fourth District Court of Appeal of a final order dismissing claims against Marshall Dennehey’s client, a professional engineer and his engineering firm, in a construction defect case in Florida. The appeal presented an issue of whether a non-supervisory engineer and his firm, who were retained by a third party to examine and inspect a contractor’s work, which third party then told the contractor to stop work, could be held liable for professional negligence. The trial court dismissed the professional negligence claims with prejudice, and without oral argument. The appellate court affirmed. 

Kimberly House (Philadelphia, PA) convinced the Pennsylvania Superior Court to dismiss the plaintiffs’ appeal of a judgment on a defense verdict for our client that was obtained by Allison Krupp (Harrisburg, PA). Our client issued a professional liability insurance policy to the plaintiffs, who were sued for legal malpractice. They notified our client of the suit and asked them to provide counsel to defend the matter. The plaintiffs never agreed to counsel proposed by our client. The plaintiffs then proceeded to mediation in the legal malpractice action and settled the matter without notifying our client. As a result, our client denied the plaintiffs’ request for indemnification. The plaintiffs brought suit for breach of contract and bad faith. In the trial handled by Allision, the jury returned a defense verdict, and the plaintiffs filed post-trial motions, which were denied. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to see a copy of the insurance contract during their deliberations. The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the plaintiffs waived their argument by failing to cite to relevant legal authority in their appellate brief. The Superior Court also stated in a footnote that, should the court have reached the issue on appeal, it would have found it meritless because the insurance contract was a central piece of evidence to which the plaintiffs did not object during trial. 

Kimberly and Scott Gemberling (both of Philadelphia, PA) successfully defended the plaintiff’s appeal of a trial court decision sustaining a preliminary objection on the ground of improper venue. In the underlying case, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas found that venue was improper in Philadelphia County and ordered that the case be transferred to Centre County, and the plaintiff appealed. The Pennsylvania Superior Court, in a precedential decision, affirmed the trial court’s decision and found that there was no abuse of discretion. In support of its decision, the Superior Court found that the plaintiff’s arguments were unsupported by Pennsylvania law. The Superior Court, in finding waiver of an issue, quoted directly from the brief prepared by Kim. 

Audrey Copeland (King of Prussia, PA) obtained the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court en banc’s affirmance of the grant of summary judgment on remand in favor of our client, which had been obtained by Patricia Monahan (Pittsburgh, PA). The court denied the plaintiff’s (a retiring police officer) claim for unjust enrichment and breach of contract regarding his pension benefits. It was the law of the case from the prior appeal that, although the plaintiff’s employment contract stated that he would be entitled to Act 600 pension benefits, he had an existing Act 15 pension pursuant to an ordinance under the Pennsylvania Municipal Retirement Law and the defendant Borough had never enacted an ordinance to establish an Act 600 pension. The Borough was not unjustly enriched by not providing the plaintiff with such a plan and, too, the Borough did not “fail” to contribute the plaintiff’s pension contributions to a pension plan. The court also upheld denial of the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. 

Audrey also persuaded the Pennsylvania Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s transfer of venue from Philadelphia County to York County obtained by her and Edward McGinn (King of Prussia, PA) for our client. The court had found that our client had no Philadelphia presence, customers, or sales and was in the business of processing and packaging canned and frozen vegetables. The Superior Court found that importing raw vegetable material through the Port of Philadelphia and the use of third-party vendors to carry out the importation and transportation was analogous to the purchase of supplies and did not meet the standard of “regularly conducting business.” Venue was also not proper merely because the defendant’s products were offered for sale in Philadelphia stores. 

Audrey and Suzanne Utke (Philadelphia, PA) obtained the dismissal of the plaintiff’s appeal of judgment in favor of Marshall Dennehey’s client as the plaintiff and his attorney failed to file post-trial motions after the defense verdict. Therefore, they had waived all issues for appeal. 

John Hare and Shane Haselbarth (both of Philadelphia, PA) conduced a successful oral argument before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania that resulted in the Court’s unanimous ruling to uphold statutory employer immunity on Pennsylvania construction sites. The six Justices who voted rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that such immunity should be overturned as antiquated and should be deemed waivable. Read more about this case in The Legal Intelligencer. 

*Results do not guarantee a similar result. 


Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.