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Legal Updates for Lawyers' Professional Liability

Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability – RESULTS

Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability – January 2026

January 1, 2026

Carol VanderWoude (Philadelphia, PA) and Aaron Moore (Wilmington, DE) secured a Delaware Supreme Court affirmance of the dismissal of a complex legal malpractice claim. The plaintiffs—seven affiliated property development companies and their owners—had been sued by their bank for defaulting on multiple credit lines totaling about $7 million plus attorneys’ fees. Our client defended those suits, which ultimately settled for the full amount owed, plus interest and fees. The plaintiffs later alleged malpractice, claiming our client should have advised an earlier settlement to avoid legal fees, expert costs, additional interest, and lost business opportunities. The trial court dismissed the claims because the plaintiffs’ expert lacked relevant experience and their damages were speculative, and the Supreme Court affirmed.

Aaron Moore (Wilmington, DE) obtained dismissal of an unjust enrichment claim brought by a condominium unit owner against the attorneys who represented her condominium association. The unit owner claimed that the law firm was liable to her for unjust enrichment in connection with legal fees it received from the association for legal services provided in their efforts to collect on past due assessments owed by the unit owner. Pursuant to the association’s governing documents, the charges were passed on to the unit owner. The court agreed that the fees paid to our client by the condominium association were properly earned.

Michael Jacobson (New York, NY) obtained dismissal of a legal malpractice suit that also alleged breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent misrepresentation, and a Judiciary Law § 487 violation. The plaintiff had retained our clients to pursue an employment discrimination claim, which was compelled to arbitration and ultimately rejected after a four-day hearing. We argued the malpractice complaint lacked allegations of negligence and causation, the additional claims were duplicative, and § 487 does not apply to arbitration. The court agreed and dismissed all claims.

Maria Nudelman and Michael Jacobson (both of New York, NY) were successful in having their motion to dismiss granted in a legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty case. Our client represented the plaintiffs in an underlying landlord-tenant proceeding commenced against them by the Department of Housing Preservation and Development of the City of New York (HPD). The plaintiffs allegedly failed to correct over 20 Building Code violations. Our client was retained by the managing agent of the buildings and appeared as counsel and executed a Consent Order on behalf of all the respondents proceeding, including the plaintiffs. The Consent Order gave the plaintiffs and the other respondents until June 30, 2021, to pay $37,500 to HPD, and if they failed to make the payment, a judgment for that amount could be entered against them. The plaintiffs claimed that they never knew about the Consent Order and as a result, a $375,000 judgment was entered against them. We moved to dismiss, arguing that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations and that the breach of fiduciary duty claim was simply duplicative of the malpractice claim and should also be dismissed. The court agreed and dismissed both counts.

Diane Toner and Matthew Flanagan (both of New York, NY) were successful in defending an appeal from the denial of the plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict following unanimous jury verdict in favor of our clients. The plaintiff, Hyon S. Yi, as administrator of the Estate of Chin W. Yi, commenced this action against our clients alleging causes of action for legal malpractice, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and a violation of Judiciary Law § 487. The plaintiff alleged that our clients committed legal malpractice by: (1) failing to assert claims in the underlying action; (2) changing the terms of the retainer agreement to a contingency agreement after discovering that settlement of the underlying action was imminent; (3) failing to assert direct shareholder claims against the corporate defendant in the underlying action; (4) failing to assert fiduciary duty claims against the majority shareholders of the corporate defendant; (5) failing to seek a receivership or attach the assets of Eastern Farms; (6) and failing to demand prejudgment interest in the second underlying action brought in 2015. The jury found in favor of our clients on all counts. Diane Toner was able to secure dismissal of the plaintiff’s appeal by arguing that the order denying the plaintiff’s motion to set aside the jury verdict was an intermediate order from which there was no right of direct appeal once the final judgment was entered, and that plaintiff did not appeal from the final judgment. The Appellate Division agreed and dismissed the appeal.

Jack Slimm (Mount Laurel, NJ) successfully defended an attorney who specializes in the representation of school boards in a grievance before the New Jersey Office of Attorney Ethics (OAE). The grievance was filed by a plaintiff’s attorney, who argued that our client violated the rules of professional conduct in connection with his arguments to the court at the trial level and on appeal. The OAE rejected the grievance, finding that the allegations of racist and misogynistic behavior by defense counsel were unfounded, that the attorney did not disrespect the court either at trial or on appeal, that the attorney did not lie about the defendant’s defenses, and did not make any false statements of fact in response to the plaintiff’s grievance. 

Josh J.T. Byrne (Philadelphia, PA) won a motion to dismiss a complaint with prejudice in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in a legal malpractice action stemming out of the criminal investigation into Nicole Daedone and her “orgasmic meditation” company OneTaste.

Scott Eberle (Pittsburgh, PA) achieved a dismissal of a complaint alleging abuse of process on preliminary objections in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. The complaint alleged the defendant attorney abused process by filing a meritless complaint that contained false allegations for the purpose of “extorting” the insurance company and earning a fee. The trial court found that the plaintiff’s claim failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, stating that the primary focus of the plaintiff’s averments were not on alleged abuse of process after it was initiated, but on the alleged ill intentions in initiating the process in the first place. The court noted that the plaintiff had not and could not state a claim for wrongful use of civil proceedings because the plaintiff settled the underlying action and, therefore, could not allege a favorable termination. 

Scott Eberle and Gregory Graham (both of Pittsburgh, PA) obtained a damage-limiting ruling on a motion to dismiss in the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The case involved defamation per se allegations against our client, a local public broadcasting organization, that were claimed to have resulted in over $30 million in business losses. Via motion to dismiss, Scott and Greg were able to successfully argue that the claim had to be limited in time to a narrow window, thus limiting the plaintiffs’ ability to recover the extensive damages they sought.

Gregory Graham (Pittsburgh, PA) achieved a summary judgment dismissal in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. The case involved claims of legal malpractice arising from divorce proceedings. 

Nicholas Chrysanthem (New York, NY) obtained summary judgment in a legal malpractice case that arose from an underlying real estate deal that fell apart. The plaintiff claimed that our client failed to properly cancel a real estate contract and alleged the loss of a $175,000 security deposit and unspecified loss of opportunity income. The court initially dismissed the duplicative breach of fiduciary cause of action and the negligent infliction of emotional distress cause of action on our pre-answer motion to dismiss. After the conclusion of discovery on the malpractice cause of action, the court granted summary judgment to our client. 

Nick also obtained pre-answer dismissal of a legal malpractice case against our client who was sued for legal malpractice because his associate neglected to oppose a threshold motion in the underlying auto case. The underlying court granted that threshold motion, in part, and denied it, in part. The plaintiff retained a new attorney without firing our client. The new attorney commenced a malpractice action against our client and refused to substitute as attorney of record in the underlying action. We moved to dismiss the case on a number of issues pre-answer, but primarily because the legal malpractice action was premature and the plaintiff could not prove that “but for” the failure to oppose the underlying threshold motion he would have been able to prove that he had a “serious injury” or actual damages. The court granted our motion to dismiss the legal malpractice complaint. 

Dante Rohr (Orlando, FL) recently secured dismissal of the latest in a series of filings brought by a former client against his attorneys alleging malpractice in the handling of his workers’ compensation and potential American with Disabilities Act claims. The first complaint, filed in state court, was stayed pending final disposition of the plaintiff’s claims in arbitration pursuant to the arbitration provision in the parties’ Retainer Agreement. However, rather than bringing the action in arbitration as directed, the plaintiff refiled his complaint in federal court, adding a plethora of federal causes of action. We argued that none of the pled federal causes of action stated a cause of action under Rule 12(b)(6). The court agreed, dismissing all federal causes of action with prejudice. Because the remaining claims arose solely from state law, the court declined to exercise its subject matter jurisdiction over those claims. Back in state court, more than two years had passed since the entry of the order compelling the plaintiff to bring his claims in arbitration. Because the plaintiff failed to do so, the court dismissed the previously stayed action with prejudice.

*Prior Results Do Not Guarantee a Similar Outcome

Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability – January 2026 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2026 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact MEDeSatnick@mdwcg.com.
 

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.