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Legal Updates for Lawyers' Professional Liability

Law Firm Breakups

Legal Update for Lawyers’ Professional Liability – May 2024

May 1, 2024

by Josh J.T. Byrne

Law firm breakups are fraught with the potential for attorney misconduct. Attorneys who determine they can no longer work together will often take the additional step of accusing one another of inappropriate conduct. Frequently, we hear about attorneys taking law firm files in the dead of night, or allegations that compensation was at least improperly, if not fraudulently, determined. 

Recently, after a seven-day hearing, in an 87-page opinion, an Ad Hoc Hearing Committee of the District of Columbia Bar recommended that the founders of the firm Tully Rinckey each be suspended from the practice of law for 90 days as a result of their repeated use of employment agreements which included “a host of restrictions and penalties they imposed or sought to impose on departing lawyers,” including liquidated damages for leaving the firm without “Good Reason.” The employment agreements also included restrictions on contacting firm clients, working with other former firm attorneys, and hiring firm employees.

Although there is very little information on discipline imposed in Pennsylvania for violations of Rule 5.6(a), the Pennsylvania Bar Association’s Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Committee has issued several informal ethics opinions related to restrictions in employment agreements for attorneys. See e.g., Informal Opinion 2017-040, Informal Opinion 2016-024, Informal Opinion 2012-006, Joint Opinion (with Philadelphia Bar Association) 99-100 “Considerations for Departing Lawyers.” All of these opinions are consistent with the determination that engagement agreements for attorneys cannot restrict the rights of the attorney to practice and cannot restrict attorneys from associating with law firm employees. See also, ABA Informal Opinion 1417 (a law firm may not require that a withdrawing partner agree not to hire or be associated with for a period of years any of the firm’s associates who are working for the firm at the time of the withdrawal); Philadelphia Bar Association Professional Guidance Committee, Formal Opinion 96-5 (provision in letter of employment that provides that a former employee may not directly or indirectly solicit or retain current or former employees, restricts the right of a lawyer to practice by restricting the right of association).

While actual discipline arising primarily from violations of Rule 5.6(a) is rare, the Tully Rinckey matter emphasizes the seriousness with which law firms need to treat potential restrictions in employment contracts. Disciplinary matters arising from these issues have occurred in Pennsylvania. According to the Pennsylvania Disciplinary Board’s website, in 2019, an attorney received an Informal Admonition as a result of an employment agreement that included a provision that required departing attorneys to pay reimbursements in connection with departing client matters, including future related matters. The agreement also required departing attorneys to provide copies of client bills that evidenced the legal fees incurred, which included confidential and privileged information in violation of RPC 1.6(a). Law firm managers need to take care in drafting employment agreements to avoid restrictions which may violate the Rules of Professional Conduct. 


 

Legal Update for Lawyers’ Professional Liability – May 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.