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Case Law Alerts

Has the Pennsylvania Superior Court limited application of the Muhammad Doctrine in attorney malpractice cases?

Khalil v. Williams, 2021 PA Super 3 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 2021)

April 1, 2021

On January 5, 2021, the Pennsylvania Superior Court issued an opinion that purported to limit the application of the Muhammad Doctrine, under which an attorney’s dissatisfied client was generally barred from bringing non-fraud claims against her attorney following a settlement to which she agreed.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has opined that a client can maintain a legal malpractice action against her attorney following a settlement to which she agreed in the absence of fraud, if she can demonstrate that the attorney failed to correctly advise her of well-established principles of law in settling the case, and that it was these misstatements about the effect of the settlement that influenced her decision to settle the case.

In narrowing the scope of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s holding in Muhammad v. Strassburger, McKenna, Messer, Shilobod & Gutnick, 526 Pa. 541, 587 A.2d 1346 (1991), the Superior Court in Khalil relied upon the non-binding, plurality opinion issued by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in McMahon v. Shea, 547 Pa. 124, 688 A.2d 1179 (1997) and its own opinion in Collas v. Garnick, 425 Pa. Super. 8, 624 A.2d 117 (1993). This conclusion, however, conflicts with the Superior Court’s 2015 opinion in Abeln v. Eidelman, 1978 EDA 2013, 2015 WL 7573233, at *2 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 23, 2015), in which the court held that “Muhammad remains as controlling precedent until a true majority of the Supreme Court rules otherwise.” Fortunately for the defendant in Khalil, the Superior Court was able to affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the malpractice claims on other grounds.

 

Case Law Alerts, 2nd Quarter, April 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.