.

Defense Digest

Forum Non Conveniens: It Really Has Little To Do With Convenience

Defense Digest, Vol. 32, No. 2, June 2026

June 30, 2026

by Melissa Devich Cochran

Key Points:

  • In evaluating a challenge for forum non conveniens, deference must be given to plaintiff’s choice of forum.
  • “Congested centers of litigation” alone are not a reason to transfer a case to another forum.
  • When a defendant is incorporated in the chosen forum, that forum has a legitimate interest in adjudicating disputes involving its corporate entities.

Codified at 42 Pa.C.S. § 5322(e), the Pennsylvania doctrine of forum non conveniens allows a court to stay or dismiss a matter in whole or in part where it “finds that in the interest of substantial justice the matter should be heard in another forum.” In evaluating a challenge for forum non conveniens, deference must be given to plaintiff’s choice forum, “but somewhat to a lesser degree when plaintiff’s residence and place of injury are located somewhere else.” See McConnell v. B. Braun Medical, Inc., 221 A.3d 221, 227-228 (Pa. Super. 2019).

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s March 25, 2026, opinion in Duxbury v. Reconstructive Orthopedic Associates II, P.C. d/b/a/ The Rothman Institute of New Jersey, et al., 354 A.3d 551 (Pa. Super. 2026) illustrates just how the application of forum non conveniens does not necessarily lead to the forum that the facts and everyday considerations may suggest is “convenient.”

The Duxburys filed their medical negligence case in Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, against Reconstructive Orthopedic Associates II, P.C. (ROA), Atlantic Surgery Care (ASC), and Dr. Alyson Axelrod, who was employed by ROA and The Rothman Institute of New Jersey (RINJ). Notably, the Duxburys are New Jersey residents and the medical care giving rise to their claim was rendered at locations in New Jersey. ROA is a New Jersey corporation with its principal place of business in Philadelphia. ROA also maintained its principal place of business in Philadelphia, and Dr. Axelrod was licensed to practice medicine in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.

The medical defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5322(e) and forum non conveniens. The trial court permitted discovery as to the forum issue. Finding “weighty reasons” in support of dismissal, the trial court granted the motion and directed the Duxburys to refile their claim in New Jersey. The trial court found the following factors as “weighty reasons” justifying dismissal: (1) the injuries were sustained in New Jersey; (2) treatment was rendered in New Jersey; (3) relevant medical providers were residents of New Jersey; (4) defendants’ witnesses resided in New Jersey, with the exception of one; and (5) the relevant medical records were located in New Jersey.

On appeal, the Duxburys argued that the trial court erred in its application of existing precedent regarding forum non conveniens, and that a consideration of the facts under a correct application of the law did not support transfer of the action to New Jersey. The Superior Court agreed, reasoning that the trial court had not conducted the full analysis set forth in McConnell, in finding “weighty reasons” alone enough to justify its decision to dismiss the plaintiff’s action with directions to refile it in New Jersey.

McConnell explains that the determination of “weighty reasons” overcomes the deference afforded to a plaintiff’s choice of forum. To make this determination the trial court must examine both the private and public interest factors involved in the case. McConnell, 221 A.3d at 227-228. The “private factors” include:

The relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance for unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of the premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive.

The public factors to be considered include:

Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of being handled at its origin. Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to the litigation. There is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial … in a forum that is at home with the state law that must govern the case, rather than having a court in some other forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself.

The Superior Court reiterated that it is the burden of the moving party (i.e. the appellees/medical defendants) to establish that Pennsylvania is a less convenient forum than another available forum. The appellate court found that the trial court committed an error of law in failing to consider the circumstances linking the case to Pennsylvania as well, and to determine whether Pennsylvania was an inconvenient forum, not simply that New Jersey was more convenient for appellees.

Regarding the private factors, the Superior Court noted that Dr. Axelrod’s proximity to Philadelphia, and concerns about her commute into town were not grounds to dismiss for inconvenience. The appellate court also found that the trial court gave no consideration to whether any witness would not or could not travel to Pennsylvania. Additionally, the court reasoned that the sources of proof—the medical records—while located in New Jersey, likely could just as easily be produced in Pennsylvania. Addressing the medical defendants’ principal place of business in Philadelphia as an “address,” the court “recognized that that for foreign defendants with corporate offices in Pennsylvania,” in terms of convenience for those defendants, that forum state seems as good as any other. McConnell, 221 A.3d at 230; see also Wright v. Aventis Pasteur, Inc., 905 A.2d 544, 551 (Pa. Super. 2006).

Though the trial court failed to consider any public factors, the Superior Court did first find error in the trial court’s focus on Philadelphia as opposed to the state of Pennsylvania. The court then determined that “congested centers of litigation” alone are not a reason to transfer a case to another forum. Second, the court emphasized that “when a defendant is incorporated in the chosen forum, that forum has a legitimate interest in adjudicating disputes involving its corporate entitles.” Finally, the Superior Court found that the medical defendants provided medical care in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and Dr. Axelrod was licensed to provide medical care in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. As to the question of what state’s law would apply, the parties agreed that New Jersey law would, and there was no showing that the Philadelphia trial judge would be incapable of applying it. The Superior Court concluded that the medical defendants failed to provide sufficient evidence of public factors to support overriding the Duxbury’s choice of forum.

What litigants can learn from the Duxbury opinion is that “convenience” in considering a plaintiff’s choice of forum for litigation is not necessarily a matter of ease, little trouble, or less effort.

Melissa works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-3477 or MDCochran@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.