Professional Liability

We obtained dismissal of our insurance broker client on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas on the basis of a statute of limitations defense. Plaintiff alleged a failure to procure insurance that would cover an employee’s death in the course of business operations. We successfully argued that the four-year statute of limitations applicable to breach of contract claims barred plaintiff’s claims based upon several instances of notice of the insurance policy terms and coverages, and a claim determination, all of which preceded the suit inception by more than four years. 

The New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal our defense team obtained in a New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD) perceived disability claim, alleging COVID-19 to be a disability under this statute. This employment discrimination claim involved a matter of first impression in New Jersey and established that COVID-19 infection, without more, does not constitute a disability under the NJLAD. A former employee filed suit, asserting perceived disability discrimination under the NJLAD. The plaintiff alleged he was wrongfully terminated based upon his employer’s perception that he had COVID-19. We filed a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer, asserting the complaint did not set forth a cause of action as COVID-19 is not a recognized disability under the NJLAD. The court granted our motion and agreed that COVID-19 is not a disability under the NJLAD and, therefore, could not be the predicate for a perceived discrimination case. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, finding the plaintiff’s COVID-19-perceived disability claim failed to plead a viable cause of action under the NJLAD.  

The plaintiffs had hired our attorney client to represent them in a property damage case against contractors and an insurance company after, as they claimed, the roof of their property was left open and water damage was sustained. The plaintiffs argued that their attorney failed to faithfully represent them and caused them to lose their claims against the contractors. After a week-long trial, we successfully proved that our attorney client did not cause the plaintiffs to lose the underlying claims, and we obtained a unanimous defense verdict in favor of the attorney defendant and his law firm. 

We secured a unanimous defense verdict in a legal malpractice case stemming from underlying property damage litigation. The plaintiffs rejected a $350,000 settlement before the jury found for our client.

We successfully defended a local school district and its board members in a lawsuit filed in Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court. The petitioner is a resident of the school district and a former school board member. At its December 2021 reorganization meeting, the school board voted to appoint a new school district solicitor. The petitioner attempted to make public comment and object to the school board's appointment of the solicitor, but he was not permitted to do so. The petitioner contended the school district and its board members violated the Sunshine Act and his right to free speech under the Pennsylvania Constitution by not allowing him to offer public comment at the meeting. The petitioner filed in Commonwealth Court, seeking to invoke the court's original jurisdiction, and he sought a writ of mandamus as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. Chris filed preliminary objections in response to the petition on various grounds. The Commonwealth Court agreed with our primary argument that it lacked original jurisdiction over the petitioner's claims because the school district (and, by extension, its board members) is a local agency and not an agency of the Commonwealth, and that the court could not assert ancillary jurisdiction because there were no other viable claims within the court's exclusive original jurisdiction. Also, although the court recognized that the petitioner could have challenged the school board's actions by filing a complaint under the Sunshine Act in the Court of Common Pleas, he failed to do so within 30 days of the December 2021 meeting. Thus, his claims by statute were untimely, and the court concluded that the transfer of his suit to Common Pleas Court would be futile. The court dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice.  

The petitioner resides in the school district and is a former school board member. At its December 2021 reorganization meeting, the school board voted to appoint a new school district solicitor. The petitioner attempted to make public comment and object to the school board’s appointment of the solicitor, but he was not permitted to do so. The petitioner contended the school district and its board members violated the Sunshine Act and his right to free speech under the Pennsylvania Constitution by not allowing him to offer public comment at the meeting. The petitioner filed in Commonwealth Court, seeking to invoke the court’s original jurisdiction, and he sought a writ of mandamus as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. We filed preliminary objections in response to the petition on various grounds. The court agreed with our primary argument that it lacked original jurisdiction over the petitioner’s claims because the school district (and, by extension, its board members) is a local agency and not an agency of the Commonwealth, and that the court could not assert ancillary jurisdiction because there were no other viable claims within the court’s exclusive original jurisdiction. Also, although the court recognized that the petitioner could have challenged the school board’s actions by filing a complaint under the Sunshine Act in the Court of Common Pleas, he failed to do so within 30 days of the December 2021 meeting. Thus, his claims by statute were untimely, and the court concluded that the transfer of his suit to Common Pleas Court would be futile. The court dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice.

Our appellate attorneys successfully convinced a Philadelphia trial judge to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict and nullify a $1.8 million jury verdict against a Philadelphia hospital. The case involved a fall in the hospital’s bathroom, and the trial judge determined that the plaintiff’s trial evidence failed to demonstrate that the hospital was responsible for the fall. 

We obtained the dismissal of a federal civil rights action alleging that a municipality retaliated against a real estate developer after the sale of a large tract of local property.

The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court ruled in favor of our employer client, holding that it was error to “erase” the 500-week employer credit provided by Act 111 for partial disability benefits paid beginning in 2008, and that the claimant’s 2019 reinstatement to total disability status did not retroactively convert those prior partial disability benefits into total disability benefits.  The claimant’s work injury, a contusion to the low back, occurred in 2006. Based on the results of a 2008 IRE that assigned a zero percent impairment rating, the claimant’s benefits were modified from total to partial. The employer filed a Notice of Change of Workers’ Compensation Disability Status, which was not challenged by the claimant. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Protz, however, the claimant filed a modification petition in 2018, seeking reinstatement of his total disability benefits. The petition was granted, and it was noted at the time that the claimant had not exhausted his 500 weeks of partial disability.  The employer filed a petition for modification, based on the results of a December 2019 IRE performed on the claimant, that was granted by the Workers’ Compensation Judge. The IRE was performed pursuant to Act 111. The parties cross-appealed, and the claimant took the position that Act 111 cannot be applied retroactively to injuries sustained prior to Act 111’s October 24, 2018, effective date and that Act 111 constituted an unlawful delegation of legislative authority. The employer cross-appealed the judge’s failure to award a 500-week credit and to suspend the claimant’s benefits.  Citing prior cases that consistently held that Act 111 applies retroactively with respect to a calculation of a claimant’s weeks of partial disability paid prior to the effective date of the Act, the claimant’s appeal was dismissed.  The employer prevailed on its cross-appeal and the Appeal Board’s order was reversed to the extent that it denied a credit for the previously paid weeks of partial disability.   

We achieved an informal admonition, the lowest form of discipline which is non-public, for a lawyer client in a matter that involved alleged failures to appropriately represent clients and timely file appeals in six different criminal matters.

By Order dated April 5, 2023, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania refused to review the Superior Court’s affirmance of a 2021 nonsuit obtained by Jack Delany in hotly contested litigation stemming from the death of a construction worker. John Hare and Shane Haselbarth handled the appeal along with Jack. The Supreme Court’s ruling ends more than five years of litigation that arose from the construction worker’s death while he was involved in the Pier 78 renovation project on the Delaware River in Philadelphia. The plaintiff sued the general contractor and others involved in the project and ultimately settled with the general contractor for $10.5 million. The general contractor then pursued a contractual indemnification claim against Jack Delany’s concrete subcontractor client on the Pier 78 project. The indemnification claim included the $10.5 million settlement plus approximately $1 million in attorneys’ fees.   The case proceeded to trial in 2021 and, at the close of the general contractor’s case-in-chief, Jack moved for and was granted a nonsuit on the basis that the general contractor was the deceased construction workers’ statutory employer pursuant to the five-element test set forth by the PA Supreme Court in McDonald v. Levinson Steel, 153 A. 424 (Pa. 1930). The case was especially notable because, rather than retaining an attorney to address the reasonableness of the amount of the underlying settlement, which is typical, Jack retained an economist to explain that, based upon his analysis of comparable cases, the settlement amount was excessive. The general contractor appealed the nonsuit. In an unanimous decision dated September 30, 2022, the Superior Court affirmed. The Supreme Court denial of allowance of appeal brings the lengthy litigation to an end.    

After the plaintiff was struck as a pedestrian by a motor vehicle, she recovered the bodily injury limits from the driver’s policy and her personal UIM policy. The plaintiff then submitted UIM claims under her daughter’s and granddaughter’s UIM policies. Both insurers denied the claims, citing to the “other insurance” clause in the policies, and claiming the plaintiff was not entitled to stacked coverage under her relatives’ policies as she and her relatives waived stacking under each of their respective policies. After the plaintiff responded to our motion for summary judgment, the court held argument on the motion. The court granted our motion, dismissing all claims against the insurer, including for breach of contract, bad faith and unjust enrichment. In granting the motion, the court adopted our arguments that: (1) the plaintiff and her relatives knowingly waived inter-policy stacking; (2) the “other insurance” clause applies to bar the plaintiff’s claims; and (3) the “other insurance” clause does not violate public policy or the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law.

We were successful in obtaining a dismissal of our client, a state interscholastic athletic association, by way of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The plaintiff was a high school wrestler who was not permitted to wrestle due to an alleged violation of the rules concerning hair style and covering requirements. The wrestler had his hair cut by the athletic trainer in order to wrestle. This incident was recorded by a local reporter and went viral. As a result of the incident, most states, including New Jersey, amended their discriminatory laws to specifically identify hair style as a protected category. The plaintiff claimed that his constitutional rights were violated and that he was discriminated against based on his hair style. We were successful in arguing that the plaintiff did not set forth causes of action for negligence, constitutional violations and a violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. 

We obtained summary judgment on a construction defect claim in Susquehanna County, Pennsylvania. The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims against the defendant, a homebuilder, in their entirety for the plaintiffs’ failure to adequately prove breach of contract, breach of express and implied warranties, fraud in the inducement, wrongful conversion and various alleged violations of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices Act.

A unanimous panel of the the Third Circuit affirmed an order of the U.S.E.D. Pa., which had granted a Rule 12 motion to dismiss in favor of a former Assistant District Attorney. The plaintiff had plead guilty to murder and other offenses in 1990 after shooting a man in the back four times. In 1993, the plaintiff filed a petition under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The crux of his argument being his counsel failed to object when the court incorrectly stated the meaning of life imprisonment. According to the original transcript, the court said, “Life implies 17 ½ to 35 years.” Our client, a former Assistant District Attorney, worked on the opposition to the plaintiff’s PCRA petition and contacted the court stenographer about that line in the transcript. The stenographer admitted the transcripts contained an error and filed a certified copy of the corrected page to reflect that the court said, “Life plus 17 ½ to 35 years.” The PCRA petition was denied. Then, in 2019, the plaintiff obtained a handwritten note by our client which referenced needing a “new and improved version” of the transcript. The plaintiff filed another PCRA petition. The current administration of the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office and the plaintiff reached a stipulated agreement to resolve the case. The plaintiff’s 1990 guilty plea was vacated, he re-pleaded to third-degree murder and robbery, and was sentenced to 17 ½ to 35 years’ imprisonment, and was then released for time served.  The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against our client under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that our client’s ex parte communication with the stenographer violated his right to due process and to a jury trial. We moved for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), arguing our client’s actions were protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity and qualified immunity. The District Court agreed and dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice. The plaintiff appealed. Writing for a unanimous panel, the Judge concluded the claims asserted by the plaintiff “lack merit[.]” Affirmance was decided solely on the issue of qualified immunity. The court concluded the claims were “fatally deficient” because: (1) the plaintiff defined his right to due process and jury trial at too high a level of generality; and (2) the plaintiff failed to cite authority establishing that his rights to due process and a jury trial entitled him to protection from our client’s ex parte communication with a court stenographer. Thus, our client was entitled to qualified immunity, as argued by us in the District Court.   

Our appellate attorneys were victorious in the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and nullified a $5.6 million judgment in a construction accident case. In a unanimous, precedential opinion, the court ruled that the general contractor represented by our attorneys was the plaintiff’s statutory employer and, thus, immune from suit. Yoder v. McCarthy Constr., Inc., 2023 PA Super 13 (Pa. Super. 2023).

Our appellate attorneys were victorious in the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and nullified a $5.6 million judgment in a construction accident case. In a unanimous, precedential opinion, the court ruled that our client, a general contractor, was the plaintiff’s statutory employer and thus immune from suit.  

The agent was sued by a condominium association, that alleged the insurance agent inappropriately and unlawfully inserted himself into the insurance company’s investigation and tortuously interfered with a contract that resulted in the insurance company paying far less than the $1.3 million in damages alleged by the condominium association. After taking depositions of the individuals from the condominium association, the insurance company and defending his client’s deposition, we convinced the plaintiff’s attorney to dismiss all claims against the insurance agent.

We achieved dismissal of a disciplinary complaint brought against our attorney client who was the victim of a sophisticated scam and sent IOLTA (Interest on Lawyers’ Trust Accounts) funds belonging to another client out of the country.

The real estate agent represented a buyer in the purchase of a home in Adams County. Prior to closing, the buyer had the property’s septic system inspected, and the system passed the inspection. Several months after closing, the real estate agent’s client decided to sell the property. When the new prospective buyers had the septic system inspected, the system failed the inspection, and they would not agree to close until the client fixed the system. The client then learned after the fact that the original sellers had experienced many issues with the septic system, that the system had failed several prior inspections because the ground would not perc, and that the sellers failed to disclose this information when they sold the property to the client. The client filed a complaint against the real estate agent with the BPOA under the Real Estate Licensing and Registration Act, alleging the agent engaged in misrepresentation and unprofessional conduct, and claimed that the agent allegedly had knowledge of the prior history with the septic system but failed to disclose it to her. We were able to demonstrate to the BPOA investigator that the real estate agent had no knowledge of the prior history with the septic system, that neither the sellers nor their agent ever disclosed information about the system, and that if she was aware, she would have advised the client not to close on the purchase until the septic system was repaired. The BPOA declined to prosecute and closed its investigation.  

A panel of the the Third Circuit unanimously affirmed an order of the U.S.D.C. for the District of Delaware which granted a Rule 12 motion to dismiss in favor of law enforcement officials. The plaintiff filed suit under Section 1983, seeking damages for the alleged violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights following a traffic stop, for driving under the influence of alcohol, and the lawful seizure of blood alcohol evidence. The officials moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims were barred by the claim accrual rule in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The district court agreed and dismissed the lawsuit. The plaintiff appealed.  Counsel argued on appeal that the plaintiff was convicted of “reckless driving” and was subject to the “alcohol-related” penalty provision of Delaware’s reckless driving statute. As such, the imposition of the plaintiff’s sentence requires his willful or wanton disregard for safety of others be related to alcohol use. The Third Circuit agreed. In affirming, the court explained, “[c]onsidering that alcohol involvement was the basis for the alcohol-related penalty provision and considering the evidence obtained through the challenged search was integral to establishing the involvement of alcohol, any error in the search would not be harmless.” Because the plaintiff failed to show his sentence has been set aside, the court agreed that the plaintiff cannot bring his claims at this time.  

We obtained dismissal of both bad faith and Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL) claims in a case filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The case arose from a UIM claim presented after a motor vehicle accident. In an extensive footnote to the order, the court included a fairly comprehensive overview of the standards for pleading viable bad faith in UTPCPL claims in Pennsylvania. The court did not allow the plaintiff the opportunity to amend his complaint in order to cure the pleading defects.

We obtained a published decision in the New Jersey Appellate Division reversing the denial of a motion to dismiss because of a lack of duty. The plaintiff’s ex-husband drove through the gate at a large, high-rise apartment complex, waited for plaintiff to arrive, and then shot her in the face. Our client was the former management company which ceased its management obligations 17 days before the shooting, when a successor management company took over. The plaintiff argued that our client was negligent based on procedures for securing the lot it put in place when it managed the property. We sought summary judgment, arguing a lack of duty due to the expiration of a management contract. The Law Division judge denied that motion, asserting there were genuine issues of fact and that the jury had to decide whether a duty existed. We persuaded the Appellate Division to grant interlocutory appeal, and then we successfully argued for a reversal. First, the Appellate Division agreed with us that the trial judge erred by holding that the existence of a duty was a jury question and not a question for the court to decide as a matter of law. Second, the Appellate Division held that, since our client no longer had any rights or responsibilities over the security of the premises when the shooting happened, and because there was no indication that the successor management company or the owner of the property could not have changed the procedures which our client had put in place, the former management company owed no duty to the plaintiff and that summary judgment was therefore appropriate.

We obtained a dismissal of an ethics grievance against a matrimonial attorney in northern New Jersey. The ethics grievance alleged that money in the grievant’s trust account was improperly handled since the ledger cards were completed incorrectly. Upon interviewing our client, the ethics investigator determined that no ethical violation was present since the money at issue was fully accounted for in the Trust account, despite the allegations by the grievant.

We obtained summary judgment in favor of a township client. The Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County entered judgment as a matter of law in favor of the township, dismissing with prejudice the plaintiff’s negligence and negligent supervision claims. Counsel argued, and the court agreed, the township was immune from liability pursuant to Pennsylvania’s Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa. C.S. § 8541 et. seq.

We successfully obtained from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmance of a district court order granting a township’s Rule 12 motion to dismiss. The panel agreed with the appellees and concluded the District Court exercised proper discretion in dismissing the complaint since the plaintiffs failed to assert under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 plausible claims of federal constitutional violations.

We obtained a defense verdict in a one-week trial in Hudson County, New Jersey, in a case where the plaintiff alleged the defendant insurance producer failed to alert the plaintiff of a policy renewal coming up and then failed to advise him that the policy had lapsed, and he had no insurance.  The plaintiff claimed the defendant breached a contract to provide the plaintiff with notices by email and that the defendant breached a duty of care in a claim for professional negligence. Due to the breadth of the insurance policy at issue, the claim against the defendant was for $500,000. At trial, the plaintiff relied upon his testimony that he did not receive the notices or any calls from the defendants regarding the lapse. We argued and established that any potential breach of contract or breach of a professional duty of care was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s damages because he failed to take any steps to either calendar or diary his insurance renewal deadlines and also failed historically to timely renew his insurance policies in the eight years preceding this loss. After an hour and fourteen minutes of deliberation, the jury agreed with the defense and found that the plaintiff could not establish a proximate cause between the alleged breach of a duty of care and plaintiff’s damages.   

We successfully appealed a summary judgment in favor of an insurance client that had been sued by another insurance carrier for more than $1.6 million in damages arising out of a fire loss to an insured auto repair facility. The opposing insurance company had paid $1.6 million in damages and intended to pursue a product liability claim against a vehicle manufacturer, alleging a defectively manufactured vehicle had caused the fire. Our client insured the vehicle that was allegedly defective. After the insurance companies conducted a preliminary expert evaluation, the vehicle was destroyed by a salvage yard in the normal course of business. A claim was made against our client for promissory estoppel where it was alleged the vehicle was destroyed despite a promise to preserve. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County’s rejection of the claims against our client and agreed with our contention that the promissory estoppel claim was a disguised claim for negligent spoliation, which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania does not recognize. 

In this case the plaintiff, after receiving legal invoices from our client, filed a legal malpractice complaint alleging fraudulent billing. At trial, the legal malpractice claims against our client were dismissed, leaving the fee claim we asserted in the counterclaim to be decided by the jury. The jury rendered a verdict in our favor within 15 minutes for the full amount of the invoices owed to the firm, $244,759.59. This victory is significant since, pursuant to the contract the plaintiff entered into with our client, the judgment on the counterclaim will total approximately $500,000.00 in interest and attorneys’ fees.

We prevailed on a motion for summary judgment with respect to the applicability of a UIM “step down” clause. Following an accident with an underinsured tortfeasor, the underlying plaintiff sought UIM recovery under three policies, including one issued by our client with limits of $500,000. The defense successfully argued that our client’s UIM limits of $500,000 “stepped down” to the $100,000 UIM limits of the plaintiff’s own policy, pursuant to our client’s policy language. The Superior Court of New Jersey, Morris County, granted our motion.