Professional Liability

We successfully obtained dismissal of wrongful use of civil proceedings claims brought against our clients, two attorneys who were alleged to have wrongfully prosecuted a professional negligence claim against the plaintiff, a real estate agent. The plaintiff would not accept any settlement that was less than policy limits. After five years of litigation, the Court granted the attorney defendants’ summary judgment motion, concluding that the plaintiff failed to adduce facts that would reflect that the attorneys prosecuted the underlying action in a grossly negligent manner, or without probable cause. The Court also held that the plaintiff was unable to demonstrate that the underlying lawsuit was prosecuted for an improper purpose.

We obtained dismissal of wrongful use of civil proceedings claims brought against our clients, two attorneys who were alleged to have wrongfully prosecuted a professional negligence claim against the plaintiff, a real estate agent. The plaintiff would not accept any settlement that was less than policy limits. After five years of litigation, the court granted our summary judgment motion, concluding that the plaintiff failed to adduce facts that would reflect that the attorneys prosecuted the underlying action in a grossly negligent manner, or without probable cause. 

We obtained a defense verdict after a bench trial in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, which found the plaintiff did not meet the definition of an insured entitled to underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage. The case arose out of a motor vehicle accident in which the plaintiff was a back seat passenger in a vehicle that was struck by the tortfeasor. After settling his bodily injury claim with the tortfeasor and with the underlying UIM carrier that insured the vehicle he was a passenger in, the plaintiff submitted a UIM claim seeking UIM benefits under his alleged sister’s UIM policy with our client. There was no dispute the plaintiff was living with his “sister” at the time of the accident. Therefore, the only issue was whether the plaintiff could show he was an insured and entitled to coverage by proving he was related to his “sister” by blood, adoption or marriage to meet the definition of a “family member” under the policy. She testified during discovery and at trial that she is not related to the plaintiff by blood, adoption or marriage. As a result of this testimony, the judge found the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof and entered a defense verdict for our client. 

In a case where we represented a child care center, a federal district judge from the Western District of Pennsylvania granted our motion to dismiss with prejudice. The plaintiffs were nine minority employees who were involuntarily furloughed in the fall of 2020. They filed suit, alleging their employment was terminated in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Family Medical Leave Act, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, the Wage Payment and Collection Law, and Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act. The court agreed with the arguments made by the center, finding that the plaintiffs’ class claims were not timely exhausted. The court disagreed with the plaintiffs’ arguments that their charges gave notice of their putative class claims because each charge only focused on the individual complainant’s alleged personal disparate treatment. The court also found that the plaintiffs were not entitled to equitable tolling as they did not exercise reasonable diligence in obtaining essential information bearing on their claim. Accordingly, the court dismissed the entire complaint with prejudice, finding no need to address the other bases for dismissal or the center’s request to strike the class action allegations. 

We were successful at the trial and appellate levels in a high-profile legal malpractice action. The Appellate Division’s decision came after a decade of litigation in various courts stemming from a judgment a multinational conglomerate obtained against the plaintiff and his partners in which litigation ensued over debt collection. The plaintiffs alleged the attorneys committed fraud and misrepresentation that led to the plaintiffs’ damages, which they claimed were well in excess of $10 million. We argued that the assignment agreement actually reduced the amount owed to the corporation and asked the court to dismiss the case, arguing that our client was protected by legal privilege, the statute of limitations had passed, and it had no legal duty to the plaintiff. The trial court agreed to dismiss the case, finding that the plaintiff’s claims were not supported by evidence. On appeal, the court upheld the decision, rejecting the plaintiff’s arguments. The Appellate Division found that our clients owed no duty to the plaintiff-debtors as non-clients since the attorneys’ alleged misrepresentations were made during adversarial litigation and, thus, were not intended to induce reasonable reliance by a specific non-client. This decision is extremely important to the trial bar and provides attorneys with a level of protection and immunity in connection with statements and arguments they make as adversaries in litigation.

We secured dismissal of a $10 million legal malpractice case at both the trial and appellate levels, with courts finding plaintiffs failed to provide necessary evidence or meet procedural requirements. The plaintiffs, a group of entities created for the estate planning of a now deceased married couple, appealed the trial court’s decision to deny their request to extend the time for discovery and to dismiss their claims against several defendants, including lawyers and law firms. The plaintiffs accused these defendants of negligence, breach of trust, misuse of funds, and legal malpractice related to a previous settlement and the handling of family business matters. The court found that the plaintiffs did not provide the necessary evidence or expert testimony to support their legal malpractice claims. The appeals court reviewed the trial court’s actions and found no mistake in how the court handled the case. The appeals court affirmed the trial court’s ruling, emphasizing that the plaintiffs’ inability to meet court requirements and present strong claims warranted the dismissal of their case.

We prevailed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in a precedential decision upholding application of a household vehicle exclusion. A fifteen-year-old was seriously injured while riding an uninsured dirt bike on private property. After recovering the bodily injury limit of the tortfeasor’s policy, he also recovered UIM benefits under the two household policies. However, the other household policy underwritten by the same carrier contained a household vehicle exclusion, which excluded UIM benefits under the facts of the accident, so coverage was denied. The carrier then filed a declaratory judgment action in the Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania, but lost because the District Court concluded that the household vehicle exclusion acted as an impermissible de facto waiver of stacking as a result of the carrier paying UIM benefits under the other household policy. On appeal, a unanimous panel of the Third Circuit vacated the District Court’s Order, holding in a precedential opinion that the household vehicle exclusion was valid and enforceable because the dirt bike involved in the underlying accident was uninsured.   

We achieved dismissal of a suit against a school district by way of preliminary objections. The Dauphin County case involved allegations that the district deprived the plaintiffs of certain educational rights, premised on procedural due process violations, negligence and subornation of perjury. Preliminary objections were filed to the plaintiffs’ original complaint on both procedural and substantive grounds. Following the filing of an amended complaint and additional preliminary objections on similar grounds, argument was held. As a result, the court agreed with the defendant and dismissed the plaintiffs’ amended complaint with prejudice. 

We successfully upheld an arbitrator’s ruling in a $13 million construction defect case, defeating claims that our client negligently recommended windows and doors for a coastal Florida home. The owners’ direct claims against the general contractor and our client, the window and door supplier and installer, were arbitrated. The owners claimed the window company misrepresented the fitness of the windows and doors for use in Florida’s coastal environment. We argued that the windows and doors were specified by the owner and architect and that our client performed proper due diligence by visiting the manufacturing facility and consulting with the manufacturer’s engineers with regard to the application. The arbitrator found no liability as to our client because there was no evidence it was negligent in its recommendation of the product.

We obtained a dismissal with prejudice of all claims in a Dragonetti action in federal court in the Western District of Pennsylvania. Our clients, a family law attorney and her law firm, were sued after they filed a series of emergency motions on behalf of a mother embroiled in a contentious divorce. The emergency motions concerned the welfare of children and contained sensitive allegations relating to purported abuse. Following the disposition of these motions, the husband and his current partner sued our clients for wrongful use of civil proceedings, abuse of process and defamation. Notably, the court’s opinion quoted our brief in support directly for its analysis of the controlling cases. The court dismissed all claims against our clients with prejudice.

We obtained a motion to dismiss in a data breach class action arising out of a ransomware attack against a hospital network. The attack compromised personal information of over 90,000 patients. In state court, our motion to dismiss was granted for lack of standing. The state court also granted our motion as to each cause of action for failure to state a claim on the basis that no implied contract existed with the entities for privacy protection and the negligence claims were not available under Florida law.

We succeeded in obtaining a per curiam affirmance in the First District Court of Appeal of a final order dismissing the plaintiff’s fire-loss subrogation claim against our client, a tenant in a leased property the plaintiff insured. The First District affirmed the trial court’s finding that the specific fire-loss provisions in the lease shifted the risk of loss to the landlord, the plaintiff’s insured. As a result, our client was a co-insured under the plaintiff’s policy. An insurance company cannot sue its own insured.

We won summary judgment for a homeowners association. Our client filed a lawsuit to enforce the Covenant of Restrictions banning barnyard animals and claiming that the homeowners failed to obtain necessary approvals to build a coup and run for six chickens. The homeowners claimed the six chickens were emotional support animals, pursuant to the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD). The court held that the chickens are not emotional support animals, pursuant to both FHA and NJLAD, and granted summary judgment. This is an area of first impression for the New Jersey courts as to whether non-domesticated animals can be considered emotional support animals.

Marshall Dennehey’s trial and appellate attorneys were successful in their representation of a national home improvement retail corporation’s tool and truck rental division. Handling the case at both the trial and appellate levels, the defense was successful in convincing the New Jersey appellate court to affirm the trial court’s decision on July 23, 2024. At the trial level, the judge granted our motion for a directed verdict and dismissed the case. The plaintiff had rented a flatbed truck in 2018 to move a cabinet he had just purchased. He alleged that a store employee gave him a set of ramps to use in the truck, but while doing so, they moved and he fell, sustaining serious and permanent injury to his back. The plaintiff alleged he later returned to the store and was told that he had been given the wrong ramps. The panel said that the record included no actual evidence that the ramp did not fit the truck beyond the employee’s saying it was the wrong ramp, or that the ramp slipped because it was incompatible with the truck. Even in his testimony, the panel said the plaintiff did not actually identify any physical cause for the ramp to move. “The dearth of evidence establishing the manner and cause of the slip or slide of the ramp rendered it impossible for the jury to make a reasoned determination as to whether defendant’s purported negligence proximately caused plaintiff’s fall and injuries,” the panel said. The court, therefore, affirmed the case on appeal. 

We obtained an order granting our motion to dismiss for failure to allege facts supporting a bad faith claim pursuant to Pennsylvania and federal case law. The case arose out of an uninsured motorist (UM) claim from a motor vehicle accident involving the plaintiff and a phantom vehicle. As a result of the accident, the plaintiff averred that he sustained various injuries, including to his head, neck, back, both knees and left shoulder. The plaintiff asserted an uninsured motorist benefit claim under his insurer’s policy, with $50,000 in UM benefits and with no stacking. In the complaint, the plaintiff asserted claims for breach of contract and bad faith. After we filed a motion to dismiss the bad faith count for failing to allege facts specific to support such a claim, the court agreed and dismissed the bad faith count with prejudice. Shortly after the decision, the plaintiff settled his UM claim for a little over $8,000.

We obtained a directed verdict in favor of our client in a high-risk defamation lawsuit. We were called to try the case on behalf of the CEO of a local chapter of a well-known national nonprofit after the plaintiff was permitted to amend the complaint to seek punitive damages from the CEO personally. The plaintiff was a volunteer at a camp. A decision was made to separate him from the camp and the organization. The plaintiff alleged that the CEO personally defamed him by alerting other volunteers and committees of the decision. He demanded an eight-figure sum prior to trial. After a six-day trial and several hours of argument at the close of the plaintiff’s case, the court granted our motion for directed verdict, ruling that the evidence presented confirmed that the communications by the CEO were covered by a qualified privilege and that, based on cross examination of the plaintiff and his witnesses, the defense established that there was no malicious conduct by the CEO. 

We successfully represented an insurance company before the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. The court agreed with our argument that the claimant needed to provide notice of his work-related injury to the defendant insurance company within 120 days of the occurrence of the injury due to his combined status as sole proprietor/owner and also the employee in this matter. The judges distinguished the facts of the case due to the fact that the claimant was a sole proprietor, owner and the only employee of his own business. The court agreed that allowing the claimant to pursue a claim, by claiming that he provided notice to himself immediately when the accident occurred, but did not bother to report the injury to the insurance company for over a year thereafter, would result in an absurdity and put the insurance company at a disadvantage in the investigation of the claim. The court also noted that the definition of “employer” in certain portions of the Act includes not only the actual employer as a business itself, but also the employer’s duly authorized agent or its insurer, if such insurer has assumed the employer’s liability. Since the claimant failed to provide notice to the insurance company within 120 days of his injury, the court held that the Claim Petition was barred. The Claim Petition was dismissed, and the claimant was not entitled to any benefits at all.

We won a decision from the First District Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s decision to grant our client’s motion to enforce an oral settlement agreement. We defended a condominium owners association against a lawsuit filed by several unit owners. The parties went to mediation, during which their attorneys agreed on the settlement terms. However, several of the plaintiff unit owners refused to sign the written settlement agreement. We argued at the trial court that the oral agreement should be enforced because memorializing the agreement in writing was not a material term of the parties’ agreement, and that the parties did not intend for the settlement agreement to only be enforceable upon the execution of the writing. Further, all the material terms of the agreement had been agreed on. The First District Court agreed and upheld the decision in favor of the condominium owners’ association.

We secured an Appellate Division decision affirming the trial court’s order dismissing a fraud and fraudulent concealment case filed against various attorneys and broker dealers. In its decision, the Appellate Division agreed with the trial court’s orders and opinions dismissing the case based on entire controversy, collateral estoppel and litigation privilege grounds. In this comprehensive decision, the Appellate Division held that the plaintiff’s claims were mirrored claims that had been fully litigated in a prior proceeding, where our clients either represented the litigants in the first case or were directly involved in the first case as defendants.

Our motion to dismiss was affirmed on appeal after the Ninth District Court of Appeals found that the plaintiff had sued a non sui juris entity by suing a county department in a personal injury suit. The plaintiff initially filed suit against the department, which was later dismissed without prejudice to allow more time to develop the plaintiff’s medical records. When he refiled his suit, he again named a county department as the defendant. We filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that a county department does not have the capacity to be sued. The plaintiff then filed a motion to amend the complaint and again named the county. In our motion to dismiss the amended complaint, we argued that the plaintiff was outside of the statute of limitations and that the change in defendant could not relate back to the originally filed suit. The plaintiff’s argument, that naming the department was merely a misnomer and that the amended complaint should relate back to the original filing, failed and the trial court dismissed the case. After oral argument, the appellate court affirmed the decision.

We won a defense verdict in a seven-day jury trial in the Philadelphia Common Pleas court. The case involved a defamation claim based on an article published in a local community newspaper. The defendants were the local Community Council and the two individuals who wrote and published the article. According to the plaintiff, the article named him and implied he wrote an anonymous letter that threatened legal action, which was seen as contrary to the community’s interest. The demand had been $1.75 million, and the plaintiff was offered $50,000. After deliberating, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants.

We obtained a defense verdict in a Title VII/Section 1983 sexual harassment case. This claim was filed against a City in Pennsylvania and was heard in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff alleged that she was subjected to a hostile work environment by a City official, and that the City failed to take appropriate remedial measures. The jury concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove that she was sexually harassed after deliberating for just over an hour.

We secured summary judgment on behalf of a custom-home builder in a breach of contract case. The plaintiffs contracted with our client to build their dream home, but, due to the plaintiffs’ change of scope and the increase of costs and services, an attempt was made to modify the parties’ contract. The plaintiff objected and submitted the dispute to the parties’ chosen arbitrator for a binding decision. The arbitrator fully sided with the builder; however, the plaintiffs moved before the Superior Court of New Jersey to have the arbitration award vacated. Once vacated, we proceeded in the civil action and convinced the court that there were no triable issues of fact to support the plaintiffs' breach of contract action.

We secured a directed verdict in favor of our client in a high-exposure and high-risk defamation lawsuit. We were called to try the case on behalf of the CEO of a local chapter of a well-known national non-profit after the plaintiff was permitted to amend the complaint to seek punitive damages from the CEO personally. When we received the case, the trial was set to begin in four weeks. We secured a brief continuance and built a client-specific defense focused on the CEO while working with a team of other firms representing other defendants, including the non-profit organization which had formerly represented all of the defendants jointly.  Background: The plaintiff was a volunteer at a camp. A decision was made to separate him from the camp and the organization. The plaintiff alleged that the CEO personally defamed him by alerting other volunteers and committees of the decision. He demanded an eight-figure sum prior to trial.  After a six-day trial and several hours of argument at the close of the plaintiff’s case, the court granted our motion for directed verdict, ruling that the evidence presented confirmed that the communications by the CEO were covered by a qualified privilege and that, based on cross examination of the plaintiff and his witnesses, the defense established that there was no malicious conduct by the CEO.  The case had been pending since 2020, and in fewer than 100 days, we became familiar with the factual and legal details to bring home a win for the client.   

We received a unanimous decision from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. This decision both limits the use of offensive collateral estoppel in disciplinary matters and establishes that the standard of proof for disciplinary matters in Pennsylvania is clear and convincing evidence. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel had sought to utilize non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel to preclude the respondent from disputing fact determinations by a bankruptcy judge when she sanctioned the respondent and his client. The Supreme Court determined that the burden of proof for the judge in issuing sanctions was something less than clear and convincing evidence and, therefore, collateral estoppel did not apply. In making its decision, the Supreme Court noted that the previously expressed standard of “preponderance of clear and satisfactory evidence” was confusing and archaic but is the functional equivalent of “clear and convincing.” 

We secured a jury verdict in a breach of contract/statutory bad faith action that arose under a legal malpractice policy issued to a law firm by our insurance company client. The plaintiffs settled a malpractice claim set forth against them without our client’s knowledge or consent. The insurance company then denied coverage for that claim, and the plaintiffs filed suit. Because the case included a bad faith claim, if the plaintiffs prevailed on both counts, the damages could have been seven figures or more. We took the case to trial before Judge Patrick in Philadelphia County. The jury returned a verdict on the breach of contract claim, finding that the plaintiffs failed to establish their damages by a preponderance of the evidence. The judge then dismissed the statutory bad faith claim.

We achieved dismissal of a breach of contract and professional malpractice claim against a professional engineering firm that provided construction monitoring services for a lender. When the project went south (for a multitude of reasons unrelated to the engineer's services), the project developer, who had obtained an assignment of rights from the lender, sought to hold the engineer responsible for project cost overruns. After a seven-day bench trial and testimony from nine witnesses, the court dismissed the complaint in its entirety. In dismissing the breach of contract claim, the court held that the plaintiff failed to establish any breach of contract by the engineer, finding that the reports prepared by the engineer during the course of the project complied with its contractual obligations, with the terms of the contract being clear and unambiguous. This included a contract provision which stated that the engineer was not responsible for the malfeasance of others, including the general contractor, or the errors and/or omissions of the project architect. The court further found that, even had the plaintiff proven that there was a breach of contract by the engineer, the plaintiff still failed to prove that the lender sustained any actual damages. In dismissing the professional malpractice cause of action, the court found that the expert testimony by the plaintiff was insufficient to establish a prima facie case. Specifically, the trial testimony on the plaintiff's direct case failed to establish any deviation from the accepted standards of practice in the services the engineer provided as the lender's representative.

We obtained a hard fought defense verdict in a contentious case involving a total fire loss at a duplex owned by a single mother. The investigation revealed that the named insured did not reside in the home and, instead, rented the two units. The claim denial included application misrepresentations and issues related to the fact that the insured property did not meet the policy’s definition of a “residence premises.” Ultimately, the court decided that the property did meet the “residence premises” definition. We were left to try the case based on material misrepresentations and tasked with convincing the jury that a single mother, who paid her premium and suffered an accidental and total fire loss, should be precluded from recovery. The jury disregarded the sympathetic plaintiff, believed the insured lied during the investigation and applied New Jersey insurance law on material misrepresentations as instructed by the court. The plaintiff had turned down $150K prior to trial.

We obtained a defense award on a six-week FINRA hearing where our client, a General Agent, faced an alleged defamation/conversion/wrongful termination claim. The claimants contended that our client not only wrongfully discharged them after discovering their involvement in a bank-owned life insurance transaction, but also converted their trails and commissions, and defamed them on their U-5 form published through FINRA BrokerCheck. Damages totaling $15 million and punitive damages were sought by the three claimants. While the panel awarded $8 million in damages against the firm they were affiliated with, we obtained a defense award on all counts and dismissal of all claims for punitive damages on behalf of our General Agent client.

We defended a school district in a special education matter involving a high school student identified with a specific learning disability and ADHD. The student sought out a peer during the school day, went into the peer’s classroom and physically attacked her, punching and kicking her several times. After the incident, the student’s Individualized Education Program team determined the conduct was not a manifestation of the student’s disabilities. The student and her parent disagreed with this determination and requested an expedited due process hearing. At the hearing, the parent argued that the student’s conduct was a result of trauma she had experienced from a previous fight she had with her peer and that the student’s decision to fight the other student was on impulse and attributable to her ADHD condition. We presented testimony from the dean of students that she had talked to the student earlier in the school day, and during the conversation, the student expressed to the dean that she wanted to fight her peer to “squash the beef” they had between them. With this, we argued the student’s behavior was not impulsive, and her decision to attack the student was premediated and thought out. The hearing officer agreed and found the school district was correct in concluding the student’s conduct was not a manifestation of her disabilities. The hearing officer permitted the school district to seek further discipline of the student, including expulsion.