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Pauline F. Tutelo

Portrait of Pauline F. Tutelo

As a member of the firm's Professional Liability Department, Pauline focuses her practice on the defense of design and construction professionals, as well as builders and general contractors in lawsuits asserting claims regarding building and design-related deficiencies. These large and complex construction defect suits generally involve multiple parties and include issues of code violations, negligence, breach of contract and fraud, as well as insurance coverage claims under GL policies.  Pauline has expanded her practice into the areas of employment litigation and public entity liability defense, including litigation related to municipalities and the exclusion of houses of worship in order to facilitate economic redevelopment (RLUIPA). 

Pauline brought significant litigation experience when she joined the firm in 2009. Pauline was a construction litigation attorney representing builders and contractors, both independently and through their insurance carriers, in complex construction defect suits. Prior to entering the construction litigation arena, Pauline practiced personal injury and workers' compensation law representing large supermarket chains in the tri-state area.  

In 1992 Pauline received her Bachelor of Arts from Brandeis University in Waltham, Massachusetts, graduating cum laude. She then went on to earn her juris doctor in 1996 from Seton Hall University School of Law in Newark, New Jersey. Pauline is admitted to the New Jersey and New York bars. Following law school, she served as judicial law clerk to the Honorable Mark A. Baber, J.S.C., in the Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County, New Jersey. 

    • Seton Hall University School of Law (J.D., 1996)
    • Brandeis University (B.A., cum laude, 1992)
    • New Jersey, 1996
    • New York, 1996
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 1996
    • "Construction Defect Litigation Begins With Authority To Sue," The Legal Intelligencer, August 6, 2013

Results

Thought Leadership

Case Law Alerts

Closing the Loophole

July 21, 2026

On November 17, 2023, New York amended the Prompt Payment Act, establishing a 5% cap on retainage under section 765-c of the General Business Law. Specifically, this amendment limited any retainage withheld from a contractor or subcontractor on a private construction project to 5%.  However, this amendment contained a significant gap: because the 5% limitation was not included among the void provisions enumerated in Section 757 of the General Business Law, owners and general contractors were able to circumvent the statutory cap through contractual provisions requiring higher retainage. Section 756-a of the General Business Law allowed the terms of a construction contract to supersede the Prompt Payment Act "except as otherwise provided" in the article. SB 5655, which went into immediate effect on December 19, 2025, closes this loophole by adding contract provisions that exceed 5% to be void and unenforceable under Section 757 of the General Business Law. 

Case Law Alerts

New York’s AVOID Act Imposes Strict Deadlines on Third-Party Actions Starting April 2026

January 1, 2026

On December 19, 2025, Governor Kathy Hochul signed the Avoiding Vexatious Overuse of Impleading to Delay (AVOID) Act (L. 2025, ch. 704), amending CPLR § 1007 to impose, for the first time, strict deadlines on third-party practice in New York civil litigation. Effective April 18, 2026, the Act is intended to streamline cases and curb delay tactics caused by late or excessive impleading, while shifting greater responsibility to both defendants and plaintiffs to identify all potentially liable parties early in the case. Under the new rules, defendants must file third-party complaints within 60 days of serving an answer when based on contractual indemnification, or within 60 days of learning of a potentially liable party under common-law theories. Second-tier third-party actions must be filed within 45 days, with subsequent tiers limited to 30 days and then 20 days. Extensions are capped at 30 days absent a court order, and no impleader is permitted after the filing of the Note of Issue; late filings will be severed or dismissed without prejudice and may not later be consolidated back into the main action. Limited exceptions apply, including certain workplace injury claims against employers (such as “grave injury” cases or when the employer’s identity was unknown), where parties have up to 120 days from the relevant triggering event. While designed to accelerate litigation, the AVOID Act may introduce new practical challenges. Counsel—particularly in complex matters like construction cases—will need to investigate liability and pursue tenders much earlier, potentially leading to expanded discovery, additional depositions, and increased motion practice. Although rights to contribution or indemnity are preserved through separate actions, settlements with plaintiffs may waive contribution rights, complicating resolution and potentially giving plaintiffs a strategic tool to restrict third-party practice and risk transfer.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.