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Defense Digest

Did the Cat Move the Ladder?

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2025

March 1, 2025

by Keith M. Andresen

Key Points:

  • New York appellate decision gives defense counsel firm ground on which to defend a standard § 240(1) case. 
  • In Simpertegui v. Carlyle House Inc., 209 N.Y.S.3d (1st Dept. May 9, 2024), a “ladder-fall” case, the First Department found that the defendants raised triable issues of fact by identifying inconsistencies in plaintiff’s account of the accident and “calling into question his overall credibility and circumstances underlying his claimed injuries.” 

In 2024 there were several important New York labor law decisions across the Appellate Divisions and even at the Court of Appeals. It is easy to ignore some of these cases given the ongoing “Fraudemic.” However, in the midst of this storm, one appellate decision has given defense counsel some firm ground on which to defend a standard § 240(1) case, particularly one involving a fall from a ladder. So, what does a cat have to do with anything? Let me explain. 

New York Labor Law § 240(1), also known as the scaffold law, provides in relevant part:

"All contractors and owners and their agents, except owners of one- and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work, in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure shall furnish or erect, or cause to be furnished or erected for the performance of such labor, scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropes, and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person so employed."

Once judgment under this statute is granted, liability is absolute, and it doesn’t matter what the plaintiff was doing or if they were comparatively negligent. 

While there are some limited defenses available—such as an uncovered worker, a non-covered activity, a recalcitrant worker, sole proximate cause—these are all very fact-specific and are typically not available in a standard fall-from-a-ladder case. Unfortunately, the majority of cases involving a fall from a ladder are simply liability dead-ends, where the plaintiff testifies they climbed up the ladder to do work, it shook, and they fell. Often times the plaintiff will testify they knew the ladder was unsafe, but they “wanted to get the job done.” These facts pled bare in an affidavit are enough for a plaintiff to move for early summary judgment after joinder of issue and before any depositions or initial discovery have taken place. 

Again, defendants are hard pressed to come up with a defense. The purpose of the statute itself, which was created to protect workers by charging owners and general contractors with absolute liability, seems to fall by the wayside. Ladder cases in recent years seem to follow the same exact fact pattern. Still, the courts seem to simply adopt the circular logic without even looking at the underlying facts—the plaintiff fell because there was a violation; there was a violation because the plaintiff fell. 

Anyone who has defended a ladder case has found it extremely frustrating. The testimonies are usually the exact same: “The ladder moved.” “The ladder shifted.” “The ladder shook.” This testimony is enough to trigger liability, no matter how ridiculous or unbelievable the remainder of the plaintiff’s testimony may be or what led up to the ladder mysteriously moving. I am tempted, sometimes, to ask the plaintiff, “Did a cat move it? Were there cats on the jobsite?” Because, frankly, that would be a much more credible explanation than the ladder just moved. 

Enter Simpertegui v. Carlyle House Inc., 209 N.Y.S.3d (1st Dept. May 9, 2024). In this matter, the plaintiff alleged he fell from a ladder while performing brickwork. He claimed that the ladder “suddenly shook” while he was about seven feet off the ground (shocking) and he fell. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment pursuant to Labor Law § 240(1), which was granted by the Bronx Supreme Court. 

The defendants appealed to the First Department. In a short, but powerful decision, the Appellate Division found the defendant raised triable issues of fact to defeat the summary judgment motion and reversed the lower court’s ruling. 

First, the plaintiff provided two separate dates of accident. He cited July 28, 2017, as the accident date in a workers’ compensation form and at a hearing. Later, at his deposition, he stated his accident date was on July 31, 2017. While mixing up accident dates is usually not dispositive, video evidence shows the plaintiff working on both days. Furthermore, no accidents were reported on those days. 

Second, he claimed he personally reported his accident to his supervisor, Abraham Diaz. Mr. Diaz confirmed the plaintiff did not report an accident to him on either date. He also provided phone records to prove the plaintiff never called him to report the accident. 

Finally, the court noted the plaintiff first went to the hospital just days after the employer fired him for absenteeism. 

The defendants also argued on appeal that the plaintiff never put forth any evidence that the ladder itself was defective, either from his own recollection or witnesses. Specifically, the plaintiff testified he was not aware if his feet came off the ladder. The court did not mention these issues, and it seems they were more concerned with his overall credibility: “Defendants raised triable issues of fact sufficient to defeat the motion by identifying various inconsistencies in plaintiff’s account of the accident, thus calling into question his overall credibility and circumstances underlying his claimed injuries.” 

This decision is important because it highlights the importance of getting all specific facts surrounding the plaintiff’s accident, not just those facts focusing on the happening of the accident itself. Defendants should seek to obtain testimony from all co-workers, supervisors, or anyone else at the jobsite who can testify as to whether an accident happened or was reported at all. Even if an accident was reported, the initial complaints or accident reports, workers’ compensation filings, testimony provided by the plaintiff, and the first medical treatment should all be compared and analyzed when assessing the plaintiff’s credibility. Obviously, phone, video, and metadata also must be scrutinized to the extent they are available. 

This may be the first in a significant line of cases where the New York State courts start seriously looking at the circumstances of ladder falls, not just providing the typical rubber-stamp treatment. After all, a cat was not on the jobsite.

*Keith is Co-Chair of our New York Construction & Labor Law Practice Group and works in our New York City office. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.