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The Quarterly Dose

Florida Tort Reform: The Impact of House Bill 837 on Health Care Litigation

The Quarterly Dose - May 2024

May 1, 2024

by Megan J. Nelson

On March 24, 2023, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis signed House Bill 837 into law. Also known as the “Civil Remedies” or “Tort Reform” law, HB 837 has changed civil litigation in Florida, including providing a uniform standard for calculating the accurate value of past and future medical expenses in personal injury or wrongful death actions. Florida Statute 768.0427 now defines how past and future medical expenses may be entered into evidence at trial and how letters of protection are admission as to medical expenses and discovery related to the treating provider and a plaintiff’s attorney’s relationship.

House Bill 837 changes how cases will be evaluated for settlement negotiations and potentially increases the ability to reasonably settle claims before trial. It is important to note that these changes apply to causes of action filed after the effective date of March 24, 2023. However, if a complaint was filed before March 24, 2023, but is amended after March 24, 2023, there may be an argument that the changes from HB 837 should apply to the amended complaint.

If you find yourself wondering why these changes matter, it’s because a plaintiff’s damages are evaluated based on multiple factors, including past and future medical expenses. For example, if the medical bills are $100,000 but the amount paid is $10,000, a plaintiff should not be able to assert $100,000 in medical expenses. Knowing what can be presented to a jury will help to provide a better evaluation and strategy for settlement negotiations.

Before the new law, a plaintiff was permitted to board the full amount of medical bills charged for services rendered, with the exception of services paid by Medicare or Medicaid. Evidence of adjustments, reductions and setoffs could not be entered into evidence, unless paid by Medicare or Medicaid. Now, under HB 837, the evidence offered to prove the amount of damages related to medical expenses for past medical bills is limited to what was actually paid, regardless of the source of payment.

Example: If the medical bill is $1,000 but the contractual reimbursement rate (private insurance, Medicare, Medicaid) is $450 and the plaintiff’s co-pay is $50, then the amount paid for the bill can be presented to the jury as $500, not the $1,000 billed.

For any unpaid medical bills (past and future), the claim can only be for an amount deemed necessary and reasonable. The amount that may be presented will depend on whether the plaintiff has health care coverage. If a plaintiff has Medicare, Medicaid or no coverage, the amount that may be offered into evidence is 120% of the Medicare reimbursement rate in effect on the date of the medical treatment or service obtained. For future medical expenses, the amount would be the reimbursement rate in effect on the date of trial.

Example: If the medical bill is $1,000 but the Medicare reimbursement rate is $400, then the reasonable value of the unpaid services would be $480.

If there is no Medicare rate for a service, then the amount that may be offered into evidence is 170% of the applicable state Medicaid rate in effect on the date of the medical treatment or service obtained. For future medical expenses, the amount would be the reimbursement rate in effect on the date of trial.

Example: If the medical bill is $1,000 but the state Medicaid reimbursement rate is $400, then the reasonable value of the unpaid services would be $680.

New Definition for Letters of Protection
Florida Statute 768.0427 now defines a letter of protection as “any arrangement by which a health care provider renders treatment in exchange for a promise of payment for the claimant’s medical expenses from any judgment or settlement of a personal injury or wrongful death action. The term includes any such arrangement, regardless of whether referred to as a letter of protection.” This means any document showing an agreement for services can be called a “Letter of Protection,” “LOP,” or anything else. If there is an agreement to provide medical services to a plaintiff and not to charge the insurance carrier, it falls under the definition of a letter of protection.

If a plaintiff has health coverage (private insurance, Medicare, Medicaid) but does not submit the medical treatment or services to the insurance carrier (i.e., treating under a letter of protection), the amount that may be offered into evidence is limited to what the insurance carrier would have paid plus the plaintiff’s co-pay.

Example: If the medical bill is $1,000 but the contractual reimbursement rate (private insurance, Medicare, Medicaid) is $450 and the plaintiff’s co-pay is $50, then the amount paid for the bill can be presented to the jury as $500, not the $1,000 billed.

If the letter of protection is subsequently transferred to a third party, the amount that may be offered into evidence is limited to the amount the third party paid or agreed to pay in exchange for the right to receive payment pursuant to the letter of protection.

Example: If the medical bill is $1,000 but a third party bought the letter of protection for $700, then the amount paid for the letter of protection can be presented to the jury as $700, not the $1,000 billed.

The law also places new obligations on a plaintiff to disclose information related to the letter of protection, including identifying whether the plaintiff was referred for treatment and the identity of the person who made the referral. If the referral is made by the plaintiff’s attorney, disclosure of the referral is permitted, and evidence of such referral is admissible, notwithstanding attorney client privilege. Moreover, in such situations, the financial relationship between a law firm and a medical provider, including the number of referrals, frequency and financial benefit obtained, is relevant to the issue of the bias of the testifying medical provider. This effectively overturns the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Worley v. Central Florida Young Men’s Christian Ass’n, Inc., 228 So. 2d 185 (2017).

As the new law allows evidence of reasonable amounts for necessary treatments, it is important to be aware that a doctor may claim that their bills are reasonable and medically necessary due to the limited availability of doctors willing to treat patients under a letter of protection. However, a proactive defense that actively pursues what the reasonable and customary cost is for the medical treatment and services received, is likely the best course of action. Florida has implemented price transparency related to minimizing the surprise bills that arrive after medical treatment and services have been provided by hospitals. This price transparency allows the defense to argue what constitutes a reasonable and customary value. 


 

The Quarterly Dose – May 2024, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

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