Megan is a member of the Professional Liability Department where she focuses her practice on the defense of errors and omissions claims brought against various professionals including attorneys.
Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Megan was a law clerk for the Honorable Alice Beck Dubow of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. During her time there, she wrote opinions on appeals involving a wide range of civil and criminal legal issues.
Megan received her J.D. from Temple University Beasley School of Law where she was a member of the Moot Court team and the Solicitations Chair of the Student Public Interest Network. Upon graduating, she served as an Assistant District Attorney for the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office. Megan then clerked for the Honorable Christopher R. Hall in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, where she assisted the Judge with drafting opinions and ruling on pre-trial motions.
Prior to law school, Megan studied International Studies and Philosophy at the University of Scranton and completed a year of service through AmeriCorpsVISTA.
Thought Leadership
Case Law Alerts
Attorney‑Client Communications Discoverable Where Plaintiffs Seek Fees as Malpractice Damages, Trial Court Holds
July 21, 2026
Plaintiffs sued Duane Morris, alleging legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty relating to a disputed 2020 settlement agreement in an underlying matter, resulting in subsequent proceedings to enforce the settlement agreement. Plaintiffs are seeking approximately $2.3 million in attorneys’ fees and costs spent defending the subsequent proceedings. A discovery dispute in this matter concerning settlement communications as evidence of proximate cause is currently before the Superior Court—this is the trial court’s opinion holding that the evidence sought was discoverable. Briefly, plaintiffs claim that they did not agree to the settlement in the underlying matter. Duane Morris, on the other hand, asserted that the plaintiffs failed to comply with the settlement agreement and thus, the defense expenses were self-inflicted. Accordingly, Duane Morris filed a motion to compel discovery related to contributory negligence and proximate causation, including communications between the plaintiffs and their subsequent counsel. After a hearing, the court granted the motion, and later denied the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration. Plaintiffs then filed an interlocutory appeal. Plaintiffs asserted on appeal that the trial court erred in compelling plaintiffs to produce documents protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or the work product doctrine; by determining that there was an “at-issue” waiver of privilege without a showing that the plaintiffs affirmatively asserted their state of mind; and by requiring production despite the lack of statutory exception. In its opinion, the trial court noted that, under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 408, evidence of settlement negotiations is inadmissible for certain purposes (such as to prove the validity or amount of a disputed claim), but could be admitted for another purpose, and does not prevent discovery of otherwise discoverable evidence. The court explained that the plaintiffs needed to establish proximate cause—that, but for the purportedly fraudulent settlement, plaintiffs would ultimately not have incurred the attorney fees associated with that the second action. The court determined that communications between the plaintiffs and their counsel regarding their objectives and their reasons for defending against the subsequent actions may be relevant and discoverable if, for example, they involved a strategic choice not to comply with the settlement agreement. Likewise, the court determined that there was an “at-issue” waiver of attorney-client privilege because those communications were at issue—in order to allow Duane Morris to raise a defense as to proximate cause and damages, discovery on plaintiffs’ reasons for defending against the subsequent lawsuits and the reasonableness of the defense costs incurred by plaintiffs was permissible. The court was persuaded by Duane Morris’s citations to other jurisdictions to support the view that a malpractice plaintiff places communications about causation at issue by seeking to recover subsequent attorneys’ fees. Finally, the plaintiffs/appellants also raised a public policy argument: that the court’s order would mean that clients seeking advice of counsel must be wary about the confidentiality because they may later be found to have unwittingly waived the privilege if they later bring a suit in which those communications are requested in discovery. The court rejected this argument because plaintiffs/appellants introduced the issue of the fees, and therefore should expect that the necessity and extent of the fees and costs would then be at issue.
Legal Updates for Lawyers' Professional Liability
AI Misuse in Legal Filings Leads to Second Sanction and Mandatory CLE Requirements
May 7, 2026
In an order issued April 20, 2026, the Hon. Kai N. Scott of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania imposed sanctions on an attorney for including hallucinated AI-generated citations in a filing, for the second time in the same matter. First, following the imposition of attorney’s fees as an unrelated sanction, Raja Rajan, Esquire, who had represented the defendants, filed a motion for leave to appeal of sanctions of defense counsel and a motion to withdraw as attorney for all defendants. The court found five citations that were either wholly hallucinated or did not support the proposition for which they were cited. Bunce v. Visual Technology Innovations, Inc., et al, No. CV 23-1740, 2025 WL 4231632, at *1, n.1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 2025). The court ordered Mr. Rajan to show cause why the filing did not violate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(2), which holds that, “[b]y presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper. . .an attorney. . .certifies that to the best of [his] knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law[.]” The court also noted that such citations in a filing potentially violated Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3, Candor Toward the Tribunal. The court ultimately imposed sanctions of $2,500 for that violation. Following the conclusion of the underlying matter, the plaintiff sought travel costs for a cancelled deposition. In response, Mr. Rajan filed an omnibus motion seeking sanctions and objecting to the imposition of travel costs. That motion again contained AI-hallucinated citations, which the plaintiff noted in his response. The court explained that the standard for the review of conduct under Rule 11 is “reasonableness under the circumstances, [...] with reasonableness defined as an objective knowledge or belief at the time of the filing of a challenged paper that the claim was well-grounded in law and fact[;]” and that the Third Circuit has said that “Rule 11 requires only negligence[.]” Bunce, 2026 WL 1082135, at *2. The court ultimately held that there was no reasonable explanation for the inclusion of AI-generated citations, and that it is fundamental that attorneys verify that cited authority supports the proposition for which it is cited. For this Rule 11 violation, the court imposed sanctions of $5,000, and required Mr. Rajan to complete additional CLE courses on AI and legal ethics, and provide proof of relevant CLEs he had previously taken.
