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Megan is a member of the Professional Liability Department where she focuses her practice on the defense of errors and omissions claims brought against various professionals including attorneys. 

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Megan was a law clerk for the Honorable Alice Beck Dubow of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. During her time there, she wrote opinions on appeals involving a wide range of civil and criminal legal issues. 

Megan received her J.D. from Temple University Beasley School of Law where she was a member of the Moot Court team and the Solicitations Chair of the Student Public Interest Network. Upon graduating, she served as an Assistant District Attorney for the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office. Megan then clerked for the Honorable Christopher R. Hall in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, where she assisted the Judge with drafting opinions and ruling on pre-trial motions.

Prior to law school, Megan studied International Studies and Philosophy at the University of Scranton and completed a year of service through AmeriCorpsVISTA.

    • Temple University Beasley School of Law (J.D., 2021)
    • University of Scranton (B.S., cum laude, 2017)
    • Pennsylvania, 2021
    • Philadelphia Bar Association, 2021-present
    • Home Ownership/ Tangled Title- Philadelphia VIP- 2021-2023

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Lawyers' Professional Liability

AI Misuse in Legal Filings Leads to Second Sanction and Mandatory CLE Requirements

May 7, 2026

In an order issued April 20, 2026, the Hon. Kai N. Scott of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania imposed sanctions on an attorney for including hallucinated AI-generated citations in a filing, for the second time in the same matter. First, following the imposition of attorney’s fees as an unrelated sanction, Raja Rajan, Esquire, who had represented the defendants, filed a motion for leave to appeal of sanctions of defense counsel and a motion to withdraw as attorney for all defendants. The court found five citations that were either wholly hallucinated or did not support the proposition for which they were cited.  Bunce v. Visual Technology Innovations, Inc., et al, No. CV 23-1740, 2025 WL 4231632, at *1, n.1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 2025).  The court ordered Mr. Rajan to show cause why the filing did not violate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(2), which holds that, “[b]y presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper. . .an attorney. . .certifies that to the best of [his] knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law[.]”  The court also noted that such citations in a filing potentially violated Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3, Candor Toward the Tribunal.  The court ultimately imposed sanctions of $2,500 for that violation. Following the conclusion of the underlying matter, the plaintiff sought travel costs for a cancelled deposition. In response, Mr. Rajan filed an omnibus motion seeking sanctions and objecting to the imposition of travel costs.  That motion again contained AI-hallucinated citations, which the plaintiff noted in his response.  The court explained that the standard for the review of conduct under Rule 11 is “reasonableness under the circumstances, [...] with reasonableness defined as an objective knowledge or belief at the time of the filing of a challenged paper that the claim was well-grounded in law and fact[;]” and that the Third Circuit has said that “Rule 11 requires only negligence[.]”  Bunce, 2026 WL 1082135, at *2.  The court ultimately held that there was no reasonable explanation for the inclusion of AI-generated citations, and that it is fundamental that attorneys verify that cited authority supports the proposition for which it is cited.  For this Rule 11 violation, the court imposed sanctions of $5,000, and required Mr. Rajan to complete additional CLE courses on AI and legal ethics, and provide proof of relevant CLEs he had previously taken.

Case Law Alerts

Superior Court Holds that Gist of the Action Doctrine Does Not Bar Breach of Contract Claims Sounding in Professional Negligence

January 1, 2026

A trial court’s grant of preliminary objections in a breach of contract action brought against the plaintiff’s former attorneys was reversed after the Pennsylvania Superior Court, sitting en banc, determined that the trial court erred (1) in applying the gist of the action doctrine and (2) in determining that the plaintiff was required to identify a specific provision in the retainer agreement that imposed a duty on the attorney defendants. The plaintiff had been convicted of a crime and sentenced to five to ten years’ incarceration, which was overturned because the defendants had provided the plaintiff with ineffective assistance of counsel. The plaintiff then sued the defendants for breach of contract for failing to provide competent legal services, without identifying a specific provision of the agreements that the defendants allegedly breached. Importantly, the plaintiff could not bring a professional negligence claim as the statute of limitations had expired. The trial court granted the defendants’ preliminary objections because the gist of the action doctrine bars breach of contract claims that actually sound in negligence. The Superior Court reversed, holding that, per its recent en banc decision in Swatt v. Nottingham Village, the gist of the action doctrine does not bar breach of contract claims that also sound in negligence. Furthermore, extending Swatt’s holding, it held that contracts for legal services contain an implied provision to provide competent legal services. Accordingly, legal professional liability plaintiffs may now take advantage of the four-year statute of limitations for breach of contract claims­—they are not limited to the two-year statute of limitations for negligence.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Congress Passes Financial Exploitation Prevention Act

On June 25, 2026, the House passed the Financial Exploitation Prevention Act of 2025 (“the Act”) by a vote of 414 to 2. The Act allows financial advisors and firms to delay suspicious transactions regarding the accounts of clients who are 65 or older, if they believe financial exploitation has occurred or is about to take place. With the advancement of technology and AI, the House’s overwhelming bipartisan passage of the Financial Exploitation Prevention Act represents an important step in strengthening the financial industry’s ability to combat the growing threat of elder financial exploitation. The Act recognizes what advisors have long known that financial professionals are often the first to detect suspicious behavior but have historically lacked clear legal authority to intervene before irreversible financial harm occurs. From the industry’s perspective, the bill accomplishes several important objectives, including the following: (1) Provides a practical “pause button” by allowing financial professionals to temporarily delay certain transaction requests when there is a reasonable belief that a senior or vulnerable adult is being financially exploited; (2) Empowers financial professionals to act by providing greater certainty that firms can act in good faith to protect clients without unnecessary legal risk; and (3) Strengthens investor protection without sacrificing client rights by allowing temporary delays based on a reasonable suspicion of exploitation, which is intended only to allow additional review and not to deny clients access to their money indefinitely. In sum, the Financial Exploitation Prevention Act will equip financial professionals with practical, carefully tailored tools to stop suspected financial exploitation before client assets are lost. By allowing firms to temporarily delay suspicious transactions under defined circumstances, Congress is recognizing the critical role advisors play as the first line of defense against increasingly sophisticated fraud schemes. The Act strikes an appropriate balance between protecting vulnerable investors and preserving individual financial autonomy, while reinforcing collaboration among advisors, families, and law enforcement to combat financial exploitation. The bill now awaits Senate action.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Expands Family Leave Protections Effective July 17, 2026

On January 17, 2026, Governor Murphy signed into law legislation expanding the New Jersey Family Leave Act (NJFLA). Beginning July 17, 2026, significant amendments to the NJFLA will expand job-protected family leave to smaller businesses and more employees across the state. The new law broadens coverage by lowering the threshold for private employers from 30 employees to 15 employees, meaning many smaller businesses will now be subject to the NJFLA. Employees of state and local government agencies will continue to be covered regardless of the size of the employer. The amendments also make it easier for employees to qualify for leave. Under the revised law, an employee will be eligible after three months of employment and at least 250 hours worked during the preceding 12 months, replacing the previous requirement of 12 months of employment and 1,000 hours worked. Currently, New Jersey's Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) and Family Leave Insurance (FLI) programs provide eligible employees with wage replacement while they are on leave but do not independently guarantee job protection. The recent amendments to the New Jersey Family Leave Act (NJFLA) expand these protections by extending job-protected leave to additional employees. Under the amended law, employees receiving TDI or FLI benefits may be entitled to return to the same position they held before taking leave, or to an equivalent position with the same seniority, status, pay, and benefits. Although the legislation also states that it does not expand or modify an employee's reinstatement rights under the NJFLA, the amendments appear to provide job protection to eligible employees receiving TDI or FLI benefits without requiring them to separately satisfy the eligibility requirements of the NJFLA or the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). As a result, some employees may be entitled to longer periods of job-protected leave than were previously available under existing law. With these amendments, New Jersey continues to strengthen workplace protections by expanding access to job-protected family leave for eligible employees. These changes significantly expand access to job-protected family leave and may require employers to update their leave policies, employee handbooks, and HR practices. Notably, employers who were previously not required to administer NJFLA may need to amend their policies and/or create new protocols to come into compliance with the NJFLA. Failure to do so would prove costly, as the penalties for non-compliance are significant.

Thought Leadership

Mitigating Long-Tail Liability: Delaware Court Reaffirms Five-Year Workers’ Compensation Deadline

Williamson v. Donald F. Deaven, Inc., No. N25A-07-004 FWW, 2026 LX 252526 (Del. Super. Ct. June 2, 2026) Claimant was involved in a compensable industrial work accident on May 12, 1995, for a low back injury.  Following this, he received compensation for temporary total disability benefits from July 1996 to September 1996 and for sustaining a permanent impairment in 1997 and 1998. For the next 23 years, the claimant continued treatment and paid his own medical bills without submitting them to the employer’s insurer. In November 2021, the claimant filed a petition seeking payment for medical expenses, including prospective surgery and a resulting period of total disability. The employer moved to dismiss the petition, arguing it was barred by Delaware’s five-year statute of limitations (19 Del. C. § 2361(b)). Pursuant to 18 Del. C. § 3914, insurers must provide prompt written notice of the applicable statute of limitations to invoke the five-year deadline. Due to the age of the case, neither party had a comprehensive file of the claim and the Board had archived its file of the matter. The carrier’s computer system retained only bare information indicating that payments occurred and agreements and receipts were filed with the Board in 1997. While the claimant argued that the employer could not prove it provided the mandatory statutory notice, the Hearing Officer recovered the archived file, which contained two “Receipts for Compensation Paid” signed by the claimant. The receipts explicitly contained the required five-year limitation language, which the claimant testified to signing at the hearing. The claimant also attempted to introduce evidence of payments he claimed the employer made, which would have extended the statute of limitations. As a preliminary matter, the hearing officer excluded the testimony about the payments because the claimant did not produce them to the employer. The Board found in favor of the employer and dismissed the claimant’s petition as time-barred. The claimant appealed the Board’s decision, arguing that he never received adequate notice of the statute of limitations and that the hearing officer’s evidentiary ruling was an abuse of discretion. The Court held that the archived, signed receipts constituted substantial evidence that the insurer fulfilled its statutory notice requirements. Therefore, the claimant’s petition was time-barred under the statute of limitations provisions of 19 Del. C. § 2361(b). Furthermore, the Court reinforced strict procedural compliance: it rejected the claimant’s attempts to introduce evidence of payment on appeal, ruling the argument was waived for failure to preserve it while the matter was still before the Board. This recent ruling by the Court underscores the importance and necessity of robust data preservation and precise compliance with notice requirements. For risk managers, employers, and insurers, the decision highlights how tight administrative execution protects against catastrophic long-tail liability.