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The Quarterly Dose

ALL RISE - Notable Litigation Achievements*

The Quarterly Dose – August 2024

August 1, 2024

Justin F. Johnson, David G. Tomeo, Victoria L. Pepe (all of Roseland, NJ) and Walter F. Kawalec, III (Mount Laurel, NJ) obtained summary judgment on behalf of an obstetrician in a medical malpractice action. The plaintiff alleged that our client did not obtain the requisite informed consent from our client to undergo a trial of labor after having two prior cesarean section deliveries (TOLAC x2). The court found that the plaintiff’s lack of informed consent claim was without foundation as she had an awareness of the risks of TOLAC x2. Rather, the court found that her claim was premised on the assertion that the physician performing the TOLAC x2 failed to convert the TOLAC to a C-section quickly enough when complications arose. The court held that, as matter of law, our client had no obligation to discuss the risk that the doctor in the delivery room may wait too long to pivot to a C-section, which was the actual cause of the plaintiff’s alleged harm.

Brett C. Shear (Pittsburgh, PA) obtained a defense verdict on behalf of his client, a cardiologist. The patient came to the hospital with chest pain radiating to his arm and shortness of breath. The attending physician ordered a stress test performed by the defendant cardiologist, which was interpreted as normal. The patient was then discharged from the hospital. Less than two weeks later, he died from a heart issue. An autopsy found significant narrowing of all of the arteries of the heart, including a 90% narrowing in the LAD (i.e. the “widowmaker”). The pathologist and coroner opined that the decedent had a cardiac event caused by the significant narrowing of the arteries, which caused his death. The ensuing claim was that the stress test was misinterpreted by the defendant cardiologist. The plaintiff’s cardiology expert criticized the defendant doctor, who graduated from Yale University. Our expert, a local cardiologist, testified that our client properly interpreted the stress test and that 10% of patients with coronary artery disease will still have a normal stress test. The jury returned a verdict, finding no negligence by the defendant cardiologist.

Carolyn B. DiGiovanni (King of Prussia, PA) obtained a defense verdict on behalf of her client, a surgical oncologist, in a binding high/low arbitration. The plaintiff alleged that the surgeon performed unnecessary surgery on a mass in her left arm, causing permanent scarring, continuous throbbing pain, and severe depression and anxiety. The plaintiff had two imaging studies, which were highly suspicious for malignancy. However, the pathologic examination ultimately determined the mass to be benign and an allergic reaction to Lupron injections given by the co-defendant gynecologist.

Matthew P. Keris (Scranton, PA) secured a defense verdict in a long-term care case with a unique spoliation issue, allegations of cover-up and a “no show” plaintiff. A longtime nursing home resident died nine days after suffering head trauma following a fall. The cause of death was “end-stage dementia.” The plaintiff—the resident’s son—was not the decedent’s guardian. In fact, the staff said he never visited his mother in three years and that the responsible party was a local agency. Without providing notice to the nursing home administration, the plaintiff’s lawyer delivered the body across the state to a Pittsburgh-based forensic pathologist for a private autopsy. The corpse was cremated shortly after the autopsy, without an opportunity for the defense to examine the body. The forensic pathologist alluded that the cause of death was not end-stage dementia, but blunt force trauma. The defense did not learn about the private autopsy until years later, when the report was provided in discovery. The defense filed a motion for sanctions for spoliation, which was followed by depositions of the funeral home staff and a hearing involving the forensic pathologist and attending physician. The forensic pathologist admitted that autopsy specimens were lost and that photos the plaintiff’s counsel claimed did not exist were on her computer and were never asked for. Although the spoliation motion was denied, the court held that the defense could question the forensic pathologist on the cremation, destroyed specimens and failure to produce the autopsy photographs at trial. On the eve of trial, the judge proctored an agreement between the parties to arbitrate the case “on expert reports only.” At arbitration, plaintiff’s counsel continued to pursue a conspiracy theory about “the true cause of death,” along with standard negligence criticisms about fall prevention. The plaintiff was cross-examined on a prior crimen falsi conviction and an Orphans’ Court petition initiated by the local Area Agency on Aging, wherein the deceased resident complained that she was afraid of her son, which was relevant to his “loss of society and companionship” claim. Robert J. Aldrich and Nicole E. Tanana (both in Scranton, PA) provided excellent motion and trial support, and Patricia A. Lafferty (Scranton, PA) represented Matt and Rob during the spoliation hearing after plaintiff’s counsel named them as his potential witnesses.

E. Chandler Hosmer (King of Prussia, PA) obtained a defense verdict in a case in which the plaintiff alleged that the physician was not qualified to perform gynecomastia surgery and should have referred the patient to a plastic surgeon. The plaintiff also alleged that the physician failed to properly obtain the patient's informed consent to perform the surgeries. The physician allegedly failed to perform the procedures properly, which caused the patient to require additional surgery and resulted in permanent disfigurement.

*Prior Results Do Not Guarantee a Similar Outcome 


 

The Quarterly Dose – August 2024, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.