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Lindsay G. McCormick

Office Managing Attorney

Portrait of Lindsay G. McCormick

Lindsay is a Florida Bar Board Certified Construction attorney and the Managing Attorney of our Tampa office. As a member of our firm's Professional Liability Department, the focus of her practice is construction defect litigation, architect and engineer defense and general professional liability defense. In this role, Lindsay provides counsel to general contractors, subcontractors, manufacturers, suppliers, architects and engineers in claims brought against them in a variety of construction projects and disputes, both individually and through insurance carriers. 

Additionally, Lindsay is well-versed in the practice of pursuing affirmative claims against subcontractors and sub-subcontractors when appropriate, including pursuing tenders and additional insured obligations. Further, Lindsay assists clients through pre-suit investigations, mediations and arbitrations when appropriate. Lindsay is also experienced in handling condominium association claims, and directors' and officers' claims for real estate agents, brokers and appraisers.

In addition, Lindsay is also a former member of the firm's Executive Committee Advisory Council, a distinguished group of firm leaders whose purpose is to enhance the communication between the Executive Committee and younger members of the firm's professional ranks, including associates, special counsel and junior shareholders. 

Outside of her law practice, Lindsay is an active participant in various programs with local pet rescue groups in the Tampa Bay Area, where she works with animal rescues and serves as a foster caretaker for rescued dogs in transition, until they find adoptive homes.

    • Florida State University College of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2010)
    • Florida Gulf Coast University (B.A., magna cum laude, 2007)
    • Florida, 2010
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida, 2011
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Litigation - Construction (2023-2027)
    • Florida Super Lawyers Rising Star (2014-2020)
    • Case Law Alerts, contributor, 2018
    • "Construction Defect Claims and the Role of the Insurer in Early Proceedings,"Insurance Journal - Focus on Florida, November 21, 2016
    •  “Chapter 558 Notice and the Duty to Defend ,” Defense Digest, Vol. 21, No. 3, September 2015
    • "Use of Case Management Orders in Construction Litigation," Lawyer magazine, publication of the Hillsborough County Bar Association, February 2015
    • Represented a shell contractor in a large condominium project litigation that spanned more than 6 years. The representation included both defending claims asserted by the Condo Association, as well as the general contractor, and actively pursuing claims against more than a dozen sub-subcontractors. Through the use of detailed analysis, effective defenses, active tendering and additional insured tenders, and settlement negotiations with numerous parties, was able to obtain a valuable resolution in advance of what would have been a 3-month trial. 
    • Represented framing contractor in binding arbitration initiated by a general contractor for both direct and consequential damages resulting from the construction of a multi-family building.  Carried representation through issuance of Interim Award by the arbitration panel containing a favorable ruling for the client, which included a finding of waiver of all alleged consequential damages.  The award spurred a reasonable settlement which the general contractor previously was not willing to consider.
    • Obtained a defense verdict at trial for an engineering client related to claims surrounding an alleged failed sinkhole repair.  Claims included professional negligence for the design of the repair, as well as claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation. 
    • Defended subcontractors and material suppliers in numerous cases for both direct and third-party claims relating to alleged construction defects and including both contractual and statutory warranty claims.
    • Defended design professionals in both direct and third-party claims relating to allegations of design deficiencies, and/or failure to properly perform supervisory duties.
    • Board Certified, Construction Law, The Florida Bar, 2024

Thought Leadership

Case Law Alerts

Florida Courts Reaffirm Damages Must Be Calculated as of Date of Breach in Construction Defect Cases

October 1, 2025

It has been well-settled in Florida that the proper measure of damages for a breach of contract claim is calculated as of the date of the breach. In terms of a construction defect claim, it is the date the construction defect occurred. Yet, we routinely see plaintiffs including significant markups for recent market trends. There are two recent Florida cases reiterating this standard and the consequences of failing to present proper evidence in compliance with this standard. In Bandklayder Dev., LLC v. Saba, the plaintiff claimed construction defects within a newly constructed single-family home. At trial, the plaintiff presented damages calculations from their expert as of the date of their expert’s 2022 report. The expert presented testimony that damages totaled $323,000 as of the date of his report, and that construction costs had increased by 35% as of the May 2023 trial. The plaintiff was awarded $425,000; however, this was reversed on appeal. The Florida Third District Court of Appeals highlighted that the proper measure of damages was the date of the breach, which was 2018, and that “fluctuations in value after the breach do not affect the non-breaching party’s recovery.” Because the plaintiff had failed to present damages as of the date of the claimed breach and because that failure was of their own doing, not of judicial error, the entire verdict was reversed, and the case was remanded with directions to enter judgment for the defendant. Similarly, in Vuletic Group, LLC v. Malkin, a contractor performed work at the homeowners’ property in 2018, which lead to claims of construction defects. At a 2023 bench trial, the homeowners presented evidence of damages from pricing in September 2022. Based thereon, they were awarded almost $500,000. However, again, on appeal this award was reversed. The Appellate Court cited the Florida Supreme Court in holding that: “Damages for a breach of contract should be measured as of the date of the breach. Fluctuations in value after the breach do not affect the non-breaching party’s recovery.” Grossman Holdings Ltd. v. Hourihan, 414 So. 2d 1037, 1040 (Fla. 1982). Yet again, the homeowners failed to present any evidence of the damages as of the date of the claimed breach of contract and, instead, relied on damages calculated years after the breach. Therefore, the homeowners did not meet their burden of proof for their claim, and the case was remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the contractor.    Case Law Alerts, 4th Quarter, October 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

Case Law Alerts

General Contract May Be Entitled to Award of Attorneys’ Fees Against Subcontractor, Despite Jury’s Apportionment of Damages

April 1, 2025

For construction defect litigation, many times we are called into action to defend a subcontractor who has been included as a third party to the primary dispute between an owner and a general contractor. Through the use of third-party complaints, general contractors are consistently including their implicated subcontractors within the primary litigation with the owner in an effort to “pass-through” any determined liability to its subs. An interesting issue that was recently brought up on appeal was whether a general contractor is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees against its subcontractor based on contractual prevailing party language if the jury apportions a greater percentage of damages to the general contractor rather than the implicated subcontractor.  In Babin Builders and Development Inc. v. Quinones, the trial court rejected the general contractors’ motion for attorneys’ fees against its stucco subcontractor because the jury had apportioned 60% of damages to the general contractor and 40% of damages to the stucco subcontractor. Therefore, the trial court determined that the general contractor was not the prevailing party and was not entitled to attorneys’ fees. On appeal, Florida’s First District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s ruling. The appellate court, instead, focused on the third-party claims asserted by the general contractor and whether there was a finding of breach of contract. It was determined that the jury did issue a finding for both breach of contract and violation of building code counts on behalf of the stucco subcontractor and, further, there was no finding that the general contractor contributed to these breaches. Therefore, despite a greater percentage of damages being allocated to the general contractor, that was not the controlling factor. Instead, the issue of attorneys’ fees was limited to the third-party claims only. Because the general contractor prevailed in the breach of contract and building code violations claims, the District Court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the matter for an entry of attorneys’ fees incurred on the third-party claims only.  It is important to pay attention to such nuances in interpretation of contract language, including attorneys’ fees provisions in considering risks and exposure.    Case Law Alerts, 2nd Quarter, April 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.