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Legal Updates for Lawyers' Professional Liability

Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability – RESULTS*

Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability – November 2024

November 1, 2024

Carly Edman (Pittsburgh, PA):

  • Obtained a dismissal with prejudice of all claims in a Dragonetti action in federal court in the Western District of Pennsylvania. Our clients, a family law attorney and her law firm, were sued after they filed a series of emergency motions on behalf of a mother embroiled in a contentious divorce. The emergency motions concerned the welfare of children and contained sensitive allegations relating to purported abuse. Following the disposition of these motions, the husband and his current partner sued our clients for wrongful use of civil proceedings, abuse of process and defamation. In a motion to dismiss, Carly successfully argued that all claims should be dismissed. Notably, the court’s opinion quoted Carly’s brief in support directly for its analysis of the controlling cases. The court dismissed all claims against our clients with prejudice. 

John ‘Jack’ Slimm (Mount Laurel, NJ):

  • In a case with $10 million in damages on the line, Jack was successful in having a complex legal malpractice action dismissed. The plaintiffs, a group of entities created for the estate planning of a married couple (now deceased), appealed the trial court’s decision to deny their request to extend the time for gathering evidence (discovery) and to dismiss their claims against several defendants, including lawyers and law firms. The plaintiffs accused these defendants of negligence, breach of trust, misuse of funds, and legal malpractice related to a previous settlement and the handling of family business matters. The court found that the plaintiffs did not provide the necessary evidence or expert testimony to support their legal malpractice claims. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the court used the wrong standard when denying their request to extend discovery and claimed they had valid reasons for needing more time and that the court unfairly dismissed their claims. However, the appeals court reviewed the trial court’s actions and found no mistake in how the court handled the case. In agreement with Jack, the appeals court affirmed the trial court’s ruling, emphasizing that the plaintiffs’ inability to meet court requirements and present strong claims warranted the dismissal of their case.
  • The New Jersey Appellate Division’s decision came after a decade of litigation in various courts stemming from a judgment in a financial services division of a multinational conglomerate obtained against the plaintiff and his partners in which litigation ensued over debt collection. The plaintiffs alleged, as a result of the statements and arguments made by the defendant attorneys in the underlying litigation regarding the debt, the attorneys committed fraud and misrepresentation that led to the plaintiffs’ damages, which they claimed were well in excess of $10 million. Jack argued that the assignment agreement actually reduced the amount owed to the corporation and asked the court to dismiss the case, arguing that his client was protected by legal privilege, the statute of limitations had passed, and it had no legal duty to the plaintiff. The trial court agreed to dismiss the case, finding that the plaintiff’s claims were not supported by evidence. On appeal, the court once again agreed with Jack and upheld the decision, rejecting the plaintiff’s arguments. The Appellate Division found that our clients owed no duty to the plaintiff-debtors as non-clients since the attorneys’ alleged misrepresentations were made during adversarial litigation and, thus, were not intended to induce reasonable reliance by a specific non-client. In addition, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance on the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) to sustain their cause of action since in New Jersey a violation of the RPC, standing alone, does not create a cause of action for damages. Further, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ request to permit malpractice claims by non-clients in the presence of fraud, collusion, or malicious acts. This decision is extremely important to the trial bar and provides attorneys with a level of protection/immunity in connection with statements and arguments they make as adversaries in litigation.

Aaron Moore (Philadelphia, PA and Wilmington, DE):

  • Obtained dismissal of wrongful use of civil proceedings claims brought against our clients, two attorneys who were alleged to have wrongfully prosecuted a professional negligence claim against the plaintiff, a real estate agent. The plaintiff would not accept any settlement that was less than the policy limits. After five years of litigation, the court granted our summary judgment motion, concluding the plaintiff failed to adduce facts reflecting that the attorneys prosecuted the underlying action in a grossly negligent manner or without probable cause. The court also held the plaintiff was unable to demonstrate that the underlying lawsuit was prosecuted for an improper purpose.
  • Obtained a dismissal of claims brought derivatively and directly by a corporation, including aiding and abetting, breach of fiduciary duty and tortious interference with contract, against our client, an out-of-state attorney who previously represented the corporation and its former director. The court granted our motion to dismiss, concluding the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege facts that would confer personal jurisdiction over the attorney under a conspiracy theory.

Matthew Flanagan and Jamie Sanderson (New York, NY):

  • Secured a decision granting our motion to dismiss in full in Orange County on an attorney malpractice matter. The plaintiff and daughter of co-defendants sued her parents and our client for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty denominated as promissory estoppel, and constructive trust. She sought damages of $800,000. The co-defendants allegedly purchased a property for the plaintiff to live and work in and had agreed to deed the property to the plaintiff once she paid the mortgage in full. Our client created a family trust for the family, naming the plaintiff as trustee, in which the property would be transferred to the plaintiff following the death of both parents. However, following a family dispute, the co-defendants replaced the plaintiff as trustee with our client. Upon the request of the co-defendants and in accordance with the terms of the trust, our client transferred the house to another beneficiary. We filed a motion to dismiss on all counts which the court granted in full. 

Dante Rohr (Orlando, FL):

  • Won a motion to dismiss in a case arising from our client’s representation of a plaintiff in a criminal matter. The plaintiff claimed that, due to his attorney's negligence in failing to notify him of his pretrial hearing, he was incarcerated for 437 days based on his failure to appear at the hearing, resulting in the revocation of his bond. The court granted Dante's motion to dismiss because the plaintiff could not establish a necessary element of his claim—actual innocence. Although the court released the plaintiff based on a showing that counsel failed to notify him of the hearing, thereby exonerating him from the failure to appear, the plaintiff could not meet the actual innocence element. Therefore, the State entered a nolle prosequi and dropped the case.

Carol VanderWoude (Philadelphia, PA):

  • Successfully defended on appeal the trial court’s grant of compulsory nonsuit in a legal malpractice action following the trial court’s rulings on various motions in limine. The trial court granted our clients’ motions in limine to preclude the plaintiff from introducing into evidence that its attorney sued the wrong parties, that its attorney obtained an uncollectable judgment, and that the plaintiff would have prevailed in a lawsuit against other parties. Following the motion in limine rulings, trial counsel moved for nonsuit—arguing the plaintiff could not carry its burden of proof without the precluded evidence. On appeal, the plaintiff argued the trial court’s evidentiary rulings violated the law of the case set forth in the Superior Court’s decision reversing the trial court’s order sustaining our clients’ preliminary objections and dismissing the amended complaint, and that the trial court erred in granting the motions in limine. The Superior Court rejected both arguments and affirmed the trial court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion to remove compulsory nonsuit. The Superior Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motions and that it properly concluded the plaintiff failed to present evidence to meet its burden of proof.

*Prior Results Do Not Guarantee a Similar Outcome 


 

Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability – November 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Recreational Immunity for County Under Landowners' Liability Act

In a recent unpublished decision in Matthew Kuzma, etc. v. Middlesex County Parks Department, et al., the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed summary judgment in favor of Middlesex County Parks Department, holding that the county was immune from liability under New Jersey's Landowners' Liability Act (LLA), notwithstanding its failure to plead the immunity as an affirmative defense in its answer to the Complaint. The case arose from injuries sustained by fourteen-year-old plaintiff, Matthew Kuzma, while playing basketball at Spring Lake Park in South Plainfield on August 23, 2019. The plaintiff observed a crack in the basketball court before beginning to play but did not consider it dangerous. During the game, his foot became caught in the crack, causing him to fall and suffer a significant ankle injury. The plaintiff alleged that the injury resulted in ongoing physical limitations and deprived him of the opportunity to play collegiate basketball. The plaintiff filed suit alleging that the defendants negligently maintained the basketball court. Although the county did not assert LLA immunity as an affirmative defense in its answers, it later moved for summary judgment on that basis. The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that the county had waived the defense by failing to plead it. The county maintained that the plaintiff had received sufficient notice of its intent to rely on the LLA through discovery and therefore suffered no unfair surprise or prejudice. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment, concluding that the county should be permitted to invoke statutory immunity notwithstanding its failure to formally plead the defense. Relying heavily on the New Jersey Supreme Court's guidance in Arias v. Cnty. of Bergen, holding a county park was subject to the immunity of the LLA, the Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the county's failure to plead LLA immunity did not preclude reliance on the defense under the circumstances presented. The court determined that the plaintiff had received adequate notice of the immunity claim through discovery and that permitting the defense furthered the public-policy objectives embodied in the LLA. In affirming dismissal, the Appellate Division acknowledged the seriousness of the plaintiff's injury and the general societal interest in maintaining parks and recreational facilities in a safe condition. However, the court emphasized that both the legislature and the New Jersey Supreme Court have expressed a clear policy choice to limit liability for public and private landowners who make recreational property available for public use. The decision reinforces the courts' continuing adherence to the Landowners' Liability Act and the principle that recreational lands and facilities should be broadly protected from liability exposure, even in cases involving significant personal injuries.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.