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Legal Updates for Lawyers' Professional Liability

Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability – RESULTS*

Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability – November 2024

November 1, 2024

Carly Edman (Pittsburgh, PA):

  • Obtained a dismissal with prejudice of all claims in a Dragonetti action in federal court in the Western District of Pennsylvania. Our clients, a family law attorney and her law firm, were sued after they filed a series of emergency motions on behalf of a mother embroiled in a contentious divorce. The emergency motions concerned the welfare of children and contained sensitive allegations relating to purported abuse. Following the disposition of these motions, the husband and his current partner sued our clients for wrongful use of civil proceedings, abuse of process and defamation. In a motion to dismiss, Carly successfully argued that all claims should be dismissed. Notably, the court’s opinion quoted Carly’s brief in support directly for its analysis of the controlling cases. The court dismissed all claims against our clients with prejudice. 

John ‘Jack’ Slimm (Mount Laurel, NJ):

  • In a case with $10 million in damages on the line, Jack was successful in having a complex legal malpractice action dismissed. The plaintiffs, a group of entities created for the estate planning of a married couple (now deceased), appealed the trial court’s decision to deny their request to extend the time for gathering evidence (discovery) and to dismiss their claims against several defendants, including lawyers and law firms. The plaintiffs accused these defendants of negligence, breach of trust, misuse of funds, and legal malpractice related to a previous settlement and the handling of family business matters. The court found that the plaintiffs did not provide the necessary evidence or expert testimony to support their legal malpractice claims. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the court used the wrong standard when denying their request to extend discovery and claimed they had valid reasons for needing more time and that the court unfairly dismissed their claims. However, the appeals court reviewed the trial court’s actions and found no mistake in how the court handled the case. In agreement with Jack, the appeals court affirmed the trial court’s ruling, emphasizing that the plaintiffs’ inability to meet court requirements and present strong claims warranted the dismissal of their case.
  • The New Jersey Appellate Division’s decision came after a decade of litigation in various courts stemming from a judgment in a financial services division of a multinational conglomerate obtained against the plaintiff and his partners in which litigation ensued over debt collection. The plaintiffs alleged, as a result of the statements and arguments made by the defendant attorneys in the underlying litigation regarding the debt, the attorneys committed fraud and misrepresentation that led to the plaintiffs’ damages, which they claimed were well in excess of $10 million. Jack argued that the assignment agreement actually reduced the amount owed to the corporation and asked the court to dismiss the case, arguing that his client was protected by legal privilege, the statute of limitations had passed, and it had no legal duty to the plaintiff. The trial court agreed to dismiss the case, finding that the plaintiff’s claims were not supported by evidence. On appeal, the court once again agreed with Jack and upheld the decision, rejecting the plaintiff’s arguments. The Appellate Division found that our clients owed no duty to the plaintiff-debtors as non-clients since the attorneys’ alleged misrepresentations were made during adversarial litigation and, thus, were not intended to induce reasonable reliance by a specific non-client. In addition, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance on the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) to sustain their cause of action since in New Jersey a violation of the RPC, standing alone, does not create a cause of action for damages. Further, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ request to permit malpractice claims by non-clients in the presence of fraud, collusion, or malicious acts. This decision is extremely important to the trial bar and provides attorneys with a level of protection/immunity in connection with statements and arguments they make as adversaries in litigation.

Aaron Moore (Philadelphia, PA and Wilmington, DE):

  • Obtained dismissal of wrongful use of civil proceedings claims brought against our clients, two attorneys who were alleged to have wrongfully prosecuted a professional negligence claim against the plaintiff, a real estate agent. The plaintiff would not accept any settlement that was less than the policy limits. After five years of litigation, the court granted our summary judgment motion, concluding the plaintiff failed to adduce facts reflecting that the attorneys prosecuted the underlying action in a grossly negligent manner or without probable cause. The court also held the plaintiff was unable to demonstrate that the underlying lawsuit was prosecuted for an improper purpose.
  • Obtained a dismissal of claims brought derivatively and directly by a corporation, including aiding and abetting, breach of fiduciary duty and tortious interference with contract, against our client, an out-of-state attorney who previously represented the corporation and its former director. The court granted our motion to dismiss, concluding the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege facts that would confer personal jurisdiction over the attorney under a conspiracy theory.

Matthew Flanagan and Jamie Sanderson (New York, NY):

  • Secured a decision granting our motion to dismiss in full in Orange County on an attorney malpractice matter. The plaintiff and daughter of co-defendants sued her parents and our client for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty denominated as promissory estoppel, and constructive trust. She sought damages of $800,000. The co-defendants allegedly purchased a property for the plaintiff to live and work in and had agreed to deed the property to the plaintiff once she paid the mortgage in full. Our client created a family trust for the family, naming the plaintiff as trustee, in which the property would be transferred to the plaintiff following the death of both parents. However, following a family dispute, the co-defendants replaced the plaintiff as trustee with our client. Upon the request of the co-defendants and in accordance with the terms of the trust, our client transferred the house to another beneficiary. We filed a motion to dismiss on all counts which the court granted in full. 

Dante Rohr (Orlando, FL):

  • Won a motion to dismiss in a case arising from our client’s representation of a plaintiff in a criminal matter. The plaintiff claimed that, due to his attorney's negligence in failing to notify him of his pretrial hearing, he was incarcerated for 437 days based on his failure to appear at the hearing, resulting in the revocation of his bond. The court granted Dante's motion to dismiss because the plaintiff could not establish a necessary element of his claim—actual innocence. Although the court released the plaintiff based on a showing that counsel failed to notify him of the hearing, thereby exonerating him from the failure to appear, the plaintiff could not meet the actual innocence element. Therefore, the State entered a nolle prosequi and dropped the case.

Carol VanderWoude (Philadelphia, PA):

  • Successfully defended on appeal the trial court’s grant of compulsory nonsuit in a legal malpractice action following the trial court’s rulings on various motions in limine. The trial court granted our clients’ motions in limine to preclude the plaintiff from introducing into evidence that its attorney sued the wrong parties, that its attorney obtained an uncollectable judgment, and that the plaintiff would have prevailed in a lawsuit against other parties. Following the motion in limine rulings, trial counsel moved for nonsuit—arguing the plaintiff could not carry its burden of proof without the precluded evidence. On appeal, the plaintiff argued the trial court’s evidentiary rulings violated the law of the case set forth in the Superior Court’s decision reversing the trial court’s order sustaining our clients’ preliminary objections and dismissing the amended complaint, and that the trial court erred in granting the motions in limine. The Superior Court rejected both arguments and affirmed the trial court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion to remove compulsory nonsuit. The Superior Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motions and that it properly concluded the plaintiff failed to present evidence to meet its burden of proof.

*Prior Results Do Not Guarantee a Similar Outcome 


 

Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability – November 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Court Allows Recklessness and Punitive Damages Claims to Proceed After Work‑Zone Crash

In a case where a defendant filed preliminary objections against allegations of recklessness and punitive damages, the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas denied these preliminary objections. This case stems from a motor vehicle accident, where the defendants car struck the plaintiffs car after the defendant allegedly fell asleep at the wheel, going at a high rate of speed, through a construction work zone. Defendant first objected to the general allegations throughout the plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to “reckless” conduct contending that there were insufficient factual allegations to support the claim of reckless conduct. Defendant next objected to the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, as punitive damages may only be assessed against a motorist for falling asleep while driving if there is further evidence to prove driver was aware of their drowsiness and risk of falling asleep. Lastly, defendant objected to plaintiffs complaint, claiming it lacked specificity. The court here found that the plaintiff had included in the complaint specific allegations related to the defendant’s alleged recklessness, including allegations regarding speeding in a work zone, almost striking the flagger, falling asleep at the wheel, and striking the plaintiffs vehicle which was stopped. Additionally, the court noted that falling asleep does not come without warning. The court found that these allegations were sufficient to support an allegation of recklessness at the pleadings stage.

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias obtained a favorable decision on behalf of their client in a case centering on the admissibility of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. In Martin v. Loury, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the exclusion of a plaintiff's legal malpractice expert, holding that the expert's opinions on causation and damages were too speculative to support the malpractice claim. The legal malpractice action arose from an underlying employment dispute involving claims for damages stemming from the breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel committed malpractice during a second trial by failing to recall the plaintiff as a rebuttal witness after the employer's CEO testified. According to the plaintiff's expert, additional rebuttal testimony would have bolstered the plaintiff's damages claims and led to a more favorable result. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected that theory. The courts found that the expert could not explain how the proposed rebuttal testimony would have altered the outcome of the underlying case or resulted in any additional recoverable damages. Notably, the trial judge in the underlying employment matter had already rejected the CEO's testimony as not credible and had accepted the damages analysis advanced by the plaintiff. The court had also determined that the amount of damages was not genuinely disputed. As a result, the expert's opinion that additional rebuttal testimony would have produced a better outcome was unsupported by the record and based on speculation rather than evidence. The Appellate Division agreed that neither the plaintiff nor the expert could identify any actual damages attributable to the alleged malpractice or demonstrate the required element of proximate causation. The court further upheld the trial court's application of New Jersey's net opinion doctrine, finding that the expert failed to provide the necessary "why and wherefore" supporting his conclusion that the attorney's conduct caused a compensable loss. Because the opinions rested on unquantified possibilities rather than demonstrable facts, they were inadmissible. Key Takeaway for Legal Malpractice Defendants For attorneys and firms defending legal malpractice claims, Martin v. Loury underscores the importance of closely scrutinizing an opponent's expert report on the critical elements of proximate causation and damages. The decision demonstrates that a malpractice claim cannot survive where an expert merely speculates that different litigation tactics might have produced a better result. Instead, the plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony grounded in the record that explains how the alleged attorney error probably changed the outcome of the underlying matter and resulted in measurable damages.

Thought Leadership

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Holds That Public Policy Does Not Prevent Insurance Coverage for Sex Trafficking Claims

On July 21, 2026, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an opinion emphasizing the limited circumstances in which courts may invoke public policy to bar insurance coverage, holding in Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (U.S. Branch) v. RI Settlement Trust that Pennsylvania public policy does not preclude coverage for claims alleging that insureds enabled or profited from human sex trafficking. The decision rejects a line of federal district court decisions predicting otherwise and reinforces that Pennsylvania courts will invoke the public policy doctrine only in the clearest of circumstances. RI Settlement is particularly significant because it arose on certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, giving the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve an issue on which federal courts had predicted Pennsylvania law differently. RI Settlement arose out of four separate civil complaints in which the underlying plaintiffs alleged that, as minors, they were the victims of human sex trafficking at various hotels in Philadelphia. The plaintiffs claimed that the hotel owners were negligent in failing to stop the sex trafficking from happening at their hotels. After the filing of the lawsuits, the hotel owners sought coverage under their Commercial General Liability policies. The insurers initially defended the hotels under Reservation of Rights letters, though the carriers later filed Declaratory Judgment actions seeking declarations that they did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify. In short, the insurers argued in the alternative that they did not owe any obligation to provide coverage based upon Pennsylvania public policy (because the claims violated the Human Trafficking Law – 18 Pa.C.S. § 3011) and the terms and conditions of the policy. On motions for judgment on the pleadings, the District Court found for the insurers on the basis of public policy: There is no duty to defend or indemnify against actions arising out of an insured's criminal conduct related to the sex trafficking of minors. The Court appreciates that it may make public policy the basis of a judicial decision only in “the clearest of cases.” See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 589 A.2d 854, 868 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1994)). Yet, the Court strains to imagine a clearer case than the one presented here in which the facts alleged indicate that Policyholders engaged in criminal conduct in violation of Pennsylvania's Human Trafficking Law. The hotel owners appealed the matter to the Third Circuit, which petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to grant review of two certified questions of law: (1) whether Pennsylvania law had an “overriding public policy” against sex trafficking, such that an insurer’s duty to defend and/or indemnify is abrogated when an insured is alleged to have enabled or profited from such trafficking; and (2) if yes, is that duty abrogated whenever the insured’s alleged conduct would constitute a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Trafficking statute. Importantly, the certified questions did not ask the Supreme Court to determine whether the policies afforded coverage under their terms. Rather, the court was asked only whether Pennsylvania public policy independently barred coverage. As a result, the court assumed for purposes of answering the certified questions that the insurers otherwise owed a duty to defend and addressed only the public policy issue, leaving all policy-based coverage defenses for further proceedings. Because the court concluded that the answer to the first certified question was “no”, it did not reach the second issue. In reaching its determination that Pennsylvania public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage for sex trafficking claims, the court limited the impact of its decision in Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A. 2d 854, 855 (Pa. 2004), which the RI Settlement opinion emphasized as having been an “Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court” – or a plurality opinion. In Greenfield, the insured homeowner was sued by the estate of his houseguest who overdosed from heroin that he sold to her. The matter wound its way to the Supreme Court, which determined that the insurer did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify based upon Pennsylvania public policy, which criminalized the sale and use of heroin as a Schedule I narcotic. In RI Settlement, the court “decline[d] the invitation” to extend the rationale of the three-justice plurality in Greenfield beyond cases involving Schedule I controlled substances. In so holding, the justices in RI Settlement refused to “divine an overriding public policy pronouncement by the General Assembly by virtue of its enactment of the Human Trafficking Law.” The opinion further states that it is not “within the purview of this Court to rank the magnitude of the public policy underlying the various crimes defined in the Crimes Code. It is sufficient for the work of the courts to know that the General Assembly has identified conduct it deems harmful and dangerous to the maintenance of an orderly society and criminalized it.” While the court declined to declare that Pennsylvania public policy prohibits coverage for sex trafficking claims, the opinion in RI Settlement expressly states that insurers are free to include appropriate exclusionary language for such causes of actions in their policies if they desire to do so. It will certainly be interesting to see whether the insurance industry accepts the court’s invitation, or perhaps whether the Pennsylvania legislature steps in to clarify that sex trafficking claims are indeed of the type or magnitude that they should not be covered by insurance. In any event, we will, of course, continue to monitor this and other insurance coverage issues that arise before courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and throughout our firm’s geographic footprint and around the country.