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The Quarterly Dose

LEGAL ROUNDUP - Pennsylvania

The Quarterly Dose - May 2024

May 1, 2024

by Kevin Majernik

Pennsylvania Superior Court holds that trial court correctly entered nonsuit on plaintiff’s corporate negligence claim for failing to show actual or constructive knowledge.
Corey v. Wilkes-Barre Hosp. Co., LLC, 2023 PA Super 262, 307 A.3d 701 (Pa. Super. 2023)

The trial court entered nonsuit on the plaintiff’s corporate negligence claim as the case did not involve any kind of systemic negligence on the part of the hospital. The trial court found that the plaintiff’s sole expert gave only generalized, non-specific terms of what the expert believed “they” should have done, but failed to identify who was “they.” The plaintiff’s expert was only critical of “they,” which the court could only assume was the nurse and the attending emergency room physician, not the defendant hospital. Even assuming arguendo that “they” referred to the defendant hospital, the only testimony concerning knowledge for corporate negligence concerned issues with alarms on monitoring equipment, which fell well short of what is required for actual or constructive knowledge necessary for a claim of corporate negligence. Accordingly, the court found that there was no testimony and/ or evidence demonstrating actual or constructive knowledge. This is beneficial to support arguments made in preliminary objections, judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment and nonsuit for corporate negligence claims where a plaintiff fails to allege or sufficiently allege actual or constructive knowledge.

 

Pennsylvania Superior Court holds that, under Section 311 of MCARE, matters reviewed do not require a document be specifically reviewed by a patient safety committee.
Lahr v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 2023 WL 8665017 (Pa. Super. Dec. 15, 2023)

The trial court had ordered production of patient safety reports which were (i) prepared in accordance with MCARE, (ii) intended to be confidential, and (iii) contained information identical to that conveyed to the Pennsylvania Patient Safety Authority protected by Section 311(d) of MCARE. The defendant-hospital claimed that the documents were privileged pursuant to MCARE, as they were patient safety event reports created in accordance with an adopted patient safety plan created in accordance with MCARE.

The Superior Court, on appeal, reversed the trial court’s determination, finding that “matters reviewed,” as stated in Section 311(a) of MCARE, do not require the purportedly privileged document under Section 311(a) if they have been reviewed by a patient safety committee or governing board in order to establish protection. Rather, at a minimum, based on the statutory interpretation of Section 311 of MCARE, a party only needs to demonstrate that the document “arose out of matters reviewed by a patient safety committee or a governing board pursuant to their Section 311(b) responsibilities.” While this decision is unreported, it will still be beneficial in asserting patient safety privileges under Section 311 of MCARE.

 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court holds that No Felony Conviction Recovery Rule barred medical malpractice and indemnification claims.
Dinardo v. Kohler, 304 A.3d 1187 (Pa. 2023)

Both the trial court and the Superior Court found that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by the No Felony Conviction Recovery Rule. The plaintiff filed a medical malpractice suit against his prior treating psychiatrist and health care providers, claiming that his criminal conduct—murdering four individuals—was a result of their gross negligence and sought compensatory damages and indemnification against judgments by the families of the four victims. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that any recovery was barred by the No Felony Conviction Recovery Rule as the plaintiff was barred from profiting and/or beneficiating via civil laws off of his own criminal conduct. Specifically, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the complaint, when read as a whole, sought damages that flowed from his own homicidal conduct.


This is a major application of the No Felony Conviction Recovery Rule in the medical malpractice realm and can serve as a basis for further preliminary objections or dispositive motions wherein a plaintiff’s claims stem from criminal conduct. 


 

The Quarterly Dose – May 2024, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.