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Co-Chair, Disciplinary Board Representation Practice Group

Portrait of Josh J.T. Byrne

Results

  • Civil Rights Claims Dismissed Against Attorney Client in Federal Court

    Obtained dismissal of claims in a civil rights action brought against their attorney client in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff brought claims for Deprivation of Rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983), Conspiracy Against Rights (42 U.S.C. § 1985), and Civil Conspiracy against their client. Jake and Josh filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), arguing that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Magistrate Judge agreed, issuing a report and recommendation for the claims to be dismissed, which the District Judge then adopted as the Court’s decision. No timely appeal was taken.

  • Unanimous Decision Received from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

    We received a unanimous decision from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. This decision both limits the use of offensive collateral estoppel in disciplinary matters and establishes that the standard of proof for disciplinary matters in Pennsylvania is clear and convincing evidence. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel had sought to utilize non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel to preclude the respondent from disputing fact determinations by a bankruptcy judge when she sanctioned the respondent and his client. The Supreme Court determined that the burden of proof for the judge in issuing sanctions was something less than clear and convincing evidence and, therefore, collateral estoppel did not apply. In making its decision, the Supreme Court noted that the previously expressed standard of “preponderance of clear and satisfactory evidence” was confusing and archaic but is the functional equivalent of “clear and convincing.” 

  • Successful Representation of Attorney in Disciplinary Board Matter

    We achieved an informal admonition, the lowest form of discipline which is non-public, for a lawyer client in a matter that involved alleged failures to appropriately represent clients and timely file appeals in six different criminal matters.

  • Dismissal of Disciplinary Complaint Involving IOLTA Funds

    We achieved dismissal of a disciplinary complaint brought against our attorney client who was the victim of a sophisticated scam and sent IOLTA (Interest on Lawyers’ Trust Accounts) funds belonging to another client out of the country.

  • Client Privacy Maintained in Disciplinary Board Matter

    In a highly unusual move in a case with potential national implications, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel filed a petition for allowance of appeal seeking to have the decision of the Disciplinary Board changed from a private reprimand to a public reprimand. The defense successfully defeated this petition, thus maintaining the client’s privacy.

  • Private Reprimand for Client in a Disciplinary Board Matter

    This case had potential national implications where the allegations by Disciplinary Counsel included 93 paragraphs and alleged violations of multiple Rules of Professional Conduct.

  • Declaratory Judgment Lawsuit Against Licensed Property Location Service Dismissed

    We obtained a dismissal of a declaratory judgment action against our clients, a national firm and its principal, who specialize in identifying and reclaiming lost property for consumers, who do not realize such lost property exists. Plaintiff brought this declaratory judgment action on the heels of plaintiff’s having suffered a smarting defeat in an attempted class action lawsuit against our clients. In that underlying litigation, the lower court dismissed plaintiff’s lawsuit twice and the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal. Plaintiff brought this action to preempt any attempts by our clients to someday bring a Dragonetti claim against plaintiff for filing the class action lawsuit in the underlying litigation without probable cause. We filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s declaratory judgment action, asserting that Plaintiff’s lawsuit was improper because it was asking the Court to make a decision on an issue that had not yet arisen. The Court granted our motion and soundly rejected Plaintiff’s claims, issuing an opinion that decisively stated “no amendment would save [plaintiff’s] Amended Complaint.” The lawsuit against our clients was dismissed with prejudice.

  • Trial Court's Sanctions Against Attorney and His Zoning Board Clients Vacated

    We assisted an attorney and his zoning board clients in having sanctions that had been imposed by a trial court judge vacated. We helped the attorney in obtaining pre-claim assistance coverage from his insurance carrier, and then worked with him to author an appellate brief challenging the sanctions. In an unpublished opinion, the judge writing for the Commonwealth Court agreed with the arguments presented by our team and the client. The Commonwealth Court found that the trial court had no jurisdiction to issue sanctions under Section 2503 of the Judicial Code. The Commonwealth Court also found there was no basis to sanction the attorney or his clients under Rule of Civil Procedure 1701, and that the trial court did not provide appropriate due process prior to making a finding of contempt. The trial court’s order for sanctions was vacated.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.