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Gabrielle L. Winter

Portrait of Gabrielle  L. Winter

Gabrielle is a member of the Workers’ Compensation Department and focuses her practice on defending employers and insurance carriers during all stages of workers’ compensation litigation. She is committed to delivering strong advocacy and thoughtful guidance that aligns with each client’s broader business goals. By taking a thoughtful, practical approach to every matter, Gabrielle places an emphasis on minimizing exposure and achieving favorable outcomes.

Gabrielle received her J.D.  from Widener University Delaware Law School, where she served as a member of the student honor council. As a certified legal intern representing survivors of domestic violence in Delaware Family Court pro bono, Gabrielle gained hands-on trial and mediation experience.  

Prior to attending law school, Gabrielle graduated magna cum laude from Rutgers University, where she studied Criminal Justice, Political Science, and Legal Studies. She was a member of the honors college, the athenaeum honor’s society, and Pi Sigma Alpha. She received the 2019 Chancellor’s Award for Civic Engagement.

Outside of her law practice, Gabrielle enjoys going to the beach and traveling.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., 2024)
    • Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey (B.A., magna cum laude, 2020)
    • New Jersey, 2025
    • Successfully argued a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on a medical provider claim petition seeking more than $100,000. The judge dismissed the case, agreeing with our argument that there was insufficient contact with New Jersey, and that the proper jurisdiction was New York.

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Appellate Division Affirms Increased Permanency Award Despite Petitioner’s Refusal of Recommended Surgery

September 30, 2026

Key Points: • A refusal of recommended treatment does not automatically preclude an increased permanency award on a re-opener claim. • Objective medical evidence remains essential in re-opener claims. Petitioners must still prove a material increase in disability through objective findings, not subjective complaints. • Credibility findings carry significant weight on appeal. The Appellate Division will defer to a workers’ compensation judge’s supported factual and credibility determinations, making them difficult to overturn. • Respond promptly to requests for settlement authority to facilitate meaningful negotiations and minimize the risk of increased attorney’s fees and costs. Can a petitioner obtain an increased permanency award while refusing recommended surgery? According to the Appellate Division's recent unpublished decision in Grasso v. Monmouth County Sheriff's Department, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1029 (N.J. Super. App. Div. May 18, 2026), the answer is yes. The decision is important as respondents often cite a petitioner’s refusal of treatment as evidence that no material increase in disability has occurred. Jason Grasso, a corrections officer employed by the Monmouth County Sheriff’s Department, injured his right great toe while attempting to break up an inmate altercation in 2016. After undergoing surgery in 2019, he resolved his claim in 2021 for an award of 27.5% permanent partial disability of the right foot. Less than one year later, Grasso filed an application for review or modification, alleging increased pain and disability. Subsequent MRI imaging showed degenerative changes within the toe, and the authorized treating podiatrist recommended a fusion surgery. Grasso declined the procedure, testifying that he believed the prior surgery had worsened his condition and that he feared the proposed fusion would further impair his ability to play with his children and continue working as a corrections officer. At trial, petitioner’s orthopedic expert testified that objective MRI findings demonstrated progressive degeneration since the original award and that the condition would continue to worsen absent surgery. Respondent’s orthopedic expert acknowledged the progression of degenerative changes reflected on the MRI, but nevertheless concluded there had been no material worsening in permanent disability since the original award. The workers’ compensation Judge found petitioner had established a material increase in disability supported by objective medical evidence and increased the award to 35% permanent disability of the right foot. The Judge also assessed increased attorney's fees and costs against the employer after finding that the respondent failed to extend any settlement offer, which the Judge viewed as a failure to “negotiate in good faith”. On appeal, the employer principally argued that petitioner should not receive an increased permanency award after refusing recommended surgical treatment. The Appellate Division rejected that argument and affirmed the increased award, emphasizing both the reasonableness of the petitioner’s decision and the deference afforded to factual findings made by the workers’ compensation judge. Relying upon N.J.S.A. 34:15-23, Robinson v. Jackson, 184 A. 811, 812 (E. & A. 1936) and Lorenc v. Chemirad Corp., 179 A.2d 401, 412-413 (N.J. 1962), the court reiterated that an employee’s refusal of surgery does not automatically justify reducing or denying benefits. Rather, the inquiry is whether the refusal was reasonable under the circumstances. Here, the workers’ compensation judge credited the petitioner's testimony regarding his increased functional limitations, his belief that the prior surgery had failed, and his reasonable fear that undergoing an additional surgery could jeopardize both his employment and quality of life. Because credibility determinations and factual findings are entitled to substantial deference on appeal, the Appellate Division declined to disturb those findings. Finally, the Appellate Division affirmed the award of attorney’s fees and costs, concluding the judge did not abuse his discretion after finding respondent failed to “negotiate in good faith” by declining to make any settlement offer before trial. Although attorney's fees are commonly allocated on a 60/40 split, workers’ compensation judges have discretion to deviate from that practice based on the circumstances of the case. Grasso reinforces several important principles governing re-openers and provides valuable guidance for evaluating permanency exposure. First, objective medical evidence remains critical. Subjective complaints alone are not enough. Petitioners continue to bear the burden of proving, through objective medical evidence, a material increase in disability since the prior award. MRI findings, diagnostic studies, changes in physical examination findings, and documented functional loss remain significantly more persuasive than increased subjective complaints alone. Second, a petitioner's refusal to undergo recommended surgery is not dispositive when evaluating increased permanency. Respondents should not assume that declining recommended treatment will automatically limit exposure. Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether the refusal was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Third, develop a complete record. Defense experts should be asked to address more than whether permanency has increased. When there has been no increase, experts need to explain why. When surgery has been recommended, experts should explain: whether the proposed procedure offers a reasonable likelihood of improving function; the expected risks and recovery; whether refusing surgery materially contributes to ongoing disability; and whether any worsening is attributable to the original work injury, normal aging, or unrelated degeneration. A well-developed expert opinion assists respondents in their arguments and also provides workers’ compensation judges with a fuller record when evaluating both the reasonableness of refusing treatment and whether a petitioner has met the burden of proving increased disability. Fourth, the Appellate Division repeatedly emphasized the highly deferential standard afforded to compensation judges. Once a workers’ compensation judge makes supported credibility determinations and factual findings, reversal on appeal becomes difficult. Finally, maintain active communication regarding settlement authority. While the Workers' Compensation Act does not define "good-faith" settlement negotiations, Grasso illustrates that a court may consider the absence of any settlement offer when exercising its discretion to assess attorney's fees and costs. Promptly providing settlement authority, even where the claim remains disputed, allows defense counsel to engage in meaningful negotiations and helps reduce the risk of a higher fee award. In summary, Grasso serves as an important reminder that the focus remains on whether the petitioner has established a material increase in disability through objective medical evidence and whether the refusal of treatment is reasonable under the circumstances. The decision also highlights the substantial deference afforded to workers' compensation judges' factual and credibility determinations and demonstrates the importance of timely settlement authority to facilitate meaningful negotiations and reduce the risk of increased attorney's fees and costs. Gabrielle is an Associate in our Mount Laurel, NJ office. She can be reached at (856) 414-6057 or GLWinter@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.