.

Elias focuses his practice exclusively on workers' compensation litigation. He represents employers and insurance carriers, defending them against all manner of workers’ compensation claims. Elias is experienced in all aspects of claims handling, from initial investigation and testimony of fact and medical expert witnesses, to brief writing and litigating before the courts.

Elias has secured positive results for his clients and received favorable decisions from Workers’ Compensation Judges, the Appellate Board and the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. He is also experienced in handling Heart and Lung Act arbitrations. By placing a high priority on communication, Elias partners with his clients to develop tailored risk management and defense strategies that best meet their needs.

Elias received a B.A. in English & Political Science from Bucknell University and his J.D. from Widener University. 

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., 2006)
    • Bucknell University (B.A., 2003)
    • Pennsylvania, 2006
    • Defense Research Institute
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Philadelphia Bar Association, Workers' Compensation Section Assistant Secretary
    • Proper Identification of Pain Generators in Work Injuries/Personal Injuries and Novel Treatment Options, Philadelphia Bar Association’s 2023 Bench-Bar & Annual Conference, September 23, 2023, Atlantic City, NJ

Results

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

The $30,000 Oops! An Insurer’s Costly Overpayment

December 1, 2025

Key Points:  Commonwealth Court held that pharmacy was not a party in the underlying UR litigation and could not be made a party to the insurer’s review billing petition since there is no equitable remedy in the Workers’ Compensation Act that would allow recoupment of overpaid medical bills by the insurer.  Accordingly, insurer had to forfeit $30,000 overpayment. Unlike most Commonwealth Court cases addressing workers’ compensation issues, Pioneer Construction Co., Inc., Eastern Alliance Insurance Company, and Employers Alliance, Inc. v. Insight Pharmaceuticals, LLC (d/b/a Insight Pharmacy), 338 A.3d 234 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2025), was an appeal of a Court of Common Pleas decision, not a Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board opinion.  The insurer, Eastern Alliance Insurance Company, mistakenly overpaid Insight Pharmacy over $30,000. In a 2020 decision, a workers’ compensation judge granted a petition to review medical treatment or billing and ordered the pharmacy to reimburse the insurer the overpaid amount. However, the Commonwealth Court ultimately ruled that the insurer could not be reimbursed and had to forfeit the money. This case started with a March 2015 Utilization Review (UR), which found that, as of December 2014, certain compound creams were no longer reasonable or necessary treatment for the claimant’s work injury. The UR was not challenged by the claimant; therefore, the insurer was no longer responsible for payment of the compound creams. However, in October 2018, the pharmacy submitted bills for the unreasonable and unnecessary compound creams to the insurer, which processed those bills. The insurer mistakenly paid the pharmacy $30,767.14. (Yikes!) Upon realizing its $30,000 error, the insurer asked the pharmacy to refund the payments. The pharmacy declined. The insurer then filed a workers’ compensation petition to review medical treatment or billing and a petition to join the pharmacy to the proceedings.  In response to the petitions, the pharmacy argued that the workers’ compensation judge lacked jurisdiction to order reimbursement because the pharmacy could not be a party to the judge’s proceedings and the Workers’ Compensation Act contains no reimbursement remedy for insurers who overpay providers. The pharmacy argued that equity was not available to the insurer and the underlying judge’s proceedings violated its right to due process because it could not be a party to that proceeding. In an October 2020 decision, the workers’ compensation judge found that the insurer had overpaid the pharmacy, granted the billing review and joinder petitions, and ordered the pharmacy to reimburse the insurer the $30,000 overpayment. The pharmacy did not appeal this decision.  In January 2021, the insurer filed a praecipe in Common Pleas Court, requesting that the $30,000 judgment ($30,767.14 plus $475.41 in statutory interest) be entered against the pharmacy.  In a February 2021 letter to the insurer, the pharmacy demanded that the insurer withdraw the praecipe or the pharmacy would seek sanctions against the insurer on the bases that: the insurer falsely identified the pharmacy as a party to the judge’s proceedings, the pharmacy could not appeal the judge’s decision because it was not a party to the workers’ compensation litigation, and  the insurer did not properly serve the praecipe on the pharmacy.  The insurer responded by arguing that, because the pharmacy participated in the judge’s proceedings and did not take an appeal from the judge’s October 2020 decision and order, the pharmacy was bound by that decision. In April 2021, the pharmacy filed a motion to open the default judgment and a motion for sanctions in the Court of Common Pleas and a brief in support. The insurer filed a response opposing the petitions and a supporting brief.  Only weeks later, in May 2021, by order and without a hearing, the Court of Common Pleas denied the pharmacy’s petitions. On May 27, 2021, the pharmacy appealed from the Common Pleas Court’s order to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. In its opinion, the Commonwealth Court reviewed a discussion of the pharmacy’s arguments and its holdings, which ultimately were unfavorable to the insurer. The pharmacy first argued that the Court of Common Pleas lacked jurisdiction because the pharmacy “was never properly served with the judgment.” The Commonwealth Court did not accept that argument—that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the judgment was not properly served—and held that it lacked merit. Second, the pharmacy argued that the insurer filed the praecipe in the Court of Common Pleas despite the fact that the pharmacy was not a party to the prior UR and judge’s proceedings that gave rise to the judgment; thus, the trial court violated its due process rights and erred by entering judgment against it. The Commonwealth Court held that, because the Workers’ Compensation Act provides no reimbursement remedy for insurers that overpay providers, the pharmacy’s counsel participated before the judge solely to assert that there was no basis under the Act for the judge to join the pharmacy or order it to reimburse the insurer. The Commonwealth Court held the judge had no valid equitable basis to join the pharmacy to the insurer’s billing review petition; therefore, the pharmacy was not, and could not, be a party to the UR and the judge’s proceedings. The Commonwealth Court held that, because the pharmacy was not a party to the UR and judge’s proceedings, the trial court erred as a matter of law by not striking the judgment against the pharmacy.  Third, the pharmacy argued that the trial court erred by denying the pharmacy’s petition to open the default judgment where Section 428 of the Act authorizes only employees or dependents deprived of compensation to recover from an employer or insurer in default of payment. The Commonwealth Court held that, without precedential supporting legal authority, the trial court disregarded the plain language of Section 428 of the Act to allow the insurer to become an entity requesting judgment against an entity not statutorily liable (an employee or dependent). The Commonwealth Court held that the pharmacy was not statutorily able to be liable for a default judgment and the Court of Common Pleas erred by not striking the judgment against the pharmacy on that basis. Ultimately, the Commonwealth Court held that the pharmacy was not a party in the underlying UR litigation and, therefore, cannot be made a party to the insurer’s review billing petition since there is no equitable remedy in the Act that would allow recoupment of overpaid medical bills by the insurer. Accordingly, the insurer was out of luck and had to forfeit the $30,000 overpayment.  Going forward, insurers and employers should pay attention to Utilization Review determinations to avoid similar situations. After obtaining a favorable UR determination that finds treatment to be unreasonable and unnecessary, follow-up with the insurer’s billing or payment departments so they, too, know that further provider payments should not be made. Unfortunately, if they are paid mistakenly, they cannot be recouped.  Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Pa. High Court Doubles Down on the Workers’ Comp Act’s Exclusivity Provision

August 3, 2023

Employers continue to be shielded from defending against lawsuits by employees when the matter at issue is intertwined with the workers’ compensation claim and an employee alleges a failure to investigate a workplace injury.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.

Thought Leadership

The Enforceability of Online Arbitration Agreements Remains Unresolved in Pennsylvania, But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has Provided Substantive Guidance on the Issue

Key Points: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirms that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable as collateral orders. The outcome of Chilutti II has generally left the substantive enforceability issues with browsewrap agreements unresolved in Pennsylvania. Until this issue is resolved by the Pennsylvania courts, companies operating in the Commonwealth should strive to ensure that their registration websites and/or application screens conspicuously present arbitration agreements in manners which ensure their users and consumers assent to the terms of the agreements by following the standards set forth in Chilutti I. Browsewrap agreements have been defined as agreements “‘in which a website offers terms that are disclosed only through a hyperlink and the user supposedly manifests assent to those terms simply by continuing to use the website,’ and typically do not require an electronic signature.” See, Cobb v. Tesla, Inc., 2026 WL 458470, at *1 n. 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 18, 2026) (citation omitted). They are largely regarded as the “if you keep using this, you agree to everything buried in this link” terms embedded into almost every online agreement consumers and users sign before proceeding with purchases of goods and/or services. While consumers are generally aware of them, many almost never click on the link, nor read them in their entirety. This leaves many consumers and users ignorant of the terms and impact of such agreements. However, one’s ignorance of the otherwise neatly-tucked-away terms rarely renders them unenforceable. The issue of the enforceability of browsewrap agreements has been up for debate for some time in many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Indeed, Pennsylvania had a brief grip on this issue for a period in time. Specifically, in 2023, an en banc Superior Court set forth heightened standards for companies to meet in order to secure assent and enforce browsewrap arbitration agreements. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc) (“Chilutti I”) Chilutti I involved a husband and wife who sued Uber and its subsidiaries after the wife, a wheelchair bound passenger using Uber’s rideshare service, fell, struck her head, and lost consciousness due to her uber driver failing to provide a seatbelt and making an aggressive turn during the trip. The Chilutti’s filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and its subsidiaries. In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that “the couple’s conduct on the company’s website and application — when they registered for the ridesharing service — signified that they agreed to be bound by the mandatory arbitration provision found in the hyperlinked terms and conditions.” The trial court granted the defendants’ petition and stayed the proceedings pending the results of arbitration, and the Chilutti’s appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court addressed two issues. First, it addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. A divided Superior Court determined that it did, with its basis for the holding being that the order from which the Chilutti’s appealed was a collateral order. Next, the Superior Court set out to address the merits of the Chilutti’s substantive claim. The Superior Court concluded that the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate. Its rationale was that Uber’s website and application did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to the Chiluttis. In reaching this decision, the en banc Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial, the registration process cannot be completed until the consumer is fully informed of this waiver, and, when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver appears at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. Since the ruling, Pennsylvania courts have applied Chilutti I to determine if browsewrap agreements are enforceable.  For instance, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas invoked Chilutti I to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen.  See Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (C.P. Alleg. Cnty. Mar. 24, 2025). Similarly, the Superior Court has held that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti I.” Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 348 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2025). While the issue of enforceability of browsewrap agreements appeared to have been resolved by Chilutti I, Pennsylvania courts’ grip on this issue has been slackened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s January 21, 2026, opinion in Chilutti II. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) (“Chilutti II”). Therein, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim, but rather the issue of whether the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the orders staying litigation pending arbitration. The Court ultimately vacated the en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s order from which the Chiluttis appealed did not qualify as a collateral order and, thus, the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits” of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim. As such, Chilutti II has rendered Chilutti I nonbinding, and the issue of enforceability of online arbitration agreements remains unresolved. However, in light of the fact the Supreme Court did not address or comment on the merits of the Chiluttis’ appeal, Chilutti I is still meaningful. Specifically, it provides guidance as to the standards a company should strive to meet to ensure they have obtained users’ assent so that they are able to enforce online arbitration agreements. Additionally, it may serve as persuasive authority in judges’ evaluations of petitions and/or motions to compel browsewrap arbitration agreements until this particular issue is properly put before our appellate courts. Keanna works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1174 or KASeabrooks@MDWCG.com.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.