.

David G. Tomeo

Portrait of David G. Tomeo

David is an accomplished defense attorney whose practice focuses on representing health care providers in medical malpractice litigation throughout New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania. His clients range from physicians and nurses, to hospitals and behavioral health facilities. 

David is often called upon to represent staffing companies and health care practices in malpractice suits, utilizing his substantial knowledge and experience to guide corporate entities in handling issues commonly faced in these cases, including “piercing the corporate veil” allegations, violation of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine, and claims for respondeat superior liability. Clients also seek David’s counsel to defend malpractice actions seeking to hold a parent or holding company liable for the alleged negligent actions of subsidiaries and the health care providers employed by such subsidiaries. In addition, urgent care center franchisors rely on David’s keen understanding of the unique intersection of medical malpractice and franchise law when facing medical malpractice suits.

David has extensive trial and courtroom experience throughout New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania. In addition to his trial court work, he has argued before the New Jersey Supreme Court and has handled numerous appeals in the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court. He has also served as an author and speaker on current trends and issues impacting his clients.  

Giving back and contributing to his community is a top priority for David. He provides pro bono legal services through Volunteer Lawyers for Justice and has been honored with the organization’s "Volunteer of the Year” award.

    • Seton Hall University School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1989)
    • Montclair State University (B.A., summa cum laude, 1986)
    • New Jersey, 1989
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 1989
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 1989
    • Pennsylvania, 2020
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of an obstetrician in a medical malpractice action. The plaintiff alleged that our client did not obtain the requisite informed consent from our client to undergo a trial of labor after having two prior cesarean section deliveries (“TOLAC x2”). The court found that the plaintiff’s lack of informed consent claim was without foundation as she had an awareness of the risks of TOLAC x2. Rather, the court found that her claim was premised on the assertion that the physician performing the TOLAC x2 failed to convert the TOLAC to a C-section quickly enough when complications arose. The court held that as matter of law our client had no obligation to discuss the risk that the doctor in the delivery room may wait too long to pivot to a C-section, which was the actual cause of the plaintiff’s alleged harm.
    • Obtained a dismissal in the Superior Court of New Jersey on personal jurisdiction grounds of a multi-count complaint brought by a New Jersey based medical laboratory against our client, an Arizona company which provides both medical services and health insurance to Arizona residents. The plaintiff argued that our client was amenable to suit in this State, asserting that our client had business interactions with the laboratory in New Jersey. In opposition, we were able to establish that not only was such assertion untrue, but also that any claims sent by the plaintiff to our client for testing services would have been processed in Arizona and that our client did not have any contacts – much less the constitutionally mandated minimum contacts – necessary for personal jurisdiction in New Jersey. In addition, finding that the plaintiff did not conduct any due diligence before filing suit, and did not make any attempt to take jurisdictional discovery while the motion was pending, the Court dismissed the action with prejudice in New Jersey, despite the plaintiff’s argument that a dismissal without prejudice was appropriate, thus leaving to the courts of Arizona whether such a dismissal has preclusive effect in any suit brought there under these facts.
    • Obtained summary judgment for a large insurance carrier in a coverage action in New Jersey Superior Court, Essex County. The client’s insured, a sports and recreation facility, named the company in a third-party complaint seeking coverage for injuries allegedly sustained by plaintiff in a tennis court accident. The subject policy had an express condition requiring the provision to the carrier of a waiver and release signed by a participant in connection with the submission of a claim.  Having to concede that a waiver and release was not obtained nor provided to the carrier in connection with the claim, the insured tried to “re-write” the condition to say that a waiver and release was not required as the plaintiff bypassed the system in place, and participated without authorization. In a case of apparent first impression in New Jersey, the Court found the policy language clear and unambiguous and enforced it as written, declining the insured’s invitation to engage in “linguistic gymnastics” to find against our client.

Results

Summary Judgment Secured in a Complex Medical Malpractice Case

We obtained summary judgment on behalf of an obstetrician in a medical malpractice action. The plaintiff alleged that our client did not obtain the requisite informed consent from the plaintiff to undergo a trial of labor after having two prior cesarean section deliveries (TOLAC x2). The court found that the plaintiff’s lack of informed consent claim was without foundation as she had an awareness of the risks of TOLAC x2. Rather, the court found that her claim was premised on the assertion that the physician performing the TOLAC x2 failed to convert the TOLAC to a C-section quickly enough when complications arose. The court held that our client had no obligation to discuss the risk that the doctor in the delivery room may wait too long to pivot to a C-section, which was the actual cause of the plaintiff’s alleged harm.

Dismissal Obtained in Multi-count Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey

We successfully secured a dismissal in the Superior Court of New Jersey on personal jurisdiction grounds. This was a multi-count complaint brought by a New Jersey-based medical laboratory against our client, an Arizona company which provides both medical services and health insurance to Arizona residents. The plaintiff argued that our client was amenable to suit in this state, however, we were able to establish that, not only was such an assertion untrue, but also that any claims sent by the plaintiff to our client for testing services would have been processed in Arizona and that our client did not have any contacts—much less the constitutionally mandated minimum contacts—necessary for personal jurisdiction in New Jersey. As a result, the court dismissed the action with prejudice in New Jersey.

Thought Leadership

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Ohio Supreme Court Holds That a Binding Appraisal Award May Not Be Set Aside Absent Specific Evidence of Manifest Mistake or Fraud

On July 23, 2026, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a rare opinion on the binding effect of an appraisal award in a property insurance policy.  The Court in One Church held: A binding appraisal award will not be set aside unless an error is so palpably wrong that it undermines the intent of the agreement, such as corruption or gross mistake, not a mere error of judgment—To plead a claim of mistake with particularity as required by Civ.R. 9(B), facts alleged in a complaint must constitute the elements of mistake—Allegation that additional, hidden damage was discovered after appraisal award failed to state a claim of mistake that could justify setting aside binding appraisal.  The case arose out of a claim brought by One Church against its insurer, Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company for roof damage from a storm. Pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, the parties agreed to submit the matter to appraisal. The two appraisers inspected the building, and both appraisers agreed that the damages were $313,271.98. The insurer paid the agreed appraised amount.  Thereafter, the insured submitted a claim for an additional $206,663.09 in damages. The insured argued that these additional damages were not discovered until after the repairs began, and that they should be permitted to submit an additional claim, even though there had already been a binding appraisal of damages. The insurer refused to pay the additional damages, and the insured sued for breach of contract and bad faith.  In the trial court, the insurer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the binding appraisal award barred any further claims. The insured took the position that additional hidden damages could not be discovered until after the repairs began, and therefore there was a mutual mistake. The trial court dismissed the case on the insurer’s motion, because there was no “evidence of fraud, misfeasance, or mistake”. The Court of Appeals agreed that appraisal awards are generally binding, but noted that an appraisal award can be set aside for fraud or manifest mistake. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, finding that the insured had pled mistake with sufficient particularity. The insurer appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the trial court decision dismissing the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court found that since the insured had already demanded appraisal, and the appraisal award was binding, “something more than error of judgement, such as corruption in the arbitrator, or gross mistake” must be pled with particularity, and proven for the insured to override the appraisal award. Since the complaint did not allege fraud or manifest mistake with sufficient particularity, something more than a mere error of judgment, the complaint was insufficient to state a claim.  The complaint in this case did not challenge the appraisal award. It pled that additional damages were discovered that were not apparent when the appraisal was done. It did not specify “who discovered the damages, how they were discovered, where they were found, why they were previously hidden, or why they rise to the level of a manifest mistake that the “appraiser would have corrected...had it been called to his attention”. Id at ¶22 citing Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970). Cases deciding the effect of appraisal awards are unusual. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in One Church relies primarily on 19th century case law for its conclusion. This emphasizes the fact that there is minimal case law deciding the effect of binding appraisal clauses in property insurance policies, and makes this case all the more significant. A lengthy dissent was written by Justice Fisher, who would have affirmed the Court of Appeals decision reversing and remanding the case for a decision on the merits. Of course, the decision works both ways, and an insurer dissatisfied with a binding appraisal award will likewise be without further recourse absent evidence of corruption, fraud, misfeasance, or manifest mistake, which must be pled with particularity. To constitute manifest mistake, “the mistake must be of such character that the arbitrator or appraiser would have corrected it had it been called to his attention.”  Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970).  The majority opinion does not specifically identify what would have been sufficient to plead mistake with particularity, or if the insured could have amended the complaint to overcome the deficiencies. The dissent argues that this was not really a case alleging mistake, but rather a question of contract interpretation. The insured did not challenge the appraisal, but argued that the hidden damage was not part of the appraisal, and the appraisal only covered the known damages.  However, this argument did not carry the day with the majority.  *Thomas F. Glassman, a shareholder in Marshall Dennehey’s Cincinnati office, filed a brief in the Ohio Supreme Court on behalf of the Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys, in support of the insurer’s position.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.