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Defense Digest

The Latest Guidance From Pennsylvania Courts on the Protections Afforded Under Pennsylvania’s Peer Review Privilege

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 3, October 2022

October 1, 2022

by Daniel Dolente

Key Points:

  • To keep discussions, materials, reports and other documents generated for peer review purposes protected from discovery in litigation, consider organizing a committee within the confines of the hospital comprised of physicians, nurses and hospital administrators to perform peer review.
  • Private medical practices meeting outside of the hospital context do not hold a privilege under the PRPA, whether or not the meeting addresses a peer review function.
  • Peer review reports authored by individual health care providers outside the confines of a hospital’s committee may be subject to disclosure.
  • Third-party vendors hired to perform peer review functions do not hold a privilege over the materials they generate. The health care provider who hired the third-party vendor to assist in their peer review process may still hold a privilege.

One of the most significant decisions to recently come out of Pennsylvania Supreme Court concerning the peer review privilege and confidential information protected from production in discovery was last summer’s Leadbitter opinion. See Leadbitter v. Keystone Anesthesia Consultants, Ltd., 256 A.3d 1164 (Pa. 2021). Leadbitter discretely held that: (1) a hospital’s credentialing committee qualified as a “review committee” under the terms of Pennsylvania’s Peer Review Protection Act (PRPA), so long as the credentialing committee was performing a peer review function; and (2) information from the National Practitioner’s Data Bank was confidential and protected from discovery under the federal Health Care Quality Improvement Act. More generally, however, the Leadbitter opinion suggested that the records, discussions, and proceedings of any hospital committee, regardless of whether it was classified as a “peer-review committee,” were protected from discovery so long as that hospital committee was performing a peer review function.

The question becomes, what materials are now protected under the PRPA after Leadbitter? Anticipating this question, the Leadbitter court advised Pennsylvania’s lower courts to review the PRPA’s definitions of “Peer Review” and “Professional Health Care Providers” when deciding whether certain documents, discussions and/or materials constitute information protected from discovery. See definitions in 63 P.S. § 425.4. Importantly, “Professional Health Care Provider” is a defined term under the PRPA and includes, among others, a physician, registered nurse, administrator of a health care facility or a corporation operating a health care facility. Leadbitter suggested that a “peer review function” could only be conducted by committees made up of “Professional Health Care Providers.”

Following Leadbitter, Judge Michael Baylson of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania had the opportunity to comment on the scope of the PRPA’s protections in Lasheena Sipp-Lipscob v. Einstein Physicians Pennypack Pediatrics, 2020 WL 7353105 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2021). In Lasheena, the plaintiff brought suit against various defendants, including St. Christopher’s Hospital for Children and Teleradiology Services, P.C., a private group of radiologists who provided radiology services at St. Christopher’s Hospital. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants failed to diagnose testicular torsion, which resulted in the loss of a testicle. Through the course of discovery, it was determined that Erica Poletto, a radiologist, authored a report reviewing the quality of care rendered to the minor-patient. The defendants sought to protect the Poletto Report, as it became known, citing Leadbitter for the premise that it expanded the protections afforded by the PRPA, so long as the documents sought to be protected were created for a “peer review purpose.”

Judge Baylson, however, disagreed with this interpretation of Leadbitter. First, the practice group, Teleradiology Services, P.C., could not assert privilege over the report because it was not a “Professional Health Care Provider.” That is, a private medical practice does not qualify as a “Professional Health Care Provider” as defined by the PRPA, so any materials generated by the practice, even if during the performance of a peer review function, would not be protected from discovery. Second, St. Christopher’s Hospital could not assert the privilege because, while the hospital certainly qualified as a “Professional Health Care Provider,” discovery revealed that Dr. Poletto did not author the report as a part of any hospital committee. Rather, Judge Baylson indicated that because Dr. Poletto authored the report alone and did not provide it to any committee that was performing a peer review function at St. Christopher’s Hospital, Leadbitter’s interpretation of the PRPA did not apply.

In December 2021, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court placed further limitations on Leadbitter in its unpublished decision in Bousamra v. Excela Health, 2021 WL 6052296 (Pa. Super. Dec. 21, 2021). In Bousamra, Mercer Health and Benefits, LLC and American Medical Foundation for Peer Review and Education, Inc., the defendants, were hired to perform a study as to whether interventional cardiology procedures performed at Westmoreland Regional Hospital were medically necessary. Excela Health, the owner of Westmoreland, hired these companies. Through the course of discovery, the plaintiffs attempted to obtain the findings and reports of both Mercer and American. The defendants objected, arguing that Mercer and American acted as peer review committees hired by Excela, which was a “Professional Health Care Provider” by virtue of its status as a corporation operating a health care facility.

Ultimately, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Leadbitter, the Superior Court in Bousamra held that neither Mercer nor American were hospital committees that engaged in peer review activity as defined by the PRPA or Leadbitter because they were not “Professional Health Care Providers.” Essentially, under Bousamra’s reasoning, third-party vendors, such as Mercer and American, do not hold the privilege over the materials created. Significantly, however, the court suggested that Excela did hold a privilege over the documents created by Mercer and American because Excela qualifies as a “Professional Health Care Provider” who hired Mercer and American for the benefit of Excela’s peer review process. The documents generated by Mercer and American may be protected from disclosure “under the umbrella” of Excela. In Bousamra, however, the court indicated that Excela may still hold the privilege for materials produced by third-party vendors such as Mercer and American at the request of a protected entity such as Excela, but the issue was moot in this case because Excela waived the privilege.

As such, after Leadbitter, courts have acknowledged its holding, and held that any discussions or documents generated by a hospital committee meeting for the purposes of conducting peer review will remain confidential and protected from discovery, so long as that committee is comprised of Professional Health Care Providers, as defined by the PRPA.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.