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Defense Digest

The New Jersey Supreme Court Weakens the Duty of Care Standard Applied to Coaches and Instructors

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 12, December 2022

December 1, 2022

Key Points:

  • High school coach’s alleged acts and omissions governed by simple negligence standard rather than the heightened standard of recklessness usually applied in recreational sports settings.
  • New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned that alleged tortious conduct by coach pertained only to her decision-making as a coach, not to coach’s active involvement in the sport.

In 2015, plaintiff Morgan Dennehy was a high-school senior and a member of her school’s field hockey team. Before a practice was scheduled to start, Morgan’s coach, defendant Dezarae Fillmyer, instructed the team to begin warming up in an area where the high school’s boy soccer team was also practicing. As plaintiff was lining up to take a practice shot, an errant soccer ball struck the base of her skull, causing injuries which gave rise to a lawsuit.

The New Jersey Supreme Court recently held in Dennehy v. East Windsor Regional Board of Edu., 2022 WL 14668556 (N.J. 2022), that the high school coach’s alleged acts and omissions were governed by a simple negligence standard rather than the heightened standard of recklessness that is usually applied in other recreational sports settings. Usually in the context of recreational sports, a plaintiff must prove that a defendant acted with recklessness (a higher standard of care) to be held liable for a plaintiff’s injuries. See generally Crawn v. Campo, 643 A.2d 600(N.J. 1994); and Schick v. Ferolito, 767 A.2d 962 (N.J. 2001). The Supreme Court in Dennehy limited its application of Crawn and Schick because Dennehy alleged tortious conduct by the coach pertained only to her decision-making as a coach, not to the coach’s active involvement in the sport.

The plaintiff asserted that she sustained injuries through the defendant’s alleged failure to supervise, prevent potential and foreseeable dangerous conditions, and post suitable warnings. The defendant argued that the plaintiff was required to show that the defendants’ acts or omissions rose at least to the degree of recklessness (instead of simple negligence), as described in Crawn and Schick. Furthermore, the defendants argued Crawn’s recklessness standard should be extended to apply to the acts and omissions of instructors and coaches, like herself, regardless of the circumstances.

In rejecting the defendants’ arguments, the Supreme Court reasoned that case law instructing courts to apply a heightened standard of care only applied in cases where the coach or instructor actively participated in the sporting activity when the injury occurred. For example, the higher standard of care was applied when a karate instructor injured a student by kicking them during a sparring match. Unlike that situation, Coach Fillmyer was not wielding a field hockey stick or otherwise actively engaged in the preliminary practice with her players when the plaintiff’s injury occurred. In other words, Coach Fillmyer was not “participating” in the sport within the meaning of Crawn and Schick. As the Supreme Court put it, “The essence of plaintiff’s theory of liability—that Fillmyer chose the wrong place and an unpropitious time to commence practice—is no different than the decisions that might be made by a biology teacher taking a class out to study marine life at the beach. In these and other similar settings, parents have the right to expect that teachers and coaches will exercise reasonable care when in charge of their children and courts will not immunize a teacher’s negligence by imposing a higher standard of care.”

There are multiple key takeaways from this case that insurers should be aware of. First, Crawn and Schick remain good law. In other words, a heightened standard of care still applies to instructors and coaches who may injure a player or student while participating in the sport. Second, coaches and instructors who oversee an activity need to be more cautious in their decision making. They need to make sure that their priority is the safety of students.

Furthermore, the court did not address the potential defenses the defendants might have under the Torts Claim Act and whether a written waiver would protect coaches and instructors from liability. In fact, if a waiver had been in place, the case could have been decided differently. As such, it would be a good idea for coaches and instructors to make their students fill out waivers before beginning practice. Only time will tell how future courts interpret this decision and apply it to other settings. 

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.