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Defense Digest

Defending Against Undocumented Construction Workers’ Future Wage Loss Claims in Pennsylvania

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 3, September 2024

September 1, 2024

by Jack A. Bennardo Jr.

Key Points:

  • Defending against an undocumented worker’s future wage loss and/or loss of future earnings capacity claim in a personal injury action filed in Pennsylvania in such a volatile area of practice is fraught with difficulty and uncertainty. 
  • In light of the indeterminate state of Pennsylvania law, effectively defending against such future wage loss claims involving undocumented workers will necessarily require extensive and strategic written discovery, careful factual investigation, effective deposition questioning and tactics, close monitoring of sister-state jurisdictions for persuasive authority and added guidance, and (likely) significant pre-trial motion practice.

June 2024 Bureau of Labor Statistics’ data indicates that foreign-born workers comprised nearly 19.2% of the entire civilian labor force in the United States. Undocumented immigrant workers, in particular, appear to make up a disproportionate percentage of the construction workforce, with one recent study by The Century Foundation suggesting undocumented migrants, nationally, commanded roughly 23% of all construction site jobs. In 2020 alone, construction laborers accounted for 11.9% of all reported fatal falls, slips, or trips across all occupations. Defending against an undocumented worker’s future wage loss and/or loss of future earnings capacity claim in a personal injury action filed in Pennsylvania in such a volatile area of practice is fraught with difficulty and uncertainty. 

Hoffman Plastics and Subsequent Court Confusion
In a significant decision handed down in 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002), overturned an award of back pay to an undocumented migrant worker, Jose Casto, who was found to have been unlawfully discharged by his employer, in violation of the National Labor Relations Act, for engaging in union organizing activities. In reaching this determination, the court reasoned that awarding such back pay to Castro would run afoul of the comprehensive employer sanctions scheme of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). It noted the IRCA constitutes a “comprehensive scheme prohibiting the employment of illegal aliens in the United States” and that it mandated “an extensive employment verification system . . . designed to deny employment to aliens who (a) are not lawfully present in the United States, or (b) are not lawfully authorized to work in the United States[.]” The high court emphasized: 

Under the IRCA regime, it is impossible for an undocumented alien to obtain employment in the United States without some party directly contravening explicit congressional policies. Either the undocumented alien tenders fraudulent identification, which subverts the cornerstone of IRCA’s enforcement mechanism, or the employer knowingly hires the undocumented alien in direct contradiction of its IRCA obligations. 

It further cautioned a contrary ruling would have set the stage for the grant of back pay to undocumented workers “for years of work not performed, for wages that could not lawfully have been earned” in the first place. 

Much ink has been spilled by courts across the nation since Hoffman Plastic was first decided in an effort to decipher whether, and to what extent, its core holdings apply in the context of state-based tort claims filed by undocumented migrants seeking damages for future wage losses. Courts in different jurisdictions have reached inconsistent conclusions and findings in this regard. 

Some courts have held that undocumented tort claimants should be precluded altogether from pursuing future lost wages/earning capacity damages. For example, in Rosa v. Partners in Progress, Inc., 868 A.2d 994, 1002 (N.H. 2005), the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that “an illegal alien may not recover lost United States earnings.” Similarly, in Hernandez-Cortez v. Hernandez, 2003 WL 22519678, *7 (D. Kan. 2003), the District of Kansas determined that the plaintiff’s undocumented status prohibited any recovery for alleged lost income based on his projected wage earnings in United States. 

Other courts, by contrast, have determined that undocumented tort claimants’ recovery of such wage loss/lost earning damages should be limited in their recovery as measured at wage levels based upon the prevailing wage rates in their home countries (as opposed to being measured at United States wage levels). For instance, Ayala v. Lee, 81 A.3d 584, 597 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2013) highlighted that the plaintiff’s immigration status was relevant to the claim for lost wages since the ability to obtain legal work impacted the likelihood of future earnings in United States and whether the plaintiff was entitled to lost wages at a United States pay rate or home country rate. Also, in Cruz v. Bridgestone/Firestone North America Tile, LLC, 2008 WL 5598439, at *6–7 (D. New Mexico 2008) the plaintiff’s economics experts were barred from offering opinions at trial on the undocumented claimants’ loss of future earnings based upon United States wage levels due to failing to make “any attempt to acknowledge the Mexican citizenship of [the claimants] or the legal barriers to their earning the average American wages which are the foundations of both experts’ studies.” 

To date, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not expressly weighed in on the scope or availability of such future wage losses for undocumented workers pursuing personal injury claims. But, it has previously found, albeit in the context of a workers’ compensation matter, that a plaintiff’s immigration status and work authorization bears direct relevance to her loss of future earnings and loss of earning capacity. In Reinforced Earth Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 810 A.2d 99, 108 (Pa. 2002), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court specifically announced “the loss of earning power” of a non-citizen, who entered the United States unlawfully and who did not otherwise have authorization to work in the United States, was “caused by his immigration status, not his work-related injury.” 

Since Reinforced Earth, Pennsylvania courts have handed down rulings consistent with the notion that “an [undocumented worker] without current, valid USCIS work authorization, is not legally available for work” and, consequently, cannot recover damages for loss of future earnings. See Ruiz v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 911 A.2d 600, 605, (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court in Mora v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (DDP Contracting Co.) elaborated on the consequences of the Reinforced Earth decision, stating:

What our Supreme Court, in effect, held [in Reinforced Earth Co.] is that loss of earning power need not be shown because it is going to be presumed that Claimant cannot work in this country and there can be no way to measure his/her earning power. Even though, in this case, Claimant found other illegal employment, that position cannot be used as a measure of earning power because only employers who fail to follow the federal immigration laws can offer him a position.

845 A.2d 950, 954, (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (emphasis added).

Further muddying the waters, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has now adopted Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 413 (effective as of October 1, 2021), which provides, in relevant part: “In any civil matter, evidence of a party’s or a witness’s immigration status shall not be admissible unless immigration status is an essential fact to prove an element of, or a defense to, the action, or to show bias or prejudice of a witness pursuant to Rule 607.” The rule, as worded, appears to indicate that evidence of a litigant’s immigration status should be admissible in a case involving a claim for future wage losses. 

Still, there is a dearth of appellate guidance as to: 

  1. whether such evidence would be permitted to be introduced to a jury prior to its rendering a decision on liability; 
  2. the precise meaning of the phrase “an essential fact to prove an element of, or a defense to, the action”; 
  3. whether a jury should be limited in calculating such losses to consideration of evidence of the prevailing wage rates in the undocumented litigant’s home country; and 
  4. whether a jury may consider evidence an undocumented migrant is facing deportation proceedings or imminent deportation. 

In light of the indeterminate state of Pennsylvania law, effectively defending against such future wage loss claims involving undocumented workers will necessarily require extensive and strategic written discovery, careful factual investigation, effective deposition questioning and tactics, close monitoring of sister-state jurisdictions for persuasive authority and added guidance, and (likely) significant pre-trial motion practice. 

Jack is a member of our Casualty Department and works in our Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, office. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 3, September 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Employer/Carriers Must Explicitly Invoke Right to Deny Claim Under “Pay and Investigate” Statutory Provision; Employes Must Always Prove Medical Necessity of Treatment

Koren v. City of Kissimmee/PGCS, ___So.3d___(Fla 1st DCA 6/10/26) The majority opinion in Koren holds that the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) properly denied psychiatric treatment because the claimant did not challenge on appeal the JCC’s finding that the requested treatment was not medically necessary. However, Judge K. Thomas authored a detailed concurrence agreeing with the result on the ground that the claimant failed to meet his burden of proving medical necessity. In doing so, Judge K. Thomas also emphasized an important principle: employer/carriers must expressly invoke the 120-day pay-and-investigate provision under Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Act if they intend to preserve their right to deny compensability. Merely authorizing evaluations, without explicitly invoking the 120-day rule, may be insufficient to preserve the right to deny compensability of specific injuries. In Koren, the claimant sustained injuries to his upper lip, tooth, right knee, and right foot when a board gave way on a deck he was repairing for the employer/carrier. The accident was accepted as compensable, and multiple specialists were authorized to treat his physical injuries, including an ear, nose, and throat physician, dentist, orthopedist, and plastic surgeon. The claimant later sought psychiatric treatment and attended an independent medical examination (IME) with a psychiatrist. The IME diagnosed adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood, opining that the condition was caused by “the actual appearance of the scar” resulting from the industrial accident. The IME recommended continued medication, including an antidepressant, as well as follow-up care with a psychiatrist and psychologist. Critically, however, the IME did not offer an opinion regarding the medical necessity of this treatment. The claimant then filed a petition for benefits attaching the IME report and requesting authorization of psychiatric care. The employer/carrier responded by authorizing a psychiatrist, whom the claimant did, in fact, see. However, the employer/carrier neither denied the claim nor issued written notice invoking the 120-day pay-and-investigate provision. The authorized psychiatrist subsequently opined that the claimant’s psychiatric condition was unrelated to the industrial accident and instead attributable to prior employment as a law enforcement officer and volunteer firefighter. The psychiatrist further concluded that the work accident was not the major contributing cause of the condition. Although the employer/carrier stipulated to the authorization of the psychiatrist, it ultimately denied the claimant’s entitlement to psychiatric treatment. The JCC denied the requested benefit. The majority opinion affirmed on the narrow ground that medical necessity had not been established. Judge K. Thomas’s concurrence, however, expands on the legal framework. Under Florida law, an employer/carrier presented with a claim must “pay, pay and investigate, or deny.” To avail itself of the 120-day pay-and-investigate protection, the employer/carrier must affirmatively and explicitly invoke that option, typically through a written 120-day letter. The statutory investigative period does not arise automatically upon the provision of care. Furthermore, an attempt to characterize authorization as a “one-time evaluation” does not avoid waiver, as even a single evaluation may constitute the provision of a compensable benefit. By authorizing psychiatric care without invoking the 120-day provision, the employer/carrier in Koren effectively accepted compensability of the claimant’s PTSD condition. Nonetheless, it retained the ability to contest entitlement to ongoing treatment. While the employer/carrier failed to demonstrate a break in the causal chain, the claimant still bore the burden of proving that the requested treatment was medically necessary. Because the JCC found that the claimant failed to meet this burden, and the claimant did not challenge that finding either below or on appeal, the denial of psychiatric benefits was ultimately affirmed.

Thought Leadership

Mitigating Long-Tail Liability: Delaware Court Reaffirms Five-Year Workers’ Compensation Deadline

Williamson v. Donald F. Deaven, Inc., No. N25A-07-004 FWW, 2026 LX 252526 (Del. Super. Ct. June 2, 2026) Claimant was involved in a compensable industrial work accident on May 12, 1995, for a low back injury.  Following this, he received compensation for temporary total disability benefits from July 1996 to September 1996 and for sustaining a permanent impairment in 1997 and 1998.  For the next 23 years, the claimant continued treatment and paid his own medical bills without submitting them to the employer’s insurer.  In November 2021, the claimant filed a petition seeking payment for medical expenses, including prospective surgery and a resulting period of total disability.  The employer moved to dismiss the petition, arguing it was barred by Delaware’s five-year statute of limitations (19 Del. C. § 2361(b)). Pursuant to 18 Del. C. § 3914, insurers must provide prompt written notice of the applicable statute of limitations to invoke the five-year deadline.  Due to the age of the case, neither party had a comprehensive file of the claim and the Board had archived its file of the matter.  The carrier’s computer system retained only bare information indicating that payments occurred and agreements and receipts were filed with the Board in 1997. While the claimant argued that the employer could not prove it provided the mandatory statutory notice, the Hearing Officer recovered the archived file, which contained two “Receipts for Compensation Paid” signed by the claimant.  The receipts explicitly contained the required five-year limitation language, which the claimant testified to signing at the hearing.  The claimant also attempted to introduce evidence of payments he claimed the employer made, which would have extended the statute of limitations.  As a preliminary matter, the hearing officer excluded the testimony about the payments because the claimant did not produce them to the employer.  The Board found in favor of the employer and dismissed the claimant’s petition as time-barred. The claimant appealed the Board’s decision, arguing that he never received adequate notice of the statute of limitations and that the hearing officer’s evidentiary ruling was an abuse of discretion. The Court held that the archived, signed receipts constituted substantial evidence that the insurer fulfilled its statutory notice requirements.  Therefore,  the claimant’s petition was time-barred under the statute of limitations provisions of 19 Del. C. § 2361(b).  Furthermore, the Court reinforced strict procedural compliance: it rejected the claimant’s attempts to introduce evidence of payment on appeal, ruling the argument was waived for failure to preserve it while the matter was still before the Board. This recent ruling by the Court underscores the importance and necessity of robust data preservation and precise compliance with notice requirements.  For risk managers, employers, and insurers, the decision highlights how tight administrative execution protects against catastrophic long-tail liability.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirmed Workers’ Compensation Order Striking Defenses and Ordering Treatment

Kneezel v. Lambertville House, No. A-2729-24 (June 1, 2026) In Kneezel v. Lambertville House, Lambertville House appealed from a workers’ compensation order to strike its defenses and directing it to authorize knee replacement surgery. By way of background, the petitioner worked as a property manager for Lambertville and injured his back and knee in December 2019. A workers’ compensation claim was filed and the petitioner treated at Rothman Institute. He underwent four injections to his low back and was recommended for surgery. The day before, Lambertville canceled and set up a second opinion exam with Dr. Lawrence Barr. The petitioner filed a motion for medical and temporary benefits (MMT), which was ultimately granted by the workers’ compensation judge. As such, he received authorized treatment for his back. The petitioner was then referred for his left knee pain and treatment was provided by Lambertville. He was recommended for a knee replacement, but the petitioner declined at that time. Approximately two years later, he sought additional treatment, which was denied. After obtaining a report from Dr. Dhimant Balar, the petitioner filed another MMT. In response, Lambertville submitted Dr. Zachwieja’s report and surveillance reports. Dr. Balar opined the left knee injury was related to the work accident, whereas Dr. Zachwieja believed it was due to his advanced degeneration as there was no evidence of acute trauma. A hearing on the MMT began in November 2024, with the petitioner testifying his knee pain never went away and he had a lot of trouble walking, especially for more than five to ten minutes. The surveillance investigators were scheduled to testify after, but had to be rescheduled a couple of times. During a conference in early February 2025, prior to when the investigators were to testify, it was discovered that Lambertville did not provide discovery to the petitioner, including the investigators’ information and surveillance footage. The petitioner moved to strike Lambertville’s defenses and sought an order to authorize the left knee treatment. Petitioner’s counsel pointed to Lambertville’s unreasonable delay in providing the necessary information and Lambertville did not file an opposition. In March 2025, the investigators’ testimonies were set for mid-March. On March 14, 2025, petitioner’s counsel advised she was still waiting for discovery and the judge directed Lambertville’s counsel to provide any missing information by March 17, 2025. Lambertville provided video clips after the petitioner had testified so the judge indicated that if everything was not provided to petitioner’s counsel by the end of March 19, 2025, the judge would sign the order granting the MMT. The next day, the judge entered the order striking Lambertville’s defenses and ordering left knee treatment. Lambertville moved for reconsideration of stay of the order pending appeal. Following oral arguments, the judge denied Lambertville’s motion, citing N.J.A.C. 12:235-3.11 (a)(4)(i) that Lambertville was required to provide surveillance after the petitioner’s testimony and that it had failed to do so even after he testified in November 2024. The judge also noted the investigators’ testimonies were rescheduled multiple times and Lambertville had more than enough time to provide the requested information and failed to do so. The judge also noted Lambertville failed to file a response to the petitioner’s motion to strike. In addition, the judge pointed to the petitioner’s testimony, finding him to be credible and observing him to have to stand and move multiple times during testimony. Lambertville appealed, arguing its due process rights were violated as there was no opportunity to be heard and the order was procedurally and factually defective. However, the Appellate Division disagreed, noting Lambertville had sufficient notice and many opportunities to be heard. It was noted Lambertville’s failure to comply with the judge’s requests led to the order. As for the motion to strike, the Appellate Division indicated Lambertville failed to oppose the motion, which provided the judge with the ability to decide without a hearing for an uncontested motion. Ultimately, the Appellate Division found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the judge’s rulings and order.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.