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Defense Digest

A Fall in the Right Direction: The Court of Appeals Requires More Than Just a Fall to Show a Violation of New York Labor Law § 240

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 12, December 2022

December 1, 2022

by James M. Boyce

Key Points:

  • New York Labor Law § 240 imposes strict liability against owners and contractors for height-related accidents.
  • In Cutaia, the Court of Appeals now requires that plaintiffs prove that a ladder is defective or failed, and that it is the cause of an accident.
  • Plaintiffs must do more than show that a fall occurred to prove a violation of New York Labor Law § 240(1).

As you may be aware, New York Labor Law § 240 imposes strict liability against owners and contractors for height-related accidents. New York Labor Law § 240(1), also known as the scaffold law, provides in relevant part:

All contractors and owners and their agents, except owners of one and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work, in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure shall furnish or erect, or cause to be furnished or erected for the performance of such labor, scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropes, and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person so employed.

Cases in New York State involving falls from a ladder have persistently proven to be arduous claims to defend against. Significantly, plaintiffs’ attorneys have relied on prior rulings that established that, if a ladder fails in some manner (i.e., it moved, shifted or swayed) because it was unsecured, then it was inherently inadequate to perform the work and, therefore, the use of the ladder was a per se violation of New York Labor Law § 240. When being faced with case of a fall from a ladder, defense counsel faces a seemingly insurmountable task of succeeding on liability.

But wait—all hope is not yet lost. In the recent decision of Cutaia v. Board of Managers of the 160.170 Varick Ste. Codo., 190 N.E.3d 28 (N.Y. 2022), the Court of Appeals held that questions of fact existed regarding whether “the ladder failed to provide the proper protection,” whether the “plaintiff should have been provided with additional safety devices,” and whether the ladder’s purported inadequacy or the absence of additional safety devices was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s accident.

In Cutaia, the plaintiff was using a ladder to cut and re-route ceiling pipes. Due to space limitations, the plaintiff leaned an A-frame ladder in its closed position against the wall. During the course of his work, he was electrocuted and fell from the ladder. The plaintiff had no recollection of whether the ladder had failed thereby precipitating his fall. The Appellate Division, First Department, like its brethren before it, held that the failure to properly secure the ladder was the precise foreseeable elevation-related risk against which Section 240(1) was designed to protect. Accordingly, the use of the ladder was a per se violation of New York Labor Law § 240(1).

In a departure from the long-standing proposition that a fall from a non-defective ladder in and of itself is a violation of the Labor Law, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court, holding that “questions of fact exist[ed] as to whether ‘the ladder failed to provide proper protection,’ and whether ‘plaintiff should have been provided with additional safety devices.’” In simple terms, the court questioned whether the ladder itself was defective, and required more than just a showing of a fall to prove a violation of New York Labor Law § 240(1).

The Court of Appeals’ recent decision in Cutaia appears to be a welcome lifeline to the defense bar. Hopefully, gone are the days of plaintiffs’ counsels’ reliance upon the mere use of a ladder to support and prove a Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action. After the Cutaia decision, plaintiffs’ counsel will now need to establish that the ladder was defective or failed in some manner, or that it was not the proper device to accomplish a task. Notably, the fact that the ladder shifted, moved or swayed is not enough to show a violation.

The long-established principles of proximate cause will once again become a factor in deciding whether a fall from a ladder is a violation of New York Labor Law § 240(1). Plaintiffs will need to show that the ladder was defective. Defense counsel may now establish that the plaintiff failed to properly secure or set up the ladder, and argue that, since the ladder was not defective, liability should not attach.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.