Casualty

We were successful in having a New York No-Fault (PIP) action fully discontinued, with prejudice. The plaintiff, a major medical provider, filed suit in Kings County Civil Court in the total amount of $25,805.85, claiming our client owed it for the claimant’s unpaid medical billing. The claimant had been involved in a motor vehicle accident and sought payment for medical treatment. Counsel for the medical provider argued that, since the billing was never paid by the insurer, it was due in full—despite the fact that the same matter had previously been fully exhausted and was processed/handled in full compliance with the applicable medical fee schedule(s). While there were evidentiary issues in our client’s case, our arguments and position were strong. After negotiations and arguments, plaintiff’s counsel acquiesced to a full discontinuance of the matter, with prejudice.

We obtained summary judgment for residential renters in a trip-and-fall case. The plaintiff tripped and fell on a set of porch steps at our clients’ home while attending a barbeque, breaking her ankle. She brought claims against the homeowner. The homeowner then joined our clients, asserting claims of negligence and contractual indemnity under the lease agreement. During her deposition, the plaintiff testified that she was familiar with the poor condition of the steps, had spoken with the renters about the steps prior to her fall, and witnessed two people, an adult and a child, trip on the steps during the same barbeque event. The homeowner also testified at his deposition that it was his responsibility to repair and maintain the subject stairs. We argued that our clients were not required to indemnify the homeowners under the Perri-Ruzzi rule, and that they owed no duty to the plaintiff, a licensee, as she knew of the condition of the steps and the risks involved in using them. The court agreed and dismissed all claims against the clients.

We were granted final summary judgment in a slip-and-fall premises liability case. The plaintiff alleged she slipped and fell on an unidentified wet substance while waiting in line at the defendant’s convenience store. The plaintiff admitted she did not see the substance prior to her fall and did not know what it was, where it came from or how long it had been there. She testified that the wetness appeared to have been tracked in by other customers, noting their shoes were wet. We moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff could not meet her burden under § 768.0755, Fla. Stat., to prove that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged condition. Surveillance footage showed multiple customers walking through the area without issue, and no visible hazard appeared on video. The court agreed and granted final summary judgment in favor of the defendant, dismissing the case with prejudice.

We obtained a defense verdict in a slip and fall case in Suffolk County Supreme Court. The plaintiff was a physician’s assistant who alleged he slipped and fell on a wet area inside his medical facility. He testified at his deposition that he saw mop swirls in the wet spot. He brought suit against the facility’s cleaning company over one year later. Unrelated to this incident, the plaintiff had a pancreatic cancer relapse after his 2019 slip and fall and was out on workers’ compensation for over one year. At trial, plaintiff’s counsel produced a note from the plaintiff’s wife stating that he would not be testifying due to his medical condition; therefore, his deposition testimony would be read to the jury, which the court allowed. We argued that plaintiff’s counsel had the opportunity to secure statements from numerous witnesses and former employees whom counsel never subpoenaed for non-party depositions or trial. The cleaning company’s owner, our client, testified that the plaintiff’s employer had access to his janitorial equipment, including mops, which were always at their disposal. We argued that it would be speculation that a wet spot on a floor would have been caused by our client. The jury deliberated for 55 minutes and rendered a defendant’s verdict.

We successfully won summary judgment on behalf of our client, a vendor who did work for a national bank. The plaintiff alleged our client created a dangerous condition in the parking lot that caused her to trip and fall. Plaintiff’s counsel was initially presented with evidence disputing the claims in his complaint, including specific work orders that identified and limited the scope of our client’s work of replacing nine concrete car stops at the bank branch location nine months prior to the plaintiff’s accident. Following initial discovery, the plaintiff testified during her deposition that the car stops had nothing to do with the trip and fall. Having failed to produce any evidence to support her claim in opposition to our motion for summary judgment, the court granted summary judgment from the bench following oral argument.

We secured a defense verdict in Delaware County after a four-day jury trial in a premises liability case against a local school. The plaintiff, a student, suffered an Achilles heel injury when cut by a door edge and claimed diminished leg function and Chronic Regional Pain Syndrome (CRPS). Despite undergoing two surgeries, neither her surgeons nor treating physicians diagnosed CRPS. During trial, the defense highlighted that the student returned the following year as undefeated captain of the school’s tennis team, winning at the state level. The case involved aggressive cross-examination of medical and liability experts, along with surveillance evidence of the plaintiff. Before trial, the demand was $1 million, while the school offered $200,000 at mediation—an offer the plaintiff rejected, walking out and refusing further negotiations. After just 2.5 hours of deliberation, the jury ruled in the school’s favor.

We were granted summary judgment on behalf of a national truck manufacturer in an asbestos case where the plaintiff claimed his mesothelioma diagnosis was the result of his work on his employer’s trucks. The plaintiff claimed he developed mesothelioma as a result of his alleged exposure to asbestos while working on the trucks and products manufactured by the other defendants. The plaintiff had worked and resided the majority of his life in Mississippi; therefore, Mississippi law was applicable. In granting summary judgment, the court found that any alleged exposure to the manufacturer’s products was de minimis in relation to his other alleged asbestos exposures. The court also found that under the “bare metal” defense, the manufacturer was not liable for third-party manufacturers’ parts, which they did not manufacture or supply, used in conjunction with their trucks.

We obtained full dismissal in a medical billings claim against our insurance carrier client in a New York No-Fault/PIP Action. The plaintiff, a major medical provider, filed suit in Kings County Civil Court in the total amount of $22,610.79, claiming our client owed it for the claimant’s unpaid medical billing. The claimant had been involved in a motor vehicle accident and sought payment for medical treatment. Counsel for the medical provider argued that, since the billing was never paid by the insurer, it was due in full—despite the fact that the same matter had previously been fully exhausted and denied on similar grounds. While there were evidentiary issues in our client’s case, our arguments and position were strong. After negotiations, plaintiff’s counsel acquiesced to a full dismissal of the matter. Thereby, our client was absolved from any fiscal liability in this action.

We successfully obtained dismissal of their client in a death-from-food-poisoning and hepatitis A case. The plaintiff, Joyce Neeld, executrix of the Estate of Alfred Neeld, alleged that Mr. Neeld passed away due to an outbreak of hepatitis A in southeast Pennsylvania, which was widely covered by the news at the time. The plaintiff, who claimed that Mr. Neeld passed away after eating at Gino’s Pizzeria and Ristorante, was seeking several million dollars from every food provider that served the restaurant, including our client. Fortunately, the plaintiff stipulated to our dismissal.

We secured the dismissal of a fraudulent claim against our insurance carrier client in a New York No-Fault/PIP Action. We argued the medical provider’s assignor was involved in a staged loss/fraudulent accident in order to obtain No-Fault/PIP benefits. In support of the defense, an SIU affidavit and the transcript of an Examination Under Oath (EUO) from the assignor were submitted, which included facts that casted doubt on the legitimacy of the accident. These included details such as the lack of an official police report, the insurance policy having been purchased right before the accident, and the inability of the assignor to remember key details of the accident. After a successful argument at the arbitration, the arbitrator ruled in favor of our client.

We obtained summary judgement on behalf of a homeowner in a 10-plaintiff negligence action arising from a house fire. In granting summary judgement, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas agreed that the plaintiffs’ failure to secure a cause and origin expert was fatal to their case as the fire was alleged to be electrical in nature and, thus, outside the purview of the average juror.

We successfully defended an appeal of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants in a motor vehicle accident case. The evidence indicated that, at the time of the accident, the plaintiff’s vehicle had stopped while partially merged from a service road onto the main traffic lane when it was struck by our clients’ truck, which was driving on the main lane, on the driver’s side of the plaintiff’s car. On appeal, the plaintiff argued our clients were a proximate cause of the accident. The Appellate Division, First Department rejected the plaintiff’s arguments and unanimously affirmed the trial court’s ruling. The First Department held the plaintiff’s contention, that he was stopped for 5 to 15 seconds before impact, does not change the fact that the defendant driver, who had the right-of-way, was entitled to assume the plaintiff would obey traffic laws and not merge until it was safe to do so. The First Department affirmed that a driver with the right-of-way who only has seconds to react to a failure to yield is not comparatively at fault for an accident.   

We won a premises liability case involving allegations of negligent sidewalk design. The plaintiff, a quadriplegic who has been in a wheelchair since 1984, entered our client’s convenience store using the designated wheelchair ramp without issue. However, upon leaving the store, he inexplicably failed to use the same ramp and, instead, attempted to go directly over the curb, resulting in a fall and a fractured leg. During his deposition, the plaintiff admitted he successfully navigated the wheelchair ramp upon entering the store. He also acknowledged seeing and knowing the ramp was there but did not use it upon exiting, in addition to confirming there were no defects in the sidewalk or curb. He admitted that raised sidewalks in front of stores are common, particularly at gas stations, and conceded that nothing obstructed his view of the curb or ramp. At the hearing, we countered the plaintiff’s last-minute attempt to introduce new testimony claiming that he was discouraged from using the sidewalk due to merchandise being present and that the store should have used a color to distinguish the curb from the parking lot. The judge requested competing orders and ultimately agreed with our application of the law, granting our motion.   

We successfully secured summary judgment in a product liability case involving an “exploding” wine bottle. Our client was the distributor of the bottle and was brought into the case as a third-party defendant. The plaintiff testified that on Thanksgiving Day, she attempted to open the bottle with the handle of a wooden spoon when the bottle unexpectedly and suddenly exploded in her hands. The plaintiff brought a product liability claim, asserting defects with the design of the bottle in using unusually thin glass prone to breakage. As the plaintiff did not produce any liability expert reports, we were able to argue that expert testimony was necessary for the plaintiff to prove her case, as the subject matter was one involving special skills and training not common to the ordinary layperson.   

We successfully obtained a motion for summary judgment, dismissing our client from a negligence case. We represented a car service which was acting as a rental agent for Avis Rent-A-Car. Our client had repeatedly rented vehicles to the defendant/third-party defendant (renter) in the case. At the time of each rental, the renter would produce a valid driver’s license that was run through a system to confirm its validity. Several days after renting a vehicle to the renter, the renter was involved in a high-speed chase with the Nassau County Police Department. While being pursued by the police, the renter t-boned the plaintiff’s vehicle at an intersection. The plaintiff underwent three surgical procedures involving bleeds to her liver and one procedure to her lung, as well as sustaining a traumatic brain injury, collapsed lung and fractured ribs. After the completion of depositions, we moved for summary judgment to dismiss our client from the litigation as our client was not the owner of the vehicle, nor was there any proof submitted that there was anything mechanically wrong with the vehicle rented to the third-party defendant. We further argued the plaintiffs failed to prove our client’s actions in renting the vehicle could be deemed as a matter of law to be the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.   

We successfully argued a motion for summary judgment on a major jury case where we represented a tenant shop owner. The plaintiff opposed our motion, alleging, inter alia, serious injuries to a shoulder and surgery. There were many moving pieces in this case, including indemnity issues, an alleged triple net lease and joinder after the statute of limitations. The plaintiff tripped and fell on a sidewalk that was under repair outside of our client’s store. We were joined by the original defendant, the landlord. We argued the plaintiff had no direct cause of action against us as we were joined after the statute of limitations; there was no evidence of record of our involvement as plaintiff did not visit our store; we were not responsible for the sidewalk repair; and the original defendant landlord was responsible for the sidewalk in question as the lease was ambiguous as to who was responsible for external repairs.   

We obtained a defense verdict for a tow truck company in an “open and obvious” case in Nassau County, NY. We represented a tow truck company that was called to a plaintiff’s workplace to tow a broken-down minibus for scrapping. Our client attached a tow rope to the bus and began operating the winch but was asked to stop so the mirrors could be removed. The plaintiff removed the passenger-side mirror and, instead of walking around the bus, walked between the tow truck and the bus, tripping over the tow rope and breaking his hip. We prepared a motion for a directed verdict based on precedent from a previous Nassau County case, involving a plaintiff who tripped over a tow rope, where the judge ruled the condition was open and obvious, with no duty to warn. However, the trial judge in this case denied the motion. We then requested a curative charge instructing the jury that the defendant had no duty to warn of an open and obvious condition. While the trial judge declined to charge the jury, she permitted us to make the argument ourselves during summation. During summation, we argued the condition was open and obvious and there was no duty to warn and asked the jury to dismiss the case. The jury deliberated for just 15 minutes before returning a verdict for the defendant.   

We successfully defended the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) in a wrongful death and survival case in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. The case involved the death of a pedestrian, Vincent Boykin, struck by a SEPTA bus, with the plaintiff, his father, disputing the Philadelphia Medical Examiner’s suicide ruling. The defense presented a forensic psychiatrist’s testimony confirming Mr. Boykin’s high suicide risk. Although SEPTA was found 40% negligent, the decedent’s 60% negligence barred recovery of damages.   

Obtained a defense verdict for our client, a global automobile manufacturer, in a contract dispute in Bucks County, PA. In 2021, amid the COVID-19 pandemic, the plaintiff purchased a new vehicle for $37,000. Seven months later, the car was involved in a crash caused by the plaintiff's daughter. Repairs for collision damage, which are not covered under the vehicle’s express written warranty, were delayed due to global supply chain disruptions caused by the pandemic. Despite the automobile manufacturer’s efforts to locate, obtain, and expedite delivery of repair parts to the collision repair shop, it took seven months to fully complete the repairs. The plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer violated the implied warranty of merchantability under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and breached the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, citing the repair delays as the basis for the claims. Ultimately, the court returned a defense verdict, rejecting the plaintiff’s claims.

We obtained a defense verdict on behalf of a public transportation system in a Wrongful Death and Survival case in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. The case involved the death of a  pedestrian, struck by a bus, with the plaintiff, his father, disputing the Philadelphia Medical Examiner's suicide ruling. The defense presented a forensic psychiatrist's testimony confirming the deceased’s high suicide risk. Although the transportation system was found 40% negligent, the decedent's 60% negligence barred recovery of damages. The claim was further limited by statutory caps applicable to Commonwealth entities.

We successfully defended a tow truck company in an "open and obvious" case in Nassau County, NY. The company had been called to tow a broken-down minibus from the plaintiff’s workplace. While removing the bus, the plaintiff walked between the tow truck and the bus, tripped over the tow rope, and broke his hip. The defense relied on precedent from a similar Nassau County case where a judge ruled that a tow rope was an open and obvious condition, with no duty to warn. Although the trial judge denied his motion for a directed verdict, she allowed him to argue to the jury that the defendant had no duty to warn. Plaintiff’s counsel did not object. In summation, we emphasized that the condition was open and obvious and urged dismissal. The jury deliberated for just 15 minutes before returning a verdict for the defendant.

We achieved summary judgment for our client, a commercial plumber, in the Cape May County Superior Court. The plaintiff alleged water leakage in the parking garage of a beach resort hotel resulted from defective plumbing work by the defendant. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that improper connections between the plumber’s pipes and the drainage system caused the leaks. The defense motion for summary judgment demonstrated that the defendant’s scope of work was limited to garage plumbing, performed according to specifications and unrelated to the waterproofing membrane or drainage system design flaws identified as the cause of the leaks. The court granted summary judgment, holding that the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff beyond the limited scope of their work and dismissed all claims. The court denied the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.   

We won summary judgment in Franklin County, Ohio, for a large supermarket chain in a slip-and-fall case. The plaintiff alleged he slipped and fell in the parking lot on ice that remained more than two days after the most recent snow fall and after the lot had been plowed and salted by a co-defendant. The plaintiff’s expert opined that no amount of remaining snow or ice is acceptable and that the standard of care according to the Ohio Building Code requires complete removal in order to maintain a “slip-resistant” surface. However, in Ohio, a premises owner is not liable for natural accumulations of snow and ice because persons are expected to appreciate the danger. The plaintiff’s expert did not opine as to what the defendants should have done, other than to completely remove the snow and ice. The court struck the plaintiff’s expert’s untested opinion as being unhelpful to a jury and found that the Ohio Building Code did not apply to the plaintiff’s pleadings without a claim for negligence per se. In disregarding the expert opinions, the court also found that the remaining snow and ice was “natural,” even though there had been attempted removal.

We won summary judgment on nine-year-old supermarket slip and fall case. The plaintiff claimed that she tripped and fell on the corner of a pallet/box of watermelons in the defendant's produce section in Newburgh, New York, where customers first walk in. The plaintiff admitted she did not see the pallet or its corner and was not looking where she was walking. After her fall, she underwent multiple surgeries, including cervical fusion. Her attorney’s demand was $4 million. The defense motion argued that the watermelon pallet was a temporary merchandise display which was open and obvious to all to be seen with common sense. Indeed, customers walked by the pallet display before and after the plaintiff’s accident at a rate of dozens per day. The store put the watermelons out in this manner as part of its display policy because the melons are delivered in cartons on pallets that cannot be taken apart. The plaintiff argued in opposition that the pallet was a hazardous defect the store created and had notice of. The plaintiff submitted an expert engineer, who claimed the display violated American Society of Testing Materials’ (ASTM) designation F1637-10 regarding safe walkway surfaces. We submitted a rebuttal engineer, who demonstrated the ASTM standard asserted by the plaintiff applied to permanent structures—like floors and buildings—not the temporary pallet, and that the standard did not exist on the day of the accident. In granting summary judgment, the court concluded that while a landowner must act reasonably in maintaining its property in a reasonably safe condition, it is not an insurer of ordinary obstacles that are readily apparent as a matter of common sense and visibility.

We obtained a reversal in the Pennsylvania Superior Court of the trial court’s denial of preliminary objections to venue. We successfully moved in the trial court for certification of the ruling pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(b) so that an immediate appeal from the interlocutory ruling could be taken, and we subsequently prevailed on appeal. The litigation arose from a helicopter accident that occurred in Afghanistan. Both plaintiffs, husband and wife, resided in Arizona. Our client is a Delaware corporation located in Bucks County, Pennsylvania, that refurbished the helicopter. The codefendant corporation leased the helicopter to the plaintiff-husband’s employer, which was organized and principally operates in Montana. The plaintiffs’ primary focus in seeking to establish venue was on our client and, in particular, on the fact that it purchased two fabric interiors from a Philadelphia vendor. The Superior Court determined that the business dealings of our client did not constitute actual business conducted in Philadelphia County. It stressed that “doing business with a Philadelphia County company does not amount to doing business in Philadelphia County if the obtained goods, services, or personnel are utilized elsewhere to further the defendant’s business activities.” As to the codefendant, the Superior Court concluded the limited venue evidence pointed to a separate but related corporate entity, and that the evidence failed to show the co-defendant regularly conducts business in Philadelphia County. Because there was no evidence to support the imputation of a separate entity’s contacts with Philadelphia on the co-defendant, venue as to the co-defendant was also improper.

The plaintiff spent the afternoon at our client’s restaurant/bar before driving ten minutes to his local Country Club to continue celebrating his birthday. Ninety minutes after he arrived at the Club, he fell down the stairs and suffered a severe brain injury. His Blood Alcohol Content was roughly three times the legal limit. The plaintiff had previously worked as a high-end custom wood finisher but is now unable to see color, among having other deficits, and he is alleged to be fully disabled.  After more than 20 depositions, and despite varying reports as to what the plaintiff had to drink at our client’s establishment, we were able to argue that he showed no signs of visible intoxication prior to the last service of alcohol by our client. Our motion was strenuously opposed by the Country Club, who argued there was testimony that the plaintiff appeared intoxicated upon his arrival at the Club. The court agreed with our argument that this was insufficient evidence for a jury to find that our client served alcohol to a visibly intoxicated plaintiff, and, as such, all claims against our client were dismissed and summary judgment was granted.

We won a motion for summary judgment in a slip and fall case in Pennsylvania. The plaintiff suffered a hip fracture when he fell on the defendant’s sidewalk while delivering a food order. At the time of the accident, there was an active freezing rain and sleet storm, and generally slippery conditions prevailed. We filed a motion for summary judgment based on the “hills and ridges” doctrine. The plaintiff argued that the doctrine was inapplicable due to human intervention that allegedly altered the natural accumulation. The defendant had applied rock salt to the sidewalk approximately 45 minutes prior to the accident. In granting our motion for summary judgment, the court found there was no evidence that the application of rock salt created a dangerous condition or increased the natural hazards of the existing ice.

We successfully achieved affirmance of the trial court’s decision to dismiss all claims against a property owner and designer in a New York labor law matter. The plaintiff was injured when he fell from a ladder stacked atop a bakers scaffold while performing renovation work on a four-story brownstone. The 16-foot ladder and the scaffold were provided by his employer—the general contractor—and set up at his employer’s discretion. The plaintiff filed an action against the owner of the property and the designer, alleging violations of various labor law claims, including labor law Sections 240(1), 241(6) and 200. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment, seeking a dismissal of all claims, was filed after the plaintiff’s depositions but before any of the defendants were deposed and with extensive discovery outstanding. The plaintiff opposed the motion and cross moved to compel further discovery. The Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, dismissing all claims as the property owners qualified for the owner and two-family dwelling exception to the labor law. The trial court held that the defendants did not direct, supervise or control any of the plaintiff’s activities. Therefore, according to the affidavit, the single-family home exception did not apply. After oral argument, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision with costs.

We secured summary judgment in a case where the plaintiff fell down a flight of stairs at a NASCAR race in Monroe County, Pennsylvania, sustaining multiple fractures. The plaintiff alleged that she fell on water that had accumulated from patrons’ coolers dripping through the bleachers onto the staircase below. The court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims in their entirety due to her failure to adequately establish actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition.

We secured a jury defense verdict in the Superior Court of New Jersey in a product liability case where the demand was $650,000. The plaintiff alleged a defect in the handle of an ultraviolet light disinfecting device that caused her to develop trigger finger. They alleged a design defect and failure to warn claim, claiming permanent damage to her ring finger and hand as a result of surgeries to correct the injury.