Ben is an associate in the Health Care Department committed to strong advocacy in the defense of hospitals, health care systems, and medical providers in health care liability matters.
Prior to joining the firm, Ben served as plaintiff’s counsel in complex medical malpractice cases, obtaining notable deposition and trial experience early in his legal career. Ben is experienced in conducting discovery, briefing and arguing dispositive pre-trial motions, and evaluating and selecting experts. He has also second chaired multiple jury trials resulting in high-profile verdicts. By identifying the opposing side’s strategy early on, Ben leverages his unique experience to deliver the strongest and most effective defense possible for his clients.
Ben obtained his juris doctor from Regent University School of Law, where he served as Chairman of the Moot Court Executive Board. During law school, he submitted a competition brief that was awarded as Second Overall Best Brief at the 2023 ABA National Moot Court Championship. Ben also served as a Legal Research and Writing Fellow for the Honorable David W. Lannetti, guiding and assisting students in mastering effective legal writing. At graduation, Ben received the Appellate Advocacy Award for his commitment to effective written and oral advocacy.
Thought Leadership
Case Law Alerts
Pennsylvania Superior Court Clarifies Legal Standard for Jury Instruction on Increased Risk of Harm in Medical Malpractice Cases
April 1, 2026
In this appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania clarified in an important unpublished opinion, the requirements for plaintiffs to obtain a jury instruction on increased risk of harm in medical malpractice actions. At trial, the plaintiff presented expert testimony from a maternal fetal medicine expert that the attending physicians deviated from the standard of care by delaying C-section delivery after monitoring fetal heart rate decelerations. The plaintiff also elicited testimony from a pediatric neurologist that minor-plaintiff was at risk for stroke based on diminished fetal heart tracings and blood flow. Importantly, the plaintiff failed to present any expert testimony that the defendants’ alleged failure to timely initiate a C-section delivery caused or increased the risk of harm of minor-plaintiff’s injury. Prior to the jury charge, the court denied the plaintiff’s request for an instruction on increased risk of harm. Ultimately, the jury found that the defendants’ conduct was not the factual cause of minor-plaintiff’s harm and awarded no damages. The plaintiff appealed, asserting that the trial court’s decision to not charge the jury on increased risk of harm was a clear abuse of discretion and error of law. The Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Civil Jury Instructions provide for a “relaxed” causation charge under specific circumstances. This instruction on increased risk of harm provides, in relevant part, as follows: Where the plaintiff presents expert testimony that the negligent act or failure to act or delay on the part of the defendant has increased the risk of harm to the plaintiff, this testimony, if found credible, provides a sufficient basis from which you may find that the negligence was a factual cause of the injuries sustained. Pa. SSJI (Civ.) 14.20. On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s decision denying plaintiff’s request for an instruction on increased risk of harm. The court held that in order for plaintiffs to be entitled to the jury charge, they must provide expert testimony, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the acts and omissions complained of could cause the type of harm suffered. Since the plaintiff failed to present expert testimony that the defendants’ alleged failure to timely initiate C-section delivery caused or increased the risk of harm of the brain injury suffered by minor-plaintiff, the plaintiff was not entitled to the increased risk of harm instruction at trial. The Superior Court’s decision is helpful for healthcare defendants, as it clarifies the legal standard necessary for plaintiffs to demonstrate a basis for instructing the jury on increased risk of harm, which has been diluted over time. Litigants in medical malpractice cases should cautiously analyze each element of expert testimony at trial to ensure this standard has been satisfied when it is anticipated the plaintiff will request an instruction on increased risk of harm.
Checking the Box? Supreme Court Holds Order Compelling Arbitration Is Not Immediately Appealable
February 2, 2026
Plaintiffs cannot avoid arbitration through premature appeals challenging the validity of an arbitration agreement. In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in a 6-0 opinion, recently held that a trial court order compelling arbitration and staying court proceedings does not qualify as an immediately appealable collateral order under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 313. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., --- A.3d ---, 2026 WL 156181 (Pa. Jan. 21, 2026). The impact of the Court’s decision clarifies that litigants may not immediately appeal an order compelling arbitration; instead, they must patiently await a final judgment to avail themselves of appellate relief. Under Pennsylvania law, appellate courts have limited jurisdiction and may entertain appeals from final orders. See Pa.R.A.P. 341(a). In general, a final order disposes of all claims and parties. See Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1). Although an order denying a motion to compel arbitration is deemed final for appeal purposes under Pa.R.A.P. 311(b)(8) and 42 Pa. C.S. § 7320(a)(1), an appeal from an order compelling arbitration has no such finality under the Pennsylvania Code. One exception to the “final judgment” rule is the collateral order doctrine. Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 313 allows parties to appeal as of right from an interlocutory collateral order. To qualify as a collateral order, (1) the order must be separate from and collateral to the main cause of action; (2) the right involved must be too important to be denied review; and (3) the question presented must be such that if review is postponed until final judgment, the claim will be irreparably lost. Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). In Chilutti, Plaintiffs Keith and Shannon Chilutti filed a complaint against Uber Technologies, Inc. in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, alleging Ms. Chilutti sustained injuries during an Uber transport from a medical appointment to her home. In response, Uber filed a petition to compel arbitration, asserting Plaintiffs had agreed to arbitration at the time they enrolled in Uber. On April 26, 2021, the trial court granted Uber’s petition and stayed all court proceedings pending the resolution of arbitration. The Chiluttis appealed the trial court’s order, arguing that an order granting compelled arbitration qualifies as an immediately appealable collateral order under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 313. The Chiluttis also asserted the Uber arbitration agreement was invalid because it deprived Plaintiffs of their constitutional right to a trial by jury. On appeal, the Superior Court reversed and remanded the trial court’s order, holding first that an order compelling arbitration satisfies the criteria for an immediately appealable collateral order. Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430, 439 (Pa. Super. 2023) (en banc). The Court reasoned that the third requirement for a collateral order was satisfied, as delaying review of a final judgment “may result in the irreparable loss of [the Chiluttis’] claims.” Id. Because the standard of review in common law arbitration appeals would be limited under 42 Pa. C.S. § 7341, the Court determined that appellant satisfied the third prong for collateral appeals under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 313. Id. Based on this reasoning, the Superior Court concluded it had jurisdiction to resolve the merits of the Chiluttis’ claim, and ultimately held the parties did not enter into a valid arbitration agreement. Id. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted review to determine whether the Superior Court lacked appellate jurisdiction to immediately review an interlocutory order staying litigation pending an arbitration. The Court reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the Superior Court erred as a matter of law in determining the trial court’s order satisfied the third prong of the collateral order doctrine. Chilutti, 2026 WL 156181 *6. Relying upon the plain language of 42 Pa. C.S. § 7341, the Supreme Court reasoned that the limited standard of review applies only to arbitrators’ awards rendered in nonjudicial arbitration, not trial court decisions or orders. Id. at *5. To this end, because the basis of the Chilutti’s appeal would be predicated on a trial court order—and not a nonjudicial arbitration award—the litigants would not suffer irreparable loss of their rights under Pa.R.A.P. 313(b) by delaying appellate review of a trial court order granting compelled arbitration. Id. Writing for the Court, Justice Brobson opined that “[i]f the Chiluttis are later aggrieved by the final judgment that the trial court enters after the matter is returned to that court following arbitration, then the Chiluttis can appeal that judgment to the Superior Court.” Id. *6. Through this decision, the Court reaffirmed its commitment to the underlying policy of the final order doctrine, which promotes “formality, completeness, and efficiency.” Id. *4. Accordingly, the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of the claims on appeal regarding the validity of the arbitration agreement. Id. *7. The ramifications of the Court’s decision in Chilutti are significant for those navigating the complex intersection of arbitration and litigation. The Court’s decision is also a decisive victory for companies seeking to avoid premature appeals of trial court orders enforcing arbitration clauses. Companies and other enterprises should be conscious of appellate courts’ limited jurisdiction when entering into arbitration clauses. In cases where compelled arbitration is ordered by courts pursuant to an arbitration agreement, an immediate collateral appeal may not be taken as of right pursuant to the Supreme Court’s application of Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 313(b). Instead, the aggrieved party must await a final order in the trial court (after arbitration proceedings conclude) before seeking appellate relief. The Supreme Court’s decision in Chilutti reinforces the importance of adopting well-drafted arbitration clauses when entering everyday business transactions. It also reaffirms the Pennsylvania judiciary’s fidelity to promoting freedom of contract, including through arbitration clauses, which may ensure confidentiality, reduce cost, and provide an alternative forum for dispute resolution.
