Audrey Copeland, who joined the firm in 1986, is a member of the Post-Trial Appellate Advocacy Practice Group. She concentrates her practice in the state and federal appellate courts and has litigated matters involving a wide range of substantive and procedural issues including professional liability, civil rights claims, land use, coverage, medical malpractice, product liability, workers' compensation and premises liability.
Results
Successfully Affirmed Workers’ Compensation Decision Before the Appeal Board
We convinced the Commonwealth Court to affirm the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board in favor of our client, the employer, which upheld the workers’ compensation judge’s denial of a claim petition. By memorandum opinion, the court found that the judge’s credibility findings were neither contradictory nor arbitrary and capricious, and the decision was reasoned. The court agreed with the employer that the defense experts’ opinions constituted substantial evidence, also noting that the Social Security Administration’s findings of disability were irrelevant to the issue of work-relatedness. The court concluded that the claimant failed to sustain her burden of proving a work-related injury, and since the causal connection between her “lingering symptoms and her work duties” was not obvious, she was required to present unequivocal medical evidence establishing that connection, which she failed to do.
Successfully Represented an Insurance Company in a Workers’ Compensation Appellate Matter
We successfully represented an insurance company before the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. The court agreed with our argument that the claimant needed to provide notice of his work-related injury to the defendant insurance company within 120 days of the occurrence of the injury due to his combined status as sole proprietor/owner and also the employee in this matter. The judges distinguished the facts of the case due to the fact that the claimant was a sole proprietor, owner and the only employee of his own business. The court agreed that allowing the claimant to pursue a claim, by claiming that he provided notice to himself immediately when the accident occurred, but did not bother to report the injury to the insurance company for over a year thereafter, would result in an absurdity and put the insurance company at a disadvantage in the investigation of the claim. The court also noted that the definition of “employer” in certain portions of the Act includes not only the actual employer as a business itself, but also the employer’s duly authorized agent or its insurer, if such insurer has assumed the employer’s liability. Since the claimant failed to provide notice to the insurance company within 120 days of his injury, the court held that the Claim Petition was barred. The Claim Petition was dismissed, and the claimant was not entitled to any benefits at all.
Thought Leadership
Defense Digest
On the Pulse…Recent Appellate Victories
September 30, 2026
Kimberly Berman (Fort Lauderdale) and Sontho SaintGermain (Orlando) succeeded in obtaining an affirmance by the Second District Court of Appeal of a final judgment in a slip-and-fall premises liability matter on behalf of a business establishment and property owner. The plaintiff was a business invitee who sued the property owner for negligence after she fell while riding her electric bicycle through its landscaped parking lot. During discovery, the plaintiff claimed the fall occurred while she was traversing through a section “covered heavily in leaves” though she could not identify how she fell nor whether there were any objects or foreign substances causing her fall. The property owner moved for summary judgment, asserting the accumulation of leaves on the parking lot was an open and obvious, naturally occurring condition that could not constitute a dangerous condition to impose liability on a property owner. The court granted summary judgment in the property owner’s favor. After oral argument, the Second District Court affirmed per curiam the final judgment in the property owner’s favor. Carrie Collier v. Cars MTI-4 L.P. d/b/a Lazydays RV Resort, No. 2D2025-1980 (Fla. 2d DCA May 13, 2026). Kimberly House (Philadelphia) succeeded in obtaining a victory in the Superior Court of Pennsylvania that reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case for reinstatement of the jury verdict which was originally won by Gary Samms (King of Prussia/Philadelphia). (The underlying medical malpractice case involved claims seeking more than $5 million in damages for serious eye injuries including a detached retina and macular hole.) At trial, the jury returned a defense verdict finding that the defendant’s negligence was not a cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. The trial judge granted the plaintiff’s post-trial motions and ordered a new trial solely on the issue of damages. The Superior Court found that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that causation was not disputed and that the jury’s finding of no causation was against the weight of the evidence. Busanic v. Premier Orthopaedic & Sports Medicine Physical Therapy, 2026 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1140 (Pa. Super. Apr. 28, 2026). Suzanne Tighe (Scranton/Philadelphia), Allison Krupp (Harrisburg) and Christopher Woodward (Harrisburg) succeeded in obtaining an affirmance by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania of a non-jury trial decision in favor of an insurance company. Plaintiffs asserted claims under the Pennsylvania Bad Faith Statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8371, following a statutory arbitration award in excess of the available underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage. The trial court held the plaintiffs failed to prove bad faith in the handling of the UIM claim and entered judgment in favor of the insurer. The Superior Court rejected the plaintiffs’ contentions that the trial court misapplied the applicable bad faith law, set forth in Rancosky v. Washington Nat’l Ins. Co. 170 A.3d 364 (Pa. 2017), and affirmed the trial court. The Superior Court further held that plaintiffs’ waived their requests for judgment notwithstanding verdict (JNOV) and new trial by failing to properly preserve these issues at trial and in post-trial motions. Brown v. U.S. Auto. Ass’n, 2026 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1393 (May 27, 2026). *Results do not guarantee a similar result.
Defense Digest
On the Pulse…Recent Appellate Victories*
June 30, 2026
Shane Haselbarth (Philadelphia) succeeded in obtaining summary judgment in a federal district court and an affirmance on appeal to the Third Circuit in a police shooting case resulting in a fatality. Dispatch relayed news of a 911 call for a stabbing, and two police officers approached the scene. Multiple bystanders informed them that the suspect had a gun, and the officers converged toward him. With the benefit of a body-mounted camera recording, the officers ordered the suspect to drop his gun. He did so, and the officers ordered him to step away from the gun, but the suspect inexplicably reached down and picked up the gun again. The officers held their fire and ordered him again to drop his gun—until the suspect raised his gun and aimed it in the direction of one officer and the suspect’s mother, whom the suspect had brutally stabbed (leading to the 911 call from the suspect’s terrorized sister). Since the suspect aimed his gun at his mother and/or the police officer, the officers used deadly force against him, and only did so when the suspect repeatedly raised his gun as though to shoot it. The district court held that the police officers’ conduct violated no clearly established right under the Fourth Amendment despite the suspect’s death from gunshot wounds. On appeal, the Third Circuit went further and held that the police officers’ conduct did not violate any right at all under the Fourth Amendment. Their use of deadly force, while tragic, was wholly reasonable given the facts and circumstances which they encountered on the night in question. Carol VanderWoude (Philadelphia) succeeded in obtaining reversal of a trial court’s order overruling preliminary objections as to venue. The plaintiff filed suit in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas alleging negligence for injuries sustained in a car accident. The accident occurred in Lebanon County between the plaintiff’s vehicle and a school bus driven by an employee of the defendant transportation company. The corporate defendant provided transportation services to school districts in Lebanon and Lancaster Counties, and had no clients in Philadelphia County. The trial court overruled the preliminary objections to venue, reasoning the act of transporting students into Philadelphia for approximately two-dozen field trips during the pertinent school-year satisfied the quality-quantity venue analysis. The Superior Court agreed with the arguments raised on appeal and held that the field trips simply aided in the corporate defendant’s main purpose of providing transportation services as directed by its clients located outside Philadelphia County and that those field trips were not conducted regularly enough to satisfy the quantity portion of the venue analysis. Kimberly Berman (Fort Lauderdale) and Jonathan Kanov (Fort Lauderdale) succeeded in obtaining an affirmance by the Fourth District Court of Appeal of a final judgment entered in favor of Marshall Dennehey’s clients, a law firm and managing lawyer. The law firm and lawyer issued an opinion letter on behalf of his clients as part of a commercial loan transaction for $7.5 million. After the client defaulted on the loan, the plaintiffs, sophisticated lenders, sued 20 different named defendants involved in the transaction. They sued the law firm and lawyer for negligent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty for its role in issuing the third-party opinion letter. The trial court granted summary judgment in the law firm and lawyer’s favor, finding in an arm’s length transaction, there was no duty owed to nonclients. The lender appealed, phrasing the issue as a pure legal question of an attorney’s professional responsibility: “When an attorney issues an opinion letter – (i) knowing that the letter is attendant to a transaction in which a non-client party to that transaction will necessarily rely on the letter (as a condition precedent to the transaction); and (ii) invites reliance on the letter without qualification—does that attorney owe any duty of care to the intended non-client recipient?” After oral argument, the Fourth District rejected the lender’s arguments attempting to extend a duty in these circumstances and affirmed the final judgment. Kimberly Berman (Fort Lauderdale) and Dante Rohr (Orlando) succeeded in obtaining an affirmance by the Second District Court of Appeal of a final judgment on a cross-claim for defense and indemnity in a construction defect matter for Marshall Dennehey’s client, a window and door subcontractor. The plaintiffs were residential homeowners who sued the general contractor for construction defects following the construction of their luxury home. They also sued the window and door subcontractor for negligent misrepresentation in its recommendation to install windows and doors manufactured by a German manufacturer. The general contractor filed a cross claim against the window and door subcontractor and third-party claims against the other subcontractors involved in the construction for defense and indemnification. During litigation, the case was referred to nonbinding arbitration, where the arbitrator found that the general contractor was not negligent, but that it breached the contract and warranties. The arbitrator also found there was no negligent misrepresentation on behalf of the window and door subcontractor. The arbitrator awarded the plaintiffs $3.1 million in damages. The general contractor moved for trial de novo on the cross claim and third-party claims only, accepting the $3.1 million award entered against it. Thereafter, the window and door subcontractor moved for summary judgment on the cross claim, asserting there was no obligation to defend or indemnify based on the express terms of the indemnification clause in the subcontract. The court granted summary judgment in the window and door subcontractor’s favor. After oral argument, the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the final judgment in the window and door subcontractor’s favor. Patricia McDonagh (Roseland) succeeded in obtaining an affirmance by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department, of an order granting summary judgment to Marshall Dennehey’s client, a building owner. Plaintiffs brought suit against the building owner after allegedly sustaining injuries when ceiling tiles fell onto them. The First Department held that defendant established that it was an out-of-possession landlord with no course of conduct of making repairs after the tenant assumed possession and control of the premises. The court further held that plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition and improperly made arguments for the first time on appeal. Walter Kawalec (Mt. Laurel) succeeded in obtaining an affirmance from the New Jersey Appellate Division of a directed verdict in a medical malpractice action. The plaintiff’s decedent was a patient in our client’s nursing home and suffered from dysphagia, or difficulty swallowing. As a result, he was on a mechanically soft diet along with moderate supervision by the nursing staff. Plaintiff’s nursing expert opined that this level of supervision required the nurse to be in the room or at least the doorway when the decedent ate. The decedent was fed an appropriate meal of eggs for his breakfast, but choked on the meal while the nurse was outside the room, and eventually died as a result. The Appellate Division agreed with our argument that because the plaintiff’s experts only established a breach of the standard of care, and the cause of death, but did not establish proximate causation between the breach and the decedent’s death, a directed verdict was warranted, and the case was properly dismissed. *Results do not guarantee a similar result.
