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Carly is a member of the Professional Liability Department where she focuses her practice on the defense of various professionals, public sector entities, and businesses, with respect to claims based on civil rights issues. 

Carly’s practice is particularly focused on public entity and civil rights litigation. In this role, she has achieved many favorable results. Carly has successfully defended public entities in a variety of matters from slip and falls to constitutional claims. For example, Carly obtained a win for her client in Magisterial District Court in Pennsylvania in a matter alleging civil rights violations by a Plaintiff who refused to leave government owned property.

In 2021, Carly received her juris doctor from Duquesne University School of Law with a concentration in civil and criminal litigation. During law school, Carly served as a research and teaching assistant, conducting extensive research in the fields of both civil and criminal law. Carly was also an active participant in the Veterans Clinic where she defended veterans in criminal matters at the Allegheny County Veterans Court. She also worked with incarcerated individuals at the Allegheny County Jail as a tutor.

Carly was previously a summer associate at Marshall Dennehey in 2020.  She obtained a Bachelor of Arts degree in Corporate Communications and Intercultural Engagement from Duquesne University in 2018. 

Carly is currently admitted to practice in Pennsylvania and the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.

    • Thomas R. Kline School of Law of Duquesne University (J.D., 2021)
    • Duquesne University (B.A., 2018)
    • Pennsylvania, 2021
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania, 2021
    • Allegheny County Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Defense Institute
    • Hills and Ridges Doctrine Update, Client Seminar, February 25, 2022
    • Obtained a dismissal of plaintiff’s legal and accounting malpractice claims in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff filed suit against a number of defendants as a result of tax liability stemming from a prior unrelated legal settlement. The plaintiff claimed that our attorney client was negligent in providing legal and accounting advice in regard to corrective tax filings following a legal settlement with a state entity. The plaintiff asserted claims of legal malpractice, accounting malpractice, fraud, and a host of constitutional violations. Carly sought dismissal via a number of arguments, including a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. After multiple rounds of amended pleadings and briefing, the court entered an order adopting our jurisdictional argument and dismissed the plaintiff’s latest complaint without prejudice based upon a Rule 8 violation for his failure to plead a proper jurisdictional basis. While the dismissal order was without prejudice, the running of the statute of limitations results in our client obtaining the win. 

Results

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Real Estate E&O Liability

Limiting Agent Liability in Pennsylvania: Knowledge, Reliance, and the E&O Landscape

May 7, 2026

Errors & Omissions (E&O) claims against real estate professionals in Pennsylvania frequently arise from allegations of nondisclosure or misrepresentation. However, Pennsylvania law provides meaningful guardrails for defense counsel, particularly where plaintiffs attempt to impose duties on agents that exceed statutory and common law obligations. A key principle, often dispositive at summary judgment, is that a seller’s agent does not owe an independent duty to investigate or discover latent defects. Under Pennsylvania law, a real estate agent representing a seller is not required to inspect the property for defects or to disclose conditions of which the agent has no knowledge. This principle aligns with the statutory framework governing licensee conduct, including the Real Estate Licensing and Registration Act (RELRA), which imposes duties of honesty and good faith, but does not create an affirmative obligation to uncover unknown defects. As a result, liability exposure in E&O claims often turns on whether the agent had actual knowledge of the alleged defect and whether the buyer’s reliance was justifiable. The Gordon v. McManus decision illustrates these principles in practice and remains a useful tool for defense practitioners. No. 972 EDA 2013, 2014 WL 10917627, at 3 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 30, 2014). In Gordon, the plaintiffs asserted claims for fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent inducement against real estate agents, alleging that the agents were aware of a recurring water infiltration issue and failed to disclose it. The plaintiffs further contended that the agents negligently misrepresented the condition of the property when questioned directly about potential water issues. The factual record, however, undermined these claims. The defendant agents maintained that they had no knowledge of any water infiltration problem. Critically, the plaintiffs had been informed by a neighbor that the basement had flooded on multiple occasions prior to closing. They also conducted their own inspection of the property and observed conditions – including the presence of a sump pump – that could reasonably signal potential water concerns. Despite these indicators, the plaintiffs did not pursue additional investigation or specialized inspection. The Superior Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the agents, emphasizing two key points that frequently arise in E&O defense. First, the absence of actual knowledge was fatal to the plaintiffs’ fraud claims. Without evidence that the agents knew of the defect, there could be no intentional misrepresentation or concealment. Second, and equally important, the court found that the plaintiffs’ reliance was not justifiable. Having been placed on notice of potential water issues, the plaintiffs failed to exercise reasonable diligence in investigating the condition. Pennsylvania courts have consistently held that where a buyer is aware of facts that would prompt further inquiry, reliance on generalized or informal assurances is insufficient to sustain a fraud claim. The Gordon court also disposed of the plaintiffs’ claim under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, reinforcing that such statutory claims cannot survive where the underlying fraud theory fails. For defense counsel, this linkage provides an additional pathway to narrow or eliminate exposure early in litigation. From an E&O perspective, Gordon highlights several recurring themes. Plaintiffs frequently attempt to recast nondisclosure claims as affirmative misrepresentation, particularly where there are informal communications between agents and buyers. Yet, absent proof of knowledge, these claims often collapse under scrutiny. Moreover, the decision underscores the importance of the buyer’s own conduct. Evidence that a buyer received notice of a potential defect, whether through third parties, inspection findings, or observable conditions, can significantly weaken claims of justifiable reliance. Practically, this framework offers clear guidance for both litigators and real estate professionals. For defense attorneys, early case assessment should focus on developing the evidentiary record regarding the agent’s knowledge and the buyer’s pre-closing awareness. For agents and brokers, risk mitigation remains centered on disciplined communication practices and encouraging independent inspections without offering definitive assurances about property conditions. Ultimately, while E&O claims in Pennsylvania continue to test the boundaries of agent liability, decisions like Gordon reaffirm a consistent judicial approach: liability cannot be imposed where knowledge is absent and reliance is unreasonable. In an environment where plaintiffs increasingly rely on hindsight to construct claims, these principles remain a critical line of defense.

Case Law Alerts

Pennsylvania Court Affirms No Duty for Brokers on Property Suitability Under the Real Estate Licensing and Registration Act.

April 1, 2026

In P. Perez Real Estate v. Homesale Real Estate Services, Inc., decided in December 2025, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of real estate brokers and an agent in a professional liability dispute. The plaintiffs, a real estate holding and management company, argued that the brokers owed a duty to determine whether certain commercial properties were suitable for their intended use and should have known about a local highway revitalization plan affecting the properties. The court held that the trial court properly granted summary judgment for the broker defendants, finding that under the Pennsylvania Real Estate Licensing and Registration Act, brokers are required to exercise reasonable professional skill and deal honestly in a transaction, but they do not have a statutory duty to independently investigate whether a property is appropriate for a buyer’s particular commercial purposes or specific future municipal plans. The decision reinforces limits on real estate agent liability in professional negligence claims and clarifies the scope of duties a licensed agent owes under Pennsylvania law.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.

Thought Leadership

PA Superior Court Upholds Household Vehicle Exclusion in Favor of Erie When Stacking Was Not Implicated

Key Points: A household vehicle exclusion was upheld under an Erie Policy when the estate of deceased insureds sought UIM coverage when the insureds were occupying a motorcycle owned by the insureds, but the motorcycle was not covered by Erie’s Policy. The PA Superior Court distinguished Gallagher v. GEICO, in which Gallagher, unlike the Erie insured, had recovered UM/UIM, thus rendering the "household exclusion" an impermissible waiver of stacking. Here, with no UIM recovery from any source, the issue of stacking, much less impermissible waiver of stacking, never arose. In sum, the household vehicle exclusion is a valid exclusion when stacking is not implicated. In the Pennsylvania Superior Court case of Erie Ins. Exchange v. Estate of Kennedy, 350 A.3d 219 (Pa. Super. 2025), the court upheld Erie’s denial of coverage under the household vehicle exclusion in the Erie Policy when the insureds were occupying a motorcycle not covered under the policy. Dennis and Elissa Kennedy, Erie insureds, died in a single-vehicle motorcycle accident, with Dennis driving. Dennis insured the motorcycle with Progressive, which paid its liability limits to Elissa, after which Elissa sought household stacked Erie UIM coverage. Erie denied coverage under its "household exclusion" applicable to vehicles owned by insureds, but not covered by Erie's policy. The trial court granted judgment in favor of Erie on the ground that such benefits were barred by an exclusion applicable when an insured has suffered damages while occupying a vehicle owned by a relative and not covered under the policy, i.e. the household vehicle exclusion. Finding that the exclusion was valid, the PA Superior Court affirmed. The court found the facts of the case and policy exclusion analogous to the case of Erie Ins. Exchange v. Mione, 289 A.3d 524 (Pa. 2023). In Mione, a motorcyclist was injured in an accident with another vehicle whose driver was both at fault and underinsured. The motorcyclist's insurance policy did not include UM/UIM coverage. However, the motorcyclist had two household policies covering other vehicles, including stacked UM/UIM coverage, as well a household vehicle exclusion. UM/UIM benefits were therefore denied, and the motorcyclist argued that the exclusion was invalid because it did not comport with the statutory waiver requirements of Section 1738. The PA Supreme Court rejected the argument, explaining that UM/UIM coverage could not be procured in the "first instance" under the motorcyclist's household policies as “[F]or a household vehicle exclusion to be acting as an impermissible de facto waiver of stacking, the insured must have received UM/UIM coverage under some other policy first, or else is not implicated at all.” The motorcyclist had not received any UM/UIM benefits under his own motorcycle policy, so there was nothing for the UM/UIM benefits of the household policies to "stack on" to, and as such, Section 1738 was not implicated. The court also distinguished the case from Gallagher v. Geico, 201 A.3d 131 (Pa. 2009), in which a motorcyclist was injured in an accident caused by another driver who was underinsured. The motorcyclist had purchased two policies, each of which provided stacked UM/UIM benefits. The first policy covered only the motorcycle; the second covered two automobiles, while also containing a "household exclusion," which precluded UM/UIM benefits. The PA Supreme Court held that the exclusion was invalid because the resulting waiver of UM/UIM coverage did not comport with the statutory requirements of Section 1738. The court distinguished the Kennedy’s case from Gallagher as the Kennedy’s were attempting to stack UM/UIM coverages from (a) the Progressive Motorcycle Policy under which Dennis Kennedy was the only insured, and (b) the Erie Policy under which Dennis Kennedy and Elissa J. Kennedy were the insureds. Crucially, the court found that the party from whom the right to stack UM/UIM benefits under the Erie policy was derived (Elissa J. Kennedy) was not an insured under the motorcycle policy. In other words, no one paid for Elissa J. Kennedy to receive UM/UIM benefits under the motorcycle policy, so that policy afforded her no contractual right to such coverage in the first instance. The court further reasoned that the "miscellaneous vehicle" exclusion in the Erie Policy was valid because the insured, Elissa J. Kennedy, had not first received UM/UIM coverage under Dennis Kennedy's Motorcycle Policy. In conclusion, the Court found Gallagher inapposite, and Mione compelled the affirmance of the trial court's ruling upholding Erie’s denial of coverage pursuant to the household vehicle exclusion. Christin is a Shareholder in our King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, office. She can be reached at 610-354-8279 or clkochel@mdwcg.com.

Thought Leadership

The Enforceability of Online Arbitration Agreements Remains Unresolved in Pennsylvania, But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has Provided Substantive Guidance on the Issue

Key Points: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirms that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable as collateral orders. The outcome of Chilutti II has generally left the substantive enforceability issues with browsewrap agreements unresolved in Pennsylvania. Until this issue is resolved by the Pennsylvania courts, companies operating in the Commonwealth should strive to ensure that their registration websites and/or application screens conspicuously present arbitration agreements in manners which ensure their users and consumers assent to the terms of the agreements by following the standards set forth in Chilutti I. Browsewrap agreements have been defined as agreements “‘in which a website offers terms that are disclosed only through a hyperlink and the user supposedly manifests assent to those terms simply by continuing to use the website,’ and typically do not require an electronic signature.” See, Cobb v. Tesla, Inc., 2026 WL 458470, at *1 n. 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 18, 2026) (citation omitted). They are largely regarded as the “if you keep using this, you agree to everything buried in this link” terms embedded into almost every online agreement consumers and users sign before proceeding with purchases of goods and/or services. While consumers are generally aware of them, many almost never click on the link, nor read them in their entirety. This leaves many consumers and users ignorant of the terms and impact of such agreements. However, one’s ignorance of the otherwise neatly-tucked-away terms rarely renders them unenforceable. The issue of the enforceability of browsewrap agreements has been up for debate for some time in many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Indeed, Pennsylvania had a brief grip on this issue for a period in time. Specifically, in 2023, an en banc Superior Court set forth heightened standards for companies to meet in order to secure assent and enforce browsewrap arbitration agreements. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc) (“Chilutti I”) Chilutti I involved a husband and wife who sued Uber and its subsidiaries after the wife, a wheelchair bound passenger using Uber’s rideshare service, fell, struck her head, and lost consciousness due to her uber driver failing to provide a seatbelt and making an aggressive turn during the trip. The Chilutti’s filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and its subsidiaries. In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that “the couple’s conduct on the company’s website and application — when they registered for the ridesharing service — signified that they agreed to be bound by the mandatory arbitration provision found in the hyperlinked terms and conditions.” The trial court granted the defendants’ petition and stayed the proceedings pending the results of arbitration, and the Chilutti’s appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court addressed two issues. First, it addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. A divided Superior Court determined that it did, with its basis for the holding being that the order from which the Chilutti’s appealed was a collateral order. Next, the Superior Court set out to address the merits of the Chilutti’s substantive claim. The Superior Court concluded that the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate. Its rationale was that Uber’s website and application did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to the Chiluttis. In reaching this decision, the en banc Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial, the registration process cannot be completed until the consumer is fully informed of this waiver, and, when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver appears at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. Since the ruling, Pennsylvania courts have applied Chilutti I to determine if browsewrap agreements are enforceable.  For instance, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas invoked Chilutti I to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen.  See Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (C.P. Alleg. Cnty. Mar. 24, 2025). Similarly, the Superior Court has held that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti I.” Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 348 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2025). While the issue of enforceability of browsewrap agreements appeared to have been resolved by Chilutti I, Pennsylvania courts’ grip on this issue has been slackened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s January 21, 2026, opinion in Chilutti II. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) (“Chilutti II”). Therein, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim, but rather the issue of whether the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the orders staying litigation pending arbitration. The Court ultimately vacated the en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s order from which the Chiluttis appealed did not qualify as a collateral order and, thus, the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits” of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim. As such, Chilutti II has rendered Chilutti I nonbinding, and the issue of enforceability of online arbitration agreements remains unresolved. However, in light of the fact the Supreme Court did not address or comment on the merits of the Chiluttis’ appeal, Chilutti I is still meaningful. Specifically, it provides guidance as to the standards a company should strive to meet to ensure they have obtained users’ assent so that they are able to enforce online arbitration agreements. Additionally, it may serve as persuasive authority in judges’ evaluations of petitions and/or motions to compel browsewrap arbitration agreements until this particular issue is properly put before our appellate courts. Keanna works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1174 or KASeabrooks@MDWCG.com.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.