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Defense Digest

On the Pulse…Recent Appellate Victories*

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 1, March 2024

March 1, 2024

Michael Salvati, David Wolf, Shane Haselbarth, and John Hare (all of Philadelphia, PA) won a unanimous precedential decision from the Pennsylvania Superior Court that upheld the venue transfer of a significant case from Philadelphia to Butler County under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The decision breaks a recent string of appellate reversals of venue transfers out of Philadelphia and distinguishes those contrary cases based upon the substantial record of hardship developed by Mike and Dave in the trial court. The decision also found that Mike and Dave satisfied the necessary showing of why the hardship witnesses were important to the case, a showing that was not even mandated until after Mike and Dave had built their trial court record. The decision has been reported as creating the new standard that defendants must meet to secure a venue transfer based upon forum non conveniens. Smith v. CMS W., Inc., 305 A.3d 593 (Pa. Super. 2023)

Walter Kawalec (Mount Laurel, NJ) succeeded in obtaining an affirmance by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit of a judgment as a matter of law for the firm’s client, a local school district. This was an employment discrimination case in which the plaintiffs alleged they suffered age discrimination and unlawful retaliation. The matter concerned the implementation of new rules for teachers’ evaluations. Under the new rules, certain negative performance evaluations would result in the referral of a tenure charge of inefficiency, which has the potential of resulting in the dismissal of the educator. In this case, a number of teachers who faced potential charges of inefficiency chose to resign rather than face tenure charges, as doing so precluded any negative impact on their pensions. Because those teachers resigned, they could not demonstrate that they suffered an adverse employment action, which is necessary to assert a viable discrimination cause of action. The mere fact that they received negative evaluations, without more, does not constitute adverse employment action, and their resignations precluded them from being discharged for inefficiency. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in the District Court. Goode v. Camden City School District, 2024 WL 107887 (3d Cir. Jan. 10, 2024).

Kimberly Berman, Jonathan Kanov, and Alan C. Nash (all of Fort Lauderdale, FL) succeeded in obtaining an affirmance by the Fourth District Court of Appeal of a venue order obtained by our client, a school board member. The plaintiff/petitioner/appellant, a convicted felon, had run for a seat on a school board before his rights had been restored and won the election but refused to be sworn in with the other newly elected board members. Since he failed to qualify and refused to accept the seat within 30 days, the Governor issued an executive order that declared a vacancy and appointed our client to the school board instead. The plaintiff filed a writ of quo warranto and a declaratory judgment action in Broward County, urging the trial court to void the executive order and order that the plaintiff take and hold the office of the school board immediately. The Governor and our client moved to transfer the case to Leon County based on the home venue privilege. The trial court granted the motion, and the Fourth District affirmed the nonfinal order on appeal. Velez v. DeSantis, 2023 WL 8636899 (Fla. 4th DCA Dec. 14, 2023).

Kimberly Berman (Fort Lauderdale, FL) and Andrea Diederich (Orlando, FL) obtained an affirmance by the Fifth District Court of Appeal for the firm’s client in an appeal of a nonfinal order denying the plaintiff’s motion to disqualify counsel. The plaintiff’s counsel moved to disqualify our firm and defense counsel for their communications with a post-incident treating physician employee/agent of the client’s owner during the course of a premises liability lawsuit. Our client argued there was no conflict of interest and no violation of the patient-physician privilege to communicate with a post-incident treating physician, who was also an employee/agent of our client. The trial court agreed and denied the motion. The Fifth District affirmed the denial of the nonfinal order on appeal and granted our client’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees on a provisional basis. Figueroa v. OHRI, LLC, 2024 WL 166910 (Fla. 5th DCA Jan. 16, 2024).

Carol Vanderwoude (Philadelphia, PA) and Ray Freudiger (Cincinnati, OH) and won a decision from the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed a jury verdict in favor of their client, a municipal housing authority. After written briefing and oral argument, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the jury verdict in which the appellant developer failed to prove that the housing authority discriminated against it (in violation of ADA and FHA) by refusing to apply to HUD for VASH vouchers on behalf of the developer. The developer failed to prove it asked the housing authority for VASH on behalf of disabled persons, the request was not reasonable, and the request was not necessary to enable disabled persons to enjoy their residences as non-disabled persons could.

Audrey Copeland and Judd Woytek (both of King of Prussia, PA) successfully defended the claimant’s appeal from a workers’ compensation judge’s decision (that had been affirmed by the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board), which found that the claimant’s temporary total disability benefits should be reinstated as of the date he filed his reinstatement petition based upon Protz following a pre-Protz IRE. 

*Results do not guarantee a similar result. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 1, March 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.