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Defense Digest

On the Pulse…Recent Appellate Victories*

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 1, March 2024

March 1, 2024

Michael Salvati, David Wolf, Shane Haselbarth, and John Hare (all of Philadelphia, PA) won a unanimous precedential decision from the Pennsylvania Superior Court that upheld the venue transfer of a significant case from Philadelphia to Butler County under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The decision breaks a recent string of appellate reversals of venue transfers out of Philadelphia and distinguishes those contrary cases based upon the substantial record of hardship developed by Mike and Dave in the trial court. The decision also found that Mike and Dave satisfied the necessary showing of why the hardship witnesses were important to the case, a showing that was not even mandated until after Mike and Dave had built their trial court record. The decision has been reported as creating the new standard that defendants must meet to secure a venue transfer based upon forum non conveniens. Smith v. CMS W., Inc., 305 A.3d 593 (Pa. Super. 2023)

Walter Kawalec (Mount Laurel, NJ) succeeded in obtaining an affirmance by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit of a judgment as a matter of law for the firm’s client, a local school district. This was an employment discrimination case in which the plaintiffs alleged they suffered age discrimination and unlawful retaliation. The matter concerned the implementation of new rules for teachers’ evaluations. Under the new rules, certain negative performance evaluations would result in the referral of a tenure charge of inefficiency, which has the potential of resulting in the dismissal of the educator. In this case, a number of teachers who faced potential charges of inefficiency chose to resign rather than face tenure charges, as doing so precluded any negative impact on their pensions. Because those teachers resigned, they could not demonstrate that they suffered an adverse employment action, which is necessary to assert a viable discrimination cause of action. The mere fact that they received negative evaluations, without more, does not constitute adverse employment action, and their resignations precluded them from being discharged for inefficiency. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in the District Court. Goode v. Camden City School District, 2024 WL 107887 (3d Cir. Jan. 10, 2024).

Kimberly Berman, Jonathan Kanov, and Alan C. Nash (all of Fort Lauderdale, FL) succeeded in obtaining an affirmance by the Fourth District Court of Appeal of a venue order obtained by our client, a school board member. The plaintiff/petitioner/appellant, a convicted felon, had run for a seat on a school board before his rights had been restored and won the election but refused to be sworn in with the other newly elected board members. Since he failed to qualify and refused to accept the seat within 30 days, the Governor issued an executive order that declared a vacancy and appointed our client to the school board instead. The plaintiff filed a writ of quo warranto and a declaratory judgment action in Broward County, urging the trial court to void the executive order and order that the plaintiff take and hold the office of the school board immediately. The Governor and our client moved to transfer the case to Leon County based on the home venue privilege. The trial court granted the motion, and the Fourth District affirmed the nonfinal order on appeal. Velez v. DeSantis, 2023 WL 8636899 (Fla. 4th DCA Dec. 14, 2023).

Kimberly Berman (Fort Lauderdale, FL) and Andrea Diederich (Orlando, FL) obtained an affirmance by the Fifth District Court of Appeal for the firm’s client in an appeal of a nonfinal order denying the plaintiff’s motion to disqualify counsel. The plaintiff’s counsel moved to disqualify our firm and defense counsel for their communications with a post-incident treating physician employee/agent of the client’s owner during the course of a premises liability lawsuit. Our client argued there was no conflict of interest and no violation of the patient-physician privilege to communicate with a post-incident treating physician, who was also an employee/agent of our client. The trial court agreed and denied the motion. The Fifth District affirmed the denial of the nonfinal order on appeal and granted our client’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees on a provisional basis. Figueroa v. OHRI, LLC, 2024 WL 166910 (Fla. 5th DCA Jan. 16, 2024).

Carol Vanderwoude (Philadelphia, PA) and Ray Freudiger (Cincinnati, OH) and won a decision from the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed a jury verdict in favor of their client, a municipal housing authority. After written briefing and oral argument, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the jury verdict in which the appellant developer failed to prove that the housing authority discriminated against it (in violation of ADA and FHA) by refusing to apply to HUD for VASH vouchers on behalf of the developer. The developer failed to prove it asked the housing authority for VASH on behalf of disabled persons, the request was not reasonable, and the request was not necessary to enable disabled persons to enjoy their residences as non-disabled persons could.

Audrey Copeland and Judd Woytek (both of King of Prussia, PA) successfully defended the claimant’s appeal from a workers’ compensation judge’s decision (that had been affirmed by the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board), which found that the claimant’s temporary total disability benefits should be reinstated as of the date he filed his reinstatement petition based upon Protz following a pre-Protz IRE. 

*Results do not guarantee a similar result. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 1, March 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.