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Defense Digest

On the Pulse…Recent Appellate Victories*

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 2, June 2024

June 1, 2024

Walter Kawalec (Mount Laurel, NJ) succeeded in obtaining a reversal by a panel of the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, on an interlocutory appeal. We sought review of an order granting discovery sanctions and denying reconsideration of that sanction’s order. The plaintiff claimed to have been injured in a hole in the parking lot at his work. His employer leased the location under a triple-net lease, which placed on the employer full responsibility for property maintenance and repair. The plaintiff sought in discovery to obtain tax return documents from the owner, among additional documents, which he hoped in vain would demonstrate some retained duty by the owner. When the plaintiff was dissatisfied with the answers to the discovery requests, he sought sanctions, which the trial judge granted. We successfully argued that this was an abuse of discretion (as was the denial of reconsideration) because the tax documents had to be first reviewed in camera; because we had fully answered the plaintiff’s discovery requests, although he was dissatisfied with the answers; and because the production of other documents merely needed a confidentiality agreement. The Appellate Division reversed the sanction order and remanded for further proceedings. Moore v. RE Associates, LLC, 2024 WL 1161734 (App. Div. Mar. 19, 2024)

Walter Kawalec (Mount Laurel, NJ) obtained an affirmance by a panel of the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, of the dismissal of a complaint, seeking insurance coverage for damage to an in-ground swimming pool after a storm. The plaintiffs had sought coverage for damage to their roof and the partial collapse of the pool. The carrier’s engineering inspection disclosed that the cause of the pool collapse was excessive hydrostatic pressure from the rainfall during the storm. The claim for the pool was therefore denied because the policy did not provide coverage for damage caused by ground water. The carrier paid on the claim for the roof damage in October 2020. Because the policy contained a provision requiring that suit must be brought within 12 months of the loss (although tolled during the coverage investigation), the carrier sought to dismiss the plaintiffs’ subsequent compliant, which alleged breach of contract and bad faith for the denial of the pool claim because it was brought more than 12 months after the carrier disclaimed coverage for the pool damage. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of the claim as time barred, rejecting the plaintiff’s arguments for extending the time to file the complaint. Drevs v. Metro. Pro. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2024 WL 1461740 (App. Div. Apr. 4, 2024).

Kimberly Berman (Fort Lauderdale, FL) succeeded in obtaining a per curiam affirmance in the Fifth District Court of Appeal of an order declaring the children dependent due to their father’s drug use and overdose in front of his children. Kimberly served as pro bono counsel for the statewide Guardian ad Litem program and represented the interests of the child as part of the Defending Best Interests Project. S.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 5D23-3142 (Fla. 5th DCA Feb. 1, 2024).

Kimberly Berman (Fort Lauderdale, FL) succeeded in convincing the Fifth District Court of Appeal to quash an amended discovery order to compel a church to identify church members and produce membership lists in a suit for exploitation, theft, conversion, declaratory relief, and other causes of action brought by a church member against the church. The court agreed with Kimberly’s arguments that the trial court’s order was deficient in that it failed to address the church’s claims of associational privilege under the First Amendment and that there was a disputed issue below as it related to the incorporation status of the church. St. Paul’s Catholic Church v. Hilt, 380 So.3d 1270 (Fla. 5th DCA Mar. 1, 2024).

Audrey Copeland (King of Prussia, PA) persuaded the Third Circuit to affirm the Pennsylvania district court’s grant of summary judgment as to various claims by the plaintiff, a former chief deputy sheriff, alleging retaliation and discrimination based upon sex, political beliefs and the First Amendment, in favor of our firm’s clients. Because the plaintiff failed to allege causation and to show that reconsideration was warranted, the district court’s dismissal of her First Amendment claim and denial of her motion for reconsideration were affirmed. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s disposition of the remaining claims because, even assuming the plaintiff established a prima facie case, the defendants provided a legitimate reason for her termination, which the plaintiff failed to show was pretextual. Fritz v. County of Westmoreland, et al., 2024 WL 808970 (3d Cir. Feb. 27, 2024) 

Ralph Bocchino and Shane Haselbarth (both of Philadelphia, PA) were successful in obtaining an order to move a very volatile case out of Philadelphia. This was a sexual assault case where, at first, the venue appeared prima facie good for Philadelphia until Ralph and Shane did a deep dive into the service and found one defendant (the one holding the case in the City) was never served and could not be found. As a result, the case is being transferred to Lackawanna County. Ralph and Shane were also successful in obtaining an order to move another case out of Philadelphia, in a a wrongful death and survival action that was filed in Lackawanna County for discovery before a complaint was filed in Philadelphia. The plaintiff had sustained very severe injuries in a head-on car crash with a tractor trailer that led to his death. Shane filed a motion to consolidate and transfer the case based on Rule 213, which Judge Bright of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas granted. 

Elizabeth Driscoll (New York, NY) secured a victory in the New York Appellate Division, First Department. Following oral arguments, the court unanimously affirmed the lower court’s decision, which denied a medical provider’s Article 75 petition to vacate a master arbitration award. The court held that the Supreme Court correctly denied the petition to vacate the master arbitration award, as neither the lower arbitration award nor the master arbitration award were irrational and neither contained errors of law or fact.

*Results do not guarantee a similar result. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 2, June 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.