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Defense Digest

On the Pulse…Recent Appellate Victories*

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 2025

June 1, 2025

Kimberly Berman (Fort Lauderdale, FL), Michael Bradford (Tampa, FL) and Mark McCulloch (Orlando, FL) succeeded in obtaining an affirmance in the Second District Court of Appeal of a judgment entered in favor of a peer-to-peer car-sharing service and the host/owner of a vehicle. The plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident with a guest who had rented a host’s automobile thru a peer-to-peer car-sharing platform. The plaintiff sued the guest, the host, and the peer-to-peer car-sharing company for negligence, vicarious liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, and joint venture. The trial court granted summary judgment for the host based on the Graves Amendment, which preempts vicarious liability claims against an owner of a vehicle where a person or entity is engaged in the business of renting or leasing a motor vehicle and is not alleged to have been negligent or to have had any criminal wrongdoing. The court also found there was no joint venture. After oral argument, the Second District Court agreed and affirmed the final judgment in our clients’ favor. 

Kimberly Berman and Michael Packer (both of Fort Lauderdale, FL), as local counsel for an insurance company, along with many other law firms and insurance carriers, succeeded in obtaining an affirmance in the Third District Court of Appeal of a judgment entered in favor of various insurance carriers for business interruption claims stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs (business owners) sought a determination of whether their losses during the COVID-19 pandemic were covered under the Business Interruption provision of their insurance policies. The business owners claimed the plain language of the policy provided coverage for Business Interruption expenses without requiring “direct physical loss.” The insurers moved for judgment on the pleadings, and the court granted the motion. After oral argument, the Third District Court affirmed the final judgment, finding that the policies did not provide coverage in the absence of “direct physical loss” or property damage. 

Diane Toner and Jack Yau (both of New York, NY) successfully defended against the plaintiff’s appeal in the Appellate Division, Second Department, which challenged an order that adhered to a prior ruling by the Supreme Court, Westchester County, that had granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint. In their brief, Diane and Jack argued the appeal should be dismissed due to the plaintiff’s failure to assemble a proper record on appeal. The plaintiff omitted critical documents relied upon by the motion court, including submissions supporting and opposing the defendant’s motion. At oral argument, Jack persuasively presented the case before a panel of four justices. The Appellate Division ruled in favor of the defendant and dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits. The court reaffirmed that it is the appellant’s responsibility to provide a complete record containing all relevant materials from the lower court. The plaintiff’s failure to do so, the court held, made meaningful appellate review impossible. The decision was unanimous, and no further appeal is available; thus, securing a decisive victory for our client.

In a case where an insurance broker faced claims of professional negligence, Carol VanderWoude (Philadelphia, PA) successfully defended the plaintiff’s appeal from a verdict obtained by Timothy Ventura and Dana Gittleman (both of Philadelphia, PA). The verdict against our client, an independent insurance broker, was well below the lost value of UIM coverage (i.e., $1 million), which the plaintiff sought to recover based on an alleged breach of the professional standard of care in failing to procure an endorsement for $ 1 million in UIM coverage on the plaintiff’s decedent’s commercial auto policy. The verdict is notable because, at trial, the client gave unexpected testimony which impacted liability, and when confronted with the client’s new trial testimony, our standard of care expert conceded a breach of the professional standard of care. Still, causation/damages were contested, and it was disputed at trial that the plaintiff’s decedent would have actually received $1 million in coverage. Tim elicited testimony on cross-examination of the plaintiff’s expert that showed that there was no evidence establishing that the insurer would have provided additional UIM coverage even if the endorsement had been purchased. Prior to trial, the parties entered into a stipulation stating that damages were capped at the value of the lost coverage, $1 million. Plaintiff’s counsel challenged the low verdict on various grounds, focusing on the fact that our expert conceded a breach of a standard of care based on the client’s unexpected trial testimony. He argued that, as a matter of law, the damages amount was the lost value of the coverage and the verdict should be increased to $1 million. However, the trial court agreed with our arguments, raised in opposition to the plaintiff’s post-trial motions, that the low verdict amount was supported by the record and that the plaintiff’s requests for post-trial relief were otherwise waived for various reasons. The Superior Court affirmed in a unanimous decision.

*Results do not guarantee a similar result. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.