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Defense Digest

On the Pulse…Recent Appellate Victories*

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 3, September 2025

September 1, 2025

Kimberly Berman (Fort Lauderdale, FL) succeeded in obtaining reversal of a non-final order that granted leave to amend to an estate to assert a claim for punitive damages and gross negligence against a dive captain, dive master, and the corporate-entity, dive companies. A woman drowned while scuba diving on a chartered tour, after which the toxicology report revealed high levels of illicit drugs and alcohol. During the litigation, her estate moved for leave to amend to add a claim for gross negligence and punitive damages, claiming the defendants were grossly negligent for failing to use the buddy system and for allowing the decedent to dive when they knew or should have known she was intoxicated. The estate also claimed gross negligence for the dive master allowing the decedent out of his eyesight for four to ten minutes during the dive despite having identified the decedent as requiring “special assistance.” In support of the motion, the estate relied on the police statements, deposition testimony, and an expert report. The defendants argued the evidence was insufficient to support the amendment and that none of the witnesses knew that the decedent was intoxicated before the dive. At the hearing, the trial judge noted the standard was “very liberal” and refused to consider the defendants evidentiary arguments because it “put the cart before the horse.” In granting the motion, the trial court did not make an affirmative finding that the estate had made a reasonable showing by evidence which would provide a reasonable evidentiary basis to recover punitive damages. On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed with our arguments and reversed on several grounds. The court found that: the trial court applied the wrong legal standard; the estate failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a reasonable basis for recovery of punitive damages against the dive captain and dive master; and the estate’s proposed, amended complaint did not properly allege a claim against the corporate entity defendants. Thus, the order for leave to amend was reversed. 

David Blake and Walter Kawalec (both of Mount Laurel, NJ) successfully overturned a $1.8 million judgment on appeal in a case that involved the Laidlow exclusion in a workers’ compensation/employers liability policy. The decedent succumbed to heat exhaustion while at work, and the plaintiff alleged the death was due to working conditions the employer knew were substantially certain to lead to injury. The plaintiff filed suit in the Superior Court, alleging both negligence and intentional torts. Our client, the insurer, offered to defend the employer, but only to the extent of obtaining dismissal of the workers’ compensation claim, which had been filed in the wrong forum. The insured rejected the offer, and suit for the injury and coverage claims commenced. At summary judgment, the trial court refused to apply the policy s clear and prominent Laidlow exclusion, which would have barred all coverage for claims in the Superior Court whether alleged as negligent or intentional. The trial court entered judgment in the amount of the arbitration award and awarded defense costs for the Laidlow suit, costs of the declaratory judgment action and interest. The matter went up on appeal. After briefing, but before argument, the New Jersey Supreme Court released the Rodriguez decision, which validated our client s position on application of the Laidlow exclusion and went even further to hold that the employer’s liability carrier has no obligation to provide a defense for the common law negligence claims filed in the Superior Court. The Rodriguez decision was unpublished and at the appellate level, while our case was at the trial level. The trial court refused to apply the principles enunciated by the Appellate Division in the Rodriguez decision and refused to apply the reasoning of a second unpublished appellate court decision directly on point. The trial court simply ignored the cases, reasoning they were unpublished. However, prior to oral argument in our matter, the Rodriguez decision was published, and the plaintiffs abandoned the case, settling for nuisance value. 

Kimberly House and Oswald Clark (both of Philadelphia, PA) successfully defended the plaintiffs’ appeal from a verdict obtained by Aaron Moore and Alesia Sulock (both of Philadelphia, PA) for our client in a legal malpractice claim. During the case, the trial court partially granted our motion for judgment on the pleadings, which dismissed several tort claims and a claim for unfair trade practices. The matter then proceeded to trial on the remaining breach of contract claim. The jury returned a verdict in favor of our client, and the plaintiffs appealed, challenging the rulings on the motion for judgment on the pleadings and a motion in limine that purportedly precluded the plaintiffs from introducing certain evidence. The Superior Court affirmed in a unanimous decision, holding that the plaintiffs’ tort claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that the plaintiffs' argument regarding the trial court's decision on the motion in limine was waived because they failed to properly develop the argument in their appellate brief. 

Kim Boyer-Cohen (Philadelphia, PA) convinced the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania to reverse the trial court's order that reinstated our client as a party for purposes of trial and the verdict sheet. The plaintiff, an employee of the co-defendant, brought suit after she slipped and fell during her employment. The Honorable Sean Kennedy had granted our client's motion for summary judgment and dismissed all claims and cross claims against them. Over one year later, the Honorable Linda Carpenter granted the co-defendant's motion in limine, allowing the co-defendant to present evidence against our client at trial, place our client on the verdict sheet, and essentially vacate the order granting summary judgment. The Commonwealth Court held that Judge Carpenter's order violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule and reversed the order reinstating our client as a party at trial and on the verdict sheet. 

In another matter, Kim Boyer-Cohen persuaded the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to affirm the summary judgment granted in favor of our client, a township solicitor, and the other township defendants. The plaintiffs sued the defendants for a substantive due process violation based on the defendants' alleged appropriation of a portion of the plaintiffs' property as a public road. The Third Circuit declined the plaintiffs' “invitation to constitutionalize garden-variety land-use disputes” and affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment, finding that the defendants’ conduct was a not virtual taking which shocked the conscience. 

Audrey Copeland (King of Prussia, PA) convinced the Commonwealth Court to affirm the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board in favor of our client, the employer, which upheld the workers’ compensation judge’s denial of a claim petition. By memorandum opinion, the court found that the judge’s credibility findings were neither contradictory nor arbitrary and capricious, and the decision was well reasoned. The court agreed with the employer that the defense expert’s opinions constituted substantial evidence, also noting that the Social Security Administration’s findings of disability were irrelevant to the issue of work-relatedness. The court concluded that the claimant failed to sustain her burden of proving a work-related injury, and since the causal connection between her “lingering symptoms and her work duties” was not obvious, she was required to present unequivocal medical evidence establishing that connection, which she failed to do. 

John ‘Jack’ Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias (both of Mount Laurel, NJ) successfully defended an appeal of a legal malpractice action in the New Jersey Appellate Division. The action was tried in Burlington County, New Jersey, and arose out of the plaintiff’s claims regarding our client’s settlement of underlying equitable distribution and alimony claims in connection with the plaintiff’s ownership of an ultrasound company. 

*Results do not guarantee a similar result.


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 3, September 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.