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Defense Digest

On the Pulse…Recent Appellate Victories*

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2025

December 1, 2025

Carol VanderWoude (Philadelphia, PA) convinced the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania to reverse the trial court’s denial of motions for post-trial relief and to direct entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict (jnov) in favor of Marshall Dennehey’s client. The plaintiff alleged he was injured while standing unsupported on a moving bus. He claimed that he lost his balance when the bus accelerated away from a bus stop and that he grabbed an overhead bar to keep from falling and injured his arm. The video showed only that the plaintiff lost his balance when the bus started moving. At trial, the defense moved for nonsuit and directed verdict, arguing that the evidence was insufficient, particularly in light of the video evidence, to overcome the jerk-and-jolt doctrine applicable to a passenger injured on a moving bus. Submission of a jerk-and-jolt case to a jury requires a sudden stop or jerk so unusual and extraordinary as to be beyond a passenger’s reasonable anticipation. The trial court denied our motions for nonsuit and directed verdict, as well as post-trial motions, having determined that the video evidence presented a jury question under the jerk-and-jolt doctrine. After independently reviewing the video evidence, the Commonwealth Court reversed and granted jnov to the defendant, pointing out that various of the trial court’s observations “were not supported by the video or testimony” adduced at trial. 

Carol and Aaron Moore (Wilmington, DE) obtained the Delaware Supreme Court’s affirmance of the trial court’s dismissal of a complex legal malpractice claim. The plaintiffs, seven affiliated companies and their owners in the business of developing property, had been sued by their bank for defaulting on multiple lines of credit. The bank filed multiple lawsuits against the property developers, claiming approximately $7 million in damages, plus attorneys’ fees, which were recoverable pursuant to the terms of the promissory notes. The property developers retained our client to defend the lawsuits, asserting that the amounts claimed to be owed to the bank were significantly overstated. Our client vigorously defended the bank’s underlying lawsuits. Ultimately, the property developers settled the bank’s lawsuits for the entire amount owed, plus interest, and the bank’s legal fees. The developers argued that its attorneys should have advised them to settle the bank’s claims after the lawsuits were commenced and that, if they had done so, they would not have had to pay the bank’s legal fees ($825,000), our client’s legal fees ($485,000), our expert witness fees ($335,000), or the additional interest on the loan. The property developers also claimed that not settling with the bank earlier caused them lost business opportunities valued at nearly $1 million. The plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claims were dismissed because their expert witness, a Maryland attorney with no business litigation experience, was not qualified to serve as an expert and because their damage claims were speculative.

Kimberly Berman and Matthew Wildner (both of Fort Lauderdale, FL) succeeded in obtaining an affirmance by the Fourth District Court of Appeal of a final order dismissing claims against Marshall Dennehey’s client, a professional engineer and his engineering firm, in a construction defect case in Florida. The appeal presented an issue of whether a non-supervisory engineer and his firm, who were retained by a third party to examine and inspect a contractor’s work, which third party then told the contractor to stop work, could be held liable for professional negligence. The trial court dismissed the professional negligence claims with prejudice, and without oral argument. The appellate court affirmed. 

Kimberly House (Philadelphia, PA) convinced the Pennsylvania Superior Court to dismiss the plaintiffs’ appeal of a judgment on a defense verdict for our client that was obtained by Allison Krupp (Harrisburg, PA). Our client issued a professional liability insurance policy to the plaintiffs, who were sued for legal malpractice. They notified our client of the suit and asked them to provide counsel to defend the matter. The plaintiffs never agreed to counsel proposed by our client. The plaintiffs then proceeded to mediation in the legal malpractice action and settled the matter without notifying our client. As a result, our client denied the plaintiffs’ request for indemnification. The plaintiffs brought suit for breach of contract and bad faith. In the trial handled by Allision, the jury returned a defense verdict, and the plaintiffs filed post-trial motions, which were denied. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to see a copy of the insurance contract during their deliberations. The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the plaintiffs waived their argument by failing to cite to relevant legal authority in their appellate brief. The Superior Court also stated in a footnote that, should the court have reached the issue on appeal, it would have found it meritless because the insurance contract was a central piece of evidence to which the plaintiffs did not object during trial. 

Kimberly and Scott Gemberling (both of Philadelphia, PA) successfully defended the plaintiff’s appeal of a trial court decision sustaining a preliminary objection on the ground of improper venue. In the underlying case, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas found that venue was improper in Philadelphia County and ordered that the case be transferred to Centre County, and the plaintiff appealed. The Pennsylvania Superior Court, in a precedential decision, affirmed the trial court’s decision and found that there was no abuse of discretion. In support of its decision, the Superior Court found that the plaintiff’s arguments were unsupported by Pennsylvania law. The Superior Court, in finding waiver of an issue, quoted directly from the brief prepared by Kim. 

Audrey Copeland (King of Prussia, PA) obtained the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court en banc’s affirmance of the grant of summary judgment on remand in favor of our client, which had been obtained by Patricia Monahan (Pittsburgh, PA). The court denied the plaintiff’s (a retiring police officer) claim for unjust enrichment and breach of contract regarding his pension benefits. It was the law of the case from the prior appeal that, although the plaintiff’s employment contract stated that he would be entitled to Act 600 pension benefits, he had an existing Act 15 pension pursuant to an ordinance under the Pennsylvania Municipal Retirement Law and the defendant Borough had never enacted an ordinance to establish an Act 600 pension. The Borough was not unjustly enriched by not providing the plaintiff with such a plan and, too, the Borough did not “fail” to contribute the plaintiff’s pension contributions to a pension plan. The court also upheld denial of the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. 

Audrey also persuaded the Pennsylvania Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s transfer of venue from Philadelphia County to York County obtained by her and Edward McGinn (King of Prussia, PA) for our client. The court had found that our client had no Philadelphia presence, customers, or sales and was in the business of processing and packaging canned and frozen vegetables. The Superior Court found that importing raw vegetable material through the Port of Philadelphia and the use of third-party vendors to carry out the importation and transportation was analogous to the purchase of supplies and did not meet the standard of “regularly conducting business.” Venue was also not proper merely because the defendant’s products were offered for sale in Philadelphia stores. 

Audrey and Suzanne Utke (Philadelphia, PA) obtained the dismissal of the plaintiff’s appeal of judgment in favor of Marshall Dennehey’s client as the plaintiff and his attorney failed to file post-trial motions after the defense verdict. Therefore, they had waived all issues for appeal. 

John Hare and Shane Haselbarth (both of Philadelphia, PA) conduced a successful oral argument before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania that resulted in the Court’s unanimous ruling to uphold statutory employer immunity on Pennsylvania construction sites. The six Justices who voted rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that such immunity should be overturned as antiquated and should be deemed waivable. Read more about this case in The Legal Intelligencer. 

*Results do not guarantee a similar result. 


Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.