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Defense Digest

On the Pulse…Marshall Dennehey Is Happy to Celebrate Our Recent Appellate Victories*

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 3, June 2021

June 1, 2021

*Results do not guarantee a similar result.

 

Kimberly Berman (Fort Lauderdale, FL) and Janice Merrill (Orlando, FL) succeeded in obtaining an affirmance by the Second District Court of Appeal of a directed verdict entered at trial in an action to hold Marshall Dennehey’s client, a welfare agency, vicariously liable for an alleged assault and battery by an employee who was terminated for forgery of the victim’s signature. The Second District rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that a new trial was warranted and affirmed the final judgment in favor of the defendant. Fields v. The Devereux Foundation, Inc., 2021 WL 49952 (Fla. 2d DCA Jan. 6, 2021).

Kimberly Berman and Jonathan Kanov (Fort Lauderdale, FL) succeeded in obtaining an affirmance by the Fourth District Court of Appeal of the dismissal with prejudice of Marshall Dennehey clients, a listing real estate agent and his broker, in an alleged negligence and fraud case. The Fourth District rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing their pleadings due to their attorney’s conduct and detailed how the plaintiff’s attorney dropped the ball in litigating the case, in a separate opinion reversing the plaintiffs’ attorney’s contempt conviction. Arnoul v. Perlstein, 310 So.3d 408 (Fla. 4th DCA Feb. 3, 2021).

Kimberly also succeeded in obtaining a dismissal by the Fourth District Court of Appeal of an appeal of an order denying emergency relief in Marshall Dennehey’s client’s action to foreclose a claim of lien and for damages and breach of contract against a former unit owner. The appellant attempted to revive an untimely appeal of a prior order by obtaining a new order to the same effect as the original and then filing the notice of appeal within 30 days of that most recent order. The Fourth District dismissed the appeal and granted entitlement to appellate attorney’s fees. Sawyers v. Lakeside Manor North Association, No. 4D21-225 (Fla. 4th DCA Apr. 7, 2021).

Audrey Copeland (King of Prussia, PA) persuaded the Commonwealth Court, sitting en banc, to affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant Borough, dismissing its former police chief’s claims for breach of contract and wrongful termination. The court held that civil service status is not conveyed to a police chief who is hired outside of the procedures in the Borough Code, and that the protections in Borough Code Section 1190 against removal are only available to a chief hired through the civil service noncompetitive examination and certification process in Section 1184(d). The Borough did not breach its employment contract with the chief when it eliminated the chief of police position, which effectively terminated him for other than “just cause,” because it was allowed by the contract, which provided a remedy of severance pay. Romutis v. Borough of Ellwood City, 246 A.3d 361 (Pa. Cmwlth. Feb. 10, 2021).

In another Commonwealth Court case, Audrey obtained an affirmance of the decisions of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board and judge that Section 440 of the Act only entitled the claimant to a partial reimbursement of costs incurred in litigating an expansion of his work injury. Since the judge’s decision was based solely on the employer’s credible expert witness and not the claimant’s own experts, the claimant could only recover reimbursement for the cost of employer’s expert’s deposition transcript. Pacheco v. WCAB (Nordstrom, Inc.), 2021 WL 1081434 (Pa. Cmwlth. Mar. 22, 2021).

Audrey also convinced the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s order granting judgment on the pleadings to a co-defendant construction company and dismissing as moot its joinder complaint against Marshall Dennehey’s client. The church alleged water and moisture penetration into its building for over 20 years after the construction project was completed, and that it retained a contractor and engineering firm to investigate and repair the issues. The Superior Court panel concluded the church failed to timely commence its lawsuit within 12 years of the project’s completion in accordance with the Statute of Repose, and that the statute applied because the occupancy permit constituted record evidence indicating that the defendants lawfully performed the construction. The dismissal of the church’s UTPCPL claims was also affirmed. The Evangelical Lutheran Church Of The Atonement At Wyomissing, PA Appellant v. Horst Construction, Horst Construction Company and Horst Construction Management Company, 2021 WL 870734 (Pa. Super. Mar. 9, 2021).

Audrey was also successful in obtaining the Third Circuit’s affirmance of the district court’s decision that Gallagher v. Geico (Pa. 2019) did not apply to allow a UIM claimant who waived UIM coverage on his motorcycle (insured with Progressive), to obtain UIM coverage through the back door from his automobile insurer (Mid-Century Insurance Company). The auto policy excluded UIM coverage because the motorcycle policy did not have UIM coverage. The Third Circuit explained that this case was about waiver, not stacking, and also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the number of vehicles on a policy has nothing to do with the rates. Dunleavy v Mid-Century Insurance Company, 2021 WL 1042981 (3d. Cir. Apr. 9, 2021).

 

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 3, June 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

 

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.