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Defense Digest

New York Practice: Responding to the Complaint

Key Points:

  • What initial steps should be taken when preparing an answer in New York?
  • What issues must be evaluated when preparing the answer?

This article will address the issues that should be evaluated when preparing an answer. It pertains to answers in New York State courts and, to a limited extent, answers in federal court in the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York.

When a case is first assigned, defense counsel is provided with the initial pleadings, generally the summons and complaint. These are often the only documents provided by our clients. Under New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR), litigation is commenced by the filing with the court of a summons and complaint (or summons with notice or endorsed complaint). The filing stops the running of the statute of limitations and is the official commencement of the litigation. Service of process on the defendant must be properly effectuated within 120 days of commencement of the action. (CPLR §306(b).)

The first issue that an attorney should address is the practical one: when is the answer due? CPLR §320 prescribes the time periods for when a responsive pleading must be served. This is generally 20 or 30 days from completion of service (20 days when service is by personal delivery to the defendant within New York State, 30 days all other times). Service is not always complete when the papers are delivered by the process server. This is especially so when service is effectuated through substituted service (leaving the summons and complaint with someone of suitable age and discretion with follow-up mailing CPLR §308). In such a situation, service is complete ten days after the filing of the proof of service (the summons and complaint together with an affidavit of service is known as “proof of service”) with the court. The time periods for other methods of service are provided for in CPLR Article 3 and, in the interest of brevity, will not be discussed here.

Unfortunately, clients are not always the best judge of when service was actually effectuated upon them. Therefore, it is recommended that one obtain an affidavit of service from the plaintiff’s counsel or from the documents filed with the court’s e-filing website.

Once the due date of the responsive pleading is established, one must next determine if an extension of time to respond will be required. This additional time is not always required because the attorney is unable to find the time to prepare the answer but, rather, because the attorney is experiencing difficulty making formal contact with the client for whom they will be entering an appearance in the case. Although New York is a “notice pleading” state, where specific detailed facts are not required in an answer, an answer (or other appearance) should never be filed on behalf of a client (or business entity) without obtaining their consent to your representation of them. This first contact is the initiation of the attorney-client relationship. In addition, during this initial client contact, the basic facts about the case and corporate structure, which are necessary to formulate responses to the averments in the complaint, can be obtained. Other issues, such as the proper corporate or business entity name, proper venue, jurisdiction and potential affirmative defenses, should be discussed during this initial attorney-client conference. These issues will be discussed below.

Once the question of “when” the responsive pleading is due has been determined, one must then focus on how to respond. If the case is such where a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR §3211 is appropriate, then a motion in lieu of answering should be considered after consulting with the claims professional.

The attorney must also determine if an answer will be served. If the action was commenced by the filing of a summons with notice, then an answer is not the proper response. Rather, pursuant to CPLR §3012(b), a defendant must serve a notice of appearance and demand for the complaint. The plaintiffs will thereafter have 20 days to serve the complaint. The complaint in this instance will properly be served by sending it via mail to the attorneys who have entered an appearance on behalf of the party. There will be no need for service of the complaint upon the client through typical service of process methods. (Service of interlocutory papers – CPLR §2103(b).) The answer is thereafter due 20 days from receipt of the complaint (CPLR §3012).

When litigation is commenced by either the filing of a summons and complaint or a summons and endorsed complaint, an answer is then to be served. A summons and endorsed complaint is generally responded to with a general denial answer, which must include the required affirmative defenses.

Also to be addressed are jurisdiction and venue. The attorney will need to evaluate whether the court has both subject matter jurisdiction over the case and whether the court has obtained in personam jurisdiction over the defendant.

Most cases pending in the Supreme Court of the State of New York have subject matter jurisdiction as the Supreme Court is a court of “general jurisdiction.” However, cases that are worth less than $25,000 should be transferred to the Civil Court of the State of New York pursuant to CPLR §325(d). If at any time it appears that a case is worth less than $25,000, a motion can be made pursuant to CPLR §325(d) to have the case transferred to the lower court. Such can also be done sua sponte by the court. However, when a case is transferred pursuant to 325(d), the plaintiff will not be limited to relief within the jurisdictional limits of the lower court.

In addition, when evaluating subject matter jurisdiction, the attorney should also consider the possibility of removal of the case to federal court. Generally, such is done when the federal court has subject matter jurisdiction based upon (complete) diversity of citizenship of the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. In addition, subject matter jurisdiction in the federal court can be obtained when the case involves a federal question, such as violation of a civil right or other federal law. If such is the case, a notice of removal must be timely served and filed in conjunction with the federal court answer. (28 U.S.C. §1446.) Timing of removal is critical and should, therefore, be evaluated as soon as the matter is assigned to counsel.

Personal jurisdiction over the individual defendant will be based upon either their “presence” in the state of New York (CPLR §301) or their activity, which falls under one of the provisions provided for in New York’s long-arm statute. (CPLR §302.) The second part of personal jurisdiction is dependent upon the proper service of the summons and complaint pursuant to CPLR Article 3.

Venue is generally more clear cut. Pursuant to CPLR Article 5, venue in transitory actions (most personal injury cases, including automobile cases) is properly placed in the county of residence of any party. (CPLR §503.) Residence is determined at the commencement of the litigation, and a party may be deemed to have more that one county for residence purposes. Interestingly, the CPLR does not provide for venue to be determined by the county of the site of the accident, as provided for in other states such as New Jersey. The upper right-hand corner of the summons generally sets forth the basis for the plaintiff’s choice of venue. If venue is improperly chosen by the plaintiff, a demand for change of venue must be served with the defendant’s answer. The plaintiff will thereafter have 10 days to consent to the change to a proper venue or provide an affidavit as to why their initial choice of venue was proper. If the plaintiff does neither, the defendants have five days to serve a motion seeking a change of venue. (CPLR Article 5.) These time requirements are strictly enforced, and if they are not complied with, objection to venue can be deemed waived. Therefore, defense counsel should be familiar with the requirements and time provisions set forth in Article 5 of the CPLR.

The next issue one should address is to make sure that one is appearing in the correct name of the client. Such is straightforward when you are appearing for an individual. Simply make sure that you have the proper spelling of their name when discussing the case with them during your initial conference. Oftentimes, plaintiffs misspell the defendants’ names when preparing initial pleadings. It is even more common that errors are made by plaintiffs’ counsel when naming corporate entities. It is common for plaintiffs to erroneously name a non-corporate or business entity by referring to a d/b/a, such as a hotel name or store name. A formal appearance, such as an answer to a complaint, should only be entered on behalf of an actual legal entity. It is extremely important that an answer only be served on behalf of and in the name of an actual business entity, or an individual. The client is usually the best source of information as to the formal corporate or business name. However, the New York Secretary of State (and most other states) have websites that are very useful for ascertaining official corporate/partnership/LLC names (www.dos.ny.gov/).

Once the aforementioned issues have all been addressed, it is finally time to evaluate the substantive allegations contained within the complaint. CPLR §3018 formally provides for three options for responding to allegations in a complaint. These are admit, deny, or deny knowledge or information as to the facts set forth in the complaint. However, by practice, additional responses have been extended to include a denial in the form alleged, which has the effect of a denial, but is generally used when the allegation is improperly worded, contains compound allegations or refers to more than one defendant. Another often used response is to “deny in the form alleged and refer all questions of law to the court.” This, too, has the effect of a denial. It is often used as a response to allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint in which it is alleged that the defendants had a “duty” to do a certain thing. Finally, the “deny in the form alleged but admit portions of the allegations in a specific paragraph of the complaint” is an option. This response is not used as often as it should be. It provides for a defendant to deny portions of an allegation while admitting other portions. Such a response is required in federal court answers. (FRCP 8.) A failure to respond to a specific numbered paragraph or allegation within a plaintiff’s complaint will be deemed an admission. Therefore, the attorney should be sure to do a count of all of the paragraph numbers in the answer to confirm that all allegations have been properly answered. It is suggested that, even if defense counsel intends to admit an allegation in the complaint, such not be left out of the answer. A formal admission should be included with the answer to avoid an inadvertent admission.

Once all of the allegations have been responded to, the attorney must next address the proper affirmative defenses to be included in the answer. CPLR §3018 provides for certain affirmative defenses that must be asserted in the answer or they will be deemed waived. However, there are usually additional affirmative defenses a defendant will assert in an answer. Generally, the rule is that the answer should contain any affirmative defenses to put the plaintiff “on notice” of a reason why the defendant will be claiming that they are not liable or responsible to the plaintiff. (CPLR §3018.)

A defendant in a civil action is also entitled to include in its answer a counterclaim against one or more plaintiffs. This is in essence a separate lawsuit brought by the defendant against the plaintiff seeking affirmative relief. It is generally related to the facts of the original action, but such is not a requirement. An answer to a counterclaim is required and is called a reply to counterclaim. (CPLR §§3011 and 3019.)

The answer may also contain cross-claims against co-defendants. These cross-claims are generally for contractual/common law indemnification or for contribution, but they are not limited to such. An answer to a cross-claim is not required in New York unless the cross-claim specifically demands an answer thereto. (CPLR §3011.) Good practice also suggests that an answer to cross-claims, whether required or not, should include appropriate affirmative defenses because it is a formal responsive pleading, subject to the requirements of CPLR §3018. (Siegel, New York Practice §223, 5th Edition.) In federal court, a party must serve an answer to a cross-claim within 21 days after being served with the pleading that includes the counterclaim or cross-claim. (FRCP 12.)

Finally, the defense attorney needs to evaluate if a verification is required and by whom such should be signed. A verification is a statement under oath that certifies the truth of the allegations contained in the pleadings. The rules as to verification of pleadings are found in CPLR §§3020-3023. Once a pleading is verified, all pleadings thereafter must be verified. If the complaint is not verified, it is still a good idea to file a verified answer as it will require that the plaintiff serve a verification to their bill of particulars, and that any subsequent amended pleadings be verified. Generally, the verification is signed by the attorney preparing the answer, unless the client resides or has offices in the same county where the attorney has his or her office. If such is the case, then the client or authorized representative/officer of the business entity must execute the verification. Verifications are not used in federal court pleading practice. Answers in federal court are not verified. It should be noted that in federal court answers, each paragraph is answered separately and that responses are not grouped together. Generally, a demand for trial by jury must be included in the federal court answer. If a plaintiff has not demanded a trial by jury and the defendant fails to do so, the court may deem that a trial by jury has been waived by the parties.

It is hoped that this article has addressed the basic issues that should be evaluated when preparing an answer in New York State practice.

Firm Highlights

News

106 Marshall Dennehey Attorneys Recognized in the 2027 Editions of The Best Lawyers in America® and the Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch® in America

Marshall Dennehey is proud to highlight the firm’s 106 attorneys who have been recognized in the 2027 editions of The Best Lawyers in America® and the Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch® in America. Less than 6% of all practicing lawyers in the U.S. were selected by their peers for this recognition. Additionally, four of the firm’s attorneys received the Best Lawyers® 2027 “Lawyer of the Year” awards in their respective practice areas and demographic regions. Since it was first published in 1983, Best Lawyers® has become universally regarded as the definitive guide to legal excellence. Best Lawyers lists are compiled based on an exhaustive peer-review evaluation. For more information, please visit https://www.bestlawyers.com/. OUR 2027 LAWYERS OF THE YEAR Harrisburg, PA Christopher Reeser, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Kacey Wiedt, Workers Compensation Law - Employers Roseland, NJ Justin F. Johnson, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Leonard Leicht, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants   OUR 2026 BEST LAWYERS IN AMERICA Philadelphia, PA Nicholas D. Bowers, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Josh J. T. Byrne, Professional Malpractice Law - Defendants Jefferey J. Chomko, Insurance Law James H. Cole, Insurance Law John J. Delany III, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Laurianne Falcone, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants John P. Gonzales, Employment Law - Management John Hare, Appellate Practice Daniel D. Krebbs, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Michele Punturi, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Bradley D. Remick, Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Andrea Cicero Rock, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Robin M. Romano, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Daniel J. Ryan, Jr., Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Gary M. Samms, Professional Malpractice Law - Defendants Christopher N. Santoro, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation -Defendants Josh D. Scheets, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Robert P. Schenk, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Robert E. Smith, Insurance Law Robin Snyder, Litigation - Health Care Michael L. Turner, Commercial Litigation; Criminal Defense: White-Collar; Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions - Defendants Claire Breaux Ventola, Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Pittsburgh, PA Melissa Devich Cochran, Commercial Litigation; Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants  John F. Deasy, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Daniel W. Deitrick, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Douglas C. LaSota, Litigation - Construction; Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions - Defendants Joseph V. Lesinski, Product Liability Litigation – Defendants   Christian D. Marquis, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Patricia A. Monahan, Insurance Law; Litigation - Insurance Patrick T. Reilly, Commercial Litigation; Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Brett C. Shear, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Teresa O. Sirianni, Education Law; Employment Law – Management; Litigation - Labor and Employment Stuart Sostmann, Product Liability Litigation – Defendants Danielle M. Vugrinovich, Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions - Defendants Scranton, PA Sarah E. Argo, Litigation - Insurance Michael J. Connolly, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants; Professional Malpractice Law - Defendants Matthew Keris, Litigation - Health Care; Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants John T. McGrath, Jr., Insurance Law; Medical Malpractice Law – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants William J. McPartland, Insurance Law John R. Nealon, Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Victoria Scanlon, Health Care Law; Litigation - Health Care; Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Michael A. Sebastian, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Thomas A. Specht, Insurance Law; Litigation - Insurance Suzanne Tighe, Litigation Insurance Harrisburg , PA Casey Alan Coyle, Administrative/Regulatory Law; Appellate Practice; Commercial Litigation Brittany E. Bakshi, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Shannon P. Fellin, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Allison Krupp, Insurance Law John R. Ninosky, Litigation – Insurance; Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Christopher Reeser, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Kacey Wiedt, Workers' Compensation Law – Employers King of Prussia, PA  Michael L. Detweiler, Construction Law Joseph L. Hoynoski III, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Gregory J. Kelley, Construction Law, Litigation - Construction Anthony Natale III, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Francis X. Wickersham, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers A. Judd Woytek, Workers' Compensation Law – Employers Erie, PA Patrick M. Carey, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Joel M. Snavely, Health Care Law; Insurance Law New Haven, CT Michael Wrona, Commercial Litigation, Litigation - Bankruptcy  Mount Laurel, NJ David D. Blake, Litigation - Insurance Barbara Davis, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Lynne Nahmani, Litigation - Health Care John H. Osorio, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants John L. Slimm, Legal Malpractice Law – Defendants; Professional Malpractice Law – Defendants Roseland, NJ Robert T. Evers, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Justin F. Johnson, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Julia Klubenspies, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Leonard C. Leicht, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Patricia M. McDonagh, Appellate Practice Sunny Sparano, Litigation - Construction Randall S. Watts, Health Care Law New York, NY Tonya M. Lindsey, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Tampa, FL Michael Archibald, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Lindsay G. McCormick, Litigation – Construction Orlando, FL Thomas F. Brown, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Dante C. Rohr, Commercial Litigation Fort Lauderdale, FL Kimberly Kanoff Berman, Appellate Practice Patrick M. Delong, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants Jacksonville, FL  Heather Byrer Carbone, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Linda Wagner Farrell, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Elizabeth B. Ferguson, Litigation - Construction James P. Hanratty, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants Wilmington, DE Sarah B. Cole, Litigation - Insurance Benjamin K. Durstein, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Maria R. Granaudo, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants  Keri L. Morris-Johnston, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Cincinnati, OH Timothy B. Schenkel, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants David E. Williamson, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Cleveland, OH Vincent E. Cononico, Litigation – Insurance, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Jillian L. Dinehart, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants David J. Fagnilli, Insurance Law Jason P. Ferrante, Health Care Law, Litigation - Health Care Andrew H. Isakoff, Transportation Law Leslie M. Jenny, Litigation - Health Care; Medical Malpractice Law – Defendant OUR 2026 BEST LAWYERS: ONES TO WATCH Jacksonville, FL Sean J. Reeves, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Orlando, FL Carolin A. Pacheco, Insurance Law Mount Laurel Stacey Gorin, Insurance Law Melville, NY Kimberly Gitlin, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants Matthew A. Gray, Insurance Law; Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Philadelphia, PA Holli K. Archer, Health Care Law; Medical Malpractice Law – Defendants; Professional Malpractice Law Emily Pritchyk, Commercial Litigation; Product Liability Litigation – Defendants Pittsburgh, PA Taylor E. Kosko, Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Defendants; Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Alana Staniszewski, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Michael D. Winsko, Product Liability Litigation – Defendants; Transportation Law King of Prussia, PA Richard Lechette, Commercial Litigation; Insurance Law, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

The Ohio Supreme Court Extends Sham-Affidavit Rule to Contradictory Expert Reports

Legal Roundup: Ohio In its June 23, 2026, decision in Moore v. Mercy Medical Center, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld a trial court’s decision to strike an expert witness’s affidavit that contradicted the opinions expressed in the expert’s prior report. This case pertains to allegations of medical malpractice after plaintiff Cheri Moore gave birth to an infant in respiratory distress who required intubation. Moore alleged that a delay in ordering an emergency cesarean section resulted in the need for intubation, causing her child’s injuries. Specifically, Moore sued Dr. Meniru, who completed his first shift at 7:00 a.m. on May 28, 2015, and did not resume treating Moore until 7:00 a.m. on May 29, 2015. One of Moore’s expert witnesses authored a report stating that the doctors, including Dr. Meniru, deviated from the standard of care by not advocating for a cesarean section in the evening of May 28, 2015. Based on this report, Dr. Meniru moved for summary judgment, arguing that the alleged breach occurred during a period when he was not on duty. In response to the summary judgment motion, the plaintiff filed an affidavit from the same expert. Although the expert expressly incorporated his previous report into his affidavit, he also offered an additional opinion: that Dr. Meniru breached the standard of care by failing to begin a cesarean section within 30 minutes of receiving reports of fetal distress. Dr. Meniru filed a motion to strike the expert’s affidavit, arguing that it contradicted the opinions set forth in his prior report in violation of the sham-affidavit rule. The sham-affidavit rule applies to “a contradictory affidavit that indicates only that the affiant cannot maintain a consistent story, or is willing to offer a statement solely for the purpose of defeating summary judgment”. Moore, supra, at ¶ 19, citing Pettiford v. Aggarwal, 126 Ohio St.3d 413, 2010-Ohio-3237. The trial court granted both the motion to strike and the motion for summary judgment, and the Fifth District affirmed. The Ohio Supreme Court accepted two questions of law: (1) whether the sham-affidavit rule applies when the sworn testimony contradicts prior unsworn statements; and (2) whether an inconsistency within the affidavit goes to credibility or admissibility, justifying an order striking the affidavit. Previous rulings by the Ohio Supreme Court regarding the sham-affidavit rule have pertained to contradictions between an affidavit and sworn deposition testimony. See, e.g., Byrd v. Smith, 2006- Ohio-3455, 110 Ohio St.3d 24, 850 N.E.2d 47. However, here, the Court was asked to apply the same rule to contradictions between a sworn affidavit and an unsworn expert report. The Court held that, because Moore’s expert incorporated his prior report into his affidavit, he effectively adopted the report as part of his sworn testimony.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Superior Court Reaffirms Liberal Pleading Standard in Medical Malpractice Actions

Legal Roundup: Pennsylvania The Pennsylvania Superior Court has reinforced a broader fact-pleading approach that may make it more difficult for health care defendants to obtain dismissal at the preliminary objection stage. In DaSilva v. Abington Memorial Hospital, the court held that the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint satisfied Pennsylvania’s fact‑pleading requirements despite the absence of individually named negligent actors. In DaSilva, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint alleging that Abington Memorial Hospital was directly and vicariously negligent after the patient, who was experiencing a mental health crisis, was left unattended by hospital staff, exited the emergency department, and was struck by a vehicle, suffering serious injuries. The trial court sustained the hospital’s preliminary objections and dismissed the complaint with prejudice, stating plaintiffs “failed to plead any material factual allegations in support of their claims of negligence [and] set forth vague allegations of negligence and unidentified agency.” Id. at *5. The plaintiffs appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court reversed, holding that the complaint sufficiently pled negligence and vicarious liability claims under Pa.R.C.P. 1019(a). The court concluded that allegations describing the patient’s condition, the hospital’s awareness of that condition, and the alleged failure to monitor or prevent elopement were adequate to satisfy Pennsylvania’s pleading requirements. Significantly, the court rejected the hospital’s argument that the complaint failed because it did not identify the specific employees responsible for the alleged negligence. Instead, the court found that generalized references to “emergency room staff” were sufficient to place the hospital on notice of the claims because “the names of those who performed services for the plaintiff are known to the defendant or can be ascertained during discovery.” Id. at *12 (citing Est. of Denmark ex rel. Hurst v. Williams, 117 A.3d 300, 307 (Pa. Super. 2015)). The effect of DaSilva is that plaintiffs may proceed past the pleading stage with relatively generalized allegations, particularly in cases involving institutional defendants where relevant details are uniquely within the defendant’s control. As a result, health care defendants should anticipate that challenges to claim sufficiency may be resolved in the later stages of litigation, including discovery and summary judgment.