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Alicia L. Calaf

Portrait of Alicia L. Calaf

Alicia joined the firm in 2005, and as a member of the Casualty Department, she handles high-exposure premises liability, product liability, automobile, retail, restaurant, and condominium litigation for insurance companies and large self-insured pharmaceutical companies. She also defends municipalities against personal injury actions in negligence and constitutional tort. Alicia has also defended federal cases and has argued before the New Jersey Appellate Division.

In 2014, Alicia became a shareholder of the firm. She has been named a rising star attorney by her peers every year.

Alicia graduated with honors from Lehigh University in 2001. In 2004, she graduated cum laude from Seton Hall University School of Law. Alicia was admitted to practice law in the District and State Courts of New Jersey in 2005.

Following law school, Alicia served as a law clerk to the Honorable Alexander Waugh Jr. and the Honorable Hector Rodriguez of the NJ Superior Court, Middlesex County, Civil Division.

    • Seton Hall University School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2004)
    • Lehigh University (B.A., 2001)
    • New Jersey, 2004
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2005
    • New Jersey Super Lawyer Rising Star (2009-2019)
      The Super Lawyers list is issued by Thomson Reuters. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
  • Secured a unanimous defense verdict in a premises liability matter involving a national home improvement retailer. The plaintiff alleged that she developed Complex Regional Pain Syndrome (CRPS) following a fall in the retailer's parking lot in October 2022. Plaintiff claimed that the incident necessitated significant ongoing medical treatment, including the implantation of a permanent spinal cord stimulator. The plaintiff sought substantial damages, including claims for extensive future medical care. The defense team successfully challenged the credibility of the plaintiff's allegations and expert testimony through rigorous cross-examination and the presentation of defense experts in forensic engineering, human factors, and pain management. The defense also demonstrated that the plaintiff's alleged condition was attributable to pre-existing medical issues rather than the incident at issue. Following a six-day trial, the jury deliberated for just 42 minutes before returning a unanimous verdict finding no negligence on the part of the defendant.

    Secured a no-cause verdict on behalf of a national home improvement retailer in a personal injury action. The plaintiff alleged that on May 20, 2019, she was injured at one of the retailer’s stores when an associate moved a lumber cart, causing a PVC pipe to fall and strike her head and right shoulder. She claimed permanent traumatic brain injury, concussion, and spinal injuries, supported by her orthopedic and neurologic experts. Our defense orthopedic and neurologic experts testified that the plaintiff’s reported symptoms were more consistent with malingering or a somatoform disorder. After a one-week trial and approximately 45 minutes of deliberation, the jury unanimously found the defendant was not negligent. The last demand was $1.2 million, and the final offer was $100,000.

    • "Bad Faith Litigation," Client Seminar CE Course, 2015
    • "Indemnification And Contribution: Avoiding The Expense Of An Affidavit Of Merit In Third Party Actions," Defense Digest, 2010-03, Vol. 16, No. 1
    • Studio 45 Discotheque, Inc. v. City of Union City, 2008 WL 583795 (App. Div. 2008)  

Results

Successful Representation of National Home Improvement Corporation’s Tool & Truck Rental Division

Marshall Dennehey’s trial and appellate attorneys were successful in their representation of a national home improvement retail corporation’s tool and truck rental division. Handling the case at both the trial and appellate levels, the defense was successful in convincing the New Jersey appellate court to affirm the trial court’s decision on July 23, 2024. At the trial level, the judge granted our motion for a directed verdict and dismissed the case. The plaintiff had rented a flatbed truck in 2018 to move a cabinet he had just purchased. He alleged that a store employee gave him a set of ramps to use in the truck, but while doing so, they moved and he fell, sustaining serious and permanent injury to his back. The plaintiff alleged he later returned to the store and was told that he had been given the wrong ramps. The panel said that the record included no actual evidence that the ramp did not fit the truck beyond the employee’s saying it was the wrong ramp, or that the ramp slipped because it was incompatible with the truck. Even in his testimony, the panel said the plaintiff did not actually identify any physical cause for the ramp to move. “The dearth of evidence establishing the manner and cause of the slip or slide of the ramp rendered it impossible for the jury to make a reasoned determination as to whether defendant’s purported negligence proximately caused plaintiff’s fall and injuries,” the panel said. The court, therefore, affirmed the case on appeal. 

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Superior Court Confirms RESDL Claims Are Subject to a Two-Year Statute of Repose

The Pennsylvania Superior Court recently concluded that claims under the Real Estate Seller Disclosure Law (“RESDL”) are subject to a two-year statute of repose running from the settlement date. This decision will further assist defending errors and omission claims against real estate agents as it bars any RESDL action commenced more than two years after the settlement date regardless of when the defect was discovered.  In Hollinger v. Deitrich, 2026 Pa. Super. LEXIS 328 (June 23, 2026), the buyers entered into an agreement of sale in April of 2017 to purchase a residential property. The settlement occurred in June of 2017. The buyers reviewed the seller disclosures that revealed the property had a sump pump in working order and a sump pit. The disclosures further noted no water infiltration into the basement, but disclosed rehab, an addition to the property and prior sewage backup.  Shortly after the settlement and closing, the buyers experienced flooding in their basement. In March of 2020, the buyers filed suit against the seller, the buyers’ real estate agent and broker and the seller’s real estate agent and broker alleging various causes of action including a violation of RESDL. The buyers alleged that they sought assurances from the agent defendants that no water infiltration occurred on the property. They further alleged that both agents lived in the area and should have known about the neighborhood water infiltration issues. The trial court granted summary judgment for the seller and the seller’s agents and dismissed the RESDL violation.  Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Gidor v. Mangus d/b/a Mangus Inspections, 345 A.3d 629 (Pa. 2025), the court explained that a statute of limitation begins to run from the time of the injurious occurrence or a discovery of the same. However, a statute of repose runs for a statutorily determined period after a definitively established event. Notably, a statute of repose eliminates a cause of action regardless of when the claim accrues. Because of this, a plaintiff may not invoke the discovery rule or other equitable tolling considerations.  RESDL requires that an action for damages, as a result of a violation of this chapter, must be commenced within two years after the date of final settlement. The court found that Section 7311(b) was clear and unambiguous that an action for damages pursuant to this chapter must be commenced within a certain time after a definitely established event that is independent of any injury or discovery of any injury. Since the buyers sued over two years after closing on the property, their statutory claims were time-barred. The court explained that the seller disclosure statement could not support common law or consumer protection claims, as using it would improperly expand remedies beyond the statute’s terms. Accordingly, the court upheld the trial court’s summary judgment ruling that the buyers’ claims under RESDL were barred by the statute of repose.  Accordingly, defense counsel should scrutinize complaints involving RESDL claims to ensure that such claims have been timely brought within two-years of the settlement date. A plaintiff will no longer be able to invoke the discovery roll to expand the time frame.

Thought Leadership

Not So Fast. . . The Limitations of the Pennsylvania RELRA in Plaintiffs’ Civil Actions Against Real Estate Broker and Licensee Defendants

Much has been made of the importance and weight of the Pennsylvania Real Estate Licensing and Registration Act, 63 P.S. §§ 455.101, et. seq. (RELRA or Act). After all, a real estate broker generally cannot recover any commission absent a signed agreement that complies with RELRA. But can a plaintiff rely on RELRA as a distinct cause of action in a civil action as to a real estate broker or licensee defendant? The Superior Court has emphatically held that he or she cannot. In the unpublished opinion P. Perez Real Est. Holdings, LLC et. al. v. Home Sale Real Est. Servs., Inc., et al., No. 256 MDA 2025, 2025 WL 35389888 (Pa. Super. Ct. December 10, 2025), the Superior Court held that the Act “does not contemplate private actions for money damages as an enforcement mechanism and consequently, does not create a private cause of action.” citing Schwarzwaelder v. Fox, 895 A.2d 614, 620 (Pa. Super. 2006). While the Act authorizes the Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs, State Real Estate Commission, to regulate the conduct governed by RELRA, the Act alone does not create a stand-alone legal cause of action as to a broker-defendant in a civil action. See P. Perez, citing Schwarwaelder at 620. Nor can it be stated that RELRA creates or imposes any legally cognizable duties on real estate brokers or licensees. While the Act contains and refers to general concepts of duty (e.g. the agent must “exercise reasonable professional skill and care which meets the practice standards required by this act” and “to deal honestly and in good faith” 63 P.S. §§606.1 (a)(1),(2), or the broker has a duty to the buyer of property to take “action that is consistent with the buyer’s interest in transaction.”  63 P.S. §§606.3 (1)), these general concepts are secondary to the duties imposed by the required written agreement between the broker and consumer. For example, in P. Perez, a case in which the buyers-plaintiffs argued that the real estate broker failed to investigate recent legislation that would affect buyer’s intentions to convert the property to commercial space, the agreement between buyer and broker contained the following provision in the “Buyer’s Due Diligence” clause: Buyer acknowledges that Brokers, their licensees, employees, officers or partners have not made an independent examination or determination of the structural soundness of the property, the age or condition of the components, environmental conditions, the permitted uses, nor of conditions existing in the locale where the property is situated. . . Accordingly, the broker defendants expressly disclaimed any duty to buyers to inform them or determine whether any applicable zoning classifications, laws, or ordinances in the township applied to the properties in question. Moreover, the Superior Court refused to read provisions of the Act into the Agreement, citing Skiff re Buss, Inc. v. Buckingham Review, LP, 991 A.2d 956 (Pa. Super. 2010). In defending civil actions it is important for the defense attorney to identify any causes of action predicated solely on RELRA. Preliminary objections may be warranted to the extent that the plaintiff asserts RELRA as a stand-alone cause of action for monetary damages, a position struck down by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in P. Perez.  Moreover, any attempt to create or heighten duties as to the broker defendants may be countered by the general proposition that the courts will not inject the vague concepts of “reasonable professional skill” or “good faith” where the written agreement has express provisions regarding the duties of the parties. Ironically, although RELRA is an important Act with which all realtors, brokers, and licensees should be familiar to guarantee that their commissions are in fact timely paid, it is not a strong stand-alone mechanism for a plaintiff’s attempts to recover monetary damages in a civil action.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Holds That a Claimant Who Was Struck By a Car While Crossing the Street During an Unpaid Break Was In the Course and Scope of Employment

This case involved a claim petition filed by a claimant who sustained injuries after being struck by a vehicle while crossing the street in front of the employer’s premises. The employer denied the claim based on course and scope, as the accident occurred during one of two mandatory fifteen (15) minute breaks provided to the claimant. The claimant would punch out at the beginning of a break and punch back in when the break was over.  On the date of the incident, the claimant punched out and left the building to get lunch at a restaurant, which required her to cross the employer’s parking lot, and then a public street, where the injury occurred. The Workers Compensation Judge (WCJ) dismissed the petition, noting that that during the two mandatory fifteen-minute breaks per shift allowed by the employer, the claimant was free to leave the employer’s premises, and during breaks, permitted to engage in whatever activity she desired. The WCJ found that at the time of the accident, the claimant was on her own time, in the middle of the street, and going to get lunch.   The claimant filed an appeal with the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board (Board), and the Board reversed.  According to the Board, the claimant’s location was still on the employer’s premises, as the claimant was taking her customary route while using a reasonable ingress/egress from the employer.  Further, the Board found that the “Personal Comfort Doctrine” applied, as the claimant was on a momentary departure to take care of her personal comfort, within the window of time she was allotted for her break.  The Board remanded the case, and a WCJ granted the claim petition.  The Board affirmed, and the employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. Before the Court, the employer argued that the claimant was not in the course and scope of her employment, because the injury did not occur on its premises, and the claimant was outside the bounds of the Personal Comfort Doctrine. The Court, however, rejected these arguments, and dismissed the employer’s appeal.  The Court noted that the break given to the claimant was so cursory, when she set out to relieve her hunger for her own personal comfort,  she remained in the course of her employment when she sustained her injuries.  A Petition for Allowance of Appeal in the Supreme Court has been filed by the Employer, Giant Eagle.