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Results

  • Unanimous Appellate Decision Preserves Defense Win in Legal Malpractice Suit

    We successfully defended an appeal from a jury verdict previously secured by members of our Lawyers’ Professional Liability Department in favor of the firm’s client in a legal malpractice case. The plaintiffs initially asserted multiple tort claims and a claim under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, which were dismissed by the trial court upon partial grant of the defense’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The case proceeded to trial on a remaining breach of contract claim, resulting in a defense verdict. On appeal, the plaintiffs challenged the trial court’s rulings on both the motion for judgment on the pleadings and a motion in limine related to evidentiary exclusions. The Pennsylvania Superior Court unanimously affirmed the trial court’s rulings, holding that the tort claims were time-barred and that the plaintiffs had waived their evidentiary argument by failing to properly develop it in their appellate brief.

  • Defense Verdict Secured in Legal Malpractice Case

    We won a defense verdict in a legal malpractice case arising from an underlying civil rights claim. The plaintiff was arrested in August 2015 following a physical altercation with her daughter and her daughter’s friends. The plaintiff alleged that, while she was being searched at the Philadelphia Police Detention Unit, a City employee struck her, causing her to fall into a “split” and suffer a hamstring avulsion. The defendant attorneys represented the plaintiff in a lawsuit against the City. The plaintiff was never able, during the underlying case, to identify the employee who allegedly assaulted her. She did not respond to communications from the defendant attorneys regarding the arbitration award and the appellate deadline; thus, no appeal was filed. During the legal malpractice trial, we presented evidence that the plaintiff could not have won the underlying case-within-the-case because she lacked corroborating evidence of the alleged assault. We also presented evidence that the plaintiff could not prove damages arising from the alleged injury. The court agreed and entered a defense verdict following a bench trial.

  • Defense Jury Verdict in Philadelphia on a Legal Malpractice Claim

    The plaintiffs had hired our attorney client to represent them in a property damage case against contractors and an insurance company after, as they claimed, the roof of their property was left open and water damage was sustained. The plaintiffs argued that their attorney failed to faithfully represent them and caused them to lose their claims against the contractors. After a week-long trial, we successfully proved that our attorney client did not cause the plaintiffs to lose the underlying claims, and we obtained a unanimous defense verdict in favor of the attorney defendant and his law firm. 

  • Unanimous Defense Verdict in Legal Malpractice Case

    We secured a unanimous defense verdict in a legal malpractice case stemming from underlying property damage litigation. The plaintiffs rejected a $350,000 settlement before the jury found for our client.

  • Claims against real estate agent dismissed.

    Our attorneys obtained dismissal of claims against a real estate agent arising from the agent’s representation of a buyer in connection with the purchase of a home in Philadelphia. Following the purchase of the property, the buyer discovered numerous undisclosed issues with the home and commenced suit against the seller and the seller’s agent. In turn, the seller’s agent joined our client, the buyer’s agent, alleging it was actually the buyer’s agent who should be liable on the buyer’s claims for negligence, violation of the Pennsylvania Seller’s Disclosure Law, breach of contract, negligent representation and fraud. On preliminary objections, we argued that the plaintiff’s conclusory allegations did not give rise to valid claims, that a buyer’s agent cannot be liable under the Seller’s Disclosure Law without actual knowledge of a material defect which was not disclosed, that the joinder complaint did not adequately allege that the buyer’s agent made any misrepresentations, and that there were no allegations adequate to suggest the buyer’s agent breached his statutory duties under the law. The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas agreed, sustaining the preliminary objections and dismissing the joinder complaint. 

  • Accounting Malpractice Claim Barred by Statute of Limitations

    We obtained dismissal of an accounting malpractice claim on preliminary objections in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. The plaintiffs alleged that their accountant improperly prepared their tax returns—as married filing jointly—and failed to claim business losses, that resulted in an unexpected tax liability being owed. Although the plaintiffs attempted to rely on the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations, the defense successfully argued that the plaintiffs were on notice of the alleged negligence by the time they received the prepared tax returns, and that their failure to investigate potential claims at that time was a failure to exercise due diligence as a matter of law. We further argued that because they were under a duty to investigate earlier, the plaintiffs could not successfully allege that they could not have known of their claims until they hired a tax attorney to investigate. Because the plaintiffs did not bring their negligence claim until more than two years after they received their prepared tax returns, their claims were barred by the Statute of Limitations.

  • Dismissal of All Claims Against Attorney in a Consumer Rights Lawsuit

    The plaintiff was named as a defendant in a debt collection action for failing to pay her attorney’s legal bills. Judgment was entered against her but never fully enforced. More than five years later, our client filed a Praecipe to Issue Writ of Revival and then mistakenly filed a Praecipe for Writ of Execution before the judgment was revived by the court. Although the Sheriff’s Sale of the plaintiff’s home never proceeded, she nonetheless sued our client for due process violations, abuse of process, conspiracy, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act. Most of the claims were dismissed early in the proceedings. Thereafter, we successfully argued in a summary judgment motion that the plaintiff failed to adduce evidence that our client acted in a manner to harass, oppress or abuse her, or that our client engaged in any other activity in violation of the FDCPA or FCEUA. The court agreed and dismissed the plaintiff’s remaining claims.

  • Successful Outcome in Legal Malpractice Action

    We obtained summary judgment in a legal malpractice action in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. The plaintiff, a Philadelphia police officer, was arrested after failing to appear in court following a hit-and-run car accident involving his motor vehicle. After proving that he was not the driver of the vehicle, the charges were dismissed. The plaintiff then sought damages from the township, police department and individual police officers for alleged violations of his civil rights. Our client, an attorney, represented the plaintiff in connection with responding to summary judgment and appealing the dismissal of his civil rights claims. When the dismissal of the plaintiff's claims was affirmed, he sued the attorney for alleged malpractice. We successfully argued on summary judgment that the plaintiff's claims were time-barred and failed as a matter of law because the plaintiff could not have prevailed in the underlying litigation. In fact, the plaintiff brought similar civil rights claims in three separate lawsuits, all of which failed. The court agreed, dismissing the legal malpractice claims as time-barred and further stating that, even if they were not barred by the Statute of Limitations, the plaintiff's claims failed as a matter of law because he cannot demonstrate that he would have prevailed but for something the attorney did or failed to do.

  • Successful Defense of Law Firm Against Legal Malpractice Cross Claims Emerging from Underlying Litigation

    We obtained summary judgment in a legal malpractice action in Lancaster County. We represented a law firm in the defense of legal malpractice cross-claims arising during underlying litigation. The plaintiff, an environmental consulting company, sued landowners for allegedly withholding information relevant to the clean-up of gasoline spill(s) on the landowners’ property. The landowners sued their attorneys, our clients, claiming that any liability on their part was due to malpractice committed in negotiating the contract between the landowners and the consultant. We successfully argued on summary judgment that the consulting company knew or should have known the allegedly withheld information years earlier, based largely on testimony obtained during the plaintiff’s deposition. The court agreed, dismissing not only the legal malpractice claims due to lack of causation, but also the consulting company’s claims against its former clients on the basis of the statute of limitations.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.